



Cambridge International Examinations
Cambridge Pre-U Certificate

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PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY (PRINCIPAL)

9774/03

Paper 3 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 2

For Examination from 2016

SPECIMEN MARK SCHEME

2 hours

MAXIMUM MARK: 50

The syllabus is approved for use in England, Wales and Northern Ireland as a Cambridge International Level 3 Pre-U Certificate.

This document consists of **17** printed pages and **1** blank page.

Assessment objectives (AOs)

AO1	Demonstrate knowledge and understanding; identify, select and apply ideas and concepts through the use of examples and evidence.	40%
AO2	Provide a systematic critical analysis of the texts and theories, sustain a line of argument and justify a point of view. Different views should be referred to and evaluated where appropriate. Demonstrate a synoptic approach to the areas studied.	60%

In the textual questions AO1 and AO2 are assessed separately.

AO1 and AO2 are both to be considered in assessing each essay.

The **Generic Marking Scheme** should be used to decide the mark. The essay should first be placed within a level which best describes its qualities, and then at a specific point within that level to determine a mark out of 25.

The **Question-Specific Notes** provide guidance for Examiners as to the area covered by the question. These question-specific notes are not exhaustive. Candidates may answer the question from a variety of angles with different emphases and using different supporting evidence and knowledge for which they receive credit according to the Generic Marking Scheme levels. However, candidates must clearly answer the question as set and not their own question. Examiners are reminded that the insights of specific religious traditions are, of course, relevant, and it is likely that candidates will draw on the views of Jewish, Christian or Islamic theologians, as well as those of philosophers who have written about the concept of God from a purely philosophical standpoint. There is nothing to prevent candidates referring to other religious traditions and these must, of course, be credited appropriately in examination responses.

Table A: Generic Marking Scheme for 10 mark questions

Level 5 9–10 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 7–8 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 5–6 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Reasonable attempt to use supporting evidence. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 3–4 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–2 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Table B: Generic Marking Scheme for 15 mark questions

Level 5 13–15 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 10–12 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 7–9 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 4–6 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–3 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Table C: Generic Marking Scheme for 25 mark questions

<p>Level 5 21–25 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 4 16–20 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 3 12–15 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
<p>Level 2 8–11 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
<p>Level 1 1–7 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
<p>Level 0 0 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Topic 1 Philosophy of Mind

Section A

[Extract from **John Searle**: *Minds, Brains and Science*: 28]

1 (a) Explain why Searle insists that no computer program can ever be a mind. [10]

Searle argues first that brains cause minds. Second, syntax is not sufficient for semantics – there is a difference between what is purely formal and what has content. Third, computer programs are entirely defined by their formal, or syntactical structure. Fourth, minds have mental contents; specifically they have semantic contents: beliefs, thoughts and desires are about something/they concern states of affairs in the world, and they do so because their content directs them at these states of affairs in the world. No computer program by itself is sufficient to give a system a mind: programs are not minds, and are not by themselves sufficient for having minds. Even hardcore Artificial Intelligence (AI) enthusiasts admit that brains cause mental states, and that programs are defined formally – so the projects of ‘strong AI’ are incapable of fulfilment. The way that brain functions cause minds cannot be solely in virtue of running a computer program, so the brain cannot be just a digital computer. Anything can be *trivially* defined as if it were a computer, and this includes brains, but the computational properties of the brain are simply insufficient to explain its functioning to produce mental states. Brain biology – the fact that the mind happens to be realised in the human brain – is not (as some AI people claim) just an irrelevant fact about the mind. Anything else that caused minds would have to have causal powers at least equivalent to those of the brain, and conceivably, so long as those causal powers are biochemical, an entirely different brain chemistry (such as Martians with green slime for brains) would have to be accepted as causing mental states if its possessor appeared to have them. Any artefact we build would have to have powers equivalent to those of the human brain, but the implementation of a computer program would not itself be sufficient. Mental states are biological phenomena. Consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and mental causation are all part of our biological life, along with growth, reproduction, bile secretion and digestion.

(b) Evaluate Searle’s claim that mental states are biological phenomena. [15]

Candidates are likely to use Searle’s Chinese Room argument to illustrate and defend Searle’s assertion that mental states are biological phenomena that are not associated with digital computers. Despite the fact that a program can appear to give a machine intentionality/consciousness, this is merely a simulation. Machines can have any formal content you like, but still understand nothing. This argument is not concerned with the level of intelligence that an AI program can display – complexity of program is not a provider of self-awareness: that is the product of biological organisms.

Candidates might look at several arguments given against Searle’s conclusions, for example the ‘Systems reply’, which argues that it is the whole system of the Chinese Room that speaks Chinese – the man in the room is just the central processor. Searle’s reply is that if the man doesn’t understand Chinese then the system doesn’t understand Chinese either: the mere fact that the man appears to understand Chinese proves nothing. This in turn is rejected by the ‘Virtual mind’ reply, that, for example, computers can simulate the operation of other programs: for example PCs can function as Acorn computers, so the program can give the same results no matter what system it runs on. Searle rejects this, – no-one supposes, he argues, that a computer simulation of a rainstorm will leave us all drenched. Fearn replies in turn that the simulation may still be as good as the real thing, in the same way that a calculator on a phone or a computer is not a real calculator but a simulation, nevertheless it does the same thing. This in turn begs the question of what minds are like – a calculator is like a computer, but a rainstorm is not. There are many directions that

candidates' answers might take, perhaps advocating a functionalist or Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) approach to the mind.

Section B

2 Evaluate the claim that the 'hard problem' of consciousness has no solution. [25]

The hard problem of consciousness refers primarily to the problem of accounting for subjective experience. Some aspects of consciousness are less difficult to explain, such as the differences between being awake and being asleep, the ability to react to environmental stimuli, and so on. The hard problem of consciousness is how one seeks to explain, for example, the fact that some organisms are subjects of experience. Why should there be a subjective element in experience? Put another way, why do qualia exist? What is it like to be something, such as a bat as opposed to a human? What is the link between brain processes, which are physical phenomena, and subjective experience? Do physical states of the brain give rise (epiphenomenally, for example) to consciousness? Where experience is clearly associated with a variety of physical functions, why are those functions associated with particular mental states and not others?

Attempts to solve the hard problem of consciousness are legion, and candidates may select any that they deem appropriate. For example reductive accounts of consciousness describe it as a purely physical phenomenon, against which candidates might well refer to Fran Jackson's story of Mary, who understands the complete physical explanation of colour, yet lives in a black and white environment. On leaving that environment, she learns something new about colour – its qualia, which supposes that a complete physical explanation of colour fails completely to explain the *experience* of colour. It is equally difficult to give a reductive account of intentional states of the brain, i.e. to explain how the brain can have representative states. Others might refer to the zombie argument – that we can conceive of a complete physical duplicate of a human that lacks conscious experiences, which entails that the physical facts do not necessitate the experiential facts. Roger Penrose suggests that consciousness is generated at the quantum level of the brain by the function of the microtubules, a theory that appears to be more successful in disproving CTM than in establishing precisely what process he has in mind.

OR

3 Critically assess the problem of personal identity. [25]

The primary problem of personal identity (PI) is a metaphysical question concerning the establishment of sufficient criteria for judging that 'x' is the 'same person' over periods of time, not least the 'same person' in a putative *post mortem* state as the individual who died. There are a number of theories of PI based on some combination of factors such as body, personality, memory and soul, so that various theories maintain that PI consists of:

- numerical identity of the soul
- or numerical identity of the body
- or numerical identity of the brain
- or psychological continuity.

According to Cartesian dualism, for example, the first of these is correct because persons are identical with their incorporeal soul, and not with their physical bodies. For those who hold this view, then, numerical identity of the body is neither a logically necessary nor a sufficient condition of PI. This view is not popular, since there are obvious problems with Cartesian dualism, such as interactionism/the problem of counting souls, and so on. It is true, however, that Swinburne still offers a robust theory of the soul. Numerical identity of the body is equally problematic, and this can be illustrated, for example, through Sidney Shoemaker's case of Brown and Robinson. This

does not rule out numerical identity of the brain as the criterion of PI, but the latter comes under fire from fission thought experiments such as those devised by Wiggins and Parfit, where the two individuals that result from brain fission now occupy unique spatio-temporal locations, so cannot be identical. Following upon the difficulties experienced by these efforts, Parfit concludes that *identity* is not what matters, so survival *post mortem* (for example) is based on psychological continuity. Candidates can explore issues such as these in depth or in breadth.

Topic 2 Ethics

Section A

[Extract from **John Stuart Mill**: *Utilitarianism*: 277–278]

4 (a) Examine Mill’s understanding of the relationship between the principle of utility and moral rules. [10]

Candidates are expected to respond by close reference to the given text. Reference may be made to other relevant passages in the set text.

Candidates may note that in *Utilitarianism* Mill sets out to defend utilitarianism and that here he defends an objection raised against the hedonic calculus. It is said to be too time consuming – ‘there is not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness.’ The objectors claim that this makes utilitarianism invalid since it is impractical.

Mill responds with a number of analogies. He has argued that if this objection is good then Christianity would also fail by the same maxim. ‘There is not time, on every occasion ... to read through the Old and New Testaments.’ The second analogy is of a traveller who, if this objection is good, he says ought not be allowed to use landmarks and direction posts in order to reach the destination. The third analogy is of a sailor who, if this objection is good, must make his own navigation calculations each and every time and not make reference to the Nautical Almanac. Mill regards each of these analogies as clearly absurd and asks the reader to consider this objection to utilitarianism as equally absurd. Mill argues that the utilitarian claim that ‘happiness’ is the goal of morality is not invalidated by the use of signposts and Almanac along the way. He claims that the utilitarian ‘Almanac’ is to be found in the rules upon which we are already agreed. Generations of human experience have established the usefulness of certain types of behaviour to the attainment of happiness. This agreement on certain rules is obvious and to insist on testing each action afresh, as if ‘considering for the first time whether murder and theft are injurious to human happiness’ is a form of ‘universal idiocy’. The principle of utility is the goal of morality and if an established moral rule guides a person towards this goal it is perfectly permissible to follow it, rather than to ‘test each individual action directly by the first principle’. The road (rules which guide a person to the goal of happiness) has to be laid down as a matter of ‘practical concernment’ and people can be informed of the route which will help them to achieve the goal of happiness. The inference of this passage is that if an established rule does not serve the principle of utility it may be disposed of. In examining this argument candidates may seek to establish who exactly is to judge the ‘almanac’ and on what basis exceptions can be made. Rules clearly do not have the same status for Mill as they would for Kant or a deontological position – they may be broken. The result of Mill’s thinking is that the decision-maker can use a rule of thumb when there is no time to do the full hedonic calculus. If the outcome of the action does not create the greatest good for the greatest number the decision was a wrong decision, but the decision-maker is affirmed as having made the right decision! The question then has to be, what is the use of the principle of utility? If moral value does not reside in the rules which govern everyday life, but in some further realm, that does not make any practical difference to the rightness or wrongness of the decisions we reach, how helpful is it? This approach has been given renewed emphasis in recent times in the form of split-level utilitarianism, of which candidates may be aware.

(b) Critically examine the claim that utilitarians should always obey the law. [15]

This question gives candidates the opportunity to extend their thinking beyond the world of John Stuart Mill and beyond the realm of moral rules to consideration of the law. Those who do not extend their focus will be self-penalised by lack of breadth, but they may nonetheless score highly if an appropriate level of analysis and evaluation is evident.

An outline of the basic tenets of utilitarianism and the difference between Bentham and Mill is expected. Candidates may be aware that Bentham and Mill were both social reformers and were deeply concerned that the law should be framed to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number. The desire to reduce the control of the church as well as unelected clerics and judges led Bentham to challenge the natural law tradition of earlier centuries. Bentham believed that natural law was a smoke-screen for the arbitrary imposition of prejudice on the people and for the maintenance of a social order which benefited the few. Bentham's utilitarianism was heavily influential in reconceptualising the idea of the rule of law in which each should count for one, and no more than one. Bentham introduced a radically new idea, which was explicit in its claim that laws are man-made: 'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.' This undermined the role of the church as the bearer of natural law and placed the emphasis upon parliament as a free agent of moral decision. Bentham was strongly atheist and wanted the separation of the church and state. He favoured individual and economic freedom, freedom of expression, equal rights for women, the right to divorce, and the decriminalisation of homosexual acts. He argued for the abolition of slavery and the death penalty and for the abolition of all corporal punishment as well as prison reform. John Stuart Mill was in broad agreement with Bentham on all these points. It is anticipated that candidates will record the felicific calculus and conclude that Bentham would find it acceptable to torture one person if this would produce an amount of happiness in other people outweighing the unhappiness of the tortured individual, even if torture were against the law. Candidates who are aware of the wider framework of Bentham's work will resist uncritical repetition of this textbook position. It is questionable whether Bentham was socially irresponsible and it is questionable whether he would have supported acts which benefit the most people regardless of the law but utilitarian principles nonetheless might be used to justify such action. The law for Bentham delimits spheres of personal inviolability within which individuals can form and pursue their own conceptions of well-being. While he argued for liberalisation of laws prohibiting homosexuality, he does this on the grounds that it is a largely private event. He recommends that forced acts of homosexuality and public displays of the same be dealt with by the law. He thought that all socially undesirable conduct could be dealt with by the law and that the necessity of law was obvious. He does not seem to have anticipated the claims that breaking the law could in principle create the greatest good for the greatest number but that does not mean that he would have conceded the point.

Mill is usually understood to take the law into account and to be more concerned with social fairness as a result. He considers it primitive to regard justice as equal to conformity to law and makes a distinction between justice and law. Mill's position on law-breaking is complex. On the one hand he claims that since the law is there to serve justice, and humans make laws, it is possible that some laws do not serve justice and are bad laws. In considering the question of what ought to be done about an unjust law, he considers the possibility that laws must never be broken and may only be challenged by competent authority. He regards this as condemning 'many of the most illustrious benefactors of mankind' and argues that this recommendation 'would often protect pernicious institutions against the only weapons which ... have any chance of succeeding against them.' He considers a bad law to be one which infringes a person's 'moral' rights in some way. Infringement of a bad law is not an act of injustice, since a bad law is an unjust law. Mill thus leaves open the possibility of breaking the law if the law contravenes a person's moral rights but he falls short of recommending it: 'A human being is capable of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human society of which he forms a part, such that any conduct which threatens the security

of society generally is threatening to his own...’ Mill regards breaking the law as a threat to society generally.

Mill considers the inner subjective feelings of morality are a sufficient guide for some but that ‘morality has no hold on some except external sanctions.’ The law, and the external sanctions it permits, is critical for those who have not been cultivated in moral rules. Those who break the law due to an absence of moral awareness must be subject to her sanctions, in order that society is protected from them. Mill appears to be suggesting that it is never acceptable for someone without moral awareness to thoughtlessly break the law. However, he has suggested that there may be occasions for those with fine moral awareness, when sensing that the law is unjust, to break the law, in order to reform it. Candidates may colourfully evaluate this.

Evaluative comments might include observations that Mill considers morality to consist in far more than the law, and that there are worse things a utilitarian can do than break the law: ‘he who betrays the friend that trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend.’ A good utilitarian ought never break human moral codes, as this is regarded by Mill as possibly more serious than breaking the law: ‘The important rank, among human evils and wrongs, of the disappointment of expectation is shown in the fact that it constitutes the principal criminality of two such highly immoral acts as a breach of friendship and a breach of promise.’ Punishment for such violations will be ‘encountered afterwards in the form of remorse.’ But ultimately, for those ‘whose mind is a moral blank’ and who ‘lay out their course of life on the plan of paying no regard to others except so far as their own private interest compels’, the law is a vital restraint. The law protects society from those with no moral compass but cannot create the moral goodness needed for a just society.

Other evaluative responses may attempt to challenge the wording of the question by rephrasing it to ‘may always obey the law’ and argue that there need not be any contradiction in following the law and being a utilitarian. Or they may rephrase in line with Mill to read ‘must follow justice’. Others may consider the long-term consequences of law breaking on the whole of society and using the calculus conclude that it would not be permitted. Others may conclude that it would ultimately be self defeating for utilitarianism to support law breaking. If the traditions of society are no longer binding and if the influence of the church on morality is to be rejected, there remains nothing but the law to act as guardian of social order.

Some candidates may make comment in relation to split-level utilitarian thinking, or the work of Singer, Scheffler and Mulgan or other modern-day formulations, all of which must be credited if used in relation to the question set.

Section B

5 Critically examine the claim that Christian Ethics cannot successfully defend embryo research and genetic engineering. [25]

Candidates may use a variety of Christian ethical approaches to answer this question but it is critical for higher-level award scripts to demonstrate a spectrum of responses to these issues within the Christian tradition. Anticipate the use of Biblical texts, situation ethics, the official teachings of the Roman Catholic Church (with explanation of natural law), conscience, prayer and tradition.

Embryo research: the question will hinge on the status of the embryo and candidates can be expected to demonstrate understanding of a variety of Christian positions with respect to the moment of conception onwards. Overlap with the abortion debate may be evident in scripts and this may be credited, especially if the candidate demands consistency of approach for all embryos. The Warnock report ruling, which was based on a decision regarding personhood not present before 14 days, will be considered by some. Some candidates may extend the question to consider research on the embryos of animals but commentary on Christian Ethics in relation to this should be present, and a spectrum of views given.

Genetic engineering: candidates who limit their enquiry to human genetic engineering are eligible for the full range of marks but awareness of genetic engineering in plants, animals and humans would be helpful. A further distinction is to be expected between somatic cell engineering, which can relate only to the individual concerned, and engineering of gametes, which would then enter the gene pool and potentially affect future generations. A further distinction may be made between genetic engineering in humans to correct a defect and genetic engineering to enhance an attribute, such as intelligence or sporting ability. Christian Ethics can defend genetic engineering of plants, and of animals to improve the stock, although there are many who object to the genetic engineering of seeds which creates infertile plants, and to genetic engineering which would create a new species. The hottest debate within the Christian community generally lies with human genetic engineering which affects the gametes, and with all types of enhancement genetic engineering.

Evaluative responses might argue that some types of genetic engineering may be defended by some Christian groups. Others may conclude that in spite of differences, Christians are unified in their commitment to life being God-given and in their respect for the principle of the sanctity of all human life. While some embryo research and some genetic engineering may be approved by some Christians, there will never be blanket consent for all forms of human embryo research and all forms of genetic engineering from within the Christian community.

OR

6 Critically examine modern developments of virtue ethics.**[25]**

Insofar as modern virtue theory is built upon Aristotle's foundation stones, it is valid and maybe necessary for most candidates to retrace the principles of Aristotle's theory, supplemented perhaps with Aquinas' thoughts, before making an assessment of modern developments. In short, Aristotle asserted that the first principle was to establish what it would be to be a virtuous agent, a good person, and to define virtuous behaviour from there. A virtuous person has character traits which we may call the virtues. For example, he or she is kind, patient, friendly, modest, truthful, loyal, courageous, and so forth. (There is some dispute amongst virtue theorists about which virtues should appear on the list but these are generally agreed although Aquinas added the theological virtues.) Having the virtues, the virtuous person therefore does the right thing not because he or she is seeking to maximise the good or conform his or her behaviour to a standard of duty, but just by acting 'out of' these character traits. The right action in any given circumstance is whatever the virtuous person would do in that circumstance. The virtues are acquired through habit and each person is free to develop them. Failure to develop the virtues is always the responsibility of the individual concerned.

Modern developments: Bernard Williams was sympathetic to virtue theory. He drew a distinction between morality – which he thought of as characterised mainly by deontological concepts – and ethics – which he thought of as concerning – in some broader sense – the good life, the good life in turn being something which allowed for luck to play a role. He argued that it is a matter of luck if one has 'good' genes and if one is brought up well in such a way that one ends up generous, rather than mean-spirited, and so on; and thus whether or not one ends up being virtuous is – to some extent at least – a matter of luck. Candidates should evaluate this development in thinking which appears to abrogate responsibility away from the individual for the acquisition of the virtues, a central and some would want to argue a vital tenet of the Aristotelian model. Some candidates will enter the freewill debate at this point, which is entirely valid.

Alasdair MacIntyre, another contemporary philosopher, argues for a virtue theory, but explicitly states that what count as virtues varies from society to society. The Homeric virtues are different from those which we should be trying to emulate in the UK today. In his later work he argues that it is human nature to become an independent, rational agent and that this is the most important virtue of all. Candidates should evaluate this development of the Aristotelian model. Aristotle considered human nature to be a constant and human virtues to be independent of culture, time, place and generation. There appears to be a logical inconsistency in MacIntyre considering all virtues to be relative to culture and his more recent work which claims that there is at least one virtue which is not culturally dependent – becoming an independent rational agent. His later works are more in line with Aristotle (and particularly with Aquinas) and he recognises this and openly works to correct his earlier work which he admits lacked full understanding.

Many candidates will inevitably evaluate virtue theory as a whole, rather than maintaining focus on modern versions, and this must be credited if relevant. A general issue, which relates to all versions of virtue theory, is that it appears to reverse the right direction for explanation: surely the virtuous person gets to be virtuous by doing the right thing; it's not that the right thing gets to be the right thing by being the thing which is done by the virtuous person. Virtue theories seem to be looking in the wrong place (agents rather than actions) for moral value. Others may argue that there is no single human nature and no single set of virtues, which makes virtue theory unworkable.

Topic 3 Old Testament: Prophecy

Section A

[Jeremiah 1: 4–19]

7 (a) Examine the content, structure and meaning of Jeremiah's call to be a prophet. [10]

Candidates are expected to answer with close reference to the text.

Content: A number of features of the call may be selected. Jeremiah hears the voice of the Lord. Jeremiah is told that he was known before birth – formed in the womb – and was chosen, elected for his role as a prophet before birth. Jeremiah is consecrated or set apart for service to God. He is appointed as prophet to the nations and not just to Israel. His ministry is not to be limited or parochial. Jeremiah resists, is insecure and lacks maturity. He receives divine reassurances and the divine touch. Jeremiah accepts and becomes an ambassador for God, the spokesperson of the Lord. Candidates may examine the content by making comparison with other call narratives. Candidates may make reference to literary style and Biblical critical approaches.

Structure: Divine confrontation, commission, objection, reassurance.

Meaning: Visions indicate the meaning – he is to be a prophet of doom, but not permanent gloom.

(b) 'To understand the call of Jeremiah is to understand the whole of Jeremiah's message.' Evaluate this claim. [15]

Candidates must provide an evaluative response. Is the whole of Jeremiah's message to be found in this call? It can be argued that the basic message is here but candidates should be able to identify missing features such as Jeremiah's message about the new covenant, Jeremiah's confessions, the Temple speech, and the distinctive nature of his own acted prophecies. The detail of his message does ultimately require many chapters to unfold but many see it foreshadowed in the call narrative. Mature responses might consider whether the call gives understanding of something other than Jeremiah's message – for example an understanding of what motivated and drove Jeremiah, an understanding of what he felt like being chosen as a prophet of God, the irresistible and compelling nature of a religious encounter with the noumenal.

Section B

8 Critically examine the relationship between prophets and the cult.

[25]

Candidates need to establish early on their understanding of the nature of a prophet and what they understand by the cult. The cult may be presented as worship which took place in shrines or the Temple where there was an acknowledged group of religious leaders. Awareness of the variety of different cultic traditions may be outlined, with a distinctive movement connected to Yahwism and other cultic practices associated with Baal, the Queen of heaven, etc. Some may be aware of the attempt to unify the cult by Josiah and make a pre-Josiah/post Josiah distinction about the cult, and/or make a pre-exilic/post-exilic distinction.

Candidates might consider the nature of a prophet and whether the relationship to the cult depended upon what type of prophet they were. The language use of *nabi'*, *hozeh* and *ro'eh* is notoriously difficult to pin down to distinct prophetic functions but candidates should be aware of the distinct role of the professional prophets. Cult prophets held a close relationship with the shrine to which they belonged or the Temple. They do not appear generally to have a priestly role and their office was not hereditary. They engaged in ecstatic utterances and received divine mandates in dreams, visions and ecstatic experiences, which they transmitted in the form of oracles – e.g. the prophets of Baal (1 Kings 18:19ff.). This professional class existed into the post-exilic period and they played an important role in Israel. They were there primarily to provide divine oracles, answer enquiries or simply to proclaim the will or instruction of Yahweh. They could also intercede between Yahweh and an individual or the people, acting in some ways like a priest. They were often condemned as 'false prophets'.

The language of *nabi'* is often associated with a different class of wandering prophets, who usually worked outside the shrine and insisted on Yahweh's unique authority in the cult. However some appear to have gathered a prophetic guild and to have lived in a fixed location (Elisha). Candidates may helpfully note that there is a spectrum of responses among these prophets to the cult.

Later prophets, beginning with Amos, exercised their role on the basis of a special call that took them away from their professional work. They were not part of a guild or representatives of a clan or a tribe, nor were they usually functionaries of a sanctuary or of the king. They were representatives and messengers of Yahweh. Prophets were not necessarily involved in formal or institutional religion, although they could be. Some prophets had a priestly function (Samuel performed as a priest and the term *ro'eh* is used of Zadok the priest, II Sam. 15:27). However the prophets often challenged the cult, as well as the king, and were largely ignored or rejected during their lifetimes. They began to write down their oracles, which in the post-exilic period were seen to have been right, while the cult prophets were seen to have been wrong. The later 'writing' prophets were also capable of ecstatic experiences, utterances, symbolic actions and delivery of oracles – functions which are found among the professional cultic prophets. Some prophets received their call in the Temple or shrine, but most were antagonistic to the false sense of security which the cultic institutions gave, and called for ethical behaviour.

Prophets were necessarily involved in politics, since religion and politics were not distinct areas of activity with the king closely involved in and part of the cult. Mature responses may note that whatever the cult was, and however a prophet is defined, it is certain that many of the prophets, even those closely connected to the cult, were not limited by the cult. They claimed to speak the word of the Lord, which did not depend on the cult, and regularly challenged both the cult and the monarch. Their primary work was to draw the people towards justice and ethical behaviour. Some may note that the work of the prophets is included in the canon of scripture which has guaranteed their enduring influence on the 'cult'.

OR

9 Critically examine the view that Moses was more significant than Samuel in the development of Old Testament prophecy. [25]

Candidates may choose any number of approaches to this question but focus must soundly be placed upon 'critically examine' and limited marks are available for those who merely re-tell the Biblical narratives. Mature responses will engage with Biblical critical approaches.

It is anticipated that candidates may incline to the view that Moses was more significant than Samuel and may spend time on recording generally their comparative achievements. It is only possible to gain a low level for this kind of response, as the question is more specific.

Responses may include the following: Moses was regarded as the greatest prophet in all Israel. 'God spoke through Moses' arguably contains the earliest and most basic definition of what it is to be a prophet. The call of Moses is regarded by many as the paradigm 'call' of a prophet narrative by which all others are measured. The prophet is one through whom God speaks and is the foundation of prophecy. The prophet experiences a call, hears the word of God and acts on the word of God. The prophet is the messenger of God to the people. Moses also did miracles – plagues and the parting of the sea. He also led the Hebrews to the promised land and initiated a military operation to conquer that land. He was a political activist and appears to have changed the political face of the Ancient Near East with the establishment of a new nation in his lifetime. He is presented as heavily influential in the legal codes of Israel with not only the Decalogue but the whole Torah attributed to him. All prophets after Moses might be said to have had to speak within the Sinai covenant tradition and its demand for justice, which is a major theme in the work of the later prophets. All who followed Moses had no option but to sit in the Mosaic tradition, to judge by it and to be judged by it. He came to be seen to represent the Yahwistic faction of prophecy. Numbers 12:6–8 establish the difference between ordinary prophets and Moses. Ordinary prophets receive their call by special vision or dream but God spoke with Moses face to face. Clearly, if this distinction is to be taken seriously, Moses was far more significant as a prophet and for the foundation of prophecy, than Samuel. Deuteronomy 34:10–12 records the Deuteronomistic position on this. Moses is also credited in Numbers 11:24–29 with initiating ecstatic prophecy. Moses is said to have set the gold standard for prophecy, according to the Deuteronomist, and thus it can be argued that he is far more significant to the prophetic movement than any who came after him. Certainly, later religious and political figures have all been compared with Moses, including Jesus, Mohammed (and Barack Obama).

Samuel also combined multiple roles of leadership: as seer, priest, judge, prophet and military leader. He had a significant political influence in establishing the monarchy, enthroning and dethroning the first kings of Israel. He appears to have had a critical impact as a military leader, working to defeat the Philistines. F M Cross' hypothesis may be recorded by candidates: that the monarchy began with Samuel and that a new kind of covenant relationship was established by Samuel. The Davidic covenant was arguably as influential as the Mosaic covenant on the development of prophecy, with the prophet often seen as the conscience of the king, in the footsteps of Samuel. Many see Samuel as the bridge between the older types of prophecy – the *hozeh* and *ro'eh*, and the new *nebi'im*, which, if the case, would be to attribute to him a critical developmental function in the sphere of prophecy.

Evaluative commentary on Moses' influence might include reflection on whether people in the time of Samuel even knew the traditions of Moses. If not, then this would certainly limit the influence Moses could have had on the development of the prophetic movement in that period. It is possible, and many argue, that at least some of the Mosaic accounts post-date the records found in 1 and 2 Samuel. The tradition which established the foundation of ecstatic prophecy to Moses is generally agreed as a later creation. It is arguable that the influence of Samuel on the prophetic movement has also been pushed back upon him from a later time. Both Samuel and Moses have so many functions that it may be argued that it is impossible to find the historical

figures in order to make any assessment of their contribution. They may each have had words put into their mouths and events attributed to them which veil the true figures. Some candidates may argue that neither Moses nor Samuel are archetypal for future prophecy – arguably Elijah was more influential on prophecy than either of them – or it may be argued that both had a major impact, with Moses being important for establishing the covenant tradition and Samuel for establishing the work of the prophet within that tradition. It is acceptable for a candidate to argue that, since nobody really knows, they cannot say either!

