

**HISTORY
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1**

Thursday 7 November 2002 (afternoon)

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer:
 - either all questions in Section A;
 - or all questions in Section B;
 - or all questions in Section C.

Texts in this examination paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses in square brackets [...]; minor changes are not indicated. Candidates should answer the questions in order.

SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1 The Russian Revolutions and the New Soviet State 1917–1929

These documents refer to the USSR under Lenin, 1918 to 1920.

DOCUMENT A *An extract from a speech by Lenin at a conference of Bolshevik leaders, 4 April 1918.*

Without the guidance of specialists in the different branches of science and technology no transition to socialism is possible. But the majority of specialists are bourgeois. These specialists can be used by the state [USSR] either in the old bourgeois way, by paying them large salaries, or in the new proletarian way, by instituting a regime which controls everyone, which would automatically control the specialists so that we can enlist them for our work.

Until we have achieved this control we must be prepared to pay specialists. This is clearly a compromise measure, but the Russians are bad workers as compared with advanced nations. It could not have been otherwise under the Tsarist regime with the system of slavery still alive. To learn how to work is a problem which the Soviet power must place before the people.

DOCUMENT B *A decree by Sverdlov, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, 22 April 1918.*

The Russian Soviet Republic, surrounded on all sides by enemies, has to create its own powerful army to defend the country, while making its social system on Communist lines.

The Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Republic considers it its immediate task to enlist all citizens in either work programmes or military service. This work is meeting with stubborn resistance on the part of the bourgeoisie, which refuses to part with its economic privileges and is trying, through conspiracies, uprisings and traitorous deals with foreign imperialists, to regain state power.

To arm the bourgeoisie would cause trouble within the army, and hinder it in its fight against the external enemies. The Workers' and Peasants' Government will therefore find ways of making the bourgeoisie share, in some form or other, the burden of defending the Republic.

Female citizens are trained, with their consent, on an equal footing with males. Persons who avoid compulsory training or neglect their duties shall be called to account.

DOCUMENT C *An extract from **Lenin, a biography** by Robert Service. London: Macmillan, 2000.*

The old problems with his health – headaches and insomnia [sleeplessness] – troubled him [Lenin] throughout spring and summer 1918. From April to August he published no lengthy piece on Marxist theory or Bolshevik party strategy. This was very unusual for Lenin. His illness was stopping him from writing. His inability to sleep at nights must have left him in an acutely agitated state. Everything was done in panic. Everything was done angrily.

On 11 August he sent a letter to the Bolsheviks of Penza:

Comrades! The insurrection [rebellion] of the five kulak districts should be pitilessly suppressed. The interests of the whole revolution require this because “the last decisive battle” with the kulaks is now under way everywhere. An example must be demonstrated.

1. Hang (and make sure that the hanging takes place in full view of the people) no fewer than one hundred known kulaks, rich men, bloodsuckers.
2. Publish their names.
3. Seize all their grain from them.
4. Take hostages in such a way that for hundreds of kilometres around people will see and tremble with fear.

These words were so shocking in tone and content that they were kept secret during the Soviet period.

DOCUMENT D *An extract from a speech by Lenin to a meeting of Peasants' delegates, 8 November 1918.*

Division of the land was all very well as a beginning. Its purpose was to show that the land was being taken from the landowners and handed over to the peasants. But that is not enough. The solution lies in socialised farming.

You did not realise this at the time, but you are coming round to it by force of experience. The way to escape the disadvantages of small-scale farming lies in communes, cartels [collective groups] or peasant associations. That is the way to combat the kulaks, parasites [those who live off others], and exploiters.

We knew that the peasants were attached to the soil [earth], that they clung to old habits, but now the poor peasants are beginning to agree with us. A commune or collective farm can make improvements in agriculture that are beyond the capacity of individual small owners.

DOCUMENT E

A poster by a Russian artist Alexei Radakov, 1920. It shows a blindfolded man stepping off a cliff. The caption reads, “He who is illiterate is like a blind man. Failure and misfortune lie in wait for him on all sides.”



1. (a) What can be inferred from Document A about the following?
 - (i) Why Lenin thinks that specialists are needed. [1 mark]
 - (ii) How he intends to secure the service of specialists then and later. [2 marks]
- (b) What message is intended by Document E? [1 mark]

2. Compare and contrast Lenin's attitude to kulaks in Documents C and D. [5 marks]

3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents A and B for historians studying the USSR under Lenin, 1918 to 1920. [5 marks]

4. Using the documents and your own knowledge, explain the origin and nature of problems facing Lenin between 1918 and 1920. [6 marks]

DOCUMENT C *An extract from the United States' Memorandum of 26 November 1941, which demanded that Japan agree to the following Draft Declaration.*

The United States Government and the Japanese Government declare that they strongly desire peace in the Pacific, that their policies are directed toward the establishment of lasting peace in the entire Pacific Area, and that they have no territorial ambitions or intentions of menacing other countries or employing armed forces for aggressive purposes against their neighboring countries. Therefore, they hereby declare that they will support and apply the following fundamental principles:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other nations.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations.
3. Principle of equality, including equality of economic opportunities and treatment.
4. Principles for international cooperation and reconciliation for prevention or peaceful settlement of international disputes and for improving international relations.

DOCUMENT D *An extract from General Hideki Tojo's testimony to the War Crimes Trial for the Far East 1946.*

In the meantime the text of the United States' proposal was reported by our Army and Naval representatives in Washington. All were astonished at the severity of the United States' demands. The main conclusions arrived at, were, as I recall them, the following:

1. The United States' memorandum of 26 November 1941 was an ultimatum to Japan.
2. Japan could not accept it. It would appear that the United States proposed these conditions knowing full well that they were unacceptable to Japan. Moreover, the memorandum was made with the full knowledge and consent of the other countries concerned.
3. Taking into consideration the recent measures taken by the United States against Japan and its present attitude, it would seem that the United States had already decided upon war against Japan. Putting it bluntly, Japan felt it necessary to guard against attack from the United States at any time.

DOCUMENT E *An extract from **The Second World War** by John Keegan, London, 1990.*

All ambiguities [lack of clarity] were resolved on 26 November. Then Cordell Hull bluntly presented them with the United States' ultimate position which was a firm restatement of the position from which it had begun. Japan was to withdraw its troops not only from Indochina but also from China, to accept the legitimacy of Chiang Kai-shek's government and, in effect, to renounce Japan's membership of the Tripartite Pact. The Hull note reached Tokyo on 27 November and provoked amazement [...] It appeared to go further than any American counter-proposal yet issued. [...] It revealed, as Tojo and his followers had long argued, that the United States did not regard the Japanese empire as its equal in the community of nations, that it expected the emperor and his government to obey the American President when told to do so, and that it altogether discounted the reality of Japanese strategic power. The army and navy at once agreed that the note was unacceptable and, while Tojo instructed his Washington representatives to continue the talks, ships and soldiers were meanwhile directed to proceed to their attack stations.

5. (a) What political message is intended by Document B? [2 marks]
 (b) According to Document E what reaction did the Japanese have to the United States' Memorandum of 26 November 1941? [2 marks]

6. Compare and contrast the attitude of the United States towards Japan in Documents A and C. [5 marks]

7. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents D and E for historians studying relations between the United States and Japan in 1941. [5 marks]

8. Using the documents and your own knowledge, assess the effect of the Memorandum of 26 November 1941 [Document C] on relations between the United States and Japan. [6 marks]

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SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War 1945–1964

These documents relate to the Cold War in the early 1960s.

DOCUMENT A *An extract from President Kennedy’s comments to a reporter after his meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna, June 1961. The comments are reported in **The Glory and the Dream** by William Manchester, London 1975.*

I’ve got two problems. First, to figure out why Khrushchev acted in such a hostile way. And second, to figure out what we can do about it. I think the first part is pretty easy to explain. I think he did it because of the Bay of Pigs. I think he thought that anyone who was so young and inexperienced as to get into a mess like that could be taken in [tricked], and anyone who got into it, and didn’t see it through, had no guts [courage and determination]. So he just beat hell out of me. So I’ve got a terrible problem. If he thinks I’m inexperienced and have no guts, we won’t get anywhere with him until we remove those ideas.

DOCUMENT B *Estimates of US and Soviet strategic weapons made by Western experts and reported in **The Cuban Missile Crisis** by Robert Beggs, London 1971.*

	Intercontinental ballistic* missiles I.C.B.M	Submarine launched ballistic missiles S.L.B.M	Long range bombers	Intermediate-range ballistic missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles I.R.B.M & M.R.B.M
1961				
USA	63	96	600	100 approx
USSR	50	no figures available	190	450 approx
1962				
USA	294	144	600	135
USSR	75	no figures available	190	750 approx
1963				
USA	424	224	630	160
USSR	100	100	190	750 approx

* Ballistic missiles are initially powered and guided but fall under gravity on their target.

DOCUMENT C *An extract from **Khrushchev Remembers**, Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, edited and translated by Strobe Talbot, Boston 1971.*

I will explain what the Caribbean crisis of October 1962 was all about. After Castro's crushing victory over the counter-revolutionaries [the Bay of Pigs fiasco] we intensified our military aid to Cuba. [...] We had to establish an effective deterrent to American interference in the Caribbean. The logical answer was missiles. I had the idea of installing missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba without letting the United States find out they were there until it was too late to do anything about them. [...] We had no desire to start a war.

DOCUMENT D *An extract from **Kennedy** by Theodore C Sorenson, New York 1965. Sorenson was Special Counsel [advisor] to President Kennedy and a member of ExComm [the committee that helped make policy decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis].*

The bulk of ExComm time Tuesday through Friday [16-19 October 1962] was spent canvassing [debating] all the possible courses of action as the President had requested. Initially the possibilities seemed to divide into six categories, some of which could be combined:

- Do nothing.
- Bring diplomatic pressures and warnings to bear upon the Soviets. Possible forms included an appeal to the UN or OAS [Organization of American States] for an inspection team, or a direct approach to Khrushchev, possibly at a summit conference [...]
- Undertake a secret approach to Castro, to use this means of splitting him off from the Soviets, to warn him that the alternative was his island's downfall and that the Soviets were selling him out.
- Initiate indirect military action by means of a blockade, possibly accompanied by aerial surveillance and warnings. Many types of blockades were considered.
- Conduct an air strike – pinpointed against the missiles only or against other military targets, with or without advance warning.
- Launch an invasion – or, as one chief advocate of this course put it: “Go in there and take Cuba away from Castro.”

DOCUMENT E *An extract from the proclamation by President Kennedy of a blockade of Cuba, 23 October 1962.*

Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States and of all American states are endangered by reason of the establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military capability in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles with a potential range covering most of North and South America [...]

I, John F Kennedy, President of the United States of America do hereby proclaim that the forces under my command are ordered beginning at 2pm Greenwich Time 24th October 1962, to interdict [prohibit and stop] the delivery of offensive weapons and associated materials to Cuba.

To enforce the order, the Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited material to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air strikes of the United States [...]

Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, wait, submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed. Any vessel or craft which fails or refuses to respond or to comply with directions shall be subjected to being taken into custody.

9. (a) Why according to Document A was Khrushchev so hostile to Kennedy when they met in Vienna in 1961? [2 marks]
 (b) What can be learnt from Document B regarding the comparative military strengths of the USA and USSR? [2 marks]
 10. Compare and contrast the views of Soviet missile policy given in Documents B, C and E. [5 marks]
 11. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents D and E for historians studying the Cuban Missile Crisis. [5 marks]
 12. Using the documents and your own knowledge, assess the extent to which Khrushchev successfully exploited President Kennedy's inexperience in the first two years of his presidency (1961–2). [6 marks]
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