

M.A. EXAMINATION 2003

for Internal Students

PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy of Mind

Wednesday, 4 June: 10.00 - 1.00.

Answer THREE questions. Avoid overlap in your answers.

1. EITHER (a) Is the conceivability of zombies inconsistent with a physicalist view of consciousness?

OR (b) Could someone share all your physical and functional properties but lack your conscious states?
2. EITHER (a) 'Every physical effect has a physical cause. So mental states must either be epiphenomenal or physical.' Discuss.

OR (b) 'The only satisfactory version of physicalism is type-type reductionism.' Discuss.
3. EITHER (a) When Jackson's Mary comes out of the black-and-white room what knowledge, if any, does she acquire? Why does this matter philosophically?

OR (b) 'Jackson's Knowledge Argument is a bad argument for *sui generis* conscious states but a good argument for *sui generis* concepts of conscious states.' Discuss.
4. Is Fodor's commitment to there being laws of intentional psychology compatible with his commitment to the computational theory of mind?
5. EITHER (a) What does the failure of attempts to reduce the categories of everyday psychology to the categories of neuroscience tell us about the prospects of a scientific psychology or the prospects of neuroscience?

OR (b) Can the study of the brain tell us anything about people's desires, beliefs and intentions?

TURN OVER

6. EITHER (a) How defensible is Dennett's claim of the indispensability of the intentional stance?
- OR (b) 'The best explanation of the success of "intentional stance" explanations and predictions of our behaviour is that we have real desires, plans and other intentional states in our minds.' Discuss.
7. EITHER (a) 'Intentional states are propositional attitudes; sensations are not propositional attitudes; therefore sensations are not intentional.' Evaluate this argument.
- OR (b) What is the case for strong intentionalism about bodily sensation? Are there any difficulties this theory cannot overcome?
8. How should we account for the fact that we seem to be able to think about things that do not exist?
9. 'Davidson's account of what makes ascriptions of beliefs and desires to a subject true is too focused on the perspective of the interpreter and not enough on how things are with the subject.' Discuss.
10. 'Meaning is conceptual role.' Discuss.
11. What is biosemantics? Is it plausible?
12. Explain and critically discuss the claim that perception involves the presentation of the world, not the representation of it.

END OF PAPER