

**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**  
**M PHIL EXAMINATIONS 2003**  
**for internal students**

**THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN**

Candidates should answer THREE of the following questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. EITHER (a) Expound and assess Wittgenstein's grounds for holding that sentences and facts can be analysed into simples.

OR (b) How important is it for Wittgenstein's project in the *Tractatus* that factual sentences can be completely analysed into elementary propositions that are logically independent of one another?

2. 'Wittgenstein's picture theory is an account of mental representation, and hence of the propositional attitudes.' Discuss.

3. What does Wittgenstein think is correct, and what incorrect, in the solipsist's use of the idea that 'The world is my world'?

4. Does Wittgenstein's appeal to the distinction between saying and showing render coherent his holding that whoever understands his propositions eventually recognizes them to be nonsense?

5. Wittgenstein says that 'Augustine describes the learning of human language ... as if the child could already think, only not yet speak.' Why does he regard this as a criticism, and how serious is it?

6. EITHER (a) What problem does Wittgenstein raise in asking 'How can a rule show me what I have to do at this point?', and how successful is his attempt to resolve it?

OR (b) Does Wittgenstein think that following a rule is an essentially social activity? In what sense is this thesis correct or incorrect?

7. What is the 'model of object and designation' which Wittgenstein criticizes in his remarks on sensation? How effective are his criticisms?

8. EITHER (a) Does Wittgenstein's treatment of rules in mathematics undermine 'the hardness of the logical must'?

OR (b) Can mathematical proof determine the sense of what is proved?

9. At one stage in his development, Wittgenstein tells us that our rule-governed responses are best considered as requiring a decision rather than a judgement. Why does he say this? Is he right?

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10. 'We are disposed to give spontaneous expression to wishes in certain circumstances' (*Investigations*, 441). Why does Wittgenstein think this is important?

11. Why does Wittgenstein think that Moore is wrong to claim that he knows he has hands?

END OF PAPER