

**BA EXAMINATION 2003**

for Internal Students

This paper is also taken by Combined Studies Students

**PHILOSOPHY****2. Epistemology and Methodology**

Friday, May 16th, 2003, 10.00 am -1.00 pm

Answer THREE questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. How, if at all, is knowledge better than mere true belief?
2. EITHER (a) Is knowing that  $p$  a matter of tracking the truth of  $p$ ?  
OR (b) How, if at all, is it possible that I could track the truth of 'I have a hand', yet not track the truth of 'I am not a brain in vat'?  
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3. EITHER (a) Are attributions of knowledge context sensitive? What, if anything, is the relevance of this question to scepticism?  
OR (b) 'To know that  $p$ , your warrant for believing that  $p$  must exclude every not- $p$  possibility.' Discuss.
4. What, if anything, can we learn about the concept *knowledge* from a practical explanation of why we have that concept??
5. EITHER (a) 'If perception, hallucination, and illusion have no common factor, then their apparent psychological similarity becomes mysterious.' Discuss.  
OR (b) 'You see the cat on the mat just in case there is a cat on the mat and that is how it looks to you.' Discuss.
6. EITHER (a) 'Nothing can justify a belief except another belief.'  
Discuss.  
OR (b) What is epistemic rationality, and what, if any, is its relation to knowledge?

7. Do reliabilist theories of warrant entail that knowing is compatible with epistemically irrational believing, and are they unacceptable for that reason?
8. EITHER (a) 'Internalists cannot explain what gives epistemic norms their authority.' Discuss.  
OR (b) 'Externalist norms, like "Believe truly and not falsely!" cannot be followed and so are irrelevant to epistemic rationality.' Discuss.
9. Must any adequate account of scientific explanation involve reference to laws of nature?
10. EITHER (a) How, if at all, is it possible to confirm an empirical law of the form 'All Fs are G'?  
OR (b) 'The reason we are not justified in concluding that all emeralds are grue on the basis of what we have observed is that the concept grue involves essential reference to time.' Discuss.
11. Can there be a substantive justification of induction?
12. What is an epistemic virtue? Can knowing be explained as epistemically virtuous believing?
13. In what sense, if any, does empirical knowledge have a basis in sense experience?
14. EITHER (a) Must any adequate account of empirical justification involve an appeal to the a priori?  
OR (b) Is it possible to explain a priori justification without appeal to a hopelessly mysterious power of rational intuition? If so, how? If not, why not?
15. To what use can the fiction of the state of nature be put in epistemology?

**END OF PAPER**