



HISTORY HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL PAPER 1

Monday 10 November 2008 (afternoon)

1 hour

SOURCE BOOKLET

SOURCE BOOKLET - INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- This booklet contains all of the sources required for Paper 1.

Section A page 2

Section B page 5

Section C page 8

Sources in this booklet have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ...; minor changes are not indicated.

SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1 The USSR under Stalin, 1924 to 1941

These sources relate to the extent of Stalin's power in the 1930s.

SOURCE A Extract from **Parallel Lives – Hitler and Stalin** by Alan Bullock, London, 1993.

In the Soviet Union ... the Communist Party had taken over the government. After 17 years not only the state administration but the economy, industry, agriculture and the armed forces all operated under the direct leadership of the Party. The centre of power was not the Council of People's Commissars but the Politburo (the main decision making body of the Party), whose members reappeared in the Council as chairman, deputy chairman and commissars in order to ensure that policies decided by the Politburo were carried out by the administration. Nothing made this clearer than the fact that the most powerful man in Russia was neither head of state, head of government nor even a member of the Council of Commissars but was content to exercise his power in the post of general secretary and as a member of the Politburo.

SOURCE B Extract from **Stalinism** by Graeme Gill, London, 1998.

While this purge [1933–1934] did aim at general housekeeping tasks within the Communist Party, it is mistaken to argue that it did not also aim at eliminating enemies within Party ranks. It is clear that in the central leaders' minds, at least part of the administrative sloppiness was due to the activities of those in the Party who were opposed to the Party and its policies. The purge's inability to rid the Party of enemies is reflected in subsequent Party policy. Particularly important were the campaigns for the verification of Party documents in 1935 and the exchange of Party cards in 1936. Like the earlier purge, both campaigns were directed in part at improving the Party's administrative procedures, but in their intent and implementation they were directed at those who did not obey directions from the centre. These were seen as enemies, seeking to subvert Party policy. The assumption that enemies of the Party and the regime could be found inside the Party was an important element which facilitated the outbreak of the great terror and the application of it to the Party.

SOURCE C

Extract from **History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,** authorised by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1939.

In 1937 new facts came to light during the trials [of Pyatakov and others] which showed that these dregs of humanity, in conjunction [together] with the enemies of the people had been in conspiracy against the Communist Party and the Soviet State ever since the early days of the October socialist revolution ... the vile assassination of Kirov, the acts of wrecking and explosions ... all these and similar villainies [crimes] ... were committed under the direction of Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev at the behest [request] of espionage services of bourgeois states.

They had set out to destroy the Party and the State, to undermine the defensive power of the country ... to prepare the way for the defeat of the Red Army and to bring about the dismemberment [tearing apart] of the USSR and restore capitalist slavery to the USSR.

SOURCE D

A photograph of Stalin carrying Kirov's coffin at his funeral in 1934. Published in **Russia and the USSR 1905–1956** by John Laver, London, 1985.



SOURCE E Extract from **The European Dictatorships, Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini** by Allan Todd, Cambridge, 2002.

Although Stalin had defeated the Left, the United and the Right Oppositions by 1929, dissent still existed within the Communist Party. Signs of this became apparent during the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930 and on several occasions in the years 1930–34 when Stalin found he could not always get his policies adopted. This undercurrent of dissent, which involved most important leaders of the Politburo and Central Committee, led Stalin to fear that he might be replaced, especially as his old opponents and defeated rivals were still around. While this opposition was not open, Stalin came to feel that in order to maintain the Party's (and his own) power, drastic action was required.

A more serious indication of the extent of opposition to aspects of Stalin's policies came in 1932 when Ryutin, a Rightist and a senior figure in the Party, wrote a document calling for the end of forced collectivization, the rehabilitation [restoration of the reputation] of the defeated oppositionists (including Trotsky) and the dismissal of Stalin.

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SECTION B

Prescribed Subject 2 The emergence and development of the People's Republic of China (PRC), 1946 to 1964

These sources relate to the political consolidation of China after 1949.

SOURCE A

Extract from an essay by Mao Zedong "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", in commemoration of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Communist Party of China, 1949.

URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4 65.htm

Our twenty-eight years have been quite different. We have had much valuable experience. A well-disciplined Communist Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party; a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a Party – these are the three main weapons with which we have defeated the enemy. They distinguish us from our predecessors. Relying on them, we have won basic victory ... Whenever we made serious mistakes on these three matters, the revolution suffered setbacks. Taught by mistakes and setbacks, we have become wiser and handle our affairs better. It is hard for any political party or person to avoid mistakes, but we should make as few as possible. Once a mistake is made, we should correct it, and the more quickly and thoroughly the better.

To sum up our experience and concentrate it into one point, it is the people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the working class (through the Communist Party) and based upon the alliance of workers and peasants ... This is our formula, our principal experience, our main programme.

SOURCE B

Extract from "The Common Program of The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 1949", adopted by the First Plenary Session on September 29 1949 in Beijing.

URL: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1949-ccp-program.html

Article 1. The People's Republic of China is a New Democratic or a People's Democratic state. It carries out the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class, based on the alliance of workers and peasants, and uniting all democratic classes and all nationalities in China. It opposes imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism and strives for independence, democracy, peace, unity, prosperity and strength of China.

. . .


Article 4. The people of the People's Republic of China shall have the right to elect and to be elected according to law.

. . .

Article 5. The people of the People's Republic of China shall have freedom of thought, speech, publication, assembly, association, correspondence, person, domicile [residence], change of domicile, religious belief and the freedom of holding processions and demonstrations.

SOURCE C

Table from A Short History of Chinese Communism by Franklin Houn, New Jersey, 1973. The table shows the structural organization of the Chinese Communist Party.



Formation (by election or appointment)____

Control_____

SOURCE D Extract from **Mao's China and After** by Maurice Meisner, New York, 1999.

"Democracy", as the term was used in Maoist China at the time, meant bourgeois democracy in the conventional sense. The people were, according to Mao, to "enjoy the freedoms of speech, assembly, association"; they were to have the right to vote and they were to "elect their own government," a government, in turn, which was to exercise a dictatorship over the reactionaries who fell outside the ranks of the people. Whether the promise of these elementary democratic rights was to be honored is a question to be taken up later – in light of the actual political practice of the new state.

SOURCE E Extract from **China's Path to Modernization** by Ranbir Vohra, New Jersey, 2000.

In 1949 the local party organs expanded as the People's Liberation Army advanced through the country. The most important of these organs were the six bureaus that provided Party leadership over the six military regions into which the country had been divided; followed by 26 provincial committees; a certain number of special district committees; and at the very bottom, 2200 county committees...

The CPC was not a mass organization. Although anyone over 18 could apply, membership was highly selective and was based on recommendations by two Party members who certified that the person's past behavior and attitudes have conformed to the revolutionary values of the Party ... The well recognized, great leaders of the CPC who controlled the Politburo (its composition reflected the rise and fall of factions within the top levels of the Party) nominated the members of the Central Committee, which in turn supervised the selection of delegates to provincial congresses, who helped select the delegates to the county and other local congresses. The elections followed a set procedure: a single slate [list] of candidates received 100 percent of the votes.

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SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War, 1960 to 1979

These sources relate to United States Cold War policies and the Vietnam War.

SOURCE A Extract from President Johnson's Message to Congress, August 5 1964.

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against US naval vessels operating in international waters, and I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two US aircraft were lost in the action. After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in South East Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime has given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in South East Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955. This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

SOURCE B Extract from "Joint Resolution of Congress, H J RES 1145", August 7 1964.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:


That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Section 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in South East Asia. In accordance with the Constitution of the United States, the Charter of the United Nations and its obligations under the South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by resolution of the Congress.

SOURCE C

"The Other Ascent Into The Unknown" – A 1965 Herblock Cartoon, copyright by The Herb Block Foundation.



SOURCE D Ext

Extract from Senator Ernest Gruening's statement during the Senate debates on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Congressional Record, August 6-7 1964.

Regrettably, I find myself in disagreement with the President's South East Asian policy ... The serious events of the past few days, the attack by North Vietnamese vessels on American warships and our reprisal, strikes me as the inevitable and foreseeable concomitant [result] and consequence of US unilateral military aggressive policy in South East Asia ... We now are about to authorize the President, if he sees fit, to move our armed forces ... not only into South Vietnam, but also into North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and of course the authorization includes all the rest of the SEATO nations. That means sending our American boys into combat in a war in which we have no business, which is not our war, into which we have been misguidedly drawn, which is steadily being escalated. This resolution is a further authorization for escalation unlimited. I am opposed to sacrificing a single American boy in this venture. We have lost far too many already ...

SOURCE E

"McNamara asks Giap: What happened in the Tonkin Gulf?", The Associated Press, November 9, 1995. Used with permission of The Associated Press Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved.

When former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara met the enemy's leading strategist on Thursday, he raised a question he'd saved for 30 years: "What really happened in the Tonkin Gulf on August 4, 1964?"

"Absolutely nothing," replied retired General Vo Nguyen Giap.

Both sides agree that North Vietnam attacked a US Navy ship in the gulf on August 2 as it cruised close to shore. But it was an alleged second attack two days later that led to the first US bombing raid on the North and propelled America deep into war.

Many US historians have long believed the Johnson administration fabricated the second attack to win congressional support for widening the war. But for McNamara, Giap's word was the clincher.

"It's a pretty damned good source," he said after the meeting.