

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
M PHIL EXAMINATIONS 2003
for internal students

EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

Candidates should answer THREE of the following questions. Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. Is it possible to acquire knowledge by testimony in the absence of reasons for believing in the reliability of one's informant?
2. Can an inductive argument justify our belief in the reliability of induction?
3. Is there a meaningful contrast between observational and theoretical terms?
4. Do our observations up to this point confirm the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue to the same extent as the hypothesis that all emeralds are green?
5. Are incompatible scientific theories ever incommensurable?
6. What is the relationship between the explanation of a past event and the prediction of a future one?
7. Do our reasons for believing something always have to take the form of other beliefs?
8. According to Quine, even in the project of substantiating our knowledge of the external world, fear of circularity is a case of needless logical timidity. Is he right?
9. Is our belief in the physical world justified by the fact that its postulation is the best explanation of some features of our sense experience?
10. Is the coherence theory of justification compatible with the correspondence theory of truth?
11. How do I acquire knowledge of the content of my intentional states?
12. Does semantic externalism render sceptical hypotheses incoherent?

END OF PAPER