



# **MARKSCHEME**

**November 2001**

**HISTORY - AFRICA**

**Higher Level**

**Paper 3**

## Notes on Individual Questions

1. **Explain why the transatlantic slave trade from West Africa continued into the second half of the nineteenth century. When and why did it eventually end?**

A two part question where the two parts should be reasonably balanced (*[12 marks]* maximum if one part is ignored) and focused on the explanations required.

### Reasons for continuation

- motivation for abolition was based on European, not African perceptions of economic interests and moral standards;
- adjustment to legitimate trade was more difficult for Africans than Europeans;
- demand for slaves continued in the Americas and profits for those prepared to take the risks were greater;
- the British naval blockade was not very effective because of the length and nature of the West African coast line.

### When and why did it end?

(Do not expect a precise date for its end, but rather some indication of the ‘beginning of the end’.)

- the end of the demand from the Americas (at the end of the American Civil War and later in Brazil and Cuba) was a crucial factor;
- the gradual realisation by most Africans that their economic future lay in the production of legitimate crops and other products;
- pressure from increased efficiency of the naval blockade; and from missionaries to abandon an immoral trade;
- the banning of the trade by the Berlin West Africa Conference (1884-1885) increased international pressure;
- the spread of European colonial control.

*[8 to 10 marks]* for narrative answers with some implicit assessment.

*[11 to 13 marks]* for answers which contain some explicit explanation of continuation and end but are not always analytical and well argued.

*[14 to 16 marks]* for well organised answers with an adequately supported argument.

*[17 to 18 marks]* or higher for answers with an analytical approach covering a wide and balanced selection of the above points, depending on the extent of the coverage and the persuasiveness of arguments.

2. **‘Tewodros II of Ethiopia was a man with a vision.’ Why did he fail to turn his vision into a reality?**

Tewodros’ ‘vision’ (or aims) should be briefly identified at the start: the unification and modernisation of Ethiopia after a century of turmoil during the ‘era of the Princes’. Other associated aims in addition to the two broad ones above, could include: the creation of a well equipped standing army; the eradication of Islam; a reduction of the wealth and privileges of the church; a reduction in the power of the Rases. The means adopted for the achievement of the aims should be described: the centralisation of power under the Emperor or King of Kings; reforms in the army, the church, the law, land ownership and taxation. Cumulatively these reforms roused widespread opposition as did the manner and style of their implementation. The regular use of the army to enforce his views and policies, and crush opposition alienated and antagonised many different sections of society– the nobles, the clergy and the peasants. His foreign policy was equally tactless and insensitive and he ended up facing a British military expedition and the desertion of most of his army. The vision remained, however, to be pursued by his successors.

An answer on these lines would deserve a mark in one of the two top mark bands. Omission of definition of ‘vision’ (aims) would reduce maximum to **[6 marks]**.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for answers with a lack of focus on the key phrase: ‘Why did he fail...’ (or even lower, for an inadequate narrative).

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers containing satisfactory details and explanation of failure.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for focused, persuasive and well supported answers to the key phrase. A conclusion which suggests that the vision lived and became a reality under his successors, would help to place answers in one of the two top bands.

**3. Assess the impact of the establishment of the capital of the Omani Sultanate in Zanzibar on the East African mainland and its peoples.**

In good answers the approach must be analytical. The time frame should start in 1840, the year when the Omani capital was moved to Zanzibar. The impact under Seyyid Said was economic as his interest in the mainland was mainly commercial, though some of his successors also had political ambitions. Under Seyyid Said trade with the mainland increased substantially, and was carried out through a well organised caravan system, financed by Indians and led by Arab Swahili merchants. There was a focus on slaves and ivory and the impact was mixed. It was partly negative (economic, political and social disruption caused by wars to capture slaves; land was laid waste, agriculture interrupted and population drastically reduced), and partly positive (though slave trading caused political chaos in many areas, in others it led to the rise of new states like the ‘empire’ of Tippu Tip and that of the Nyamwezi under Mirambo). The growing number of Arab-Swahili traders penetrating the interior as far as the Great Lakes and Buganda led to the spread of Islam and the Swahili language as a ‘lingua franca’. Zanzibar became a gateway to the interior for European explorers, missionaries and, eventually, European imperialists. Some of this impact was difficult to classify but was certainly far-reaching and included moves to end the slave trade and undermine the political power of the Omani.

For a mark in the two top bands answers must show the mixed nature of the impact of the Omani presence *e.g.* positive/negative; economic/political/cultural.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for narrative answers with implicit assessment of ‘impact’.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for analytical answers which contain some explicit attention to ‘impact’.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for well organised answers, focused upon a wide-ranging analysis and assessment of impact as indicated above.

**4. Assess the achievements and importance in African history of JaJa of Opobo.**

There should be two parts to answers to this question. Candidates are likely to write more on achievements than on ‘importance’. JaJa was an outstanding example of a ‘new man’ who rose to power because of his skill and talent in the commercial field. He was involved, during a period of transition, in facing challenges from Europeans in the fields of trade and culture. He supported traditional religion and culture and helped his state to respond successfully to new economic and political circumstances. JaJa was aggressive in face of these new challenges; but eventually a victim of the imperial ambitions of Europeans.

*[8 to 10 marks]* will be scored for narrative answers with implicit assessment of achievements and importance.

*[11 to 13 marks]* for answers which contain more explicit assessment of achievement and importance.

*[14 to 16+ marks]* could be given for answers with clear focus on assessment of achievements and importance in African history. No answer will reach *[17 to 18 marks]* or *[19 to 20 marks]* without identifying importance in African history.

**5. Compare and contrast the work of Shaka Zulu and Mosheshwe of the Sotho, as African state builders.**

There is plenty of scope here for a running ‘compare/contrast’ approach. The most significant contrast between Shaka and Mosheshwe as state builders is that the former is an outstanding example of an aggressive state builder and the latter of a defensive one. The two were alike in being helped by, or taking advantage of, the Mfecane and of relations with foreign traders and/or missionaries. Both depended heavily on their military strength and skills. Shaka introduced radical military reforms which led to social and political reforms in the Zulu state. Mosheshwe was assisted by the mountainous character of his kingdom in defending and consolidating it. He offered refuge to many of the tribes who were terrorised by, and fled from, Shaka. Shaka expanded and consolidated the Zulu kingdom by attacking and absorbing others along with their lands. Look for specific examples of these aspects of the two leaders.

If only one ruler is addressed **[8 marks]** cannot be reached.

Candidates who have a running comparison/contrast approach should be rewarded more highly than those who produce two end-on accounts of the work of the two leaders. The first type of approach, accompanied by specific examples of their work will deserve a mark in one of the two top bands. The second will barely reach the **[11 to 13 marks]** band, or the top of the **[8 to 10 marks]** band if the answer lacks illustrative detail.

Unbalanced answers which show little knowledge of one of the two men will struggle to get beyond **[10 marks]**.

**6. Why was the Berlin West Africa Conference held in 1884-85 and why did its decisions lead to the acceleration of the European partition of Africa?**

An accurate knowledge of the chronology and interaction of events relating to the partition of Africa between 1876 and 1884 is necessary if this question is to be effectively answered. By 1884 increased European interest in Africa was threatening to get out of control and to end in a European war. The old concept of ‘informal empire’ was no longer tenable as trade rivalry intensified. Leopold’s activities in the Congo basin stimulated interest amongst, and action by, other powers: De Brazza’s treaty with Makoko, Britain’s occupation of Egypt in 1882 led Bismarck, prompted by Portugal, to summon the conference in order to control the potentially dangerous situation.

The conference powers took certain decisions which laid down the ground rules for the future partition of Africa: the establishment of ‘spheres of influence’; and the need for ‘effective occupation’ as a pre-condition for a claim to occupy territory. The second of these decisions stimulated a spate of activity amongst European powers to satisfy the demand for effective occupation in the years immediately following the conference. For a mark in one of the two top bands a few examples of such activity should be given with details of claims, treaty making and perhaps reference to the role of chartered companies. The two parts of the question should also be reasonably evenly balanced for **[14+ marks]**; and failure to answer the second part of the question will restrict the maximum mark to **[12 marks]**.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for narrative answers with implicit explanations.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for narrative answers with interwoven explicit explanations.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for answers which are reasonably balanced between the two parts, are well supported with accurate knowledge, and focused on explanation of both parts of the question.

**7. Explain why, and with what results, independent African Churches were widely established in Africa before 1914.**

This is a two part question and candidates should give specific examples to support general points in each part. The presence of the word ‘widely’ indicates that these examples should be taken from different parts of the continent.

Why

On the religious side Africans established Independent churches as a protest against the slow progress made by mission controlled churches in ordaining Africans to the priesthood and in promoting them to higher posts in the church hierarchy. Once established Independent churches also played a leading role in protesting against aspects of colonial rule which led to the exploitation of Africans, such as land alienation; various forms of taxation; use of forced labour.

**Examples**

The best examples of the emergence of these churches before 1914 is found in:

- **Southern Africa:** the Thembu Church (Nehemiah Tile in Cape Colony, 1883); the Ethiopian Church (James Dwane, 1896). By 1913 over 30 Ethiopian churches existed, the name being inspired by Ethiopia’s victory over the Italians at Adowa in 1896.
- **Malawi** here independent churches were especially associated with protests against colonial rule. The main leaders were Eliot Kamwana (the Watch Tower movement); Charles Domingo (the Watch Tower movement and later the Seventh Day Baptists) who also established many independent schools; John Chilembwe, who went to the USA with Charles Booth and returned as an ordained priest in 1900. He was the most anti-colonial of all, and set up the Baptist Independent Mission and helped establish the Natives’ Industrial Union. He also led the Chilembwe Rising in 1915, an anti-colonial rising, directed particularly against the recruitment of Africans to fight in the First World War.
- **West Africa** the main leaders were Mojola Agbebi and William Wade Harris. Agbebi was associated with several independent churches in Nigeria including the African baptist Church (1888); the United Native African Church (1891) and the African Bethel Church (1901). Harris, a Liberian Protestant evangelist, moved in 1913 to Ivory Coast where he had the greatest success in terms of the number of converts.

Results

These varied from church to church. All led protests against outside influence and control of churches in Africa. Only Chilembwe carried protest to the point of open rebellion. Most leaders (Kamwana, Agbebi, Wade Harris) were opposed to the use of violence. All advocated education as a means of promoting higher living standards in Africa and stimulating progress generally. All believed that Christianity in Africa must come to terms with African culture. They were early examples of members of the educated elite becoming African Nationalists.

For a mark in one of the top two bands candidates must answer both parts of the question with specific examples from at least two main regions.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for narrative answers with some implicit explanation of establishment and some reference to results.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers which contain some, perhaps unbalanced, response to both parts of the question.

**[14 to 16 marks]** for well organised, balanced and analytical answers with examples relating to independent churches from more than one region.



**8. Analyse the achievements of *either* of Menelik II, King of Shewa and Emperor of Ethiopia, *or* of Mutesa I, Kabaka of Buganda.**

This is a question in which a substantial degree of narrative will only be acceptable if accompanied by some explanation of the chosen ruler's achievements. This should include a brief reference to the position inherited by either Menelik or Mutesa from his predecessor(s), in addition to the personal ability and skills (diplomatic, military *etc.*) of the ruler himself. Note that in the case of Menelik the achievements include those as king of Shewa as well as Emperor. A variety of other factors would be relevant such as the military leadership of Ras Alula, the geographical features of Ethiopia, and the errors and incompetence of the Italians to account for Menelik's victory over the Italians. In the case of Mutesa it would be relevant to mention the fertility and economic strength of Buganda, and Mutesa's encouragement of contact with foreigners who might help to strengthen his own and his country's position.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for narrative answers with implicit analysis, if the candidate has failed to account for achievements.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers which contain a reasonable depth of analysis and explanation of achievements.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for answers which are focused on analysis and explanation of achievement of the chosen ruler. A conclusion which took the form of a considered assessment of the achievements would help to place an answer in any of the two top markbands.

**9. Why did Samori Toure succeed in creating the Mandinka Empire but fail to protect it from French conquest?**

Here explanation and analysis should dominate the answer and the narrative element be kept to a minimum. Samori's personal strengths as a soldier, trader, administrator, and Islamic leader should all be mentioned as reasons for his success in building the Mandinka Empire. He was aware of the importance of a well organised, well equipped standing army and a flourishing economy. The state organised agriculture and ensured supplies for the army. The state also controlled markets and trade. He set up an armament industry staffed by Mandinka smiths in government workshops. He was aware of the importance of winning African support by marriage alliances and gaining time by diplomacy.

However, after the first, short, and indecisive war against France (1882-1886) things began to go wrong for Samori. Before war was resumed against France (1891-1898) he had fought an unnecessary and disastrous war against Sikasso and failed to persuade Ahmadu, ruler of the Tukolor Empire, to become his ally against the French. In spite of a fighting withdrawal into a second empire, continued support from most of his people, and skilful military tactics designed to avoid direct confrontation with the French, he was forced to surrender in face of the overwhelmingly superior weaponry of the French. Perhaps above all, after the Berlin West Africa Conference, European solidarity against Africans held firm whilst Africans failed to unite to oppose European aggression. Unfortunately Samori's success in creating his empire came at a time when the European 'scramble for Africa' was reaching its climax.

*[8 to 10 marks]* for narrative answers with limited explanation..

*[11 to 13 marks]* for answers as long as both rise and fall receive some explanation.

*[14 to 16+ marks]* for answers which contain reasonably equal balance between explanations of Samori's success in creating the Mandinka Empire, and his failure to protect it.

10. **‘The African response to European expansion varied but the outcome was always European domination.’ With reference to the policies of *either* Lobengula, *and/or* Lewanika, to what extent do you agree with this statement?**

A good introduction could take the form of briefly noting the varied response of different African rulers/people from violent resistance to collaboration, with combinations of the two in between. Reference might be made to the view that ‘Resisters were always losers, collaborators were gainers.’ The quote invites candidates to give their views **but with reference to the response of either Lobengula or Lewanika** or both. Traditionally many see the former as a ‘resister’ (though in fact he tried hard to cooperate without surrendering his sovereignty) and the latter as a collaborator. Both ended up as losers but the manner of the losses of Lewanika and his people was less violent and sudden than those of Lobengula and the Ndebele.

*[8 to 10 marks]* for answers, written in general terms, about the policies of Lobengula and/or Lewanika with only implicit reference to outcome.

*[11 to 13 marks]* for answers with clearer focus on the African response and its relation to the ‘outcome’.

*[14 to 16+ marks]* answers will be analytical and well argued and contain a response to the question “to what extent do you agree with this statement”. A mark in the two top bands should **not** be awarded unless this last element is present, and is compatible with the evidence provided.

**11. Explain why the Tswana of Bechuanaland sought British protection, but the Nama and Herero in South West Africa resisted German occupation.**

This is another question on African response to Europeans, asking candidates to explain the different responses of three African peoples. The approach should take the form of an analysis of the motives of the Tswana who chose to ask for British protection in 1885, after their territory had been declared a British sphere of influence at the Berlin West Africa Conference. The choice of the Tswana rulers was a wise one taken in the knowledge that the British were anxious to pre-empt a Boer or German move to take over the territory. The declaration of a British Protectorate was formalised in 1891. A similar analysis should be made of the motives of the Nama and Herero who chose to resist the Germans from 1884 to 1894, then signed an armistice and cooperated with the Germans against other South West African tribes until 1904, when they once again resisted because of their treatment by German government and settlers with loss of land and cattle. Herero resistance ended late in 1905. Nama resistance continued until 1909.

This question does not require candidates to go beyond explaining the motives behind the response of the three African peoples.

*[8 to 10 marks]* for narrative answers on all three peoples with only implicit explanation.

*[11 to 13 marks]* for answers which contain some explicit explanation.

*[14 to 16 marks]* for answers which show the kind of analysis suggested above, but without placing motivation in a broader context.

*[17 to 20 marks]* for answers provided their analysis of motives is sound, that show awareness of the context/time frame of the question - beginning with the meeting of the Berlin West Africa Conference, and the impact of the decisions taken there to establish spheres of influence and lay down the doctrine of effective occupation which led to the climax of the European partition of Africa.

**12. In what ways, and with what results, did the South African Act of 1909 affect future black/white relations in South Africa?**

Albert Luthuli, leader of the ANC in the 1950s called the South Africa Act of 1909 ‘the great Segregation Act’. Candidates should try to identify ways in which the South Africa Act set the future pattern of black/white relations in South Africa. The symbol of the continuance of white supremacy and segregation of the white and non-white peoples in South Africa were the Act’s decisions on the franchise: no nonwhites were eligible to stand for election to the legislature; and the right to vote was granted only in Cape Province where it had previously existed, and was now protected by an entrenched clause in the constitution of the Union of South Africa. This denial of political rights and powers to non-whites, set the pattern for segregation of the races and discrimination against non-whites which was developed by legislation enacted by the white minority over the next half century until it culminated in the system of Apartheid between 1948 and 1960. Examples of this legislation included the Mines and Works Acts of 1911 and 1926 (establishment of industrial colour bar); the Natives Land Act of 1913 which defined African reserves in the country, the only areas where non-whites had the **right** to live. (These reserves were later to become the future ‘Bantu Homelands’ in 1959 under full scale apartheid). The Native Urban Areas Act in 1923 regulated the presence of non-whites in towns in ‘White South Africa’. In 1936, in spite of the so called ‘entrenched clauses’ meant to protect the voting rights of non-whites in Cape Province, black Africans lost their right to vote in 1936 in Hertzog’s Segregation Laws. In 1956 the Cape Coloureds also lost their voting rights. A few more examples of segregation of, and discrimination against, non whites between 1948 and 1960 should also be expected for a mark in the two top bands e.g. Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949); the Pass Laws (1952); Bantu Education Act (1953); Separate Amenities Act (Petty Apartheid) (1953).

**[8 to 10 marks]** for answers containing general remarks about the Act and its effect on future black/white relations.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers which demonstrate specific knowledge of the Act linked with future developments.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for answers which show, with examples, ways in which the Act set the pattern of future black/white relations in South Africa with the mark depending on the appropriateness of arguments and examples used.

**13. Why, and with what results, did Britain change her system of colonial administration in her African colonies between 1890 and 1922?**

Why

The reasons for change had much to do with the high cost implications of continuing to implement assimilation, and with the difficulties of finding British officials in sufficient numbers to administer an expanding colonial empire. The influence of the ‘racist’ views of Social Darwinism was also partly responsible for the abandonment of assimilation. Finally Lugard, the architect of Indirect Rule, argued that this was the best way of preparing Africans to take responsibility for eventually ruling themselves.

With what results

Indirect rule as a system worked with varying degrees of success. It worked best in areas where a system of government under traditional chiefs already existed *e.g.* as in the Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria. Where no such traditional system existed (*e.g.* in Iboland, SE Nigeria, or where once traditional systems had undergone change *e.g.* in parts of the old Oyo Empire in SW Nigeria) misunderstandings and conflict arose. British attempts to create ‘warrant chiefs’ in Iboland, thus ignoring the existing segmentary system, led to riots in the 1920s. The switch to Indirect rule also aroused opposition from the educated elite, particularly in West Africa, where this group had begun to occupy positions of responsibility under assimilation. There was no role for the educated elite under indirect rule and they now began to campaign for changes in the system *e.g.* to fight for the establishment of more elected members on legislative councils. In the long run this class would be the new rulers of Africa when colonies achieved their independence. Lugard had been wrong in thinking that indirect rule was the best way to train Africans to rule themselves. Ruling through traditional chiefs had one serious disadvantage: it was neither progressive nor liberal. It perpetuated traditional, conservative societies interested in serving their own interests and retaining their power. The educated elite resented this.

Some answers may be written with reference to Nigeria or even Northern Nigeria alone. Such answers will be very narrow, given the wording of the question. To get beyond **[10 marks]** candidates must show some knowledge of British rule outside West Africa, *e.g.* in East and/or Central Africa.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for descriptive answers with some implicit explanation.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers which address reasons for change and its results but with little supporting detail.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for sound answers to both parts of this question which support general points with some accurate specific knowledge from more than one region.

**14. Explain the nature of African opposition to colonial rule in *either* British or French West Africa between the two World Wars.**

The various primary resistance movements were over before the end of the First World War. Opposition was now secondary opposition carried out by the educated elite. There were basic differences between African opposition to colonial rule in British and French West Africa between the two World Wars. There were far more explicitly political opposition movements in British than in French West Africa. This was because the French colonial system of Association provided a role for the educated elites within the African territories and, theoretically at least, the opportunity for 'citizens' to be elected to the French Assembly. British Indirect Rule on the other hand had no place within the system for educated Africans who, therefore, campaigned for changes in the British system. These political movements included Herbert Macaulay's Nigerian National Democratic Party and the National Congress of British West Africa led by Casely Hayford. Both campaigned for the inclusion of more elected members on the new Legislative Councils in British colonies. Macaulay's movement was Nigerian based and won all of the elected seats on the Nigerian Legislative Council as well as on the Lagos Municipal Council following the constitutional changes in Nigeria in 1922. Casely Hayford's movement attracted membership from British West Africa as a whole and had only limited success in winning elected seats. Casely Hayford was critical of the arrangements for filling places on the Legislative Council in the Gold Coast because these gave more weight to indirect choice by Councils of Chiefs than to direct election by popular vote. The colonial government made the most of these clashes between Africans. Casely Hayford died in 1930 and little more was heard of his movement.

In the 1930s, opposition came mainly from various youth movements whose members were disillusioned with the older elite politicians. These youth movements were based on individual colonies and could claim to be the first genuine 'nationalist movements'. The aims of the Nigerian Youth Movement, founded in 1934, included the 'unification of the different tribes in Nigeria' and the 'complete autonomy for Nigeria within the British Empire and economic opportunities equal to those enjoyed by foreigners.' Similar movements, like the West African Youth League, and the Gold Coast Youth Movement were formed in 1938 and based in Freetown and Accra respectively .

The African Press, active in British West Africa since the 1930s, was the most consistent organ of opposition. It supported African claims to self-government, watched over African interests against the colonial administration and reported black political activities outside as well as inside West Africa. The most famous journalist was Namdi Azikwe, later a leading politician in Nigeria. In 1937 he launched a group of openly propagandist papers, most famous of which was the **West African Pilot**. News was selected to show the injustices and inequalities of colonialism.

In French West Africa there were few political opposition movements other than the Young Senegalese Party which had been founded before the First World War. Criticism and opposition took the form of cultural protest through the 'Negritude' movement which kept alive the cultural traditions of West Africa in protest against the earlier assimilationist policies of the French. Its most famous exponent was Leopold Senghor. Political application was much rarer in French than in British West Africa.

**N.B.** Do *not* expect all of the above.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for narrative answers with implicit explanation.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for analytical answers containing fuller, and explicit explanation.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for answers which focus on the nature of, and reasons for, African opposition in either British or French West Africa, illustrated with specific examples.

**15. How and why did the two World Wars stimulate the growth of nationalist movements in Africa?**

Of the two World Wars, the Second had by far the greatest effect in promoting nationalism in Africa. The impact of the two wars had been achieved in the same basic way: by bringing significant numbers of Africans into contact with each other and with people from other countries in different war zones and giving Africans opportunities to travel to, and observe, other places and their inhabitants, their standards of living and systems of government. Myths about the superiority of white people over black/coloured peoples were corrected or at least modified. This was particularly true of the Second World War during which the Japanese, a coloured people, had inflicted crushing defeats on the British, French and Americans. After the wars many Africans returned home knowing something about democracy and politics. Soon after the Second World War mass political parties emerged in Africa led by very able leaders whose aims were to achieve self government and independence.

- The Mandate System of the League of Nations, founded after the First World War, had established a system which monitored the rule of the colonial powers who had taken over ex-German colonies in the interests of the native peoples. Africans interested in improving their lot quickly learned how this system could help them to achieve self-government and eventually independence. After both World Wars the colonial powers, though finally victorious, were no longer as confident or as capable of bearing the financial responsibilities of empire as before.
- During the Second World War allied leaders had met to discuss issues like Human Rights, and a new world organisation to take the place of the old League of Nations. The two ‘Super Powers’, the USA and Soviet Russia, who had been allies of the two main colonial powers, Britain and France, vied with each other in denouncing colonialism. Their attitude encouraged Africans to campaign for independence and thus fuelled African nationalism.

If only one World War is mentioned the maximum mark would be **[12 marks]**.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for narrative/descriptive answers with implicit attention to ‘how’ and ‘why’, usually addressed together.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers which focus explicitly on ‘how’ and ‘why’ with specific examples.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for analytical answers which use specific material from both World Wars. Marks in the two top bands should only be awarded to answers which refer to the Mandate System of the League of Nations and the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, parts of the new world order which emerged from the two World Wars and had an impact on the growth of African nationalism.



**16. For what reasons, and in what ways, did French colonial policy in Africa change between the end of the Second World War and 1960.**

Material relating to any of France's African colonies could be used in answers to this question. The essential change in French policy was the abandonment of the notion that France's overseas territories were, and would remain, overseas provinces of France and the decision to grant complete independence to most of them. This had happened in most cases by 1960.

In 1946 a French Union was created in which the colonies or overseas territories would become partners with Metropolitan France. The colonies would have their own assemblies but would also send representatives to the Paris Assembly. All inhabitants would become French citizens and forced labour would be abolished. A decisive change took place in 1958 when President de Gaulle, in a referendum, offered France's West African territories the choice of self-government within a French Community or complete independence with all links with France broken. This was the first time that French colonies had been offered independence. Though initially only Guinea under Sekou Toure chose independence, by 1960 all French colonies in French West and Equatorial Africa had become independent.

Changes had come earlier in North Africa. With the French under increasing pressure from the War of Liberation in Algeria, nationalists in both Morocco and Tunisia won independence in March 1956. France had already lost her territories in Indochina and the stability of the French state itself was at stake if Algeria, with its large population of French colons, was also lost. These were the main reasons for the 'U-turn' in French colonial policy in Tropical Africa. However, pressure from other African leaders had contributed to the change. There had been differences of opinion between the three main West African leaders, Senghor in Senegal, Houphouet-Boigny in Ivory Coast and Sekou Toure in Guinea over the Loi Cadre in 1956. The Gold Coast's achievement of independence from Britain in 1957 had also had an impact on French West African leaders.

*[8 to 10 marks]* for descriptive answers about French colonial policy with implicit mention of change in a basic, general way.

*[11 to 13 marks]* for answers with some comment on the nature of, and the reasons for change.

*[14 to 16 marks]* for answers with specific analysis and details which explain why and how French colonial policy changed.

*[17+ marks]* for answers which identify the major changes in French policy and explain them in terms of pressures throughout the French Empire which threatened the security of France itself and other pressures from events elsewhere in Africa.

**17. Compare and contrast the struggle for independence in Kenya and Tanganyika.**

There is plenty of material to make both comparisons and contrasts though the latter are easier to find than the former.

Much depended on the **Leadership** of the independence movements. In both countries the independence movement had an able, popular and charismatic leader. In Kenya Jomo Kenyatta had returned to his country in 1946 and was immediately recognised as leader of the Kenya African Union (KAU). In the next 5 years political progress towards African participation in politics was slow. Africans became frustrated and impatient and in October 1952 the Mau Mau resistance movement began amongst the Kikuyu, Kenyatta's own tribe. The British governors were suspicious of Kenyatta who was arrested with many other Africans and accused of leading and managing the rising. Though no firm evidence was produced and Kenyatta always disclaimed any link with Mau Mau, he was convicted and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. He was released in 1959 but confined to the Northern Province and banned from active politics until 1961. Even in prison, however, he remained the country's 'de facto' leader.

Nyerere in contrast was never imprisoned and remained, throughout the independence movement, its unchallenged leader. In 1952 he became president of the Tanganyika Africa Association (TAA), an elitist movement with a limited appeal. Two years later he met with other groups to form the much broader based Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which he rapidly expanded by forming local branches throughout the country. He believed in cooperating with the government and was rewarded by being appointed as one of the African members of the legislative council in 1957. He went along with a new electoral system, the Tripartite system, in 1958 though he believed in non-racial politics and in the same year struck up a good working relationship with the new Governor, Turnbull. This was in contrast to the distrust which marked Kenyatta's relations with the governors of Kenya. In the 1958 elections most of the Asians and Europeans elected to the Tanganyikan Legislative Council were already members of TANU. By 1960 TANU had become a genuine non-racial party and won 70 of the 71 seats to the Legislative Council and had no serious opposition. In March 1961 a Constitutional Conference in Dar es Salaam agreed to self-government in May 1961 and full independence in December 1961. In the meantime Kenya's progress had been held up by:

- the ban on Kenyatta's participation in politics;
- prolonged disputes between those in favour of non-racial politics (the Africans) and those in favour of multi-racial politics (white settlers and Asians);
- the emergence of two national parties - KANU (the Kenya African National Union) representing the two largest tribes, the Kikuyu and the Luo; and KADU (the Kenya African Democratic Union) representing the smaller tribes who feared that they would be dominated by the large ones. Africans in Kenya were disunited in contrast to those in Tanganyika. These divisions delayed independence in Kenya until December 1963, just over two years later than in Tanganyika. The two year gap between the achievement of independence is also partly explained by the following contrasts between the two movements:
- Nyerere's style of leadership: he was in favour of compromise, and against confrontation;
- the absence in Tanganyika of serious tribal rivalry and suspicion which delayed negotiations in Kenya and was responsible for the emergence of two rival parties;
- the advantage held by Tanganyika over Kenya because she was a Trusteeship territory of the United Nations, a status which Nyerere skilfully exploited in the interests of his country;
- the complications and problems caused by Kenya's large settler and foreign population in contrast to Tanganyika's relatively small White and Asian communities.

If only one leader is addressed, **[8 marks]** cannot be reached.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for answers which give end-on accounts with limited linkage.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers with end-on accounts with good linkage or attempts at a comparative approach.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for well supported well organised answers with a point-by-point approach identifying both similarities and differences.

**18. Explain the similarities and differences in the policies and tactics of Leopold Senghor and Felix Houphouët-Boigny, as leaders of the independence struggles in their countries.**

A chronological narrative of the progress of Senegal and the Ivory Coast to independence, interspersed with references to the similarities and differences in the views and roles of the two leaders could be an effective approach to this question.

At the end of the Second World War Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny were the two leading statesmen in French West Africa. Each represented his country in the French Constituent assembly and played a part in drawing up the new constitution which set up the French Union in 1946. Under this each colony had its own assembly; citizenship was granted to all inhabitants; forced labour was abolished; representation of each colony in the French Assembly was increased. In the same year Houphouët-Boigny founded the first mass political party in French West Africa, the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA). The aims of the party included freeing Africa from ‘the colonial yoke.’ For Houphouët-Boigny the Constitution of 1946 had not gone far enough towards the achievement of this aim. Repressive measures were taken against the RDA because of its links with the French Communist Party. H-B sought to cooperate with the French Government hoping for further reforms. He broke the RDA’s links with the French Communist party. In 1956 he was rewarded with a post in the French Government. He supported the Loi Cadre which gave votes to all citizens and allowed each colony to set up its own Executive Council. The new law weakened the traditional federal links that had previously existed between the individual territories within the Federation of French West Africa This pleased Houphouët-Boigny but not Senghor. Serious differences opened up between Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny. Senghor remained outside the RDA and opposed the new law. He hoped to protect Senegal’s position of leadership in the Federation and he believed French West African colonies would be in a stronger position to negotiate their independence if they did so collectively as a Federation rather than as single colonies.

At this point Sekou Toure who had become Vice-President of Guinea under the new ‘Loi Cadre’ became an important player in the politics of French West Africa. Hitherto all three men had agreed on the need for greater freedom but still in some sort of association with France. De Gaulle’s arrival in power as President of France in 1958 became, unintentionally, the catalyst for a radical change in French colonial policy. He held a referendum in French West and Equatorial Africa in which Africans would be asked to choose either self government for each territory within a proposed new French Community or complete independence. He expected all to say ‘Yes’ to the first option. All did so except Sekou Toure who opted for complete independence. De Gaulle carried out his threat to cut all links with colonies which voted ‘No’ to membership of the Community. However, before the end of 1960 every colony in French West and Equatorial Africa had sought and obtained independence. Sekou Toure’s bold challenge to President de Gaulle had left other leaders, including both Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny, no choice but to follow his lead. Within the framework of a narrative showing how French West African colonies became independent, unexpectedly, in 1960, candidates who show the similarities and differences between the views and tactics of Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny will earn a mark in one of the two top bands. Errors in understanding the views and tactics of the two men and the crucial part played by Sekou Toure and, unintentionally, by de Gaulle will clearly lower the appropriate mark for such candidates.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for narratives answers on each ruler with at least implicit comments on the similarities and differences between them.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers which concentrate on similarities and differences to a limited extent.

**[14 to 16 marks]** for clear, focused answers which identify and explain the similarities and differences between the two rulers.

**19. Why did Kwame Nkrumah's popularity decline between 1947 and 1966?**

There is no doubt that Nkrumah's popularity was much lower in 1966 than in 1947 when he returned to the Gold Coast after over 2 years in Europe. For several years after his return- until the late 1950s- his popularity increased. This covered the period when he was first the General Secretary of the UGCC and then the successful and charismatic founder and leader of the Convention People's Party (CPP) which led the country to independence in 1957. It might be argued that he lost support amongst the Asante in the Northern Province in the mid 1950s. They formed their own opposition party, the National Liberation Movement to campaign for a federal form of government because of Asante fears that they would be dominated by the coastal peoples. In 1957, however, Nkrumah and the CCP's policy of independence as a unitary state prevailed. From 1957 until 1962 Nkrumah's popularity and prestige in Ghana and in Africa as a whole was high.

His decline began in 1962 when he made Ghana a one-party state and began to rule in an arbitrary way which brooked no opposition. What made his decline worse were other aspects of his rule, particularly the high level of corruption and extravagance amongst his closest supporters in the CPP. Agriculture, the base of the country's economy, was neglected whilst vast sums were squandered on prestige projects like a new Presidential Palace, a motorway to Accra airport and the Volta Dam. As the economy crumbled and the people suffered, Nkrumah's style of government became intolerable and was quite incompatible with his claims to be a socialist. In 1966 he was overthrown by a military coup whilst on a state visit to China. His wider popularity in Africa and beyond had also declined. From 1957 until 1963 he was a symbol of the new Africa: leader of the first independent country in tropical Africa, supporter of others struggling to be free, and advocate and pioneer of closer union between African states. When he attended the Addis Ababa Conference in 1963 which led to the founding of the Organisation of African Unity, his proposal for the creation of a United States of Africa met with general opposition amongst those who suspected him of wanting to dominate the new United Africa.

*[8 to 10 marks]* for narrative answers of Nkrumah's rule, 1947 to 1966, with implicit assessment of popularity but without references in detail to reasons for decline.

*[11 to 13 marks]* for answers with greater focus and comment on reasons for decline.

*[14 to 16+ marks]* for answers which trace and analyse the reasons for Nkrumah's decline in popularity on the lines outlined above. Distinguish between the top three bands with reference to the depth of understanding and knowledge demonstrated by the candidate.

**20. Why was independence *either* in Mozambique *or* in Angola achieved late, and only after an armed struggle?**

Mozambique became independent in June 1974 and Angola in November 1975. Independence came late and only after an armed struggle with national liberation forces in these two territories for the following reasons:

- Portugal, unlike other colonial powers was a poor country, the poorest in Western Europe, and she believed that her colonies were indispensable to her economy. If they were given independence, other wealthier, industrialised countries would step in to supply capital, expertise and technology;
- Unlike most other colonial powers she was a dictatorship under Dr Salazar until 1968 and could ignore the pressure of public opinion, whether domestic or international, through the United Nations. She had always insisted that her colonies were overseas territories and an integral part of Portugal;
- she had encouraged settlers to go to Angola and Mozambique particularly since 1946 to alleviate her own unemployment problem and by 1970 there were 500 000 white settlers in these two colonies;
- the two colonies had South Africa on their southern border. They were regarded by South Africa and some Western countries who invested in South Africa as essential to the defence of the ‘white south’; for this reason these countries were willing to offer military aid to Portugal in her struggle with the African liberation forces in Mozambique and Angola.

Some of these reasons *e.g.* the presence of a large white settler element in the population explain the late achievement of independence in other colonies and the need for an armed struggle on the part of Africans. Most, however, are peculiar to Portugal and her colonies.

Independence came only when the Portuguese army lost the will to resist and suffer further losses and overthrew the Portuguese dictatorship in a coup in 1974. The new regime, backed by the army, negotiated independence agreements.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for answers which give narrative accounts of events leading to independence fail to explain the need for armed struggle.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers which provide explicit reasons of ‘why late’ and ‘why an armed struggle’ but only in very basic and general terms.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for answers which focus on explanation of ‘late’ and ‘armed struggle’ with some depth of analysis in the explanation provided.

**21. Using specific examples, explain why military regimes and single-party states became common in the first decade after independence.**

Single party states were established in many African states soon after independence. Within a short time after this some of the single-party civilian regimes were overthrown by a military coup and replaced by a military regime. Irrespective of the examples chosen by the candidates various general reasons can be given for such changes. These include:

- the Western models of democracy which were bequeathed by the colonial powers to their ex-colonies had been evolved in Europe over a long period of time and were unlikely to work successfully in Africa's newly independent states;
- the multi-party character of these Western models, invariably produced in Africa, parties that coalesced around tribal and regional interests. The forces of tribalism threatened the unity, stability and security of some states;
- the main interest of most Africans was in economic development, leading to improved standards of living and the eradication of poverty and its consequences. Multi-party regimes, giving the opportunity to change the party in power, were a costly irrelevance when everyone was agreed on the priorities of government. African leaders like Nyerere argued that democracy was compatible with a single-party system providing the party presented a choice of candidates in each constituency. (There were other countries, however, (e.g. Ghana and Kenya) in which the main motive for the establishment of single party government was to keep an ambitious leader in power;
- the need for strong government to achieve priority aims went beyond the banning of alternative parties to the control by these parties of the whole apparatus of government e.g. appointment to, and control of, the civil service, police and army. The problems facing newly independent states demanded the same approach as a war situation-the creation of a 'national government.'
- unfortunately single-party government led only too often to the abuse of power by members of the ruling party. The result was that many of the single party regimes became very unpopular because of the serious mismanagement of the economy and the failure to deliver promises made to the people. The situation was made all the more intolerable by the widespread and massive scale of corruption which accompanied it. The military was the most likely alternative to civilian government since the officers in the armed forces had been trained and educated and should, in theory, have had some integrity and organising ability.

Almost any choice of examples will allow candidates to argue along these lines and illustrate the validity of these general explanations of the emergence of single-party and military regimes. Good examples of countries where both types existed (Ghana) or where one or other type was established (Tanzania or Kenya) are available.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for answers with explanation but with little or no reference to specific evidence.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers which contain some satisfactory specific evidence.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for well organised answers which explain clearly and in some detail, the circumstances and conditions which led to the establishment of a single party state and for a military regime in one or more African states.

**22. ‘The instability in Zaire from 1960 to 1965 was mainly the result of Belgian colonial policy before 1960.’ To what extent do you agree with this judgement?**

Candidates may reach different conclusions about the extent to which they agree with the quotation. The aspects of Belgian colonial policy which undoubtedly contributed to instability in Zaire between 1960 and 1965 were the deliberate restriction of education to primary level, the exclusion of Africans from any share in administration, and the precipitate decisions to grant independence to the Belgian Congo in 1960. Together these three aspects of Belgian policy left the country ill-prepared to undertake the responsibility for administering a vast country when it was unexpectedly made independent in 1960. Perhaps the most basic causes of instability lay in the deep ethnic divisions within the country, especially between the Baluba and the Benelulua in Kasai province and the divisions between the handful of Congolese politicians who emerged at, or just before, independence: Kasavubu of the Bakongo who became President, and Tshombe from mineral rich Katanga were in favour of a Federal structure for the new country whilst Lumumba who became Prime Minister favoured a strong centralised state. Within a week the Congolese army mutinied, most Europeans left the country, Tshombe withdrew Katanga from the Congo and the economy collapsed. Lumumba appealed to the United Nations for help in holding the country together and forcing Katanga to return but the United Nations force refused to do what Lumumba wanted. Lumumba added to the confusion by calling in the Russians but this soon proved his undoing. Briefly and dangerously the country became the unlikely scene of rivalry between communism and capitalism. Lumumba was overthrown by a coalition of the army under Colonel Mobutu and Tshombe, with some Western backing. The Russians were expelled. Lumumba was murdered whilst a prisoner of Tshombe in March 1961. The United Nations’ force, before finally withdrawing in 1963, helped to bring Katanga back into the Congo. Chaos reigned, however, for a further two years with fighting between the supporters of the martyred Lumumba, the Western backed forces of President Kasavubu and white mercenary troops led by Tshombe who reappeared on the scene. Finally at the end of 1965, a group of army leaders led by General Mobutu seized power and overthrew Kasavubu.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for narrative answers which mention both Belgian colonial policy before 1960 and events 1960 to 1965 but do not establish a cause and effect link between the two.

**[11 to 13 marks]** answers which establish connections between the two but suggest no other causes of instability.

**[14 to 16 marks]** answers which demonstrate a clear link between Belgian colonial policy and instability and accept colonial policy as the main cause of instability.

**[17+ marks]** for answers which refer to other reasons for instability and reach a considered conclusion compatible with the evidence produced.

**23. Explain the aims and evaluate the success of Nasser's policies in Egypt between 1952 and 1970.**

This is in effect a question on the extent of the success of Nasser's policies. The following comments would be relevant:

- its initial objective, the overthrow of the corrupt monarchy, had been completely achieved;
- Egypt's foreign policy had been conducted on the principle of nonalignment, proclaimed at the Bandung Conference in 1955. The principle was not applied in the policy over (a) the Arab-Israeli conflict and (b) towards African countries still under colonial rule, The first exception led to Nasser's one disastrous failure in the 1967 War against Israel (over which he initially resigned but resumed as president until his death in 1970). He helped many African countries still under colonial control, and offered shelter and hospitality to representatives of governments in exile *e.g.* Algerians from the FLN. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, provoked by collusive action between Britain, France and Israel, he gained a great triumph and international recognition;
- he had significant success in his domestic social reforming policies beginning with his redistribution of land seized from the estates of the country's biggest landowners in and after 1952; a series of Presidential decrees in 1961 nationalised the country's major industries, banks and insurance companies;
- his African policies, when freedom from colonialism was not involved, were conducted with restraint *e.g.* in the settlement of the Sudan problem he remained 'neutral'.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for narrative with only implicit evaluation of success.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers showing explicit assessment of success in two of the areas listed above.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for answers with a statement of clear aims and evaluation of the success of the policies. For a mark in one of the two top bands, each of the focus areas above should be considered in evaluation of success.



24. **‘The struggle for independence in Zimbabwe was more complex than in most African countries.’ Explain this complexity and indicate why Robert Mugabe and his party emerged as victors.**

The single development which made the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe ‘more complex than most’ was the illegal and unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith, leader of the Rhodesian Front party, made in November 1965 after Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, had removed any threat of military intervention. It became difficult from then on for Britain to negotiate with African leaders until legality was restored. A new constitution in 1970 dealt a blow to the prospects of this and the British Government broke off all diplomatic relations with Rhodesia. Guerrilla war waged by African nationalist forces began in earnest on a new front in the north-east border in 1972-1973 from bases in Mozambique. It was this war which eventually forced concessions from the Rhodesian Front Government in 1979 after negotiations held at the Lancaster House Conference. In the intervening years of war the complexity of the struggle for independence became clearer in the existence of various nationalist movements under different leaders. The nature of the struggle was dramatically changed when Mozambique became independent in 1974. In November Ian Smith, under pressure from South Africa, adopted measures of ‘détente’ and released several leading nationalists from detention to allow them to attend talks in Lusaka. These included Joshua Nkomo, veteran leader of ZAPU, Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of ZANU and Robert Mugabe also of ZANU who replaced Sithole as leader at the end of 1976. Under pressure from the USA and South Africa’s P.M. Vorster, Ian Smith announced a move to majority rule within two years. In preparation for a conference in Geneva to discuss details for this, ZANU agreed with ZAPU to form the Patriotic Front. The Conference ended in failure (December 1976) because the PF representatives had no confidence in Smith’s promises. Guerrilla war intensified with ZAPU and ZANU troops both in action under separate commands. Smith, under pressure from the war and sanctions made a deal with Bishop Muzorewa’s new party, the United African National Congress. Elections were held in April 1979 but were boycotted by the PF. The war was stepped up when Muzorewa became Prime Minister under a Constitution which allocated 28 % of seats to the white minority. Finally in August 1979 Britain acted on an invitation from the independent African states involved in the war, to organise a Conference involving the PF. This was held at Lancaster House and led to the appointment of a British Governor to Southern Rhodesia. This ended UDI and restored legality. A cease fire was signed and elections, supervised by Commonwealth observers, were held in February 1980. The elections were won by Robert Mugabe’s ZANU PF with 57 of the 80 common role seats. Nkomo’s PF, Mugabe’s main rival, won 20 seats and Muzorewa’s UANC only 3 seats. Mugabe became Prime Minister of independent Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980 heading a ZANU PF government with PF and white members. Mugabe initially adopted a conciliatory attitude to his rivals. His decisive election victory had in no small measure been made possible by a ‘terrorist’ campaign waged by his supporters in Ndebele territory, the stronghold of his rival, Joshua Nkomo.

The main focus should be on an analysis of the features which made Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence ‘more complex than most’; but there should be some attempt to explain Mugabe’s election victory.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for answers containing a narrative of the independence movement with some implicit explanation.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers with some explicit detail and explanation.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for analytical answers which focus on complexity and on the reasons for Mugabe’s victory.

**25. Why was the Central African Federation, one of Africa's first attempts at closer union on a regional basis, so short lived?**

From the start the movement for the amalgamation of the three territories of Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was opposed by the vast majority of Africans who saw Federation as a means of preserving and extending white domination in the region. Before giving its support to the scheme, the British government had to be convinced by the arguments and assurances of the whites in Southern Rhodesia that African interests would be respected. In October 1953 the British government was sufficiently persuaded to allow the Federation to be established.

Developments in the next few years, however, confirmed the fears of the Africans. The initial constitution gave minimal rights to Africans and the first changes made in 1957 were insignificant. The fears of Africans were increased by a white campaign to seek Dominion status for the Federation when the constitution was due to be reviewed in 1960. African leaders in the three territories-Joshua Nkomo in Southern Rhodesia, Kenneth Kaunda in Northern Rhodesia and Hastings Banda in Nyasaland stepped up their campaign to end the Federation. The disturbances which followed Dr Banda's return to his country in 1958 led the British government to appoint two commissions-the Devlin Commission and the Monckton Commission- to report on the situation. The two Commissions pretty well sealed the fate of the Federation. Devlin reported that contrary to the white view that African opposition was the work of a small minority, that 'it was deeply rooted and almost universally held'. Monckton said that under Federation 'partnership for Africans was a sham' and that any individual territory that wished to do so should be allowed to secede. Only if 'drastic and fundamental changes were made to its constitution' and in the racial policies of the Southern Rhodesian Government should the Federation be allowed to continue. Roy Welensky, a leading Southern Rhodesian politician, believed that the Monckton Report 'sounded the death knell of the Federation'. Between 1960 and 1962 all three countries drew up new constitutions. Nyasaland's was first in 1960 and placed power firmly in African hands. Northern Rhodesia did the same in 1962. Meanwhile in Southern Rhodesia, in spite of Monckton's warnings, the new constitution made little change and power passed into the hands of the Rhodesian Front, an extreme right wing party, in the election held in December 1962. The dismemberment of the Federation now began and was completed by the end of 1963. Nyasaland was granted self-government in May 1963 and full independence as Malawi in July 1964. Northern Rhodesia was granted self-government in January 1964 and became independent as Zambia in October 1964. Events had proved African opposition to be genuine and justified and white promises about partnership to be hollow.

Answers must focus on the reasons for the Federation being short lived. Some accurate narrative of developments accompanied by an analysis of the reasons for the African opposition to Federation will earn a mark in the **[17 to 20 marks]** range depending on the knowledge shown and the persuasiveness of the arguments. The strength of African opposition and its impact on the British government's position should be central to a good answer. Where this is missing, answers will struggle to reach the **[8 to 10 marks]** band.

**[8 to 10 marks]** for narrative answers on rise and fall of the Central African Federation with implicit explanation of 'short lived'.

**[11 to 13 marks]** for answers which contain explicit explanation of 'short lived'.

**[14 to 16+ marks]** for analytical answers with a satisfactory explanation for 'short lived' focused mainly on the evidence of the Devlin and Monckton Commissions. For a mark in the **[17 to 18], [19 to 20]** markbands answers must show a real understanding of these two reports.

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