



HISTORY
ROUTE 2
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1 – THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT 1945–79

Friday 8 November 2013 (afternoon)

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer all the questions.
- The maximum mark for this examination paper is [25 marks].

Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ...; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to the Suez Crisis of 1956.


SOURCE A

Extract from **The Suez Crisis, 1956** from The Office of the Historian, United States Department of State, 2012. The authors are experts on the history of US foreign policy.

On 29 October 1956, Israeli forces moved across the border, defeated the Egyptian army in the Sinai, captured Sharm el-Sheikh and thereby guaranteed Israeli strategic control over the Straits of Tiran. Britain and France issued their ultimatum and landed troops, effectively carrying out the agreed upon operation. However, the United States and the Soviet Union responded to events by demanding a ceasefire. In a resolution before the United Nations, the United States also called for the evacuation of Israeli, French, and British forces from Egypt under the supervision of a special United Nations force. This force arrived in Egypt in mid-November. By 22 December, the last British and French troops had withdrawn from Egyptian territory, but Israel kept its troops in Gaza until 19 March 1957, when the United States finally compelled the Israeli government to withdraw its troops. The Suez conflict fundamentally altered the regional balance of power. It was a military defeat for Egypt, but Nasser's status grew in the Arab world as the defender of Arab nationalism.

SOURCE B

Cartoon by Fritz Behrendt published in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1956, depicting the situation after the Suez Crisis.



The Man at the Tap

SOURCE C

Extract from Arafat – The Biography by Tony Walker and Andrew Gowers, 2003. Tony Walker is political editor of the Australian Financial Review and Andrew Gowers was Middle East editor of the London Financial Times from 1987 to 1990. Walker and Gowers are both journalists.

International pressure forced a ceasefire at midnight on 6 November and Nasser emerged a towering hero in the Arab world. He had defied the power of Britain and France, not to mention Israel. It was a "victory" that seemed to Arafat and his colleagues could benefit the Palestinian cause, but they discovered nothing could have been further from the truth. After his triumph over the tripartite aggression, Nasser cracked down even harder on the Muslim Brotherhood and anyone else he considered a threat to public order. Student activists who had flirted with the Muslim Brotherhood were among those kept under close surveillance. The Egyptian secret police had, in any case, long been taking a close interest in Arafat's activities

SOURCE D

Extract from **The Arab–Israeli Wars** by Chaim Herzog, 2004. Chaim Herzog was president of Israel from 1983 to 1993 and was a high ranking officer in the Israeli army until 1962.

In Gaza, the withdrawal of the Israeli forces led to a period of violence in which those who had allegedly "cooperated" with the Israeli occupying forces, from November 1956 until the Israeli withdrawal in March 1957, were summarily executed. The United Nations soldiers in the Gaza Strip lost all control of the roaming fedayeen gangs, and indeed of the entire situation. Within two days of Gaza being transferred to the United Nations, Nasser had nominated a military governor for the Gaza Strip who, without asking the UN, moved in with his headquarters – the United Nations did not even complain, and this weakness sowed the seeds for future problems in the area. Within a short time, the Mayor of Gaza was dismissed and replaced by a pro-Egyptian. At the same time, the UN, under pressure from the Egyptians, ordered its forces to leave the Gaza Strip and only patrol its borders. The UN Emergency Force took up positions along the borders between Israel and Egypt, and at Sharm el-Sheikh.

SOURCE E

Extract from "Consequences of the Suez Crisis in the Arab World" by Rashid Khalidi, in **The Modern Middle East:** A **Reader** by Albert Hourani, et al, 1993. Rashid Khalidi is professor of Arab Studies at Columbia University, US, and was a personal friend of Arafat in the 1980s.

Beyond its effect on Egypt and the other direct participants, the Suez Crisis had a profound effect on the rest of the Arab world ... Suez firmly established Nasser as the pre-eminent Arab leader until the end of his life, and Arab nationalism as the leading Arab ideology for at least that long. Suez also ended the dominant influence over the Arab world which Britain and France had sometimes shared and sometimes disputed for over a century ... Arab leaders ceased paying attention to London and Paris, turning to Cairo, Washington, and Moscow. Finally, because it involved Israel in open collaboration with the old imperial powers and in an invasion of the territory of an existing Arab state, the Suez Crisis established an image of Israel in the Arab world, and a pattern of conflict with it, that had an impact perhaps as important as the 1948 war.

8813-5331 **Turn over**

- 1. (a) What, according to Source C, were the immediate consequences of the Suez Crisis? [3 marks]
 - (b) What is the message conveyed by Source B?

[2 marks]

2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources A and E about the Suez Crisis of 1956.

[6 marks]

3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source C and Source D for historians studying the Suez Crisis of 1956.

[6 marks]

4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, analyse the consequences of the Suez Crisis for the countries involved up to the end of 1959.

[8 marks]