

**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON**  
**M PHIL EXAMINATIONS 2003**  
**for internal students**

**PHILOSOPHY OF MIND**

Candidates should answer THREE of the following questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. 'Mental causation is no more a problem for dualism than it is for physicalist theories of mind.' Discuss.
2. Can the nature of phenomenal consciousness be fully explained in terms of representational content?
3. Is deciding to raise your arm an action?
4. 'Though many philosophers purport to advocate some form of non-reductive physicalism, what they in fact endorse is either a form of reductive physicalism or else no form of physicalism at all.' Discuss.
5. 'Attempts to naturalise mental content have been a resounding failure. In view of this, eliminativism about content seems like our most plausible option.' Discuss.
6. 'The nature of the mind cannot be explained in terms of the idea of interpretation, since this idea presupposes mentality.' Discuss.
7. Is anger just a propositional attitude?
8. 'There can be no science of emotion since emotions do not form a natural kind.' Explain and evaluate this claim.
9. Should a theory of concepts be a theory of concept-possession?
10. 'A reductive theory of the will is impossible.' Discuss.
11. What is non-conceptual content? Do any mental states have it?
12. 'All accounts of perception are forced to allow that perceptual experience can mislead us as to its true character. Since a disjunctivist account allows this only with respect to cases of misperception, it offers the least revisionary account.' Discuss.

END OF PAPER