

## **MARK SCHEME for the May/June 2014 series**

### **9769 HISTORY**

**9769/74**

Paper 5m (Special Subject: China under Mao Zedong, 1949–1976), maximum raw mark 60

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

Cambridge will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

Cambridge is publishing the mark schemes for the May/June 2014 series for most IGCSE, Pre-U, GCE Advanced Level and Advanced Subsidiary Level components and some Ordinary Level components.

<b>Page 2</b>	<b>Mark Scheme</b>	<b>Syllabus</b>	<b>Paper</b>
	<b>Pre-U – May/June 2014</b>	<b>9769</b>	<b>74</b>

**1 (a) How far does Document D corroborate Document A's view of the quality of the Nationalist army and its leadership during the Civil War? [10]**

The answer should make full use of both documents and should be sharply aware of both similarities and differences. Real comparisons of themes and issues should be made across the documents rather than by separate treatment. Where appropriate, the answer should demonstrate a strong sense of critical evaluation and awareness of provenance by use, not only of the text but of headings and attributions.

**Similarities – A** refers to low morale and the errors of the command show a disillusion on the part of this general, even if he does not refer to the morale of his men. Indignation is referred to in **A** and shown in **D** – if not over speculation, over incompetence. The numerical disadvantage in **A** may be shown by the heavy losses and the need to meet Communist attacks in **D**.

**Differences –** There is no direct evidence in **D** of the apathy and defeatism referred to in **A**. There are no desertions despite the changes of plan and losses. There is also no confirmation of officers being enriched and the poor paying. **D** sees a keen officer let down by poor information and orders – something not directly dealt with in **A**.

**Provenance – A** is not from front line experience but from reports presumably, whereas **D** is from the sharp end of war – indeed Jiu was killed in the following year. **D** is later in the campaign when the Nationalists were under greater pressure, but the more pessimistic picture is given earlier in **A** from a foreign source at a time when the US was feeling the pressure of commitments in foreign policy and disillusioned by Jiang.

Page 3	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	Pre-U – May/June 2014	9769	74

- (b) How convincing is the evidence provided by this set of documents for the view that the strength of their policies was the key reason for the Communists' success in China in 1949? [20]

The answer should treat the documents as a set and make effective use of each although, depending on the exact form of the question, not necessarily in the same detail. It should be clear that the demands of the question have been fully understood and the material should be handled confidently and with a strong sense of argument and analysis. Good use of supporting contextual knowledge should be demonstrated. The material deployed should be strong both in range and depth. Critical evaluation of the documents is to be expected. The argument should be well constructed. Historical concepts and vocabulary should be fully understood. Where appropriate, an understanding and evaluation of differing historical interpretations is to be expected.

Candidates could see evidence for Nationalist weaknesses being the key element – in **A** morale has deteriorated and apathy and desertion seem to be common. Nationalist forces lack reinforcements and are poorly paid compared to officers. They are also fighting far from their home provinces. To an extent, **D** confirms this but it is operational weaknesses and poor information. **E** offers loss of political support by the KMT but not the sort of long-term weaknesses seen in **A** as it sees that the war might have lasted longer, whereas **A** gives the impression of imminent KMT collapse.

The loss of support by key groups is seen as important, just as much as the military factors in **D**. The factor in the question is the strength of Communist policies. Military policy is considered in **B** with flexibility – small groups, the avoidance of long conflicts over strongly held positions. This actually questions KMT weakness as they have US training and equipment, but stresses superior CVP links with the people and bonds between troops and leaders, something that **A** and **D** see as KMT weakness. **C** further stresses the political support the CCP had through its peasant policies, allying with the poor peasants and labourers. **E** implies the CCP strategy of not acting hastily was effective but downplays their skills and policies, indicating that the KMT forces were ready to desert and that vital political support had been lost – as it was unlikely that CCP policies would appeal to the gentry and merchants. This puts the stress on the favourable circumstances, not the policies.

In terms of provenance, **A** says its information is based on 'many sources'; but it is not based on first-hand experience and it is by an American official. **D** is based on personal experience but may cloud judgements – many commanders are quick to blame staff work and poor decision-making from above. However, it is consistent with other evidence about KMT incompetence and with CCP skills in deception. **B** is rallying his supporters and insisting on his own skills, but not all of the war was conducted in this flexible way and the growing numerical superiority became important. In the end, the conflict had to rely on larger-scale actions, not merely these tactics of 1947 – which **E** suggests might have led to a protracted conflict unfavourable to the CCP. The support of the peasants had been a key factor but this is not the whole story as **E** and **D** stress – victory on the battlefield did not entirely depend on peasant support, but it helped to swell numbers. **E** is an interesting view but the author keeps a balance between CCP strengths and KMT weaknesses. The loss of political support is put into the context of the military defeat of the KMT. There could be contextual knowledge of the importance of peasant support; of the actual fighting in the Civil War; of KMT weaknesses to confirm or challenge the explanations.

<b>Page 4</b>	<b>Mark Scheme</b>	<b>Syllabus</b>	<b>Paper</b>
	<b>Pre-U – May/June 2014</b>	<b>9769</b>	<b>74</b>

- 2 'In the period 1949 to 1956 the Communist regime kept itself in power in China because of its use of terror.' How valid is this judgement? [30]**

Candidates should:

**AO1** – present a response to the question which displays accurate and relevant historical knowledge. A sharp focus on the demands of the question is required. No set response is to be expected. It is the quality of the argument and the evaluation that should be rewarded. The regime change had resulted in considerable violence in the countryside against landlords. Terror might include the Labour Camps and the measures against 'counter revolutionary elements' from late 1950. Networks of work units, streets and neighbourhood committees were set up. There was control of movement and encouragement of spying and informing. The Red Army remained large. Foreigners were driven out and there were large numbers of executions. The Party was purged in the 'three antis' campaign from 1951 and this was extended to the middle classes from 1952. In 1953 more Party purges began with the campaign against Gao gang and Rao Shushi.

**AO2** – be able to demonstrate an understanding and awareness of historical concepts, enabling them to present clear, focused and analytical explanations, which are capable of weighing up the relevant and relative factors and approaches and arriving at a well considered judgement. Attempts to deal with historiography and differing historical interpretations may well enhance answers, but are not required. The discussion could set the violence and terror against other factors: the Korean War saw an upsurge of nationalism; the propaganda was effective in gaining support for the changes, and there were beneficiaries – extensive land reform left peasants in control of lands and, for the time being, free to carry on with traditional cultivation. Communal projects were generally beneficial. There were major steps in the emancipation of women, educational improvements and changes in public health. Mao enjoyed a high reputation, and the replacement of what was seen as a corrupt regime dominated by the West was initially popular. Whether the regime relied essentially on violence is a matter of debate and no set judgement is expected.

**AO3** – [not applicable to Special Subjects]

**AO4** – write in a coherent, structured and effective way. The writing should show a sense of both organisation and direction, displaying clarity, balance and – especially in stronger candidates – fluency. Candidates will not be explicitly penalised for specific deficiencies in spelling, punctuation and grammar. However, the cumulative effect of substantial problems in this area will inevitably influence judgements concerning the overall clarity and effectiveness of the presentation.

<b>Page 5</b>	<b>Mark Scheme</b>	<b>Syllabus</b>	<b>Paper</b>
	<b>Pre-U – May/June 2014</b>	<b>9769</b>	<b>74</b>

### 3 How far were Mao's economic policies after 1949 motivated by Marxist ideology? [30]

Candidates should:

**AO1** – present a response to the question which displays accurate and relevant historical knowledge. A sharp focus on the demands of the question is required. No set response is to be expected. It is the quality of the argument and the evaluation that should be rewarded. The economic policies might include the land redistribution; the subsequent collectivisation of agriculture; industry and the Five Year Plan 1953–57; the Great Leap Forward and subsequent plans.

**AO2** – be able to demonstrate an understanding and awareness of historical concepts, enabling them to present clear, focused and analytical explanations, which are capable of weighing up the relevant and relative factors and approaches and arriving at a well considered judgement. Attempts to deal with historiography and differing historical interpretations may well enhance answers, but are not required. It is essential for candidates to show an understanding of key elements of Marxist ideology – though refracted through Mao's adaptation of classic Marxism. The creation of an industrial proletariat; the centralised planning; the attempts to eradicate class barriers; the elimination of the bourgeoisie in a dictatorship of the proletariat might be seen as ideologically based. The counter argument is that pragmatic considerations came first – the acceptance of peasant landownership, for instance; the retreat from ideology after the failures of the Great Leap Forward; the encouragement of the backyard furnaces; and the somewhat idiosyncratic social and economic ideas behind the Communes might be considered not to be in line with Marxist ideology. This is a wide topic, so the emphasis should be on using material to support arguments; an equally full coverage of all aspects of economic policy should not be expected.

**AO3** – [not applicable to Special Subjects]

**AO4** – write in a coherent, structured and effective way. The writing should show a sense of both organisation and direction, displaying clarity, balance and – especially in stronger candidates – fluency. Candidates will not be explicitly penalised for specific deficiencies in spelling, punctuation and grammar. However, the cumulative effect of substantial problems in this area will inevitably influence judgements concerning the overall clarity and effectiveness of the presentation.

<b>Page 6</b>	<b>Mark Scheme</b>	<b>Syllabus</b>	<b>Paper</b>
	<b>Pre-U – May/June 2014</b>	<b>9769</b>	<b>74</b>

**4 To what extent, in the years 1949–76, did China manage its relations with the USSR better than its relations with the USA? [30]**

Candidates should:

**AO1** – present a response to the question which displays accurate and relevant historical knowledge. A sharp focus on the demands of the question is required. No set response is to be expected. It is the quality of the argument and the evaluation that should be rewarded. Relations with the USA might consider the Korean War 1950–53; the issue of Taiwan, particularly the war scare of 1958; US opposition to recognising Communist China; Chinese anti-US propaganda; and US support for containment of communism in Asia. The moral and diplomatic support given by China to North Vietnam alienated the US. The changes of the 1970s – the ‘parting of the bamboo curtain’ and Nixon’s historic visit.

With the USSR, the treaty of 1950 and the Russian influence on the Korean War; Mao’s disapproval of the Khrushchev era changes; the failure of the talks of 1958, and the bad feeling caused by the war scare over Taiwan in 1958; the ideological disputes over the Great Leap Forward; and USSR concern about Chinese influence in Albania. In 1962 bad relations were enough for the USSR to give aid to India in the border war between India and China, and Mao saw Cuba as humiliating adventurism. The Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was condemned by Mao. Under Brezhnev there was not a united front and there were disputes over Russian influence in Vietnam. It was Mao’s death in 1976 that led to an easing of tensions with the USSR; better relations with the USA had come in 1972 with Nixon’s visit.

**AO2** – be able to demonstrate an understanding and awareness of historical concepts, enabling them to present clear, focused and analytical explanations, which are capable of weighing up the relevant and relative factors and approaches and arriving at a well considered judgement. Attempts to deal with historiography and differing historical interpretations may well enhance answers, but are not required. Candidates are free to argue that Mao might have become over-dependent on Stalin with some disastrous results – for example, the Korean War and the adoption of essentially flawed economic ideas and scientific theories like Lysenko-ism. They might argue that the rift between the two great Communist powers was in neither’s best interests in the Cold War, and that insufficient opportunities were taken to improve relations until after Mao’s death.

As it was unlikely that Communist China would achieve good relations with the US given the latter’s fear of communism, her commitment to the defence of Southeast Asia and the determination to preserve Taiwan, then Mao did well to achieve the rapprochement of 1972. It could be argued that the US served as a unifying feature in China and hostility to Western Imperialism bolstered the regime. However, the bad relations with the USSR achieved little and actually hindered China in the war with India. Alternatively, the continuing hostilities with the US could be seen to have excluded China from a major role in world affairs, made a large defence expenditure necessary and led to hostility with the USSR when the latter’s rulers attempted a more realistic policy of arms reductions. No set answer is expected.

**AO3** – [not applicable to Special Subjects]

**AO4** – write in a coherent, structured and effective way. The writing should show a sense of both organisation and direction, displaying clarity, balance and – especially in stronger candidates – fluency. Candidates will not be explicitly penalised for specific deficiencies in spelling, punctuation and grammar. However, the cumulative effect of substantial problems in this area will inevitably influence judgements concerning the overall clarity and effectiveness of the presentation.