



Cambridge International Examinations
Cambridge International General Certificate of Secondary Education

HISTORY

0470/22

Paper 2

October/November 2015

2 hours

No Additional Materials are required.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

An answer booklet is provided inside this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

This paper has two options.

Choose **one** option, and answer **all** of the questions on that topic.

Option A: 19th Century topic [p2–p5]

Option B: 20th Century topic [p6–p11]

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

The syllabus is approved for use in England, Wales and Northern Ireland as a Cambridge International Level 1/Level 2 Certificate.

This document consists of **11** printed pages, **1** blank page and **1** insert.

Option A: 19th Century topic**IN THE PERIOD UP TO 1866, WAS BISMARCK PLANNING GERMAN UNIFICATION?**

Study the Background Information and the sources carefully, and then answer **all** the questions.

Background Information

Some historians argue that Bismarck planned the unification of Germany as soon as he became Minister-President in 1862. They claim that every move he made in foreign policy was designed to bring this about. This version of events is supported by Bismarck in the memoirs he wrote in the 1890s where he showed himself as a master planner plotting German unification from the beginning and claiming that in both of the wars of 1864 and 1866 German unification was at stake.

Other historians argue that he had no master plan for German unification. They claim that his main interest was to increase the power of Prussia which he achieved by exploiting the mistakes of his enemies.

In the period up to 1866, was Bismarck planning German unification or simply planning Prussian dominance?

SOURCE A

After Denmark was defeated in 1864, Bismarck said, 'We do not desire a European war. But if it comes we shall not be among the losers.' Whoever heard this might have understood that Austria, Bismarck's ally at that moment, was to become his enemy, to be fought fearlessly and recklessly. If Germany was to be unified, it would be under Prussian, not Austrian leadership.

In a meeting of Prussian ministers and generals in May 1865 Bismarck argued that they should still try and reach a settlement with Austria. He was not trying to avoid a war with Austria. He only wanted to avoid a war at that very moment, because he was not sure of the attitude of France and Italy. Bismarck never made the mistake of underrating the strength of an enemy. He knew Austria was still a great military power. He therefore had to consider the international situation very carefully before he committed himself irrevocably.

By February 1866, in a meeting of the Prussian Crown Council, Bismarck called the war with Austria inevitable and asked for permission to conclude an alliance with Italy and to obtain guarantees from Napoleon. The King gave his permission and Bismarck's way was clear. Now war was indeed inevitable. Bismarck did not allow even a single day to pass after the conclusion of the Italian alliance before commencing the political campaign which could only end in war with Austria.

Was it Bismarck's intention at the time of the war with Denmark in 1864 to eventually make war against Austria? He certainly never had any moral objections about a war of this kind. However, he would have been willing to do without the war if he had been able to achieve his aims by normal diplomacy. Some have argued that he could not have known beforehand what concessions Austria was prepared to make in order to avoid war. But it is unlikely that Austria would have been able to save her alliance with Prussia by renouncing her claims in the Duchies. Although Bismarck was not from the beginning bent on war with Austria, he was engaged in a policy which included the eventual unification of Germany, which made war unavoidable. The mistake of the Austrian statesmen was that they did not see in time that war was indeed inevitable and that military preparations were necessary; but they cannot be criticised for having failed to avoid a war which was unavoidable.

After the war Bismarck did not seek the annexation of any Austrian territory by Prussia. He saw that it was not in Prussia's interests to make Austria an enemy in the future when he would move against France in his policy to unify Germany. He said to General Stosch, 'We shall need Austria's strength in the future for ourselves.'

From a history book published in 1950.

SOURCE B

The idea, that when Bismarck persuaded the Austrians to join Prussia in the war against Denmark in 1864 he was already looking forward to 1866 and a way of tricking Austria into declaring war on Prussia, is far fetched. If this was the aim, why not have a war right away? Because, say supporters of the legend, Bismarck needed to make sure of France. Another view seems more likely – that he hoped to persuade Austria to give up north Germany to Prussia without a fight. This is why, as late as May 1866, he was still exploring possible compromises. There was no master plan, only a clever exploitation of every lucky incident which arose on the way.

By the summer of 1865 neither Austria nor Bismarck wanted a war. Austria was almost financially bankrupt and Bismarck was not sure William I would fight a fellow German state. Over the winter of 1865–66 Prussian-Austrian relations deteriorated. In February, at a meeting of the Prussian Crown Council, Bismarck made a clear statement that if Prussia was to increase her power, war with Austria was only a matter of time. A secret alliance was made with Italy, and in April the Austrians took the aggressive step of mobilising their army. Bismarck then presented to the Diet proposals for a reform of the Confederation which would exclude Austria and increase Prussia's power. Austria persuaded the Diet to reject the proposals and to mobilise. The fighting began soon after this.

After the Prussian victory at Sadowa, Austria was at the mercy of Prussia. However, Bismarck brought the war to a speedy end. His real reason for ending the war quickly and offering the Austrians reasonable terms was that, on 4 July 1866, France had written to William I proposing an armistice. If Bismarck had refused, the consequence for Prussia would have been serious – the mobilisation of a French army on the Rhine.

From a history book published in 2001.

SOURCE C

As soon as the army shall have been brought into such a condition to command respect, then I will take the first opportunity to declare war with Austria, to split apart the German Confederation, bring the middle and smaller states into subjection and give Germany a national union under the leadership of Prussia.

From the memoirs of Count von Eckstadt published in 1886. Eckstadt is recalling what Disraeli, a British politician, stated that Bismarck said to him at a meeting in 1862. Eckstadt was the Saxon Ambassador in Britain at the time.

SOURCE D

We owe it to public opinion in the army and among the people to assert our power and influence in Germany, and not to yield to any direct attacks from the Lesser States. The notion of Austria and Prussia together must be accepted by the Confederation. The Lesser States must learn that if they attempt to subject the European policy of Austria and Prussia to the control of the Confederation they will make the continuance of friendly relations impossible for these two Powers.

From Bismarck's message to the Austrian government, 1863.

SOURCE E

If war in alliance with France against Austria is banned then a Prussian policy is no longer possible. But if war is waged against Austria it has to bring about not only the annexation of the Duchies but a new arrangement in the relations of Prussia with the German medium and small states.

Bismarck speaking in a meeting of the Prussian Crown Council, May 1865. He was replying to the Crown Prince's argument that Prussia should not fight a war against Austria.

SOURCE F

A cartoon published in France in 1866. The states being picked up include Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Schleswig and Holstein.

SOURCE G

For years I have wished for a German Cavour or Garibaldi. And overnight he has appeared in the person of the much-abused Bismarck. I bow before the genius of Bismarck, who has achieved a masterpiece of political planning and action. How marvellously the man spun all the threads of the great web. How precisely he knew how to use his king, Napoleon, his army, the government, Austria and its forces. I leave it to my stubborn colleagues from Swabia and Bavaria to abuse him. For years they have yelled for German unity, and when someone achieves the impossible by transferring German unity from a book of student songs into reality they shout 'crucify him'.

A letter by a German liberal to a fellow liberal, 19 August 1866.

Now answer **all** the following questions. You may use any of the sources to help you answer the questions, in addition to those sources which you are told to use. In answering the questions you should use your knowledge of the topic to help you interpret and evaluate the sources.

1 Study Sources A and B.

How far do these two sources agree? Explain your answer using details of the sources. [7]

2 Study Source C.

How useful is this source as evidence about Bismarck? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [8]

3 Study Sources D and E.

Does Source E prove that Bismarck was deceiving the Austrians in Source D? Explain your answer using details of the sources and your knowledge. [8]

4 Study Source F.

Why was this source published in 1866? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [8]

5 Study Source G.

Are you surprised by this source? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [7]

6 Study **all** the sources.

How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that in the period up to 1866 Bismarck was only planning to increase Prussia's strength rather than to achieve German unification? Use the sources to explain your answer. [12]

Option B: 20th Century topic**HOW FAR WERE SOVIET ACTIONS OVER BERLIN JUSTIFIED?**

Study the Background Information and the sources carefully, and then answer **all** the questions.

Background Information

One of the biggest problems facing the victorious allies after the Second World War was what to do about Germany. It was agreed at Yalta that Germany should be divided into four zones (American, French, British and Soviet). Berlin was divided in the same way. The Soviet Union wanted to keep Germany weak and wanted reparations. The Western allies wanted Germany to recover. In 1947 the British and American zones were combined to help economic development and the French zone was added later. In response the Soviets began to disrupt and restrict travel between Berlin and the allied zones in Germany.

In March 1948 the allies agreed to establish a federal system of government for the western parts of Germany and in June introduced a new German currency – the Deutsche Mark. On 24 June the Soviets blockaded all methods of surface transport between West Berlin and non-Soviet zones. They stopped supplying food to non-Soviet Berlin and cut off the electricity.

Was Soviet action over Berlin justified?

SOURCE A

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From a history book published in 1998.

SOURCE B

Although the Soviets favoured a united Germany, Stalin's main objective was the security of the Soviet Union. The first priority was to neutralise the German menace. Hence Stalin's policy of destroying Germany's economic power through reparations, which were a divisive issue from the start.

The Anglo-American strategy was driven by the fear that if Germans in the Western zone remained impoverished they would turn back to Nazism – or else to Communism. The emphasis was on reconstructing political institutions and giving Germans responsibility for their domestic affairs. Fortunately for the Western allies, Communist occupation policies in Berlin and the Soviet parts of Eastern Germany did not win over the Germans. If Stalin wanted Germany to remain united then Soviet tactics were not very sensible. From the beginning the Soviets established a Communist-led government without allied consent and set about breaking agreements made at Potsdam by extracting and dismantling whatever fell within their grasp.

And yet even by early 1947 a division of Germany was not certain – Marshall was still optimistic that whatever arrangements were made about Germany, a divided Germany would not be necessary. The real break came in the spring of 1947 at the Moscow meeting of the US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. It was clear that the British and Americans were determined to build up the West German economy while the Russians still wanted a united Germany as envisaged at Potsdam. One American official said, 'It was the Moscow Conference of 1947 which really brought down the Iron Curtain.' In 1948 the Western Allies held their own conference on Germany. They announced they had agreed 'that close co-operation should be established among themselves in all matters arising out of Marshall Aid in relation to Western Germany. Such co-operation is essential if Western Germany is to make its full contribution to European recovery.' In June plans to form a West German government were announced. On 20 June a new currency was introduced into the Western zones. The Soviets replied by cutting communications between West Berlin and the Western zones.

It is sometimes suggested that American decisions like the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan pushed Stalin from compromise to rigidity, and that European divisions were caused by America's insensitivity. But this was not so. The immediate cause of the division of Germany and Europe lies in Stalin's own errors. He squandered his advantage by uncompromising tactics. If he hoped to let Germany rot until a resentful Germany fell into his lap, he miscalculated. But Germany was at his feet. All the Soviet Union had to do was accept the Marshall Plan and convince the Germans of Moscow's good faith in seeking a neutral, independent Germany. This would have shifted the balance of advantage.

From a history book published in 1960.

SOURCE C

Meeting at White House about the Berlin Situation. When the question was discussed – do we stay in Berlin or not? – President Truman interrupted to say that there was no discussion on that point, we were going to stay. We were in Berlin by terms of an agreement and the Russians had no right to get us out by either direct or indirect pressure.

From the diary of a US official, 28 June 1948.

SOURCE D

After repeated meetings between the Western representatives and Stalin the hope was expressed that the Berlin blockade was about to be lifted. Yet the blockade continues and even air communications between the Western zones and Berlin are now under threat. The seizure of the Berlin City Hall by the Communists appears to be only a matter of time. When that happens the position of the Western powers will be far more difficult. Russia is holding the trump cards in Berlin and will only give in at a price too high for the Western powers. Besides, any bargain that one may strike with Moscow today will not be kept by Stalin.

The activities of Russia in Berlin will convince any sensible person that Moscow is trying to drive the Western Allies to a declaration of war, in which they will be branded the aggressors. The longer the Western Allies remain in Berlin as targets of constant humiliations by the Soviet power, the greater the danger of plunging Europe into another war. The Western Allies can pull out of Berlin with dignity and get back to their own zones on the excellent grounds that co-operation with Russia is no longer possible. They can then establish their military, economic and political front along their Russian border and meet the Soviets on even terms.

From an American newspaper, 12 September 1948.

SOURCE E



A cartoon published in the Soviet Union in 1949. A caption published with the cartoon said, 'Western mother hen hatching new Nazi chick'.

SOURCE F



A cartoon published in Britain, June 1948. The figure on the left is Ernest Bevin, who was in charge of British foreign policy at the time.

SOURCE G

Western currency reform is against the wishes and interests of the German people and in the interests of American, British and French capitalists. It completes the splitting of Germany and is a breach of the agreement made at Potsdam. The Western powers claim it is impossible to agree on a four-power currency reform for the whole of Germany. But this is just an excuse, the Soviet representatives took every opportunity of reaching an agreement on common currency reform. The Western capitalists are supported in their policy of splitting Germany by the big German capitalists and by those who helped Fascism to power. The introduction of two currencies in Germany will mean that trade relations will be destroyed. Trade between zones will become trade between two separate states since two different currencies will be used. Free passenger and goods traffic between the occupation zones will be destroyed.

From a speech by Marshal Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Governor of Berlin, 18 June 1948.

SOURCE H



A cartoon published in Britain, September 1948. It shows Stalin and other Soviet leaders.

Now answer **all** the following questions. You may use any of the sources to help you answer the questions, in addition to those sources which you are told to use. In answering the questions you should use your knowledge of the topic to help you interpret and evaluate the sources.

1 Study Sources A and B.

How far do these two sources agree? Explain your answer using details of the sources. [7]

2 Study Sources C and D.

Does Source C make Source D surprising? Explain your answer using details of the sources and your knowledge. [8]

3 Study Sources E and F.

How far would these two cartoonists have agreed with each other? Explain your answer using details of the sources and your knowledge. [8]

4 Study Source G.

How useful is this source as evidence about the crisis over Berlin? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [7]

5 Study Source H.

Why was this source published in 1948? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [8]

6 Study **all** the sources.

How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that Soviet actions over Berlin were justified? Use the sources to explain your answer. [12]

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