

BA EXAMINATION 2002

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

PHILOSOPHY

Optional subject (c): Philosophy of Mind

Monday, 13 May 2002: 10.00 – 1.00

Answer THREE questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. What might it mean to say that mental properties supervene on physical properties? Does any version of this claim constitute an acceptable form of physicalism?
2. 'Consciousness renders the mind/body problem insoluble.' Discuss.
3. EITHER (a) 'If the type identity theory were correct, we could in principle build a device—a "Cerebroscope"—that would read off our mental states from our brain states. But this is absurd. So, the type identity theory must be false.' Discuss.

OR (b) 'Pain cannot be identified with C-fibre activity, because one can conceive of pain occurring without C-fibre activity.' Explain and assess this objection to the type identity theory.
4. 'If non-reductive physicalism is true, then mental properties can play no causal role in the production of behaviour.' Discuss.
5. EITHER (a) 'Mental states are functional states.' What does this mean? Is it true?

OR (b) 'Though functionalism provides a correct account of intentional states, it is inadequate as an account of consciousness.' Discuss.
6. In what sense, if any, is holism true of the mental?
7. 'Introspection is a form of perception.' Explain and assess this claim.

TURN OVER

8. EITHER (a) In what way can a pain be located in your toe?
OR (b) “Only I can feel my pains” is a metaphysical truth, “I can feel pains only in my body” is a contingent truth.’ Discuss.
9. Explain and assess the claim that perceptual states have non-conceptual content.
10. What, if anything, do Putnam- and Burge-style thought-experiments tell us about the nature of our minds?
11. Is the claim that the content of our thoughts depends on our environment compatible with the claim that we have immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own thoughts?
12. What is intentionality? Can it be explained naturalistically?
13. EITHER (a) Are emotions defined by the propositional attitudes that they involve?
OR (b) To what extent, if any, are emotional responses rational?
14. Is self-deception possible?
15. EITHER (a) ‘Intentional actions are actions which are intended.’ Discuss.
OR (b) Does intentional action occur as a practical mode of exercising rationality?
16. Do non-human animals possess wills?
17. In what sense, if any, are there mental images?

END OF PAPER