

BA EXAMINATION 2003

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

PHILOSOPHY

Optional subject (c): Philosophy of Mind

Friday, May 9th, 2003, 10.00 am - 1.00 pm.

Answer THREE questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. 'The facts about qualia are incompatible with a physicalist theory of consciousness.' Discuss this claim in connection with one or more of the following: the Knowledge Argument, the inverted spectrum hypothesis, the absent qualia hypothesis.
2. Does functionalism support or undermine the claim that identity relations hold between mental and physical states?
3. EITHER (a) Are bodily sensations such as pains rightly located in one's brain or in the places they are felt to be?
OR (b) Could I know about the position of someone else's limbs via bodily awareness? If not, does it follow that bodily awareness is a form of introspective self-awareness?
4. What is non-conceptual content? Do any mental states have it?
5. EITHER (a) Discuss the claim that anomalous monism renders the mental qua mental causally inefficacious.
OR (b) 'Mental causation is no more of a problem for substance dualism than it is for physicalism.' Discuss.
6. EITHER (a) What, if anything, do Twin Earth cases and/or Frege cases tell us about the nature of intentionality?
OR (b) Does intentionality require a naturalistic explanation? Can one be given?
OR (c) What, if anything, is an intentional object?
7. EITHER (a) 'Attitudes such as believing, wanting and hoping are relations between a person and a proposition.' Is this true?
OR (b) How should we understand the relationship between a belief ascription and the belief ascribed?
8. EITHER (a) Do beliefs have phenomenal characteristics?

OR (b) 'It is a mistake to think of introspection as a form of perception.' Discuss.

9. 'Assume both that externalism is true and that we are a priori authoritative with respect to our beliefs. It follows that since we have beliefs about water, we know that water exists a priori, which is absurd.' Discuss.

10. EITHER (a) Are emotions constituted by beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes?

OR (b) 'To be emotional is to be irrational.' Discuss.

11. Does behaviour count as action just in case it is intended?

12. 'The notion of supervenience doesn't really explain anything about the relation between the mental and the physical.' Discuss.

13. 'Every unconscious mental state is at least potentially conscious.' Discuss.

14. 'Though some non-human animals may possess minds, they do not possess wills.' Discuss.

END OF PAPER