



**HISTORY
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1**

Thursday 4 November 2004 (afternoon)

1 hour

SOURCE BOOKLET

SOURCE BOOKLET – INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this booklet until instructed to do so.
- This booklet contains all of the sources required for Paper 1.
 - Section A page 2
 - Section B page 5
 - Section C page 8

Sources in this booklet have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses in square brackets [...]; minor changes are not indicated.

SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1 The USSR under Stalin, 1924 to 1941

These sources relate to Stalin's foreign policy in relation to Germany.

SOURCE A *Extract from **Russia's War** by Richard Overy, London, 1997.*

A programme of military collaboration developed in the 1920s between two most unlikely partners, the Red Army and the German Reichswehr [Army]. They were drawn together by their countries' shared status as international outcasts, the Soviet Union for its communism, Germany for its alleged responsibility for the war of 1914. Each had something the other badly wanted: the Soviet Union wanted access to advanced military technology; Germany needed somewhere to develop the weapons and tactical experience it was denied under the disarmament terms of the Treaty of Versailles.

So it was that German officers, separated from their communist collaborators by an ideological chasm [wide gap], found themselves operating with them in secret, in military installations. Trainees travelled to the Soviet Union on false passports, in civilian dress. Those that died in training accidents were put in coffins in large crates described as "aircraft parts". Soviet military leaders spent months or years in Germany absorbing German strategic thinking, German tactical doctrine and German ideas on the military economy and logistical support [relating to the movement of troops and supplies]. In 1931 the German officers sent to Moscow on training courses included names that became famous a decade later, including Keitel and Manstein, but a decade later almost all their Red Army counterparts were dead.

SOURCE B

Soviet cartoon of 1933. The four figures standing round the cradle, from which Hitler is emerging, represent Britain, France, Germany and the USA. The currency of each country is indicated on the back of each figure by word or sign.



“In the Cradle of German Fascism – Good Day Adolf Hitler.” 1933

SOURCE C

The Nazi – Soviet Pact, 23 August 1939.

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR, wanting to strengthen the cause of peace between Germany and the USSR, have reached the following agreement

1. Both parties commit themselves to refrain from any act of violence or aggressive action and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.
2. Should either of the parties become the object of aggression by a third power, the other shall not support the third party.
3. The Governments of the two parties shall maintain continual contact with one another in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interest. [...]
5. Should disputes or conflicts arise between the two parties, both parties shall settle these disputes through friendly exchange of opinion.
6. The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years. [...]

SOURCE D *Pact dividing Poland between Germany and USSR, 28th September, 1939.*

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR consider it as exclusively their task, after the collapse of the former Polish State, to re-establish peace and order in these territories. To this end they have agreed upon the following:

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR shall determine the boundary of their respective interests in the territory of the former Polish state. The territory of Lithuania falls in the USSR sphere, while the province of Lublin and part of Warsaw fall in the German sphere. Both parties will tolerate in their territories no Polish agitation which affects the territory of the other party. They will suppress in their territories all such agitation and inform each other about suitable measures.

SOURCE E *Stalin's speech on the radio, 3 July 1941, reacting to the German invasion of the USSR.*

Comrades, citizens, brothers and sisters, men of our army and navy! It is to you I am speaking dear friends!

The treacherous military attack by Hitlerite Germany on our Motherland, begun on 22 June, is continuing. In spite of the heroic resistance of the Red Army, and although the enemy's finest divisions and finest air force units have already been smashed and have found their graves on the field of battle, the enemy continues to push forward, hurling fresh forces to the front [...] Grave danger overhangs our country.

The Red Army, Red Navy and all citizens of the Soviet Union must defend every inch of Soviet soil, must fight to the last drop of blood for our towns and villages. All our industries must be got to work with greater intensity to produce more rifles, machine guns, shells, planes. We must guard factories, power stations and telegraphic communications, and arrange air raid protection.

We must wage a ruthless fight against deserters, panic-mongers, rumour-mongers [those spreading panic and rumour]; we must kill spies, sabotage agents and enemy parachutists. In areas occupied by the enemy, partisan [resistance] units must be formed. The enemy must be hounded and destroyed at every step, and all their measures frustrated.

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SECTION B

Prescribed Subject 2 The emergence and development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1946 to 1964

These sources relate to Mao Zedong’s (Mao Tse-tung) Hundred Flowers Campaign, 1956.

SOURCE A *Extract from a speech by Lu Dingyi, Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 26 May 1956.*

“Letting flowers of many kinds blossom, diverse [different] schools of thought contend” means that we stand for freedom of independent thinking, of debate, of creative work: freedom to criticize and freedom to express, maintain and reserve one’s opinions on questions of art, literature or scientific research [...]

SOURCE B *Cartoon published in January 1957, from **China Reconstructs**, A Chinese Government Publication, illustrating how some party members took unofficial action against Mao’s intentions.*



*“The people like many flowers.
The old-fashioned Party man thinks they need only one – the one he likes.”*

SOURCE C *Extract from a speech by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People, 27 February 1957.*

Literally the two slogans – let a hundred flowers blossom and let a hundred schools of thought contend – have no class character; the proletariat can turn them to account, and so can the bourgeoisie or others. Different classes and social groups each have their own views on what are fragrant flowers and what are poisonous weeds. Then, from the point of view of the masses, what should be the criteria today for distinguishing fragrant flowers from poisonous weeds? In their political activities, how should our people judge whether a person’s words and deeds are right or wrong? On the basis of the principles of our Constitution, the will of the overwhelming majority of our people and the common political positions which have been proclaimed on various occasions by our political parties, we consider that, broadly speaking, the criteria should be as follows:

- (1) Words and deeds should help to unite, and not divide, the people of all our nationalities.
- (2) They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction.
- (3) They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, the people’s democratic dictatorship.
- (4) They should help to strengthen, and not shake off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party.

SOURCE D *Extract from **Mao’s People** by B Michael Frolic, Massachusetts, 1980. Frolic visited Hong Kong in the 1970s interviewing refugees from China. One of the refugees is explaining what happened to him in 1957.*

I was walking along the corridors when I saw my name on the wall, along with four others, accused of being “secret counter-revolutionaries in their hearts and deeds,” “stinking fish” who must not be allowed to pollute our school any more.

Why me? What had I done? The answers came swiftly enough at a general meeting in which I had to stand at attention and hear my girlfriend in a clear, confident voice tell the whole school how I had secretly opposed the Party and had tried to enlist her cooperation in this effort. She said I had spoken maliciously of specific individuals, including Lin, and was plotting to restore the old pre-Communist government. She said that at first she thought she could persuade me to come forward and admit my mistakes, but now she realized I was too dangerous and had to be exposed. She looked straight ahead while reciting these lies. Her accusation, together with Lin’s testimony that I was a secret rightist, sealed my fate.

It wasn’t fair and I had become a convenient target, a handy scapegoat to get the rest off the hook. They dragged out my past and accused me of having a reactionary class background because my father had been a landlord under the Gnomindang (Kuomintang).

SOURCE E *Extract from **Mao: A Life** by Philip Short, New York, 1999.*

The tragedy of the “Hundred Flowers” was that Mao genuinely did want the intellectuals and people to “think for themselves”, to join the revolution of their own free will rather than being forced to do so. His goal, he told Party cadres, was “the creation of a political environment where there will be both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of purpose and personal ease of mind and liveliness”. Yet that formula, in practice, proved utterly self-defeating. By the mid-1950s, Mao was so convinced of the essential correctness of his own thought that he could no longer comprehend why, if people had the freedom to think for themselves, they would think what *they* wanted, not what *he* wanted – so long as they retained a spark of intellectual independence, they would produce ideas of which he disapproved and which he would find it necessary to suppress. In practice, discipline always won out; independence of mind was crushed.

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SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War, 1960 to 1979

These sources relate to Nixon's foreign policy of détente.

SOURCE A *Extract from Richard Nixon, First Inaugural Address, 20 January, 1969.*

The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker [...] Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of communication will be open. We seek an open world – open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people – a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation. We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy. Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition – not in conquering territory or extending power, but in enriching the life of man. As we explore the reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together – not as new worlds to be conquered, but as a new adventure to be shared. With those who are willing to join, let us cooperate to reduce the burden of arms, to strengthen the structure of peace, to lift up the poor and the hungry.

SOURCE B *Extract from **Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938** by Stephen Ambrose and Douglas G Brinkley; Eighth Revised Edition, New York, 1997.*

It all came down to the program Nixon called Vietnamization. Six months after taking office, he announced that his secret plan to end the war was in fact a plan to keep it going, but with lower American casualties. He proposed to withdraw American combat troops, unit by unit, while continuing to give air and naval support to ARVN [Army of South Vietnam] and rearming ARVN with the best military hardware America had to offer [...] Nixon had high hopes for his policy when he started out [...] Dr Henry Kissinger had convinced him that there was a path to peace with honor in Vietnam and it led through Moscow and Peking. If the two communist superpowers would only refrain from supplying arms to the North Vietnamese, Kissinger argued, Hanoi would have to agree to a compromise peace, a policy he called “linkage”. The United States would withhold favors and agreements from the Russians until they cut off the arms flow to Hanoi [...] Linkage assumed that world politics revolved around the constant struggle for supremacy between the great powers [...] Kissinger regarded North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos as pawns to be moved around the board of the great powers. He insisted on viewing the war as a highly complex game in which the moves were made from Washington, Moscow and Peking.

SOURCE C

*American Cartoon, 1972 by Nancy King and editors published in **A Cartoon History of United States Foreign Policy**, New York, 1991. The three nations are represented by Mao, Brezhnev and Nixon.*



Nixon “I’m not sure of the rules, but it looks like an interesting game.”

SOURCE D

Extracts from the Joint Communiqué between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America issued in Shanghai, 28 February, 1972.

The two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude [secretly plot] with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

SOURCE E *Extract from “The White House Years” by Henry Kissinger, Boston, 1979.*

With the SALT announcement on 20 May, we seized the initiative. It was followed [...] by the announcement of the Moscow summit, and a nearly uninterrupted series of unexpected moves that captured the “peace issues” and kept our opponents off balance [...] Whatever one’s views about détente in the abstract, in the context of 1971 and 1972 the carefully considered measures of the Administration toward the Soviet Union were imperative to prevent a long rush toward abdication of responsibility in America and among our allies. Our willingness to discuss détente had lured Brezhnev into an initiative about mutual force reductions that saved our whole European defense structure [...] It was a classical example of why such a policy was needed to maintain the essential elements of national security if we were to avoid the destruction of our national defense and Alliance solidarity in the era of Vietnam.
