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# A-LEVEL PHILOSOPHY

PHIL2 An Introduction to Philosophy 2  
Mark scheme

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Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Assessment Writer.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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## **Philosophy Unit 2: An Introduction to Philosophy 2**

### **General Guidance for Examiners**

#### **Deciding on a level and the award of marks within a level**

It is of vital importance that examiners familiarise themselves with the generic mark scheme and apply it consistently, as directed by the Principal Examiner, in order to facilitate comparability across options.

The generic mark scheme must be used consistently across all questions. The question-specific mark scheme will indicate a variety of material and approaches that a candidate is likely to use. It is not, however, prescriptive. Alternative responses are possible and should be credited if appropriate.

It will be found that when applying the generic mark scheme, many responses will display features of different levels. Examiners must exercise their judgement. In locating the appropriate band, examiners must look to the best-fit or dominant descriptors. Marks should then be adjusted within that band according to the following criteria:

- understanding of philosophical positions
- accuracy and detail of arguments
- quality of illustrative material
- grasp of technical vocabulary where appropriate
- quality of written communication

It must be noted that quality of written communication should only determine a level in cases where the meaning of a response is obscured. In most cases it will determine adjustments within a level.

It must also be emphasised that, although the question-specific mark scheme is not proscriptive, examiners must familiarise themselves with its content. Examiners must recognise creditworthy material and the subject-specific mark scheme is an important tool for achieving this.

**Generic mark scheme for questions with a total of 15 marks**

<b>AO1: Knowledge and Understanding</b>	
<p><b>5–9 marks</b> At the top end of the level there will be a clear, detailed and precise understanding of the relevant philosophical issues. Lower down the level, responses will be accurate and focussed but may lack balance. At the bottom end there may be some blurring of distinctions, but one issue will be clearly explained.</p>	<b>Level 2</b>
<p><b>1–4 marks</b> The explanation will lack detail, or the detail may be narrow and/or only partially addresses the question. Blurring or conflation of issues may result in some lack of clarity. There may be significant omissions. At the bottom end of the level responses may be vague, unfocussed or fragmentary.</p>	<b>Level 1</b>
<p><b>0 marks</b> Nothing worthy of credit.</p>	
<b>AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application</b>	
<p><b>4–6 marks</b> At the top end of the level, the illustration(s) or example(s) will be clear and have a precise bearing on the issues being explained. Relevance will be apparent. At the lower end of the level, one illustration may be treated precisely with another illustration treated briefly, with only a partial grasp in evidence.</p>	<b>Level 2</b>
<p><b>1–3 marks</b> Where two illustrations are required, one may be clear and precise but the second confused or absent. Alternatively, there may be a blurring of points and their relevance to the explanation is not apparent. At the lower end of the level, examples will lack detail and clarity and may fail to serve their purpose. If only one illustration is required it will be vague or only partially succeed in achieving its purpose.</p>	<b>Level 1</b>
<p><b>0 marks</b> Nothing worthy of credit.</p>	

**Generic mark scheme for questions with a total of 30 marks**

<p><b>26–30 marks</b>  Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and positions clearly and precisely explained. The analysis and use of examples will proceed from a secure knowledge base. Evaluation must be present and will show sophistication and direct engagement of the issues. The relation between argument and conclusion will be clear.  The response is written in a fluent and sophisticated style with minimal, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response will read as a coherent whole.</p>	<b>Level 6</b>
<p><b>22–25 marks</b>  Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and explained but there may be some imprecision. Examples will be deployed effectively but their implications may not be made fully apparent. Evaluation must be present but may lack philosophical impact, or it may be penetrating over a limited range of material. Knowledge and understanding of the issues will be apparent but not always fully exploited.  The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.</p>	<b>Level 5</b>
<p><b>16–21 marks</b>  The response will explain and analyse some relevant material but positions might be juxtaposed rather than critically compared. Relevance will generally be sustained, though there may be occasional tangents at the lower end of the level. Knowledge of issues will be present but may lack depth and/or precision. Evaluative points are likely to be underdeveloped or applied to a limited range of material and may not be convincing. Examples are likely to be used descriptively rather than critically.  The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>	<b>Level 4</b>
<p><b>10–15 marks</b>  Responses in this level may be short or of limited scope. There may be narrow focus on one aspect or a range of issues may be referred to with limited understanding or analysis. Evaluation may be replaced by assertion or counter-suggestion. Sporadic insights may be present but they would lack development. Some knowledge will be present but it is likely to either lack detail and precision, or will not be analysed or evaluated. This is likely to feature at the lower end of the level.  The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>	<b>Level 3</b>
<p><b>5–9 marks</b>  There may be a basic or philosophically unsophisticated grasp of some issues. Analysis may be predominantly simple and/or lack clarity in places. There may be errors of reasoning and understanding. Evaluation, if present, will lack penetration or be very narrowly confined. The response may lack overall purpose and may fail to directly address the relevant issues. At the lower end of the level, the response may be disjointed.  Technical language is limited in its employment or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.</p>	<b>Level 2</b>
<p><b>1–4 marks</b>  There may be an extremely basic awareness of one relevant point without development or analysis. The response may be tangential with an accidental reference to a relevant point. Errors of understanding are likely to be intrusive. At the very bottom of this level there will be little creditworthy material. Fragments of knowledge will feature in this level.  Technical language is not employed or is employed inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar are intrusive.</p>	<b>Level 1</b>
<p><b>0 marks</b>  Nothing worthy of credit.</p>	

**Theme 1: Knowledge of the external world****Total for this question: 45 marks**

<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	Explain and illustrate <b>two</b> differences between common sense (naïve) realism and representative realism.
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**[15 marks]**

Two distinct differences are required rather than a general description of each position. However some credit should be given for differences implicit in such a description.

Responses could include:

- Common sense realism claims that we have direct, unmediated access to the external world, whereas representative realism claims we have indirect, mediated access to the external world, which is represented to us via sense data.
- Common sense realism involves two components to perception, perceiver and external world, whereas representative realism involves three components, perceiver, external world and sense data.

*Note, the above two points can be offered as distinct differences, but if combined as one point this should be credited as such and not treated as blurring.*

- Common sense realism does not make a distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of objects. All qualities of an object are perceiver independent. Representative realists may make the distinction, in that only some properties exist independently of perception.
- Common sense realism allows that we perceive the external world 'as it is' and so scepticism about 'reality' does not occur. Representative realism renders the external world a hypothesis and leaves room for doubt about whether our perceptions are true representations of the external world.
- Common sense realism may struggle to explain problems of illusion, hallucination, time-lag and perceptual variation, whereas the introduction of sense data and secondary qualities in representative realism offers solutions to these.
- Common sense realism may be said to abide by Ockham's Razor in postulating the fewest number of entities to explain perception, whereas representative realism cannot be said to do this.
- In common sense realism the objects of perception are public and located in public space. In representative realism they are private and exist in private space (Russell).

*Other relevant responses should be credited.*

Illustrative material could be drawn from descriptions of our perception of any objects, and if candidates explain the differences using sceptical arguments there could be references to private cinemas etc.

*No marks are available for critical/evaluative discussion of the differences, although relevant knowledge and understanding of such accounts should be rewarded.*

**0 2** Assess the claim that objects are collections of ideas.

**[30 marks]**

Expect candidates to identify the position as idealism, most likely with reference to Berkeley, either explicit or implicit. Responses focusing on the representative realist account of the role of sense are not focussed, and should be rewarded only insofar as they are relevant to an analysis of the idealist position.

Objects are mind-dependent collections of ideas, existing only when perceived (*esse est percipi*). For the theory to be coherent, it is claimed that objects are always perceived, existing as ideas in the mind of God. Idealism denies the existence of material substance. Physical objects are immaterial in nature.

Development and support for the claim could include:

- The distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of objects, as made in representative realism, does not make sense. The 'primary' qualities of objects are also mind-dependent, rather than being mind-independent. Shape, size, motion and so on, as distinguished by Locke, all vary with the perceiver.
- Idealism is ontologically economical, with reference to one quality, the mental, rather than the dual qualities of mind and matter posited in other theories. There could be reference to Ockham's Razor.
- Matter itself is unintelligible as it would exist beyond our immediate perception so cannot enter our minds as an idea. Mind is a better explanation of regularity in our perception of objects.
- Such a reference to an unknowable material world also leaves room for scepticism about the nature of the external world, which is avoided in idealism as we have direct access to objects as collections of ideas/sense data, so the world is as we perceive it to be.
- Idealism seems to solve the linking problem inherent in the Lockean (and Cartesian) account of perception. If a material substance is extended, and causes our ideas, which are non-extended mental items, then how do the two interact? If all we are aware of are sense data, then how can we link them to an external world?
- Several issues presented with this theory are dealt with by reference to God. These include solipsism, the consistency and regularity of our perceptions, and unperceived change. Objects exist in the mind of God and as such are never unperceived. Objects exist externally to human minds. God is thus placed at the heart of the theory as detailed by Berkeley.
- Better candidates will not criticise Berkeley on ad hominem grounds for using God as a 'cop-out' but recognise that idealism supports the existence of God for Berkeley.
- God may be argued to be the cause for perceptions rather than as constant perceiver.

Critical analysis of the theory could include:

- Is the theory really economically parsimonious if God needs to be introduced to make it coherent?
- There may be reference to the circularity involved in using God to guarantee the continued existence of objects when otherwise unperceived, but also using unperceived change to guarantee the existence of God. How do I know that a bath left running didn't cease to exist and reappear full when perceived by me again? Because God was perceiving it. How do I know that God exists? Because objects change when unperceived. To avoid this, either an independent argument for God would be needed, or God is needed to account for our perceptions.
- Confusion in the term 'idea'. Berkeley has not distinguished between the act of perception and the object of perception. The act of perception is mental, but this does not mean that the object of perception is (eg Russell's tree or Robinson Crusoe's fallacy).
- Do I perceive what God perceives? Does he will what I perceive?
- There may be development of the problem of how objects continue to exist / change if unperceived by human minds (eg Russell's Cat).
- There may be development of problems of solipsism.

- Is the theory really empirical in nature if it makes reference to a God for which there is arguably no empirical evidence? Berkeley can no more prove the existence of God than Locke can prove the existence of matter. There are problems with mental or spiritual substance, in the same way there are with material substance.
- If objects are collections of ideas, then how can I distinguish between an imagined idea and a veridical perception?
- How does idealism make a distinction between a hallucination and real perception without reference to a material world? A possible response would make reference to incomplete families of ideas.

The above points could be used to argue for a number of conclusions, for example:

- The claim that objects are collections of ideas is a convincing one. It is consistent with empiricism and avoids sceptical conclusions associated with materialism.
- The claim that objects are collections of ideas data is not convincing, and relies on an unjustified belief in God to be coherent.
- The claim that objects are collections of ideas data is a coherent one only with the introduction of an eternal mind, and so the success of the theory rests on the strength of arguments for God.
- Solutions to the problems of unperceived change, consistency and regularity in perception, and lack of choice are equally given by reference to a material world of objects. Using inference to best explanation, this is the theory we should adopt.



## Theme 2: Tolerance

Total for this question: 45 marks

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 Explain and illustrate how tolerance differs from any **two** of the following:

- Indifference
- Indulgence
- weakness.

[15 marks]

Tolerance involves objection, acceptance and rejection.

- **Indifference** differs from tolerance because tolerance involves an attitude of acceptance towards an issue which you care about, and object to, and objection is not present here. One can be tolerant towards gay marriage if one morally objects to it, but one has nothing to tolerate if one is indifferent to gay marriage.
- **Indulgence** includes the objection component of tolerance but the grounds for allowing an objectionable act to continue (when it would otherwise not be) involve an attitude of favour towards the person performing it. Genuine acceptance is not present. There may be illustrative examples eg parents indulging their children or society indulging celebrities.
- **Weakness** involves objection towards an act but not the acceptance on moral grounds required for tolerance. If an individual *would* suppress the act if they could, then they are merely powerless to stop it, rather than tolerant. If the circumstances changed to afford them power, they would suppress it. A minority group within society may object to the majority law but not have the power to change it. Here acceptance is not present.

Some indications of illustration are given above but candidates should develop specific examples to make their point.

**0 4** 'For a society to be tolerant, it must leave people alone to do or say as they please.' Assess this claim with reference to **either** religious diversity **or** social diversity.

**[30 marks]**

There could be some discussion of what a tolerant society is: a society in which most (but not all) individuals are tolerant or a society in which there is minimal state interference in the lives of individuals. Arguments for either view are likely to be drawn from classical liberalism and focus on social progress and individual flourishing (Mill) or rights to life, liberty, property (Locke) and, generally, the pursuit of happiness. The idea being that we're better off if we are left alone to pursue our own goals.

Candidates focusing on religious diversity are likely to refer to some of the following:

- The historical context of tensions between Catholics and Protestants that gave rise to arguments for toleration (eg Locke's letter).
- Current tensions between Islamists and both moderate Muslims and an increasingly secular society. There may be references to Danish cartoons, films like *The Innocence of Muslims*, threats to burn the Koran (Qur'an), novels like *The Satanic Verses*.
- Issues involving eg the burka, arranged marriages, forced marriages etc.
- Tensions caused by religious cults or sects.

Candidates focusing on social diversity may refer to:

- Ethnic diversity (which includes religious diversity), racial tensions and racism. This may involve dimensions of prejudice/discrimination as well as responses to discrimination (such as outbreaks of rioting) or simply to a range of different cultural practices. Recent attempts to curb Eastern European immigration may also be referred to.
- Sexuality. Gay pride on the one hand, homophobia on the other. Again, this may be linked to certain religious views. Feminist hostility to aspects of mainstream culture (eg the sex industry, representations of women generally) may also feature.
- Social class differences may also feature: whether references to 'chavs' is a way of demonising the working class or underclass.

Development and support for the claim could include:

- Further development of liberal arguments for toleration eg Mill's arguments for freedom of thought and expression (autonomy, fallibilism, experiments in living etc).
- Locke's arguments that the State exists to secure rights and not to save souls or tell us how to live.
- If we set any limit to tolerance of minority groups, does this make us intolerant? We've banned Islam4UK but is this ban sensible? Does this make us intolerant to those groups who do not hold liberal values? If so, perhaps there should be no limit to what other groups can do and say.
- Some candidates may point out that leaving others to do and say as they please does not have to exclude the possibility of offence. Any expression of objection may offend someone.

Critical analysis of the claim could include:

- Conservative concerns that tolerating too much change threatens social cohesion and may undermine moral standards. There may be reference to Devlin.
- Should we respect the rights of individuals to practise their religion and/or retain religious, moral and social values from another culture? Should we value diversity for its own sake? Perhaps we should be encouraging social integration/assimilation.
- Radical concerns that, in unequal societies, toleration strengthens the tyranny of prevailing opinion which is likely to reflect the values of the most powerful groups.
- There may be discussion of conceptions of tolerance. Is permitting a minority to exist or to do and say as they please is a private sphere (providing the minority know their place) genuine tolerance? Does tolerance require any more from us than to co-exist peacefully? Perhaps

genuine tolerance involves respect or esteem.

- Linked to the point above about limits, it could be argued that tolerance requires a limit. For liberals this is when harm is caused to others (Mill) or when activities are illegal and/or threaten the security of the State (Locke). This does not make the society intolerant.
- Perhaps we should not tolerate the intolerant? If we do we may be at risk of losing the culture that allowed the intolerant freedom of expression in the first place (this shouldn't be difficult to illustrate). Perhaps at times we have a moral or political obligation to restrict the freedom of others.

The above points could be used to argue for a number of conclusions, for example:

- A tolerant society would require us to allow others to do and say as they please. Any restrictions to the freedom of others cannot be classed as tolerance.
- Genuine tolerance does entail that we should allow others to do and say as they please. However the value of social cohesion and strong moral guidelines outweigh the value of autonomy and therefore tolerance is not always desirable.
- Tolerance does not always entail permitting others to do and say as they please. Sometimes we have a moral duty to safeguard the rights of some even if it means undermining the freedom of others. There should be limits to tolerance.
- Leaving others alone to do and say as they please is not enough to make a society tolerant, as tolerance requires respect/esteem and/or not offending others.

**Theme 3: The value of art****Total for this question: 45 marks**

<b>0   5</b>	Explain and illustrate <b>two</b> reasons to support the view that form is an important factor in why we value art.
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**[15 marks]**

Form refers to the relations between non-aesthetic features of artwork, and is said to elicit aesthetic emotion or enjoyment. This includes shapes and colours in paintings, or the rhythms, pitch etc in music. We describe form in terms of balance, structure, proportion, harmony and so on. There should be positive points relating to form, rather than simply negative points against other factors, although credit should be given for implicit knowledge which is relevant to the question.

Responses could include:

- Form is a universal quality of all art. Other features such as expression or representation cannot be said to be necessary as they do not feature in all artwork. Regarding a lack of representation, examples could be drawn from music or abstract art such as Barnett Newman's *Adam*.
- Form is an intrinsic feature of art, meaning art can be appreciated independent of context, and we do not need to know how or why it was created.
- Form allows for a disinterested appreciation of art. If something is represented in the work, whether that thing exists, or whether we approve of it is irrelevant. For example, one can appreciate Michelangelo's *David* for its purely formal qualities, without being concerned about whether David existed, or whether it is an accurate representation. Likewise, we can appreciate Shakespeare's *Macbeth* without approving of murder, or supposing the historical existence of such a character.
- Disinterested appreciation allows for objectivity in the appreciation of art. It is not dependent on the viewer or any particular emotion. Objectivity in the appraisal of art should lead to an agreement over what constitutes 'good' art.
- The concern of art is beauty, and formal features are necessary for conveying beauty. Therefore form is necessary for art to be art.
- Reference could be made to the role of form in conveying information or expressing emotion. The structural features of a work of art may illuminate a particular emotion or condition of human experience (for example *The Scream*).
- Form unites our appreciation of art with our appreciation of natural beauty. Natural objects can have aesthetic properties because they have form.
- There could be reference to Clive Bell. Form gives rise to the distinctive aesthetic emotion.

*Other relevant responses should be credited.*

Some illustrative examples are given above, but illustrations are likely to be varied. Examples of abstract art are likely to feature, but these should be specific.

*No marks are available for criticisms/evaluation although relevant understanding in such responses should be rewarded.*

**0 6** 'Art without feelings is not good art.' Assess this claim.

**[30 marks]**

This is a broad question on expressivism designed to allow candidates to focus on the feelings of the artist, audience, or both. They can also discuss whether it is the art itself that has to express feelings rather than the artist. There may be references to Croce and Collingwood.

Development and support for the claim could include:

- We often value art because it is a 'genuine', 'authentic' or 'sincere' expression of the artist's feelings.
- Artists are seen as being especially emotionally sensitive, with the gift of converting this into a publicly accessible work of art.
- Reference to feelings allows us to distinguish an original artwork from a forgery.
- There may be reference to Croce. When the artist channels their emotions appropriately and gets it 'just right' a feeling of aesthetic pleasure follows.
- There may be reference to Collingwood. Art is valued as a clarification of emotion. The completion of the work reveals the latent emotion as it is created. When the audience engages in the artwork the artist is hoping that, through imagination, they will be able to share in this self-realising experience.
- Candidates may focus on the feelings of the audience. Art is valuable if the audience can engage in an emotional response.
- Art is valuable for the purging/cathartic effects it has on the audience (Aristotle).

Critical analysis of the claim could include:

- Are feelings necessary in art? There could be reference to artworks valued for formal or representative qualities (note, alternative theories should not just be juxtaposed). Sculpture can be valued for its cold, mathematical precision.
- Are feelings a sufficient condition for art? An angry outburst or kicking the car is an expression of feeling. Does art have to involve some level of skill or technique?
- We may never know the feelings of the artists (eg death of the author or intentional fallacy). The feelings we read into a piece of art or feel when we experience it do not entail the author was feeling them. Therefore the only feelings to be valued are those of the audience.
- Art should be appreciated in a disinterested fashion (Kant). Only if aesthetic enjoyment can be counted as feeling, are feelings important. Would a drug that induced the same emotional response in the audience be valued in the same way?
- To focus on the feelings or emotions of the artist is to lose focus on the quality of the art produced. There may be references to 'tortured souls' such as Amy Winehouse. Would we value her music less if we were not aware of what she was feeling when she wrote it? (This may not be classed as a criticism if it is the case).
- Can we apply psychological terminology to works of art? Can a painting be 'sad'? Perhaps we can only use the language of emotion metaphorically.
- This leads on to a discussion of whether feelings can be expressed, or merely represented in art. Perhaps metaphor is being used.
- Are any feelings valuable, or only some? If Wagner's operas express feelings of anti-Semitism, are they as valuable as art that is uplifting or expresses moral messages of which we approve? Does this introduce moral or cultural relativism into the appreciation of art?
- This could be developed to discuss the feelings aroused in the audience. If a movie inspired feelings of depression, anger or hate, is it valuable?
- Does it matter if art produces different feelings in different audiences?

The above points can be used to argue for a number of conclusions, for example:

- Art without feelings is not good art. The feelings of the artist should be sincere, and it is the revelation or channelling of these feelings that gives art value.
- Art without feelings is not good art. However it is the emotional response of the audience which has value, the feelings of the artist when they produced it are irrelevant and/or unknowable.
- Art without feelings is not good art, but the feelings to be valued are an aesthetic enjoyment of form, and this should be objective rather than subjective.
- It could be argued that focusing on feelings detracts from the intrinsic qualities of the artwork, and that we should make objective judgements on what is 'good' art.
- Art without feelings is not good art, but feelings cannot be expressed or evoked without form, and often representation plays a part in the emotional response. Therefore feelings are a necessary but not sufficient condition for art to be valued.
- Art without feelings can be good art. There are examples of art lacking in emotion (such as abstract sculpture) which are valued for their form or skill. Emotion is not a necessary condition for art to be valued.

**Theme 4: God and the world****Total for this question: 45 marks**

0	7	Explain and illustrate how analogy can be used to argue that the universe is designed.
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**[15 marks]**

Responses should show an understanding of the principles of analogy, most likely making a comparison with nature/the universe and man-made machines. Candidates may explain how analogy works and illustrate separately, or the understanding of analogy may be shown through the illustration. The analogy can be small scale (parts of the universe, for example the human eye) or large scale (universe as a whole).

- An analogy is a comparison between two things with similar qualities.
- In the design argument analogies are empirical, regarding strong similarities established on observational grounds.
- Analogies may refer to regularities of co-presence or regularities of succession / spatial or temporal order.
- Analogies use inference to argue from what is known to what cannot be known directly. We can infer a designer of the universe because of the similarities with machines, which we know to be the result of a designing mind. And even if we don't know the exact purpose of something, we can still know it has a purpose.
- In the case of design arguments, the principle 'effects, like causes' may be employed. When the two effects (universe and machines) resemble each other, we can infer that the causes also resemble each other.
- We can make comparisons between the universe or its parts, and man-made machines. Paley refers to order, complexity and purposeful arrangement. Cleanthes' argument in Hume's *Dialogues* suggests that the universe is a great machine subdivided into smaller machines, and that the parts show an adaptation of means to ends.
- Candidates may develop Paley's argument that the human eye is analogous to a watch rather than a stone, and requires explanation.
- There may be reference to Aquinas and the analogy of the archer.
- There may be development of the idea that we know from experience that machines do not happen by chance.
- Candidates may develop Cleanthes' claim that the mind of God must be like the mind of man, only greater, 'proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed.'
  - Swinburne's idea that regularities or successions (laws of nature) bear a close resemblance to regularities created by human beings.

*Other relevant responses should be credited.*

Some illustrative material is mentioned above, and can be drawn from the literature, but original examples should be rewarded.

*No marks are available for criticisms/evaluation although relevant understanding in such responses should be rewarded.*

**0 8**

'A world in which we are free to choose evil is better than one in which we are not free to choose evil.' Discuss.

**[30 marks]**

Candidates may outline the problem of evil in logical and/or evidential terms. This question allows for a range of theodicies relating to free will, possible worlds, soul making and afterlife.

Development and support for the claim could include:

- As God is both omnipotent and benevolent, he has chosen to actualise the best world there can be. Thus a world where we can freely choose evil has to be the better one.
- Candidates may discuss how a different world would be worse. For example, a world with no freedom to choose evil would not allow for moral responsibility. Actions not performed freely are not valuable.
- Some candidates may link the free will defence to Augustine and the privatio boni argument. This should be made relevant to the question. Although it is not 'better' that man disobeyed God, it is still better that God gave us the freedom to choose evil.
- A world without the freedom to choose evil would not allow for soul development, and this is the point of life on Earth. There may be references to Irenaeus or Hick. We learn and develop from our choices, and this requires the freedom to choose evil as well as good.
- Candidates may refer to the fact that God cannot intervene to stop the evil consequences of our actions, as this would not be genuine freedom.
- Candidates may claim that it is impossible for God to create beings with the freedom to commit evil but never did so. It is logically impossible for God to give the freedom to choose and know that it will never be misused. So the inevitable consequence of free choice is indeed evil (Plantinga).
- The freedom to choose evil must result in evil being the consequence of these choices. This rules out the possibility of God allowing us to have free choices in a world where there are no 'sharp edges', or the 'wrong' decision does not result in suffering. There may be references to Swinburne. God did not create this as a 'toy world'.
- A world in which humans can freely choose evil allows for moral responsibility and for reward/punishment in the afterlife. Those who suffer from a misuse of free will in this life will be compensated in the next life.
- Candidates may claim that natural evils are necessary, if humans are to be able to freely choose evil. Laws of nature are needed if the universe is to behave in a regular predictable manner, so God cannot constantly intervene. Without such predictability we could not know the consequences of our actions and there could be no moral progress. The result is both moral and natural evil, but the alternative is unpredictability and irregularity and this is worse.
- A world with compassion, sympathy and other 'highest goods' would be logically impossible without evil. Thus it is better than humans can choose to commit evil.

Critical analysis of the claim could include:

- Candidates may cite the problem of evil in simple terms: An all-loving, omnipotent God would not create a world in which sentient beings suffer. As they clearly do suffer, such a God does not exist.
- Any appeal to soul development seems weak when animal suffering is considered, or the suffering/death of babies who have no time to develop spiritually. The means/end problem: the exercise of freedom by some towards a good comes at the cost of others.
- There may be discussion of Flew's argument that God could have made us in such a way that we always choose what is right. How acceptable is Flew's account of a free action?
- There might be a discussion of Mackie's claim that if it's logically possible to choose the good on some occasions then it's logically possible to choose the good on all occasions. If it's logically possible then why did God not make it so? There might be a discussion of how such a world could



be distinguished from one in which it was impossible to choose wrongly.

- Candidates may argue that compensation in heaven is not sufficient justification for the suffering that results from a misuse of free will.
- Even if some of the logical arguments for why evil is necessary are convincing, the evidential problem of evil cannot be solved. I can imagine a better world in which people grow spiritually, appreciate goods in life and show compassion, but with less evil. The scale of evil in this world makes it hard to believe that this is the better world.
- Similarly, I can imagine a better world in which evil is more equally distributed, and where some people do not suffer so much that their souls seem to be destroyed, or they turn from God.
- Could we have the freedom to choose evil in a world without such destructive natural evils, which are beyond our control? There could be other ways for us to learn the consequences of our actions in a predictable and regular universe.

The above points can be used to argue for a number of conclusions, for example:

- A world in which we are free to choose is better than one where we are not, as the value of freedom outweighs any suffering resulting from its misuse.
- A world in which we are free to choose evil could logically be better than one in which we are not, but this is not the case in this world, a world with this scale of evil. A world with freedom but less evil or more evenly distributed evil would be better.
- A world in which we are free to choose evil is not a better world, as soon as one innocent child suffers needlessly as a result of a misuse of free will, the costs have outweighed the benefits.

**Theme 5: Free will and determinism****Total for this question: 45 marks**

<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>	Explain and illustrate <b>one</b> argument to show that free will and determinism are compatible.
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**[15 marks]**

Expect various accounts of compatibilism/soft determinism, although libertarianism could also feature if free will of the mind is contrasted with the determinism of the material world.

Responses could include:

- Hume's claim that we should understand freedom to mean an absence of constraint, and determinism to be regularity. The same motive/desire is followed by the same action with regularity. If we can act upon our motives without constraint then we are free, but actions will still be determined by character. Desires are causes. For Hume, there is no necessity in nature in addition to the regularities.
  - Regarding more responsibility, Hume says that praise and blame are themselves part of the causal chain, involved in promoting or deterring actions of a particular type.
- Frankfurt on first and second order desires. First order desires include our basic wants (for example desiring a cigarette, not enjoying classical music) and second order desires are our desires about first order desires. We are not free when we act only on our first order desires without reflection (wantons). The ability to impose second order desires allows humans to have free will. Genes and the environment etc may determine our first order desires, but we have free will if we can act or not act upon them in accordance with second order desires. The same action could be caused (if unreflective) or free (if in accordance with second order desires).
- Aristotle claimed despite causal determinism we act freely if the 'movement of the limbs ...has its origin in the agent...' giving them the power to act or not act. Ignorance of circumstance is also a criterion for involuntary action. Our dispositions are not voluntary in the same way our actions can be (but we can 'work' at them).
- Hobbes claimed that God is the ultimate cause of every action, but as long as a person is not physically forced to act, they are free. Jumping off a cliff as opposed to being pushed – the former has no immediate material cause so is free. The liberty of man... consists in this, that he finds ... inclination to do."
- A dualist would argue that determinism applies to the material world, but as the mind is not physical it does not obey the same laws of nature. The body is determined, the mind is free.
- Kant claimed that the phenomenal world is determined, but to make sense of morality we must postulate a noumenal self that has free will.
- There could be reference to responsiveness to reasons as a criterion for free will.
- There may be reference to Russell, 'doing as you please but not pleasing as you please'.

*Other relevant responses should be credited.*

Illustrative material could be varied, perhaps describing acting freely on a motive. Expect references to smoking or eating if Frankfurt is used. The dualist account could be illustrated by example of how the body follows natural laws but the mind does not.

*No marks are available for critical/evaluative discussion of the differences, although relevant knowledge and understanding of such accounts should be rewarded.*

**1 0**

‘If determinism is true, praise and blame become meaningless.’ Assess this claim.

**[30 marks]**

Candidates may argue for a connection between free-will and responsibility, perhaps with reference to Kant’s claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ or to Sartre. Praise and blame are only appropriate if human action can be seen in terms of reasons not just causes. Alternatively it could be argued that determinism can incorporate praise and blame as features of a causal system, rather than moral or metaphysical categories.

Development and support for the claim could include:

- Determinism removes the alternative possibilities clause that one ‘could have acted otherwise’ (in exactly the same circumstances) needed for an act to be morally praiseworthy or blameworthy.
- Reference to Kant – ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. We need to postulate free will or we cannot have a meaningful morality.
- Sartre also makes the link between free will and moral responsibility. Any attempt to ‘shift’ moral responsibility by rejecting our total and utter freedom is an act of self-deception / bad faith.
- There could be reference to the fact that we treat crimes of passion more leniently, as they are not as ‘free’ and so the perpetrator cannot be held as morally responsible.
- There could also be reference to the fact that we distinguish the thief from the kleptomaniac, as one is free and the other isn’t. This could also be used in an analysis of Hume’s view, below.
- In an analysis of some of the alternative views below, it could be argued that praise and blame carry a moral value, not just an intrinsic or practical one, and so they do become meaningless if determinism is true.
- Strawson in *Freedom and Resentment* talks of reactive attitudes (hurt feelings, anger etc) which are suspended in certain circumstances, The reactive attitude is modified or suspended in two cases, either accident / emergency where we excuse or justify the action, or where the individual is viewed incapable of genuine personal relations (children, mentally ill) In the latter case we do adopt an objective attitude, and Strawson appears to be a compatibilist by default, free will is irrelevant to our reactions.
  - Candidates may discuss Sartre, who whom character refers to a person’s actions not something distinct from them.
  - It could also be argued that praise, blame and punishment are not, as some philosophers would have it, just elements in a causal chain to regulate behaviour. This would fail to explain the importance of proportionality when allocating punishments.

Critical analysis of the theory could include:

- Frankfurt’s illustrations could be offered as counterexamples to the ‘alternative possibilities’ clause of morality (the man with a computer chip in his brain that is never activated – he had no real alternative but can be blamed for his actions). (Candidates may analyse whether this lack of real possibilities is the same as the decision being determined. This was a free action).
- Honderich’s claim that we should attribute strict liability if the action is performed, regardless of intentions and desires. Praise and blame go on with lesser moral recriminations in some (but not all) respects. We do praise people for things beyond their control (beauty, intelligence etc...).
- Hume would claim that we can praise or blame someone for their character. Indeed it is only if actions are determined by character (rather than random) that praise and blame make any sense. (Candidates may analyse whether we can really be blamed for the character or desires we have. As mentioned above, we treat the kleptomaniac and thief differently, blaming the latter, and yet on Hume’s account both are free as if they act on their desire to steal without constraint).
- There may be reference to praise and blame as elements in the causal chain, their significance being practical rather than moral, instrumental rather than metaphysical. Skinner’s revised ‘morality’ could feature. Liability for praise and blame could be based on the ability for rational deliberation.

- Aristotle claimed despite causal determinism we act freely if the ‘movement of the limbs...has its origin in the agent...’ giving them the power to act or not act. So the agent can be praised or blamed if the action originated with them.
  - Candidates could make the point that whereas reasons are justifications causes are not.
  - Frankfurt’s theory of first and second order desires may be discussed, along with the regress problems raised against it.

The above points could be used to argue for a number of conclusions, for example:

- Praise and blame are moral terms, and determinism rules out the possibility of choice necessary for moral decisions to be made. The terms are meaningless if determinism is true.
- Determinism is true, but if desires are treated as causes, despite all actions being caused, we can meaningfully praise and blame the agent.
- If determinism is true, praise and blame are meaningless as moral or metaphysical terms, but have a practical value in encouraging/discouraging certain behaviours.

**Assessment Objective Grid**

<b>AS Assessment Objective</b>	<b>Marks allocated by Assessment Objective</b> 15 mark question	<b>Marks allocated by Assessment Objective</b> 30 mark question	<b>Total Marks by Assessment Objective</b>
<b>AO1</b>	9	9	18
<b>AO2</b>	6	12	18
<b>AO3</b>	0	9	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>45</b>