

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
MPHIL EXAMINATIONS
for internal students

The Philosophy of Mind

10:00-13:00, Monday 13th May, 2002

Candidates should answer **THREE** of the following questions.

Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. Expound and assess the claim that a mental state is conscious in virtue of being the object of a higher order thought.
2. Is there any sense in which we know our own mental states a priori? Is a positive answer to this question compatible with the dependence of mental states on the environment?
3. Are actions tryings?
4. 'We explain actions in terms of beliefs and desires. Therefore, intentions and decisions play no essential role in the explanation of actions.' Discuss.
5. 'Being frightened of X essentially involves believing that X is dangerous.' Discuss.
6. How does the account we give of the relation of causation affect our account of mental causation?
7. What relationship is there between the concept of intensionality and the concept of intentionality?

8. 'Perception presents the world, it does not represent it; only a disjunctivist account can explain this fact about perception.' Discuss.

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9. Assess the claim that bodily sensation is a form of perception in which the subject is aware of just one object: their body.
10. 'All forms of physicalism are reductive in one form or another; therefore there is no such thing as a completely non-reductive physicalism.' Discuss.
11. What does it mean to say that the mental is normative? Evaluate the claim that a functionalist theory of mind cannot account for the normativity of the mental.
12. Many philosophers attempt to construct naturalistic theories of intentional content. What, if anything, makes a theory naturalistic? Is there any reason in principle why such attempts cannot succeed?

END OF PAPER