



Level 1/2 Certificate in History
SPECIMEN

HISTORY

**Modern World
Paper 3 Historical Investigation 8045/3/PM**

Pre-release SOURCE MATERIAL

Topic 4: Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1955

Why did the USA and USSR become rivals, 1945-1948?

Sources A to J for use in answering Questions 01-07

Source A A cartoon, published in *Punch* magazine on February 7, 1945. It had the title, *Trouble with Some of the Pieces*.



TROUBLE WITH SOME OF THE PIECES

Source B

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Britain's Ambassador to Moscow from 1942 to 1946, explains the Soviet reaction in 1945 to the Atomic bomb in a note written on December 3, 1945.

I should probably reach back a longish way in order to draw in the psychological background of the people upon whose minds the bomb exploded last August. For years they have been toiling after security for their country and their system. Nearly all of those who now govern Russia and mould opinion have led hunted lives since their early manhood when they were chased by the Tsarist police. Then came the immense and dangerous gamble of the Revolution. The survival of their system and the safety of themselves remained as precarious as ever. Witness the prolonged struggle that came after the death of Lenin and the years of the purges when their system was wobbling and no one of them knew today whether he would be alive tomorrow. Meanwhile, they worked by means of a kind of terror till they dragooned an idle and slipshod people without regard for its suffering into building up a machine that might promise the kind of security they rightly felt they needed.

The German invasion caught them still unready and swept them to what looked like the brink of defeat. But with the turn of the tide, as the Red Army moved westwards, belief became confidence and the final defeat of Germany made confidence conviction. Russia could from behind her powerful three hundred armed divisions stretch out her hand and take most of what she needed and perhaps more. It was an exquisite moment because this resounding success justified at last their faith in the permanence of their system.

Then came the Atomic Bomb. At a blow the balance which had now seemed set and steady was rudely shaken. The three hundred divisions were shorn of much of their value. About all this the Kremlin was silent but such was the common talk of the people. But their disappointment was tempered by the belief that their Western comrades in arms would surely share the bomb with them. That expectation was shared by the Kremlin. But as time went on and no move came from the West, disappointment turned into irritation and, when the bomb seemed to them to become an instrument of policy, into anger. It was clear that the West did not trust them. This seemed to justify and quicken all their old suspicions. It was a humiliation also and the thought of this stirred up memories of the past. We may assume that all these emotions were fully shared by the Kremlin.

[A copy was forwarded to Secretary of State, James Byrnes, at the suggestion of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevan, on December 6, 1945, in view of the forthcoming Moscow Conference commencing on December 16, 1945]

Source C

A Russian photomontage called *Hysterical War Drummer* made by Alexander Zhitomirsky in 1948. Zhitomirsky (1907-1993) worked for the Red Army during World War 2 producing *Front Illustrierte*, a newspaper dropped behind enemy lines in order to weaken their morale. The Nazis added Zhitomirsky's name to their most wanted list. After the war he continued to produce images during the Cold War period.



Source D A cartoon by Edwin Marcus for the *New York Times* published on March 14, 1948. It had the title, 'While the shadow lengthens'.




Source E A cartoon by Herb Block for the *Washington Post* published on January 26, 1949.



Source F

A painting by the artist, R. Wong, called 'The Blockade'. It was commissioned in 1997 by the USAF and German government. It was designed to show the complexities of the operation. The artist was advised by an Aviation historian. The two figures in the centre of the painting are General Lucius D Clay, US Military Governor of Germany, and William H Turner, Commander of the Combined Airlift Task Force.

On June 13, 1948 General Clay commented, '*There is no practicability in maintaining our position in Berlin and it must not be evaluated on that basis. We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent.*'



Source G

A porcelain figurine set produced by the German manufacturer, Hummel, as a memorial to the Berlin Airlift. Hummel made and sold all 25,000 sets of these in 1993. The certificate of authenticity said, 'This commemorative edition honors the Berlin Airlift – June 26, 1948 to September, 30, 1949 – an unprecedented effort to provide a vital lifeline of food and supplies to the beleaguered city of Berlin.'



Source H An advertisement produced in May 1949 for the Douglas Aircraft Company.

MILK...new weapon of Democracy!

Supplied by air transport alone, 2½ million Berliners sample a new way of life

- In today's diplomatic Battle for Berlin, hope for democracy is being kept alive for millions in Western Europe by the U. S. Air Force.

Flying Douglas aircraft almost exclusively, Yankee crews have poured over half a million tons of supplies into Berlin since last June. This impressive feat has strained to the limit our resources in air transport. *It has shown why cargo planes in sufficient numbers must be considered essential to any modern military defense program.*

Needed—and desperately—are larger, faster types of aircraft designed exclusively for air transport. And to meet this need, Douglas is now building the giant Douglas DC-6A. Able to fly 30,000 lb. loads at 300 mph, the DC-6A will make available to the military services a cargo transport of *rugged dependability*, capable of supplying world-wide bases in any kind of national emergency.

DOUGLAS

>> SERVING MANKIND AROUND THE WORLD

DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COMPANY, INC.

Source I

An interpretation of the origins of the Cold war.

5 Stalin did genuinely fear the West: the West's fear of Stalin was equally real. The Cold War was seen by each side to be the result of the other's stubbornness. Stalin had lost more than the other allies in the war, and he feared the resurrection of a united Germany. He had wanted reparations from the whole of Germany, not just his zone, and he felt that his original demands had been scaled down. He thought that Poland had been securely put in the Soviet bloc at Yalta; since he needed a loyal government there, sympathetic to him, he could not understand why the allies wished to interfere. The Americans now had the atom bomb and as far as he could see they were becoming increasingly belligerent, interfering and awkward. Nor had they kept to the spirit of Potsdam and Yalta as he remembered it. The West was alarmed by Stalin's hard line in the satellite states, by his refusal to hold democratic elections and by his twisting and turning over Poland. They saw too his huge standing army: that force that had overpowered Nazi Germany. Molotov said 'No' at every suggestion in the UN and the iron curtain had come down like a shutter from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic.

20 Some historians thought that the Cold War struggle was ideological; others saw it as a matter of power politics. But these views discount the genuine idealism of Britain, America and the liberated countries for a new world order based upon the acceptance of the universal principles of free will and thought, in which prosperity could be created by the use of science and technology, inside a system of universal government in which war and violence were unthinkable. The West was preoccupied with reconstruction; it genuinely wanted to disarm as soon as possible. But as Stalinist oppression was shamelessly revealed throughout Eastern Europe, culminating in the Czech coup of 1948, and as Molotov blocked all attempts at four-power agreement on Germany, and the Greek civil war was fought with Soviet help for the Communists, it seemed that Russia was poised to strike at the West.

Adapted from J Vaizey, *The Squandered Peace*, Hodder and Stoughton, London. 1984. pp. 64-5.

Source J

Another view of the origins of the Cold war.

Washington officials assumed that foreign policy grew directly from domestic policy; American actions abroad depended on the political, social, and economic forces at home and the economic was the most important of these forces given the Depression in the 1930s. The Depression, they thought, had
5 been prolonged and partly caused by high tariff walls and regional trading blocks which had dammed up the natural flow of foreign trade; this in turn had led to political conflicts which had ignited World War II. Free flow of exports and imports were essential.

Only the United States, quadrupling its production while other major industrial
10 nations suffered severe war-time damage, wielded the necessary economic power to establish this desired world economic community. The use of this type of power, moreover, would allow the United States and the world to de-emphasize military power and return to peace-time conditions. Washington policy-makers decided to use this gigantic economic power. Unlike the 1930s,
15 the United States would not sit on the side-lines; indeed, it could not afford to do so.

One week after Japan surrendered, Secretary of State James F Byrnes explained. 'Our international policies and our domestic policies are
20 inseparable,' he began. 'Our foreign relations inevitably affect employment in the United States. Prosperity and depression in the United States just as inevitably affect our relations with the other nations of the world.' Byrnes believed 'a durable peace cannot be built on an economic foundation of exclusive blocs... and economic warfare... [A free and open trading system]
25 imposes special responsibilities upon those who occupy a dominant position in world trade, such as the United States'. In announcing the American intention to re-order the world, he uttered a warning: 'In many countries throughout the world our political and economic creed is in conflict with ideologies which reject both our political and economic principles. To the extent that we are able to
30 manage our domestic affairs successfully, we shall win converts to our creed in every land'.

Adapted from Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-66*, (America in Crisis Series), John Wiley, London, 1967. pp. 6-7.

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