



**HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
HIGHER AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1**

Friday 2 November 2001 (afternoon)

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer Section A or Section B.

SECTION A

PRESCRIBED SUBJECT 1 **The Caliphate and the Imamate**

DOCUMENT A *Extract from: **The history of prophets and kings**, by al-Tabari, Albany, 1996, pp. 16–17*

Ali remained two days, during which he and Mu‘awiya did not exchange messengers. Then Ali summoned Bashir b. Amr b. Mihsan al-Ansari, Sa‘id b. Qays al-Hamdani, and Shabath b. Rib‘i al-Tamimi and said, “Go to this man and summon him to God, to obedience, and to unity”. Shabath b. Rib‘i asked, “**O Commander of the Faithful**, will you not tempt him with an offer of an office of authority and a position in which he will have influence with you if he gives you the oath of allegiance?” Ali replied, “Go to him and argue with him and find out his opinion”. This was at the beginning of Dhu’l hijja [May–June 657].

They came and entered in upon Mu‘awiya, and Bashir b. Amr praised God. Then he said, “O Mu‘awiya, I implore you by God not to split the unity of this community and not to shed its blood in internal conflict”. But Mu‘awiya cut him off, saying, “Have you not commended that to your master?” Bashir replied, “My master is not like you. Of all creation, he has the most right to this position of authority by virtue of his merit, his religion, his precedence in Islam, and his relationship with the Messenger of God”. Mu‘awiya asked, “What does he say?” and Bashir replied, “He asks you to fear God and to respond to your cousin in acknowledging the truth to which he calls you. It is safer for you regarding your life in this world and better for you regarding your final end”. Mu‘awiya said, “And are we to make the blood of Uthman count for nothing? No, by God, never!”

DOCUMENT B *Extract from: **Makers of Arab history**, by P. Hitti, New York, 1968, p. 45*

Mu‘awiya had been sent as an army officer to Syria by **Abu Bakr**, appointed governor by Umar and confirmed by Uthman. Any personal ambitions he might have had must have been kept in the background. He posed not as an avenger of a relative but as a champion of legitimacy in the caliphate. He managed to put Ali on the horns of a dilemma: “Produce Uthman’s assassins or accept the responsibility of an accomplice”. Meanwhile he exhibited in the Damascus mosque the blood-stained shirt of the murdered aged caliph and the two severed fingers of his wife, who tried to defend him as he read the Qu’ran he had compiled. Uthman’s compilation became the accepted text. His blood, we are told, flowed upon the sacred leaves and – conveniently – stained the passage: “And God will suffice you for defence against them”.

DOCUMENT C *Extract from: The caliphate: its rise and fall, by W. Muir, Beirut, 1963, pp. 252–3*

Mu‘awiya had no sooner received the emblems of Uthman’s murder – the blood-stained shirt and Najla’s mangled fingers – than he hung them on the pulpit of the Damascus mosque. There suspended, they remained a spectacle maddening the Syrians to revenge. Still, he took no immediate action. Biding his time, he waited to see what the new caliph might do.

The Syrians had not long to wait the outcome of Ali’s plans. Damascus was in excited mood when Ali’s letter reached Mu‘awiya. At first no answer was sent. At last Mu‘awiya sent a letter – stranger than ever had been sent before. On the cover was written: From Mu‘awiya to Ali. There was no other word.

Arriving at Medina the envoy presented the letter to Ali who broke the seal impatiently. “What does this mean?” he cried. Mu‘awiya’s envoy replied: “I left behind me 60,000 warriors bent on revenging the caliph’s death – and revenging it on you?” “What!” exclaimed Ali, “On me! Do you not see that I am powerless to pursue the murderers? O Lord! I take you to witness that I am guiltless of Uthman’s blood!”

DOCUMENT D *Extract from: The Oxford History of Islam, Oxford, 1999, pp. 15–16*

After Uthman’s murder the people of Medina recognized as the next caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib – cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, therefore a member of his clan, the Hashim. Ali’s acclamation as caliph was opposed by significant segments of the Community of Believers, however – in particular by Uthman’s kinsmen of the Umayyad clan, led by Mu‘awiya and by leading members of some other Quraysh families.

The First Civil War finally came to an end in 661, when a **Kharijite** assassin killed Ali. Shortly thereafter, the majority of Believers agreed to recognize Mu‘awiya as caliph, perhaps less because they thought him the ideal ruler than because, after five years of turmoil, they yearned for stability and unity among the Believers. Mu‘awiya’s recognition as a caliph marks the beginning of the **Umayyad** caliphate (661–750). During his two decades as caliph, Mu‘awiya relied on careful diplomacy and strong governors, especially in Iraq and the east, to maintain an uneasy peace in the community. The relative stability of his reign enabled the Muslim armies once again to embark on raids and campaigns of conquest against neighbouring areas.

But the issues that were at the heart of the First Civil War – how leaders of the community of Believers were to be selected, and above all what were the criteria for leadership – remained unresolved.

1. Explain briefly each of the following:
 - (a) Commander of the Faithful (Document A)
 - (b) Abu Bakr (Document B)
 - (c) Kharijite (Document D)
 - (d) Umayyad (Document D) *[4 marks]*

2. From the evidence of these documents and your own knowledge, why did Mu‘awiya refuse to recognise Ali as caliph? *[6 marks]*

3. From the evidence of Documents A and D and your own knowledge, what were Ali’s claims to the caliphate? *[5 marks]*

4. From the evidence of Documents C and D and your own knowledge, what deep problems had brought the **umma** to civil war? *[5 marks]*

SECTION B

PRESCRIBED SUBJECT 2 The Crusades

DOCUMENT E *Extract from: Al-nawadir al-sultaniyya, by Ibn Shaddad, in Arab historians of the Crusades, London, 1978, pp. 99–102*

Almighty God has said. ‘And those who fight for Our cause, We shall guide them in Our path, and God is with those who act with nobility,’ and the sacred works are full of passages referring to the Holy War. Saladin was more assiduous and zealous in this than in anything else. For love of the Holy War and on God’s path he left his family and his sons, his homeland, his house and all his estates, and chose out of all the world to live in the shade of his tent, where the winds blew on him from every side – so much so that on one stormy night on the plain of **Acre** his tent fell down, and if he had not happened to be in the turret he would have been killed.

Behold, what purity of ambition, what a brave and burning soul! My God, You know that he expended every energy to make Your Faith victorious and fought the Holy War in the hope of Your mercy.

DOCUMENT F *Extract from: The political language of Islam, by B. Lewis, Chicago, 1988, pp. 71-73*

One of the ideas most commonly associated, in Western minds, with Islamic political thought and practice, is the notion of holy war. Islam is perceived, from its inception, as a militant, indeed as a military religion, and its followers as fanatical warriors, engaged in spreading their faith and their law by armed might.

The leader of the Muslims in the *jihad* is the sovereign or ruler of the Muslim state. In classical times, this meant the caliph; later it meant whatever **sultan** or amir was in charge. At a time when Islamic standards of legitimacy and of justice were being compromised to accommodate the harsh realities of military power, the jurists were careful to insist that the obligation of *jihad* survived every change of government or regime, and was owed to any ruler actually possessing the necessary power. According to a saying improbably ascribed to the Prophet: “*Jihad* is incumbent upon you under every amir, whether he be godly or wicked, and even if he commits major sins.” In *jihad*, the subject’s normal duty of obedience becomes one of active armed support.

DOCUMENT G *Extract from: **Saladin**, by A. S. Ehrenkreutz, Albany, 1972, p. 234*

Popular though the story of Saladin's war against the Crusaders has always been, it constitutes only one aspect of his political and military career. To obtain a full understanding of that glamorous historical career, one has to consider both his role in the foundation of the Ayyubid regime and his policy towards Egypt, as well as his commitment against the Crusaders.

Saladin lived up to the hopes vested in him by his immediate family; at the end of his career the descendants of Ayyub ruled over Egypt, most of Syria, and Yemen. But the way in which this domination was accomplished hardly helped lay effective foundations for a cohesive and united regime. Saladin's ruthless policy of military suppression – to cite only the **Fatimids** and Zangids as its most prominent victims – did realize his immediate personal ambitions, but the lack of a sincere moral or ideological motivation prevented consolidation and preservation of his dynastic heritage. His authority over the leading members of his family was at best rather tenuous. After Saladin's death the absence of any profound loyalty and respect for him became apparent when his sons and legitimate successors were quickly pushed aside by his equally ambitious brother and nephews. Continuous warfare among various Ayyubid contenders, waged against a background of new Crusader aggressions and the Mongol invasion, undermined the position of that militaristic establishment. By the middle of the thirteenth century – only fifty-six years after Saladin's death – the Ayyubid domination in Egypt and Syria came to an abrupt end with the brutal seizure of power by the **Mamluk** commanders in Egypt.

Viewed as a whole, Saladin's policy towards Egypt is a depressing record of callous exploitation for the furthering of his own selfish political ambitions.

DOCUMENT H *Extract from **Saladin: The politics of the Holy War**, by M. C. Lyons and D. E. P. Jackson, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 368–71*

Saladin himself subordinated money to men and he used the wealth of Egypt for the conquest of Syria, that of Syria for the conquest of the Jazira and that of the Jazira for the conquest of the Coast. William of Tyre noted that liberality was one of Saladin's most dangerous weapons, and, whatever strains and disappointments were involved, he unquestionably succeeded in his own main aim, the collecting of raw material for war in the form of men, money and supplies.

Liberality as a weapon in the power struggle was allied to diplomacy, both on a personal level and in dealings between states. It is, of course, true to say that Saladin blurred the distinctions of the Holy War by adding Muslims, such as the Almohads, to the list of possible enemies and, instead of being confined to the recovery of the Coast, the concept was thus almost infinitely extendable. His Holy War propaganda must be seen as an attempt, conscious or unconscious, to canalise energy and direct it outwards. The attempt failed.

5. Explain briefly each of the following:
- (a) Acre (Document E)
 - (b) sultan (Document F)
 - (c) Fatimids (Document G)
 - (d) Mamluk (Document G) *[4 marks]*
6. From the evidence of Documents E and F and your own knowledge, was it legitimate for Saladin to describe his war against the Franks as **jihad**? *[5 marks]*
7. From the evidence of Document G and your own knowledge, what criticisms may be made of Saladin's policies? *[5 marks]*
8. From the evidence of Documents E, G and H and your own knowledge, give your assessment of Saladin's achievements against the Franks. *[6 marks]*
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