IB DIPLOMA PROGRAMME
PROGRAMME DU DIPLÔME DU BI
PROGRAMA DEL DIPLOMA DEL BI

M02/310–315/HS(1)

HISTORY
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1

Monday 13 May 2002 (afternoon)

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer:
  either all questions in Section A;
  or all questions in Section B;
  or all questions in Section C.

Texts in this examination paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses (three points ...); minor changes are not indicated. Candidates should answer the questions in order.

SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1 The Russian Revolutions and the New Soviet State 1917–1929

These documents relate to the 1917 February/March Revolution (dates used are according to the old style calendar).

DOCUMENT A *Extracts from a letter to a colleague and a cable to the Tsar, both from the President of the Duma, Rodzianko, who witnessed the events of 26 and 27 February 1917 in Petrograd.*

26 February

Unexpectedly there erupted a soldier mutiny such as I have never seen. These, of course, were not soldiers but peasants, taken directly from the plough, who now found it useful to make their peasant demands. In the crowd all one could hear was, "Land and freedom", "Down with the Romanovs", "Down with the officers". In many units officers were beaten. This was joined by the workers, and anarchy reached its peak.

27 February

Situation serious. In the capital anarchy. Government paralysed. Transport of food and fuel completely disorganised. Public disaffection [discontent] growing. On the street chaotic shooting. Army units fire at each other. It is essential at once to entrust a person enjoying country's confidence with the formation of a new government. There should be no delay. All delay is death.

DOCUMENT B *An extract from the manifesto of the central committee of the Social Democrats, 27 February 1917.*

Citizens! The strongholds of Russian tsardom have fallen. The Russian people through huge efforts and at the cost of blood and many lives, have thrown off the slavery of centuries.

The task of the working class and the revolutionary army is to create a Provisional Revolutionary Government which will stand at the head of the new-born republican order. The Provisional Revolutionary Government must draw up temporary laws to defend the rights and liberties of the people, to confiscate church, landowners', government and crown lands, and transfer them to the people, to introduce the eight hour working day, and to summon a Constituent Assembly on the basis of a suffrage [right to vote] that is universal.

DOCUMENT C *An extract from **The Russian Revolution 1899-1919**, by Richard Pipes, London 1990, dealing with the Tsar's response to reports from Petrograd.*

Nicholas chose to ignore the warnings and said to his aide, "That fat fellow Rodzianko has again written me all kinds of nonsense, which I shall not even bother to answer."

But as the day went on Nicholas's equanimity [calmness] was severely tested, for Rodzianko's alarmist assessments received confirmation from sources in which he had more confidence. A cable came from Khabalov [an adviser] to the effect that he could not prevent unauthorised assemblies because the troops were in mutiny and refused to fire on the crowds. Galitsyn [prime minister] informed the Tsar at 2 pm in the name of the cabinet that the raging mobs were out of control and that the cabinet wished to resign in favour of a Duma ministry. He further recommended the imposition of martial law and the appointment of a popular general to take charge of security. Petrograd had become unmanageable.

Nicholas still thought he was facing a rebellion not a revolution: he refused to turn over control of administration to a Duma cabinet, and ordered his cabinet to remain at its post.

DOCUMENT D *Nicholas's letter of abdication, 2 March 1917.*

By the grace of God, We Nicholas II, Emperor of all the Russias, to all Our faithful subjects;

In these days of terrible struggle against the external enemy who has been trying for three years to impose his will upon Our Fatherland, God has willed that Russia should be faced with a new and formidable trial. Troubles at home threaten to have a fatal effect on this hard fought war. The destinies of Russia, the honour of Our heroic army, and the welfare of Our dear country demand that the war should be carried to a victorious conclusion at any price.

Our cruel enemy is making his supreme effort, and the moment is at hand in which Our valiant army, together with Our glorious allies will overthrow him.

In these days which are decisive for the existence of Russia, We think We should follow Our conscience by facilitating [helping to bring about] the closest co-operation of Our people and the organisation of all its resources for the speedy realisation of victory. For these reasons, in accord with the Duma, We think it Our duty to abdicate the crown and lay down the supreme power.

DOCUMENT E *Petrograd crowds burning emblems of the Imperial regime, 26 February 1917.*

1. (a) According to Document D why did Nicholas II abdicate? *[2 marks]*

(b) What message is portrayed by Document E? *[2 marks]*

2. In what ways do Documents C and E support the views expressed in Document A? *[5 marks]*

3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents B and D for historians studying the 1917 February/March Russian Revolution. *[5 marks]*

4. Using these documents and your own knowledge, explain why the 1917 February/March Russian Revolution was successful. *[6 marks]*

DOCUMENT D *An extract from **Khrushchev Remembers** by Nikita Khrushchev, Boston 1971.*

The North Koreans wanted to give a helping hand to their brethren who were under the heel of Syngman Rhee. Stalin persuaded Kim Il-sung (Kim Song-ju) to think it over. Kim returned to Moscow when he had worked everything out. [...] Stalin had his doubts. He was worried that the Americans would jump in, but we were inclined to think that if the war were fought swiftly – and Kim Il-sung was sure it could be won swiftly – then intervention by the USA could be avoided.

Nevertheless Stalin decided to ask Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung's) opinion about Kim Il-sung's suggestion. I must stress it wasn't Stalin's idea, but Kim Il-sung's. Kim was the initiator. Stalin, of course, didn't try to dissuade him. [...] Mao Zedong also answered him affirmatively. He approved Kim Il-sung's suggestion and put forward the opinion that the USA would not intervene since the war would be an internal matter which the Korean people would decide for themselves.

DOCUMENT E *An extract from **Russia, America and the Cold War 1949-1991** by Martin McCauley, London and New York 1998.*

In June 1950, there were further communist advances in Asia, as North Korea invaded South Korea, and in Vietnam the communists went on the offensive against the French and defeated them finally at Diem Bien Phu in 1954.

The death of Stalin in March 1953 and the election of President Eisenhower, committed to ending the Korean War, signalled a phase of negotiation between east and west and the ending of Cold War One. Moscow had already launched the doctrine of peaceful co-existence in 1952, following the successful explosion of its atomic bomb. War ceased to be inevitable because it was so destructive. The Russians toyed with the concept of a united, neutral Germany, but this was opposed by West Germany and France. An armistice was signed in Korea in July 1953, and a ceasefire in Indo-China in 1954. A new mood of optimism was abroad, and negotiations between east and west were held in 1954 and 1955, the first since 1947, covering Austria, Korea and Indo-China. […] The optimism soon lapsed, however.

9. (a) What does Document A reveal about the US naval response proposed by Acheson immediately following North Korea's invasion of South Korea? *[2 marks]*

(b) What message is portrayed by Document B? *[2 marks]*

10. Compare and contrast the accounts of the invasion of South Korea given in Documents C and D. *[5 marks]*

11. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents A and C for historians studying the outbreak of the Korean War. *[5 marks]*

12. Using these documents and your own knowledge, how far do you agree with the judgment, "The Korean War transformed the Cold War"? *[6 marks]*