

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
M PHIL EXAMINATIONS 2003
for internal students

FREGE

Candidates should answer THREE of the following questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. Explain and assess Frege's move from his *Begriffsschrift* Theory of Identity to the 'Sense and Reference' Theory of Identity.
2. 'Far from being analytic, Hume's Principle is not even true.' Discuss.
3. (i) A thought consists of parts that mirror the structure of the sentence expressing it; and (ii) the same thought can be analysed in different ways. Does Frege hold both these views? Are they compatible?
4. Does Frege's theory of propositional attitude contexts require an infinite hierarchy of senses?
5. What special problem does the expression 'I' pose for Frege's semantic framework? Is there an adequate Fregean solution to this problem?
6. How successful is Frege in responding to Kerry's Paradox?
7. Why does Frege take a sentence to be a complex name for a truth-value? Was he right to do so?
8. 'Frege argues that thoughts are not the contents of consciousness. This makes it impossible to understand how speakers of a language can communicate their thoughts to one another.' Discuss.
9. Explain and evaluate Frege's rejection of psychologism.
10. In *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, Frege rejects a contextual definition of the concept of direction on the grounds that 'it will not, for instance, decide for us whether England is the same as the direction of the Earth's axis'. Is this a good reason to reject contextual definition?
11. Discuss Frege's conception of numbers as objects.

TURN
OVER

12. How important is it to Frege's conception of mathematics that extensions should be objects?

END OF PAPER