

**HISTORY
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1**

Monday 13 May 2002 (afternoon)

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer:
 - either all questions in Section A;
 - or all questions in Section B;
 - or all questions in Section C.

Texts in this examination paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses (three points ...); minor changes are not indicated. Candidates should answer the questions in order.

SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1 The Russian Revolutions and the New Soviet State 1917–1929

These documents relate to the 1917 February/March Revolution (dates used are according to the old style calendar).

DOCUMENT A *Extracts from a letter to a colleague and a cable to the Tsar, both from the President of the Duma, Rodzianko, who witnessed the events of 26 and 27 February 1917 in Petrograd.*

26 February

Unexpectedly there erupted a soldier mutiny such as I have never seen. These, of course, were not soldiers but peasants, taken directly from the plough, who now found it useful to make their peasant demands. In the crowd all one could hear was, “Land and freedom”, “Down with the Romanovs”, “Down with the officers”. In many units officers were beaten. This was joined by the workers, and anarchy reached its peak.

27 February

Situation serious. In the capital anarchy. Government paralysed. Transport of food and fuel completely disorganised. Public disaffection [discontent] growing. On the street chaotic shooting. Army units fire at each other. It is essential at once to entrust a person enjoying country’s confidence with the formation of a new government. There should be no delay. All delay is death.

DOCUMENT B *An extract from the manifesto of the central committee of the Social Democrats, 27 February 1917.*

Citizens! The strongholds of Russian tsardom have fallen. The Russian people through huge efforts and at the cost of blood and many lives, have thrown off the slavery of centuries.

The task of the working class and the revolutionary army is to create a Provisional Revolutionary Government which will stand at the head of the new-born republican order. The Provisional Revolutionary Government must draw up temporary laws to defend the rights and liberties of the people, to confiscate church, landowners’, government and crown lands, and transfer them to the people, to introduce the eight hour working day, and to summon a Constituent Assembly on the basis of a suffrage [right to vote] that is universal.

DOCUMENT C *An extract from **The Russian Revolution 1899-1919**, by Richard Pipes, London 1990, dealing with the Tsar’s response to reports from Petrograd.*

Nicholas chose to ignore the warnings and said to his aide, “That fat fellow Rodzianko has again written me all kinds of nonsense, which I shall not even bother to answer.”

But as the day went on Nicholas’s equanimity [calmness] was severely tested, for Rodzianko’s alarmist assessments received confirmation from sources in which he had more confidence. A cable came from Khabalov [an adviser] to the effect that he could not prevent unauthorised assemblies because the troops were in mutiny and refused to fire on the crowds. Galitsyn [prime minister] informed the Tsar at 2 pm in the name of the cabinet that the raging mobs were out of control and that the cabinet wished to resign in favour of a Duma ministry. He further recommended the imposition of martial law and the appointment of a popular general to take charge of security. Petrograd had become unmanageable.

Nicholas still thought he was facing a rebellion not a revolution: he refused to turn over control of administration to a Duma cabinet, and ordered his cabinet to remain at its post.

DOCUMENT D *Nicholas’s letter of abdication, 2 March 1917.*

By the grace of God, We Nicholas II, Emperor of all the Russias, to all Our faithful subjects;

In these days of terrible struggle against the external enemy who has been trying for three years to impose his will upon Our Fatherland, God has willed that Russia should be faced with a new and formidable trial. Troubles at home threaten to have a fatal effect on this hard fought war. The destinies of Russia, the honour of Our heroic army, and the welfare of Our dear country demand that the war should be carried to a victorious conclusion at any price.

Our cruel enemy is making his supreme effort, and the moment is at hand in which Our valiant army, together with Our glorious allies will overthrow him.

In these days which are decisive for the existence of Russia, We think We should follow Our conscience by facilitating [helping to bring about] the closest co-operation of Our people and the organisation of all its resources for the speedy realisation of victory. For these reasons, in accord with the Duma, We think it Our duty to abdicate the crown and lay down the supreme power.

DOCUMENT E *Petrograd crowds burning emblems of the Imperial regime, 26 February 1917.*



1. (a) According to Document D why did Nicholas II abdicate? *[2 marks]*
(b) What message is portrayed by Document E? *[2 marks]*

2. In what ways do Documents C and E support the views expressed in Document A? *[5 marks]*

3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents B and D for historians studying the 1917 February/March Russian Revolution. *[5 marks]*

4. Using these documents and your own knowledge, explain why the 1917 February/March Russian Revolution was successful. *[6 marks]*

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SECTION B

Prescribed Subject 2 Origins of the Second World War in Asia 1931–1941

These documents relate to Japanese policy in East Asia and western reaction to it in the years 1932 to 1940.

DOCUMENT A *An extract from the Summary of Fundamental National Policies made by the second Koenoe cabinet on 1 August 1940.*

1. Basic Policy

The basic aim of Japan's national policy lies in the firm establishment of world peace in accordance with the spirit of Hakko Ichiu [whole world under one rule], in which the country was founded, and in the construction, as the first step, of a new order in Greater East Asia, having for its foundation the solidarity of Japan, Manchoukuo [Manchuria] and China.

Japan will, therefore, devote the total strength of the nation to the fulfilment of the above policy by setting up swiftly a firm national structure of her own, adapted to meet the requirements of new developments both at home and abroad.

2. National Defense and Foreign Policy

The Government will develop armaments adequate for the execution of the national policies, by taking into consideration the new developments both at home and abroad, and constructing a state structure for national defense, capable of bringing into full play the total strength of the nation.

Japan's foreign policy, which aims ultimately at the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, will be directed, first of all, toward a complete settlement of the China Affair, and the changes in the international situation.

DOCUMENT B *A Western view of Japan, early 1930s. The figure represents a Japanese soldier.*



CAN HIS APPETITE BE SATISFIED?

DOCUMENT C *An extract from a secret talk given by Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) to military officers in Hankow in 1934.*

The Japanese have been doing their best to obtain domination of the Pacific Ocean. It is not so much the problem between China and Japan, as it is the problem between Japan and the whole world. Why? Our late Party leader, Dr. Sun Yatsen (Sun Yat-sen), plainly told us: “China occupies the status of a semi-colony.” What is a semi-colony? It is a country which is oppressed or protected by a group of nations, thus becoming a common colony to them all.

Japan, however, has been trying to make China her colony, and in order to attain this object, she will have to fight the world powers. If Japan cannot wage a decisive war with the world powers, she will not be able to dominate Asia, nor will she be able to solve the Pacific problem. In that case, she cannot become the dominant power in Asia, and she cannot swallow China. As long as Japan is unable to conquer the world, she cannot destroy China or dominate Asia.

DOCUMENT D *The Stimson Doctrine of Non-recognition, 7 January 1932 sent by the American Government to the Governments of China and Japan.*

With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria [Manchoukuo], as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorised by the Council of the League of Nations will make an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan possible. But in view of the present situation the American Government regards it to be its duty to notify both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese Government that it does not intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or their agents, which may impair [affect] the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity [unity] of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy.

DOCUMENT E *An extract from **Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia 1894–1942** by Richard Storry, London 1979.*

It can be said that public opinion in Britain and America, although by now deeply stirred by events in the Far East, may not have been prepared for a war that was not obviously one of national self-defence.

Be that as it may, such risks had to be accepted if America and Britain hoped to preserve their interests, not to mention their prestige, in the Far East. There was lacking, however, the necessary Anglo-American unity of purpose that a bold course required. Compensation and apologies, unreservedly offered by Japan, were accepted; Washington and London made no further demands. The sense of relief in Tokyo could be felt on all sides.

5. (a) According to Document C, what does Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) regard as Japan's aim and what does he believe will prevent it being fulfilled? [2 marks]
- (b) What does Document B reveal about the attitude of the West towards Japan at the time? [2 marks]
6. How consistent are Documents A, C and D in their view of Japanese intentions in East Asia? [5 marks]
7. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents A and C for historians studying Sino-Japanese relations in the period 1932 to 1940. [5 marks]
8. Using these documents and your own knowledge, assess the role of the western powers, in particular the United States and Great Britain, in the conflict between Japan and China in the period 1932 to 1940. [6 marks]

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SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War 1945–1964

These documents relate to developments in the Cold War in the early 1950s.

DOCUMENT A *An extract from the memoirs of Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State 1949-1953, New York 1969.*


Monday June 26th 1950

In response to the President's request for suggestions I recommended that:

- The Air Force and Navy should give all-out support to the Korean forces, for the time being confining their efforts to the south of the 38th parallel.
- The Seventh Fleet should be ordered to prevent an attack on Formosa (Taiwan) and the Nationalists told not to attack the mainland. [...]
- Aid to Indo-China should be increased and we should propose to the French that we need a strong military mission.
- At the Security Council meeting called for the next day we should propose a new resolution calling on UN members to give Korea such help as might be needed to repel the armed attack and restore peace in the area. If Malik [USSR representative in the UN] returned to the Security Council and vetoed the resolution we should have to carry on under the existing one [calling for withdrawal to the 38th parallel]. If he did not return, it would pass without opposition.

DOCUMENT B *Cartoon by David Low in the **Evening Standard**, a London newspaper, July 1950.
[The person holding the hand of the United Nations is President Truman.]*

INTO ACTION



“In memory of the League of Nations. Died of lack of exercise facing wanton aggression.”

DOCUMENT C *An extract from **History of the United States of America** by Hugh Brogan,
London and New York 1985.*

It is difficult to recapture the atmosphere of the late 1940s, when it seemed self-evident to Washington that Stalin controlled a monolithic [massive] movement. [...] The invasion of South Korea by North Korea on 25 June 1950 was automatically seen as a deliberate test of Western wills. It was assumed, whether correctly or not may never be known (since it is hard to foresee the day when the Soviet and North Korean archives will be opened), that the North Koreans would never have dared to act without the express authorization, indeed orders, of Stalin. The Chinese communists were discounted [disregarded]: they too were supposed to be mere tools of the Kremlin. This was the moment long awaited, long feared. If Stalin were allowed to succeed, the United States would be shamed for ever; worse, the security of Japan and the entire western Pacific would be threatened. Stalin might even be sufficiently encouraged by Western inaction to attempt some feat in Europe. So the line had to be drawn here, now.

DOCUMENT D *An extract from **Khrushchev Remembers** by Nikita Khrushchev, Boston 1971.*

The North Koreans wanted to give a helping hand to their brethren who were under the heel of Syngman Rhee. Stalin persuaded Kim Il-sung (Kim Song-ju) to think it over. Kim returned to Moscow when he had worked everything out. [...] Stalin had his doubts. He was worried that the Americans would jump in, but we were inclined to think that if the war were fought swiftly – and Kim Il-sung was sure it could be won swiftly – then intervention by the USA could be avoided.

Nevertheless Stalin decided to ask Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung's) opinion about Kim Il-sung's suggestion. I must stress it wasn't Stalin's idea, but Kim Il-sung's. Kim was the initiator. Stalin, of course, didn't try to dissuade him. [...] Mao Zedong also answered him affirmatively. He approved Kim Il-sung's suggestion and put forward the opinion that the USA would not intervene since the war would be an internal matter which the Korean people would decide for themselves.

DOCUMENT E *An extract from **Russia, America and the Cold War 1949-1991** by Martin McCauley, London and New York 1998.*

In June 1950, there were further communist advances in Asia, as North Korea invaded South Korea, and in Vietnam the communists went on the offensive against the French and defeated them finally at Diem Bien Phu in 1954.

The death of Stalin in March 1953 and the election of President Eisenhower, committed to ending the Korean War, signalled a phase of negotiation between east and west and the ending of Cold War One. Moscow had already launched the doctrine of peaceful co-existence in 1952, following the successful explosion of its atomic bomb. War ceased to be inevitable because it was so destructive. The Russians toyed with the concept of a united, neutral Germany, but this was opposed by West Germany and France. An armistice was signed in Korea in July 1953, and a ceasefire in Indo-China in 1954. A new mood of optimism was abroad, and negotiations between east and west were held in 1954 and 1955, the first since 1947, covering Austria, Korea and Indo-China. [...] The optimism soon lapsed, however.

9. (a) What does Document A reveal about the US naval response proposed by Acheson immediately following North Korea’s invasion of South Korea? *[2 marks]*
- (b) What message is portrayed by Document B? *[2 marks]*
10. Compare and contrast the accounts of the invasion of South Korea given in Documents C and D. *[5 marks]*
11. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents A and C for historians studying the outbreak of the Korean War. *[5 marks]*
12. Using these documents and your own knowledge, how far do you agree with the judgment, “The Korean War transformed the Cold War”? *[6 marks]*
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