



HISTORY
ROUTE 2
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1 – PEACEMAKING, PEACEKEEPING – INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1918–36

Wednesday 8 May 2013 (afternoon)

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer all the questions.
- The maximum mark for this examination paper is [25 marks].

Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ...; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to the Ruhr Crisis (1923).

SOURCE A Extract from a public statement made by the German president Friedrich Ebert, 10 January 1923.

Compatriots! Based upon military power a foreign nation is about to damage the right of self-determination of the German people. Again one of Germany's adversaries [enemies] invades German territory. The policy of force, which since the conclusion of peace has been violating the treaties and trampling [crushing] on human rights, threatens the principal German economic district, the main source of Germany's labour, the bread of German industry and the entire working classes. The French move is a continuation of wrong and violence and a violation of the Treaty [of Versailles] aimed at a disarmed nation. Germany was willing to pay within the limits of its capacity. Without being heard in Paris, it is going to be attacked.

SOURCE B Extract from **Crisis and Renewal in France, 1918–1962** edited by Kenneth Mouré and Martin S Alexander, 2002.

The allies turned against France in the autumn. Britain had long been haunted by ideas of French predominance [domination] and was now horrified by German collapse. Forgetting that both were temporary conditions, Britain approached the United States about a new reparation inquiry with US involvement; this was granted on an unofficial basis, adding US financial power to British views ... As 1924 began, the Dawes committee set to work, leaving French policy at Anglo–American mercy. Diplomatic isolation, national weariness, and above all financial crisis drove Prime Minister Poincaré from office in June. Others presided over France's defeat at the London Conference of 1924, where the Versailles Treaty was revised at the insistence of American bankers and British leaders, and led to Locarno in 1925. There Britain succeeded in restoring Germany to equality and itself to the centre of power. When the Locarno Treaties were signed, the Ruhr occupation had ended.

SOURCE C

Cartoon entitled "Into the Arms of the Enemy" by David Low, published in British newspaper **The Star**, 1923, depicting the French prime minister Raymond Poincaré attacking Germany.



"You can do nearly everything with the bayonet – except pick coal."

A Ruhr Trade Unionist.

Solo Syndication/Associated Newspapers Ltd.

SOURCE D Extract from **Grandeur and Misery of Victory**, memoirs of French prime minister Georges Clemenceau, 1930.

When, on 26 September, Germany had given up passive resistance, we were obliged to go back to the system of conferences and meetings of experts. Committees were set up, and were to meet in Paris. But—and this was the great innovation!—the presidency of one of these committees was entrusted to General Dawes of the US, and the president of the second committee was an Englishman, Reginald McKenna.

From the political point of view, the consequences were disastrous. The League of Nations was henceforth to be in charge of the question of disarmament. The United States became the arbiters [mediators] for everything connected with the implementation of one of the most important parts of the Treaty of Versailles, which they had not ratified!

That was tying our hands forever and at the same time surrendering our complete independence, as well as the rights conferred on us by the Treaty of Versailles.

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SOURCE E

Extract from Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901–1950 by Ronald E Powaski, 1991. Ronald E Powaski is an American historian specializing in twentieth century history.

The Ruhr invasion failed. While France met no military opposition to the occupation, she was condemned by Britain and the United States. Moreover, German passive resistance deprived France of most of the material advantages she had expected.

The Ruhr occupation also hurt Germany. The Germans lost more in revenue [income] from the Ruhr in the nine months of passive resistance than they had paid in reparations in all the years since the war. Further, the complete collapse of the German currency increased agitation from both the extreme left and right and called into question the continued existence of the Weimar Republic.

There was no way the United States could escape the consequences of a German economic collapse. Germany's inability, or refusal, to pay reparations would make it impossible for the United States to collect war debts from the allies. And Europe's economic recovery, upon which the vitality of America's European trade and investments depended, would also prove impossible if Germany's economy were ruined. Further, an economically and militarily weakened Germany, it was feared, could not serve as an effective barrier against Bolshevism, let alone remain a stable democracy.

- 1. (a) Why, according to Source D, was the occupation of the Ruhr "disastrous" for France? [3 marks]
 - b) What is the message conveyed by Source C? [2 marks]
- 2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources B and D about the consequences of the occupation of the Ruhr. [6 marks]
- 3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and Source E for historians studying the Ruhr Crisis (1923). [6 marks]
- 4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate the impact of the Ruhr Crisis (1923) on international relations between 1923 and 1929. [8 marks]