

**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
ARTS FACULTY
MA EXAMINATION
for Internal Students
PHILOSOPHY NEW REGULATIONS**

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Answer THREE questions.

1. 'Anomalous monism is implicitly epiphenomenalist.' Discuss.
2. Should a physicalist be a type-identity theorist?
3. What problems does consciousness pose for physicalism? How, if at all, can these problems be solved?
4. Is our grasp of mental concepts explained by our tacitly holding a true theory of the mind?
5. EITHER (a) Compare and contrast Fodor's and Dennett's views about realism concerning intentional states.

OR (b) How can the laws of psychology generalise over contentful states if they are implemented by computational processes which are sensitive only to syntactic form?
6. What role, if any, should the idea of interpretation play in a theory of mind?
7. What is a propositional attitude? Are all intentional states propositional attitudes?
8. Are bodily sensations intentional states?
9. 'Thoughts cannot be relations to intentional objects, since it is possible to think about what does not exist.' Discuss.
10. What is the thesis of internalism about intentional content? Is it true?
11. 'The only plausible naturalistic theory of content is an informational one.' Discuss.
12. 'An inferential role theory of content entails content holism; therefore it should be rejected.' Discuss.

END OF PAPER