



**HISTORY
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1**

Tuesday 6 May 2008 (afternoon)

1 hour

SOURCE BOOKLET

SOURCE BOOKLET – INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- This booklet contains all of the sources required for Paper 1.
 - Section A page 2
 - Section B page 4
 - Section C page 7

Sources in this booklet have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ... ; minor changes are not indicated.

SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1 The USSR under Stalin, 1924 to 1941

These sources refer to industrialization under the Five Year Plans.

SOURCE A *Extract from **The Stalin Years**, edited by Christopher Read, Basingstoke, 2003.*

Alongside the debate [in 1928] on rapid industrialization was a parallel discussion on planning. It was assumed that some form of state planning would be needed to encourage the growth of industry, as socialism was a system that believed in planning ...

How did this complex [complicated] debate result in the process of industrialization? In the first place Stalin had not joined the left in denouncing the NEP. Trotsky denounced him for his timidity. By 1929, however, industrialization was advancing at a great pace, due to several factors interacting with one another. The “war scare” of 1927 focused attention on the industrial weakness of the country, secondly the NEP seemed to be in trouble.

The Politburo, in spite of divisions, adopted the first Five Year Plan in 1928, but it was only in 1929 that the planning tried to enforce rapid industrialization with the slogan “there is no fortress the Bolsheviks could not storm”. Far from being a carefully planned process, the first Five Year Plan set unrealistic targets, and even raised them. The result was such chaos that a more modest regime of advance was instituted ...

However a breakthrough had taken place. While calculations today show the falsity of claims made at the time, production in key areas did make an upward surge.

SOURCE B *Extract from a speech by Stalin to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in January 1933 attacking those who had hindered industrial progress. Taken from **Stalin** by Dmitri Volkogonov, London, 2000.*

The remnants of the dying classes – industrialists and their servants, private traders, former nobles and priests, kulaks and their henchmen, former white officers and NCOs [non-commissioned officers], former policemen – they have all wormed [worked] their way into our factories, our institutions, our trading bodies, our railways and river transport and into our collective and state farms. They have disguised themselves as workers and some of them have managed to work their way into the party.

What have they brought with them? Of course they have brought their hatred of the Soviet regime ... The only thing left to them is to play dirty tricks and harm the workers. They set fire to warehouses and break machinery. They organise sabotage. They organise wrecking.

SOURCE C *Extract from “Women in Soviet Society: Equality, Development, and Social Change” by Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, in **Stalinism** edited by David Hoffman, Oxford, 2003.*

It was not a revolutionary program of emancipation [liberation] that brought about the profound changes in women’s roles, it was the indirect result of the first Five Year Plan in 1928 and Stalin’s determination to increase industrial output ...

The massive entry of women into the industrial labour force during the 1930s was a central feature of social transformation, with increased educational opportunities for women, provision of child care, and legislation to ensure the compatibility of women’s domestic responsibilities with industrial employment. These changes affected many social institutions, including, most importantly, the family itself. The new roles assumed by women were thus linked to Stalin’s strategy of industrialization which needed women to work in industry.

SOURCE D *Table of Industrial Production taken from **The World This Century: Working with Evidence**, by Neil De Marco, London, 1997.*

The First Five Year Plan: 1928–1932

	Output in 1927	Target	Actual output in 1932
Coal	35.4	75	64
Oil	11.7	22	21.4
Pig iron	3.3	10	6.2
Steel	4.0	10.3	5.9

The Second Five Year Plan: 1933–1937

	Output in 1933	Target	Actual output in 1937
Coal	64	152.5	128
Oil	21.4	46.8	28.5
Pig iron	6.2	16	14.5
Steel	5.9	17	17.7

Industrial Production (all figures are given in million tons)

SOURCE E *Extract from **Stalin**, by Isaac Deutscher, London, 1965. Deutscher, a former communist, was a Polish journalist who lived in London from 1939.*

It was only in the late thirties that the achievements of the second revolution began to mature. Towards the end of this decade, Russia’s industrial power was catching up with Germany’s. Her efficiency and ability to organise was still much lower. So was the standard of living of her people ...

The other continental [European] nations, to whom only a few years before, Russia still looked up, were left behind, and after the Second World War the USSR was to rise to the rank of an industrial giant, second only to the USA.

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SECTION B

Prescribed Subject 2 The emergence and development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1946 to 1964

These sources relate to economic reconstruction in industry and agriculture under Mao, 1952–1962.

SOURCE A *Extract from **Modern China** by Edwin E. Moise, London, 1995.*

By 1955 the CCP was ready to move from private property to socialist ownership as the basis of the economy. The change was made with remarkable speed; it was effectively over, both in industry and agriculture, by the end of 1956.

In the countryside peasant farms were grouped into agricultural producers’ cooperatives equivalent to the *kolkhoz* [collective farms] in the Soviet Union ...

In the cities capitalist businesses were either taken over outright, or converted to state-private joint enterprises, in which the state had the final say in all decisions.

Chinese economic policy in the mid fifties was following the pattern set by the USSR. The chief goal was to develop heavy industry – steel, machinery, and so forth – as quickly as possible. Russian technicians helped design and build large plants. Light industry and agriculture took second place, though they were not neglected to the extent they had been in the early stages of Stalin’s industrialization in the Soviet Union ...

Yearly production targets produced quite respectable rates of growth during the first Five Year Plan.

SOURCE B *Extract from an article in the **People's Daily**, a Chinese newspaper, 3 September 1958.*

People's communes, which mark a new stage of socialist development in China's rural areas, are now being set up and developed in many places at a rapid rate.

The movement has been started by the masses of the peasants spontaneously on the basis of their great social consciousness. Now, with the encouragement and guidance given by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, it is making even bigger strides forward.

The masses of peasants in many areas have written large numbers of wall newspapers, applications and resolutions, asking for the establishment of people's communes ...

Where people's communes have already come into existence, the peasants, beating drums and cymbals, celebrated the occasion and their enthusiasm in production has reached a new peak. The poorer and lower middle class peasants, in particular, regard it as "the realisation of a long cherished hope" ...

Their massive scale of production requires a higher efficiency, and greater manoeuvrability [manipulation] of labour as well as the participation of women in production. Therefore, more and more common mess halls [canteens], nurseries, tailoring teams, are being set up, and the last remains of individual ownership are being eliminated.

SOURCE C *A survivor of the famine in 1959-1960 gives her account. Taken from **Hungry Ghosts, China's Secret Famine**, by Jasper Becker, London, 1996.*

In the first year of people communes [1958-9], we earned points and the communes distributed grain to each family. This we kept at home. But in the second year [1959-60], there was nothing left at home, it had all been taken away. Nevertheless, the village cadres came to every household to search for food. They took away everything they could find, including our cotton bed covers, several bags of carrots, and the cotton we had saved to make new clothes.

The communal canteen did not serve any proper food, just wild grasses, peabut shells and sweet potato skins. Because of the diet we had terrible problems.

More than half the villagers died, mostly between new year [1960] and April or May. Many families disappeared completely with no survivors at all. The production team chief's daughter-in-law and his grandson starved to death. He then boiled and ate the corpse of the child, but he also died.

SOURCE D *Extract from Mao: The Unknown Story, by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, London, 2005.*

Mao wasted much of the technology and equipment bought from Russia, along with the skills of the accompanying specialists. Machinery often lay idle, as the gigantic infrastructure they required was lacking. The equipment that was working was overworked, often twenty-four hours a day, while maintenance was neglected or dismissed as irrelevant. Mao encouraged ignoring regulations, and told those Chinese who were working with Russian advisers that they must not be “slaves” to Russian expertise. Russian common sense got nowhere ...

People starved in the cities too, although death tolls were much lower than in the countryside ... This famine, which was nationwide, started in 1958 and lasted through 1961, peaking in 1960 ... Close to 38 million people died of starvation and overwork.

SOURCE E *Table of China’s Agricultural Record, 1954 to 1962, from: Michael Lynch, “The People’s Republic of China Since 1949”, Hodder Murray, 1998. Reproduced by permission of John Murray (Publishers) Ltd.*

Year	Grain Production (millions tonnes)	Meat Production (millions tonnes)	Index of Gross Output Value of Agriculture
1954	169.5	3.8	103.1
1955	183.9	3.9	106.6
1956	192.8	3.4	120.5
1957	195.1	4.0	124.8
1958	200.0	4.3	127.8
1959	170.0	2.6	110.4
1960	143.5	1.3	96.4
1961	147.5	1.2	94.1
1962	160.0	1.9	99.9

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SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War, 1960 to 1979

These sources relate to the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.

SOURCE A *Extract from **The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction** by Robert McMahon, New York, 2003*

Over the past four decades, scholars, policy analysts, and former governmental officials have vigorously debated every aspect of this near-catastrophe, often varying sharply in their interpretive judgments. While some have praised Kennedy’s masterful crisis management and remarkable cool under fire, others have blasted [criticised] the American president for his willingness to risk nuclear war and the almost certain deaths of tens of millions of Americans, Soviets, Cubans, and Europeans, over the emplacement of missiles that did not fundamentally alter the prevailing nuclear balance. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who sat in on the ExCom [Executive Committee of the National Security Council] meetings, later attributed JFK’s Cuban success to “plain dumb luck”. That may be the most apt coda [final chapter] for this whole affair, especially if one recognizes how close the world actually came to nuclear war in October 1962. On the other hand, one must acknowledge Kennedy’s instinctive caution and prudence [wisdom], in the face of pressure from his military advisers for a more aggressive response, was instrumental to the peaceful ending of an affair of unparalleled danger.

SOURCE B *Comments by Theodore Sorensen, a member of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, as quoted in **Dean Acheson; The Cold War Years, 1953–71** by Douglas Brinkley, New Haven, 1991*

I remember Dean Acheson coming to our meeting and saying that he thought we should knock out Soviet missiles in Cuba by air strike. Someone asked him: “If we do that, what do you think the Soviet Union will do?” He said, “I think I know the Soviet Union well. I know what they are required to do in the light of their history and their posture around the world. I think they will knock out missiles in Turkey.” And then the question came again, “Well, then, what do we do?” “Well,” he said, “I believe under our NATO treaty, with which I was associated, we would be required to respond by knocking out a missile base inside the Soviet Union.” “Then what do they do?” “Well,” he said, “then that’s when we hope cooler heads will prevail and they’ll stop and talk.”

SOURCE C

*Extract from a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy, October 26, 1962.
Taken from the website of the Avalon Project at Yale Law School.
URL: www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba084*

... Let us show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: We, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear ... Mr President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose ... Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

SOURCE D

*Extract from a telegram from Kennedy to Khrushchev, October 27, 1962.
Taken from the website of the Avalon Project at Yale Law School.
URL: www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba095*

I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases on Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements ...

As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals – which seem generally acceptable as I understand them – are as follows:

- 1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba
- 2) We, on our part, would agree ... (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba ...

If you will give your representative similar instructions ... the effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding “other armaments,” as proposed in your second letter which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race ...

SOURCE E

Drawing "This Hurts Me More Than It Hurts You". Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, drawing by Edmund S. Valtman, (reproduction number LC-USZ62-130423)



In this cartoon Valtman characterises Khrushchev as a dentist and Castro as a patient.