

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
MPHIL EXAMINATIONS
for internal students

Epistemology and Methodology

10:00-13:00, Tuesday 14th May, 2002

Candidates should answer **THREE** of the following questions.
Please avoid overlap in your answers.

1. Is knowledge a state of mind?
2. In what sense, if any, might I be in the same state whether I am veridically perceiving an object, having an illusion, or hallucinating?
3. Does whether somebody knows that p depend on context?
4. Does induction need a justification?
5. 'Evidence is best understood in terms of change of probability.' Discuss.
6. Can there be explanations of why something happened which are not causal explanations?
7. Is it ever sufficient for a true belief to have the status of knowledge that it has been formed by a reliable method?

PLEASE TURN OVER

8. Are there good reasons for thinking that no empirical belief can be non-inferentially justified?
9. If the contents of my beliefs are determined by external factors, can I know what I believe without investigating those factors?
10. Does acceptance of a scientific theory involve the belief that it is true?
11. If every otherwise cogent justification of the validity of modus ponens has to use modus ponens, does it follow that I cannot be justified in believing in the validity of modus ponens?
12. Can non-trivial a priori knowledge result from linguistic stipulation?
13. Can belief in the physical world be justified as the best explanation of some features of our sensory experience?

END OF PAPER