



**General Certificate of Education (A-level)
June 2013**

Philosophy

PHIL2

(Specification 2170)

Unit 2: An Introduction to Philosophy 2

Final

Mark Scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all examiners participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each examiner analyses a number of students' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

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Philosophy Unit 2: An Introduction to Philosophy 2

General Guidance for Examiners

Deciding on a level and the award of marks within a level

It is of vital importance that examiners familiarise themselves with the generic mark scheme and apply it consistently, as directed by the Principal Examiner, in order to facilitate comparability across options.

The generic mark scheme must be used consistently across all questions. The question-specific mark scheme will indicate a variety of material and approaches that a candidate is likely to use. It is not, however, prescriptive. Alternative responses are possible and should be credited if appropriate.

It will be found that when applying the generic mark scheme, many responses will display features of different levels. Examiners must exercise their judgement. In locating the appropriate band, examiners must look to the best-fit or dominant descriptors. Marks should then be adjusted within that band according to the following criteria:

- understanding of philosophical positions
- accuracy and detail of arguments
- quality of illustrative material
- grasp of technical vocabulary where appropriate
- quality of written communication

It must be noted that quality of written communication should only determine a level in cases where the meaning of a response is obscured. In most cases it will determine adjustments within a level.

It must also be emphasised that, although the question-specific mark scheme is not proscriptive, examiners must familiarise themselves with its content. Examiners must recognise creditworthy material and the subject-specific mark scheme is an important tool for achieving this.

Generic mark scheme for questions with a total of 15 marks

AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	
<p>5–9 marks At the top end of the level there will be a clear, detailed and precise understanding of the relevant philosophical issues. Lower down the level, responses will be accurate and focussed but may lack balance. At the bottom end there may be some blurring of distinctions, but one issue will be clearly explained.</p>	Level 2
<p>1–4 marks The explanation will lack detail, or the detail may be narrow and/or only partially addresses the question. Blurring or conflation of issues may result in some lack of clarity. There may be significant omissions. At the bottom end of the level responses may be vague, unfocussed or fragmentary.</p>	Level 1
<p>0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.</p>	

AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	
<p>4–6 marks At the top end of the level, the illustration(s) or example(s) will be clear and have a precise bearing on the issues being explained. Relevance will be apparent. At the lower end of the level, one illustration may be treated precisely with another illustration treated briefly, with only a partial grasp in evidence.</p>	Level 2
<p>1–3 marks Where two illustrations are required, one may be clear and precise but the second confused or absent. Alternatively, there may be a blurring of points and their relevance to the explanation is not apparent. At the lower end of the level, examples will lack detail and clarity and may fail to serve their purpose. If only one illustration is required it will be vague or only partially succeed in achieving its purpose.</p>	Level 1
<p>0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.</p>	

Generic mark scheme for questions with a total of 30 marks

<p>26–30 marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and positions clearly and precisely explained. The analysis and use of examples will proceed from a secure knowledge base. Evaluation must be present and will show sophistication and direct engagement of the issues. The relation between argument and conclusion will be clear. The response is written in a fluent and sophisticated style with minimal, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response will read as a coherent whole.</p>	<p>Level 6</p>
<p>22–25 marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and explained but there may be some imprecision. Examples will be deployed effectively but their implications may not be made fully apparent. Evaluation must be present but may lack philosophical impact, or it may be penetrating over a limited range of material. Knowledge and understanding of the issues will be apparent but not always fully exploited. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.</p>	<p>Level 5</p>
<p>16–21 marks The response will explain and analyse some relevant material but positions might be juxtaposed rather than critically compared. Relevance will generally be sustained, though there may be occasional tangents at the lower end of the level. Knowledge of issues will be present but may lack depth and/or precision. Evaluative points are likely to be underdeveloped or applied to a limited range of material and may not be convincing. Examples are likely to be used descriptively rather than critically. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>	<p>Level 4</p>
<p>10–15 marks Responses in this level may be short or of limited scope. There may be narrow focus on one aspect or a range of issues may be referred to with limited understanding or analysis. Evaluation may be replaced by assertion or counter-suggestion. Sporadic insights may be present but they would lack development. Some knowledge will be present but it is likely to either lack detail and precision, or will not be analysed or evaluated. This is likely to feature at the lower end of the level. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>	<p>Level 3</p>
<p>5–9 marks There may be a basic or philosophically unsophisticated grasp of some issues. Analysis may be predominantly simple and/or lack clarity in places. There may be errors of reasoning and understanding. Evaluation, if present, will lack penetration or be very narrowly confined. The response may lack overall purpose and may fail to directly address the relevant issues. At the lower end of the level, the response may be disjointed. Technical language is limited in its employment or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.</p>	<p>Level 2</p>
<p>1–4 marks There may be an extremely basic awareness of one relevant point without development or analysis. The response may be tangential with an accidental reference to a relevant point. Errors of understanding are likely to be intrusive. At the very bottom of this level there will be little creditworthy material. Fragments of knowledge will feature in this level. Technical language is not employed or is employed inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar are intrusive.</p>	<p>Level 1</p>
<p>0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.</p>	

Theme 1: Knowledge of the External World

Total for this question: 45 marks

0 1

Explain and illustrate **one** strength and **one** weakness of idealism.

(15 marks)

Candidates may give a general outline of the idealist position but this is not a requirement.

Strengths of idealism could include:

- It avoids the problems faced by making a primary/secondary quality distinction. Primary qualities of objects are also mind-dependent, rather than being mind-independent. Shape, size, motion and so on, as distinguished by Locke, all vary with the perceiver.
- Idealism is ontologically economical, with reference to one quality, the mental, rather than the dual qualities of mind and matter posited in other theories. There could be reference to Ockham's Razor.
- Avoidance of the linking problem. Representative realists may not be able to explain how we know that sense data give an accurate representation of 'reality'. In idealism the objects are experienced directly, and really are as they appear.
- Idealism is consistent with empiricism, referring only to that which is experienced. It removes reference to matter, which is unknowable/unverifiable (solves Locke's problem of substance).
- A theist would argue that a strength of the theory is that God is rightfully placed at the heart of the theory, and it could be argued that the continued existence of objects is evidence for God's existence, strengthening theism.
- Idealism has an answer to the problem of hallucinations, in that it refers to consistency/regularity, and how hallucinations will not be able to be detected by all the senses. Real objects as families of ideas.

Weaknesses of idealism could include:

- The problem of the continued existence of objects when unperceived.
- The problem of explaining consistency and regularity of objects.
- Various problems regarding the postulation of God to ensure the coherence of idealism, such as the lack of empirical evidence being inconsistent with Berkeley's theory.
- Or, the circularity involved in the argument. How do we know God exists? If it were argued that it is because objects continue to exist unperceived, then how do we know objects really do continue to exist unperceived? If it is argued that it is because God exists, then this is circular. An independent proof of God is needed.
- Problems regarding the postulation of an Eternal Mind, and the definition of an 'idea'. Is the immediate object of perception my sense data or God's? Do I have the same perceptions as God?
- Confusion over the term 'idea' could also be that Berkeley conflates the object of apprehension with the act of apprehension (desert island fallacy).
- Idealism could lead to solipsism.
- Berkeley's argument regarding the lack of knowledge of material substance applies equally to mental and spiritual.
- The problem of hallucination. How can idealism distinguish between veridical perception and hallucination without reference to a world beyond the mind?

Other relevant responses should be credited.

Illustrative material could be drawn from Berkeley's *Three Dialogues* in which Philonous argues against the mind-independence of primary qualities. Sceptical arguments concerning the linking problem could be illustrated. Expect reference to various objects, to which we have direct access.

Expect reference to unperceived change, such as baths filling or Russell's hungry cat.

Criticisms that begin with a problem that Berkeley used God to solve, and continue to discuss problems with the introduction of God should not be penalised for blurring.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

0 2

Assess the claim that sense data are unnecessary in explaining our perceptions of the world.

(30 marks)

Candidates may identify the position as direct/naïve realism, ie that there exists a mind-independent material world of objects, we have unmediated perceptual access to objects and objects have all the properties we perceive in them. Candidates are likely to develop a discussion about the strengths and weaknesses of this claim involving arguments for and against sense data. There may be explicit or implicit reference to Strawson, Hume, Berkeley, Russell, Austin, Ayer, Locke, Descartes, Reid, etc.

Arguments in support of the claim could include:

- If we avoid sense data we abide by Occam's razor/principle of parsimony. We should choose an explanation of perception with the fewest possible entities.
- The intuitive appeal of the common sense view and the pragmatic success of direct realism. As a species we have evolved quite successfully without reference to sense data.
- Direct realism avoids the sceptical/solipsistic conclusions that are associated with a veil of perception. Sense data only lead to doubt about the nature of the external world, and even the real cause of our perceptual experiences.
- There may be development regarding the veil of perception or private cinema arguments, Evil Demon or Matrix examples may also feature.
- Expect replies to arguments often used to advocate reference to sense data. For example in the case of illusion, there are not two things (an object and an appearance) rather there is just an object with the property of looking different in different conditions (Austin).
- We are able to identify explanations for illusions from science. They are not mental errors.
- Reference to sense data leads to unnecessary reification of appearances.
- Disjunctive account – in the case of illusion and hallucination we perceive sense data, but we should not generalise to say this is always the case.
- Sense deceptions are usually corrected by other senses, so we are able to claim we are perceiving an object directly when we pay due care and attention.
- Regarding time-lag, direct perception is not synonymous with instantaneous perception. We do not perceive sense data, but rather the object itself, just not immediately.
- Regarding perceptual variation, we can explain and predict this, for example with an understanding of depth or distance. We still perceive the object directly and do not need to refer to sense data (Reid).
- We can determine the 'real' properties of objects under optimum conditions (Strawson). A rose has a real colour, which we directly perceive in the best light and with fully working faculties.
- There may be references to empirical evidence for denying the existence of the moment of conscious awareness or 'Cartesian Theatre', eg Dennett.
- Can we really describe experiences in terms of sense-data, without referring back to material objects themselves?
- We are required to know facts about physical objects to set up the premises. But if all we have are sense data, can we justify this?
- Is the concept of sense data really coherent? How can an immaterial entity have properties of shape and colour? Where are they located?
- Could we describe something as a representation if all we have are representations?

- Scientific description arguments can be responded to. We can question whether there is one objective description and/or whether scientific descriptions revise out concepts but do not reveal mistakes (Stebbing).

Arguments against the claim could include:

- The problems of sense deception, illusion and hallucination show that we do not perceive the world directly or 'as it is.' Refutation by counterexample. These are explained by introducing sense data.
- Perceptual variation indicates we cannot make knowledge claims about the nature of the material world. A rose may look red in one case and grey in another. It cannot be both red and grey. It is the sense data that alters.
- The difficulty in determining what the optimum conditions for perception would be, if we claim we see the object directly and 'as it is'. This is solved by introducing sense data.
- Alternatively, time-lag arguments could be used to argue that we do not perceive objects directly. Rather we perceive a delayed sense data caused by the object.
- Science tells us we do not perceive the material world 'as it is'. Physics claims the world is actually colourless, odourless, etc. We experience secondary qualities which exist only in sense data.
- Science also suggests a causal chain, from object, sense organs, nerves, brain and perceptual processes, so we cannot be perceiving objects directly.
- There may be reference to the primary/secondary quality distinction. When we perceive secondary qualities, these are not properties of the objects themselves, but rather powers to produce sensations in us.
- There may be arguments against the claim that we can know of an external, material world, as we only have access to sensations. It is necessary to refer to sense data in perception as we can't refer to anything else.
- This could be developed into idealism, whereby objects are perceived directly but are mind-dependent collections of ideas/sense data.
- This could also be developed into phenomenalism (could be implicit rather than explicitly referenced), whereby we make no reference to the cause of sense experiences.
- Qualitative similarity (Ayer).

The above points could be used to argue for a number of conclusions, for example:

- We have no need to refer to sense data as we have direct access to material objects (naïve realism).
- The disjunctive account could be offered. On rare occasions we may perceive sense data but this is not always the case.
- We must refer to sense data as this is how we indirectly perceive a material world (representative realism).
- Sense data/ideas are what we directly perceive and constitute reality (idealism).
- We must describe objects in terms of sense data and can make no reference to the cause (phenomenalism).
- Direct realism is not philosophically watertight but we should still avoid reference to sense data on pragmatic grounds or because it avoids sceptical conclusions.

Other relevant discussion points and positions should be credited.

Theme 2: Tolerance

Total for this theme: 45 marks

0 3

Explain and illustrate **one** way in which tolerance may result in a paradox or contradiction.

(15 marks)

There may be some initial explanation of the concept of tolerance but this is not a requirement. Paradoxes or contradictions could be drawn from the objection, acceptance and rejection components.

- Tolerating the intolerant. For example minority groups who show intolerance towards their own members. We would increase the autonomy of some members by not tolerating these actions. But then do we undermine the autonomy of those committing the intolerant acts? Would this fall foul of the principle of fallibility? An example could be women feeling oppressed in forced marriages.
- Tolerance may mean permitting and safeguarding minority views that if left unchecked and allowed to become the majority view would undermine a tolerant society.
- The paradox of setting limits to tolerance. If we define any limits to what we can tolerate, for example intolerance or harm, then this itself is an act of intolerance.

The above bullet points all relate to rejection, and if more than one is mentioned should not be treated as blurring.

- Refraining from intolerance for prudential reason qualifies as tolerance. The racist may only refrain from acting on their intolerant thoughts due to self-interested reasons. But if these reasons are rational and considered, they would be defined as tolerant.
- If we are given rational and considered reasons for something we believe to be morally wrong, then we have the paradox that it is morally right to tolerate what we believe to be morally wrong.
- Tolerance is supposed to be grounded in rationality but its universal application by an individual may make him (her) appear irrational.

Other relevant responses should be credited

Illustrations could be drawn from a range of examples. There may be reference to minority fundamentalist religious groups, forced marriages, tolerant sexists or racists, right-wing political parties, morally repugnant acts for which people give considered justification, examples of consumerism and repressive desublimation and so on.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

0 4

Assess the claim that a tolerant society may not benefit its members.

(30 marks)

Some candidates may begin with the arguments for a tolerant society, and this is acceptable provided they do consider counter-arguments and ultimately answer the question. There may explicit or implicit references to Locke, Mill, Devlin, Forst, Wolff, Rawls, etc. The argument against tolerance may take the form of conservative, religious, communitarian or Marxist perspectives. These could be contrasted with classical liberalism, utilitarianism and value pluralism.

The arguments against the desirability of tolerance may include:

- Religious fundamentalists will be convinced of the correct way to live, that they know what the 'good life' involves (the will of God). Toleration of other ways of life will have a corrupting effect.
- Experiments in living do not necessarily lead to a happier or 'better' life.
- The value placed by liberals on autonomy assumes that we are rational beings who will discover the best way of living. This is not necessarily true – strong moral guidance and social rules may be preferable.
- Mill assumes that people will make rational decisions based on evidence, but for some people exposure to racist views, for example, may mean they do form false beliefs. We may lose 'truth' if tolerance prevails in a society of susceptible members.
- There may be minority groups who do not respect autonomy. If these minorities are permitted to become the majority, then autonomy is better protected by not being tolerant. Tolerance might strengthen the tyranny of the majority.
- We should not tolerate the intolerant, as this would undermine the values tolerance is supposed to protect. Candidates could use this point to support the claim in question, or to argue for a tolerant society that admits exceptions.
- There may be times when we have a moral or political duty to be intolerant. At the very least, tolerance should have limits. We should never tolerate harm. Conservatives may argue that even apparently self-regarding acts can undermine the moral fabric of society.
- There may be reference to Lord Devlin – governments should enforce common moral values. Morality is social, and the government should pass laws to preserve moral values. This ensures social cohesion.
- A government has the duty to protect its citizens, and security may dictate intolerance towards certain views or lifestyles that may be inherently hostile or dangerous. Value neutrality is not desirable.
- Tolerance may avoid real social change – repressive desublimation. If we feel 'free' in a society tolerant of everything (for example pornography) then we have no need to challenge authority. Through consumption the masses are effectively controlled, no longer needing an alternative outlet for their suppressed urges.
- A feminist critique of tolerance suggests that it leads to a rise in pornography and a devaluing of the female form. There may also be a feminist critique of the toleration of patriarchy within the family.
- Contrary to Mill, diversity is not necessary for social development and new ideas. Intellectual breakthroughs are not limited to tolerant societies.
- Contrary to Mill, it is implausible to suggest that we can use reasoned argument against certain views or lifestyles (as indicated in Fitzjames Stephen's criticism of Mill regarding pimps).

- There may be reference to traditional conservative justifications, for example imperfections in human nature, inequalities in moral and intellectual capabilities.

Arguments in favour of tolerance may include conceptual and pragmatic:

- There may be references to infallibility or subjectivity. Rawls and reasonableness/burden of judgement. We cannot be sure which conception of the 'good life' is right.
- The intrinsic value of autonomy, respect and equality, independent of any extrinsic pragmatic results. There may be development through Mill or Locke. Man as a progressive being (Locke).
- Tolerance is a virtue of pluralist democracies. There is a conceptual connection between tolerance and democracy, regardless of pragmatic considerations.
- Societies can be tolerant without actually promoting certain views or lifestyles.
- Avoidance of the 'tyranny of the majority'.
- The benefits of 'experiments in living' and diversity for the development of ideas, through debate and discussion. This is how society grows and develops.
- Society benefits materially/economically from tolerating skilled minorities. For example the French suffered a loss of skilled labourers through their persecution of the Huguenots.
- The pragmatic value of avoiding strife. This could be contrasted with the above view that common moral values are more cohesive, especially in the inevitable context of pluralism.
- There could be historical references to the dangers of intolerance, for example extreme cases like Nazi Germany.
- There could be a discussion of whether tolerance should be valued intrinsically or instrumentally.
- Deficiencies in rationality should be seen as an incentive to improve education.

The above points could be used to argue a number of conclusions, for example:

- A tolerant society may not benefit its members. This could be concluded from a range of the above issues, such as security, social cohesion, common moral values, the need for strong moral guidelines and so on.
- A tolerant society does benefit its members. This could be concluded from a range of the above points, such as the value of autonomy, experiments in living, fallibility, or historical lessons.
- A tolerant society does benefit its members as tolerance does allow for limits to what can be tolerated.

Other relevant discussion points and positions should be credited.

Theme 3: The value of art

Total for this theme: 45 marks

0 5

Explain and illustrate **two** criticisms of the view that we value art because it expresses the feelings of the artist.

(15 marks)

There may be clarification of the view that art should have an expressive quality and be emotionally moving, but this is not required.

Criticisms could include:

- Expression of feelings is not necessary for us to value art. An intricate tapestry design or nicely painted plate could be 'good' art without expressing emotion. Abstract art does not necessarily express feelings, nor does instrumental music.
- The value of art should be intrinsic to the art itself. This could be developed into formalism. All art has form or some sort, whereas not all has an expressive quality. Art can have a cold beauty, divorced from feelings. Russell compared mathematics to the 'beauty, cold and austere' of sculpture. An example could be Brancusi's *Fish*.
- In focusing on the feelings of the artist we may begin to focus on the life and emotional state of the artist rather than the quality of the art. Art becomes valuable because of the 'tortured soul' or 'reclusive genius' who created it. Some may disagree that Van Gogh's *Starry Night* should have an elevated value because we know something of the artist's feelings at its creation, or that Amy Winehouse's music has taken on elevated value after her death.
- We do not want to value art lacking in skill or technique simply because it is expressive. A student's drawing of a stick-man teacher being pushed off a high cliff in the margin of their book expresses their hatred of said teacher, but is this valuable art?
- Expression of feelings is not sufficient to call something art at all, let alone valued art. Stamping one's feet or kissing are (arguably more effective) ways of expressing feelings, but are not art.
- We should be wary of emotional expression in art, rather than valuing it. It is irrational and potentially dangerous (Plato). We should control our feelings rather than freely express them in art otherwise we may be led into impulsive actions.
- Sometimes we value art because of the ideas expressed, rather than feelings. Hirst's shark in formaldehyde expresses the idea of *The Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living*. Banksy's art is thought to express social messages. Lady Gaga's music contains pro-gay messages.
- The audience may not be able to connect with the feelings the artist is attempting to express because they lack the same beliefs or context. Someone who does not believe that Christ died for our sins may be unable to understand the sorrow said to be expressed in Van de Weyden's *Deposition*. The expression of feelings lacks universal appreciation.
- We may value art for the emotional response it triggers in the audience, independent of the emotions of the artist. Dance music can evoke feelings of euphoria in some, but leave others cold. The musician who created it may have been experiencing neither emotion.
- We risk committing the intentional fallacy by making claims as to what feelings the artist is expressing. There is evidence that the feelings of the artist and the feelings 'expressed' in a work of art are not always the same. Is the value of art in the feelings evoked in the audience rather than the feelings that may or may not be that of the artist? At any rate, we can never be sure they are one and the same.

- There are difficulties in using psychological terms usually applied to humans when talking about works of art. If an artist is trying to express sadness, does the painting or music become 'sad'? How does this relate to the original emotion of the artist? Adele's *Someone Like You* is described as a 'sad' song because it about a break-up, but how does this word relate to the song itself?

Other relevant responses should be credited

Some illustrative examples are given above, but illustrations are likely to be varied. Examples of abstract art are likely to feature.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

0 6

Assess the claim that we should value art because it truthfully represents reality.

(30 marks)

This question relates to the issues of whether we value art because it informs us, and allows candidates to discuss both representation and/or truth. Candidates may refer to other features of art that may be valued such as emotional or formal content, but this should maintain relevance by showing why these features are as/more important than truthful representations.

Arguments in support of the claim could include:

- The value of ‘a good likeness’ in art has long been recognised, and we often criticise visual art for not being a likeness of the subject. We praise literature or plays for being ‘true to life’ and films for being a ‘realistic’ portrayal.
- Artists spend years perfecting techniques to create art that is ‘true to life’. Actors may even temporarily lead the life of the people they are playing to give a ‘true’ representation.
- Even if what is represented does not exist in reality as a particular object, art can truthfully represent ideals. For example the Greek statue *Leonidas* represents an idealised version of mankind, or Bouguereau’s *Birth of Venus* represents the ideal of femininity.
- There may be discussion of what ‘represent’ means. Does it have to mean imitate? A depiction of a hill on an ordinance survey map is a truthful representation of reality without resembling it.
- There may be reference to art that represents reality without resembling or imitating it. Impressionist art attempts to represent reality more truthfully by employing a better understanding of light, and representing what we ‘really’ see, for example Monet’s *Water Lilies*.
- Ancient Egyptian and Aboriginal art was often not valued because people assumed a lack of resemblance was a result of lack of technology or skill. But later it was understood that simple two-dimensional or birds-eye representations gave more information about reality to the culture in which they were produced.
- Once we understand that representation does not have to mean imitate or copy, we can still judge the value of art in terms of representation, and claim that there are better or worse representations of an object.
- There may be a deeper sense of representation where representation is used to convey moral truths, again making imitation or resemblance irrelevant. For example Picasso’s *Guernica* represents the truth of the horror of war.
- There may be discussion of the word ‘truthfully’, in which it could be suggested that a representation of an artist’s vision, or a deeper moral truth does not have to equate to any empirical or material ‘truth’ in the world. Again, this means that representation does not mean imitation. For example Munch’s *Scream* truthfully represents terror better than reading a dictionary definition.
- Art can truthfully represent certain emotions or universal human conditions even when a scene being depicted or characters in a play are not ‘real’. *Romeo and Juliet* can be said to represent the reality of love and revenge.
- Emotional responses may be valued, but these are ultimately responses to the representational qualities of the art.
- Candidates may distinguish works of imagination from works of fantasy, as the former may not represent facts in the world but can reveal truths on another level, perhaps about the human situation.

Arguments against the claim could include:

- There may be discussion of Plato. Art is a copy of particular objects, which themselves are copies of Forms. Although many people do value art as a true representation of reality, it is a copy of a copy. As such it is really a limited depiction and sometimes blocks us from the truths of reality.
- Is this view reductionist? It focuses on the instrumental rather than the intrinsic value of art. For example, the aesthetic pleasure we experience, which differs from what we could experience if we encountered the object represented.
- If a true representation of reality was all that was important, why don't we value forgeries as much as originals? Surely the process of creation and intention of the artist are important, rather than what is represented? Representation is not sufficient for us to value art.
- If true representation was sufficient to value art, we could replace it with another medium that also gives a truthful representation, such as a text book, without losing value. Or even bypass the art and attend to what is being represented.
- Some art is not representation at all, for example abstract art, such as Karel Appel (1960) *Untitled*. Representation is not necessary for us to value art.
- In instrumental music, representation is irrelevant. Even if we say a piece of music is 'joyful', this emotion is being evoked rather than represented.
- Focusing on truth or representation is too intellectual, and ignores the emotional response we have to art.
- Bell claimed that the truth of representation is not the point. Form is the object of aesthetic pleasure and is intrinsic to the art. This allows us to value non-representational art.
- 'Truth' as an aesthetic standard is rejected by formalists.
- There may be a discussion of the word 'truthfully'. Can any art be 'true' to reality in an objective sense, when even our everyday perceptions of the world involve selection and interpretation? Could art ever be 'untrue'?
- Following from this, does art 'truthfully represent' reality, or only the features seen as important by a particular culture or age?
- Do we want art to be a 'truthful representation'? Sometimes it is a pleasurable distraction from the truth, for example a fantasy novel.
- If what is supposedly being represented is an 'ideal', does this qualify as a truth about reality?
- Is imagination more valuable than truthful representations? Is reality just the springboard for the imagination?
- The word 'truthfully' is a category mistake when applied to art. Truth and falsity are properties of propositions.

The above points could be used to argue for a number of conclusions, for example:

- Art should be a truthful representation of reality. It should inform us.
- Art should be a truthful representation of reality, but we must understand that representation does not have to mean imitate or copy.
- Art should be a truthful representation of reality, but we must understand that there is subjectivity regarding 'truth'.
- Art cannot be a truthful representation of reality if we are unable to discover objective truths. At most, art represents perspectives on reality.
- Truthful representation is not *necessary* for art to be valuable.
- Truthful representation is not *sufficient* for art to be valuable.

- The claim is more persuasive for some art forms (such as painting) than others (such as music).
- Truthful representation is one feature which makes art valuable, but art lacking it can also be valuable. If art sets out to truthfully represent reality then it should be valued if it does so successfully.
- Art is pointless, this is what makes it art.
- Art determines the purpose, rather than purpose determining art.

Other relevant discussion points and positions should be credited.

Theme 4: God and the world

Total for this theme: 45 marks

07

Explain and illustrate **one** argument to show that belief in God reflects attitudes and commitments rather than facts about the world.

(15 marks)

This question could be answered in a negative way, suggesting that religious belief fails the tests of verifiability or falsifiability, or in a positive way suggesting that it should be the nature of religious belief to mirror attitudes rather than facts. Answers could include:

- Religious belief does not make factual claims as it is not verifiable, as shown by Ayer and the logical positivists.
- Religious belief does not make factual claims as it is unfalsifiable and hence not a real hypothesis about the world.
- Religious belief is an expression of attitude or commitment to a way of life and the statements made, although appearing to be empirical, are not. There could be references to DZ Phillips, or to Braithwaite's notion of 'stories'.
- Braithwaite would also be an example of fideism, claiming that the differences between religions are different stories, and acceptance of any empirical claims being made in these stories is not necessary. Rather, these stories illustrate an attitude or commitment to view the world in a particular way.
- Religious belief involves an 'inwardness' that is an attitude rather than a factual claim (Kierkegaard).
- Religious belief is not based on factual claims, as the stories of different religions do not need to be believed as true, but rather as myths to inspire ways of living.
- Religious belief is one world view amongst many others, it is a way of 'seeing-as' (Hick).
- There could be reference to Winch and the claim that there is no external relation between language and reality.
- Religious belief is a language game whose criteria for sense and meaning are not observational. Concepts like 'reality' and 'the world' are given within the rules of the game.

Illustrative material could include Wisdom's Parable of the Gardener as used by Flew, Hare's 'bliks', Hick's Celestial City, and illustrations of language games. Linguistic examples should also be credited, such as Phillips' claim that statements such as 'God loves me' are expressions of commitment to a way of life rather than factual claims about the world. Equally, examples of unverifiable statements should also be credited. There may be illustrations of religious claims that should not be thought of as factual claims, but rather 'pictures' to which one commits, for example the Last Judgement.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

0 8

'We infer a designer from design, so we can infer God from the world.' Assess this claim.

(30 marks)

This is a broad question allowing a range of approaches. Candidates may include arguments from analogy, probability, or Inference to Best Explanation. Design could be discussed on a small or large scale, ie a focus on features of nature or the apparent design of the universe. There may be explicit or implicit reference to Paley, Hume, Kant, Tennant, Swinburne, Hume, Behe, Darwin, Dawkins, etc. Discussion could focus on assessing the 'evidence' for design and/or assessing the process of inference.

Arguments in support of the claim could include:

- Paley's argument that due to the common features of order, complexity and purposeful arrangement in a watch and an eye, we can infer a designer of the latter based on the rules of analogy.
- Hume's presentation of the argument through Cleanthes, that the universe is a 'great machine' subdivided into smaller machines. The author of nature must be very like the mind of man, only greater, in proportion to the grandeur of the work executed.
- Tennant or Swinburne's Inference to Best Explanation (IBE), that given regular laws of nature, and the fact that the universe is not chaotic, a rational agent is more likely than chance.
- The probability of certain features of the universe, such as the human brain or DNA molecule is very low. There may be reference to Intelligent Design, for example Behe, Dembski. The irreducible complexity of some organisms or their parts is not explicable in Darwinian terms.
- The incompleteness of scientific/evolutionary theory to explain features such as aesthetic appreciation or philosophy.
- The anthropic principle or 'fine tuning' argument suggests the universe has been designed for human life. For example, if there had been a difference in temperature of a millionth of a degree at the Big Bang it would not have resulted in our universe.
- Specific references to 'fine tuning' in nature, such as water expanding when frozen.
- Specific references to spatial order. The universe shows mathematical precision, such as the Golden Ratio that appears in shells, flowers, etc.
- Specific references to regularities of succession, for example laws of gravity.
- Design is not incompatible with evolution, if evolution is part of the process of reaching a designed, intended telos.
- Aesthetic benefits in nature.
- In discussion of the process of inference, other examples may be cited where we make a hypothesis about a unique event (such as the Ice Age), or infer from a single example, (as in the case of other minds).
- There is no evidence of any 'botched' universes to suggest that ours is one of many, a result of trial and error.

Arguments against the claim could include:

- Support for evolution and critique of Intelligent Design. No feature has been accepted as irreducibly complex.
- Design and order are not features of the world itself, but the result of the minds imposing design and order to make sense of experience.
- The world is only 'designed' to those who have a particular way of 'seeing-as', a religious point of view.
- Supposed aesthetic benefits are only subjective responses to a world devoid of aesthetic properties.
- To say the universe is designed is an unfalsifiable hypothesis. Would the believer allow anything to count against it?
- As we have no experience of other universes, we cannot make inferences as to the cause of the features of this one. What would an un-designed universe look like? An inference from a single case is a weak inductive argument.
- Probability has no application to a single case.
- The analogy with man-made designs is weak. Hume suggested that the universe could equally be compared to something naturally occurring and organic, such as a giant vegetable.
- The point could also be applied to Swinburne's argument, as the universe does not resemble a machine in temporal succession.
- In response to the anthropic principle, should we really be surprised that the universe seems designed for our survival? Any species that survived would think this. If it were any different we wouldn't be here to contemplate it.
- Versions of the Epicurean hypothesis. The random movement of finite atoms in infinite time will eventually generate this universe. Reference may be made to the lottery or dealing cards. All combinations are equally improbable but a person who gets dealt four aces ten times in a row may attribute agency.
- Based on the rules of analogy, how much could we say about the 'designer'? If successful, the inference can be made to a designer intelligent enough to design the world, but we can infer no more than this 'cosmic architect'. We cannot infer perfection, infinity, a creator, etc.
- Hume's argument that there could be multiple gods, a trainee God, sexual or mortal. The evidence could suggest a God who is not omnipotent or benevolent. (Swinburne's refutation could be offered, that the creator of the laws of nature must necessarily be disembodied).
- Structural defects suggest that if there is a designer, this designer is not perfect. This could be on a small scale (such as the human appendix or cancer cells) or on a large scale (such as natural evil).
- There is incompatibility between the attributes required for a designing God. For example God is supposed to be transcendent but design requires action in time and space.
- Multiverse theories – our universe if one of many, explicable by a version of evolutionary theory (Stephen Hawking).
- In response to mathematical arguments, a random mess can be expressed mathematically without showing it to be the product of intelligent design.

The above points could be used to argue a number of conclusions, for example:

- The claim is not convincing. This could be due to the weakness of the 'evidence' for design, or because alternative explanations such as evolution or chance are more convincing. It could be because the process of inference or use of analogy is unsuccessful.

- The claim is convincing. This could be due to the strength of the analogy, or the lack of a good alternative explanation for the evidence we see. This could also be approached in terms of IBE.
- The claim is not strong enough to act as proof for God, but still holds a persuasive power. As Kant claimed, it is the argument most in accordance with common reason and as such deserves respect.
- Even if some elements of the world exhibit design, this is enough to undermine atheism, even if other elements appear flawed.
- Whether one agrees with the claim will depend on their perspective on the world, their particular way of 'seeing-as'. Some will see design in the world that needs an explanation, others will not.
- The above point could be used to argue that as only those who believe in God 'see' design in the universe, and as such are the ones who will infer a designer so we end up begging the question. The claim will only be accepted by those who believe in God already, but will not convince the atheist.

Other relevant discussion points and positions should be credited.

Theme 5: Free will and determinism

Total for this theme: 45 marks

0 9

Explain and illustrate how determinism may be distinguished from religious predestination.

(15 marks)

Determinism is the view that given certain conditions only one possible effect can be the result of a particular cause, given fixed laws of nature and causal necessity. Predestination (or theological fatalism) is the view that there is a divinely determined outcome to all things in the universe. There can be more than one interpretation of this. Some candidates may argue that we cannot make free decisions, others that we can make free decisions but God knows how we will act rather than deciding it, and some will suggest although an ultimate end has been decided, we have the freedom to make decisions along the way, they just won't have an effect on the final outcome. All should be credited provided the differences are clear.

Differences between the two may include:

- Determinism does not require reference to anything metaphysical and is explicable purely in terms of natural laws. Religious predestination makes reference to a metaphysical God and so requires religious belief.
- Determinism refers to causal necessity, based on the laws of nature in the physical universe. Religious predestination refers to the necessity that an omniscient God cannot be wrong about future events.
- Determinism derives necessity from laws of nature. Religious predestination derives necessity from the will of God (this should be seen as a variation on the last point).
- Determinism relies on the complete uniformity of laws of nature, whereas in religious predestination, God can intervene to suspend the laws of nature in order to bring about the predestined outcome.
- Determinism allows that our choices have an impact on outcomes – choices become the causes of future effects in the world. Religious predestination either rules out free choice or the choices we make are irrelevant as our fate will remain unchanged.
- Determinism is arguably incompatible with free will because there is no 'gap' in universal causal necessity. Religious predestination is arguably incompatible with free will because free will is incompatible with God's omniscience.
- Determinism is compatible with the universe existing as a 'brute fact' with no telos or purpose. Religious predestination implies a divine plan or telos.
- Determinism (at least hard determinism) arguably removes any moral responsibility. Religious predestination removes moral responsibility from humans but there is a question over the moral responsibility of God.

Other relevant responses should be credited.

Illustrations could be drawn from Calvinism to show that the damned and saved cannot change their fate, Hume to show the moral responsibility of God if predestination is true. Expect illustrations of determinism to be drawn from the laws of nature, neuroscience etc. This is a relatively difficult question to illustrate and short but appropriate examples should be rewarded.

No marks are available for criticisms/evaluation although relevant understanding in such responses should be rewarded.

1 0

'There is no contradiction in claiming that human action is both determined and free.'
Assess this claim.

(30 marks)

Expect candidates to assess compatibilism/soft determinism. There could be explicit or implicit references to Hume, Aristotle, Frankfurt, Ayer, Ryle, etc. Criticism could come from a libertarian or hard determinist position.

Arguments in support could include:

- Hume claimed that the above claim is true when we understand the meaning of the terms. Human action is caused in the same way as physical objects, meaning regularity – constant conjunction of motive and action. Mankind has been uniform in behaviour throughout all history.
- It is necessary for actions to be caused by motives/desires/character in order to understand human behaviour and allow for moral responsibility. The alternative is random action.
- We may feel that physical objects are caused and our actions are uncaused, but this feeling represents no actual difference.
- Hume claimed that liberty should be understood as the absence of constraint. This hypothetical liberty is afforded to all who are not prisoners in chains. Liberty is the power of acting or not acting upon the will. We do so in a regular and predictable way. Actions are both caused and free.
- If the cause of an action is our desire, then we are also free.
- Ayer developed Hume's view. That human action is capable of being explained under natural laws does not mean that we act under constraint. There must be a causal explanation for action to allow responsibility.
- Ayer claimed that determinism means that actions are explicable in causal terms. Freedom means that I could have acted otherwise if I had so chosen, my action is voluntary and no one compelled me to act. The two are compatible.
- Defining 'free' as unconstrained may coincide with common sense, and our intuitions about moral responsibility (we do not blame someone who was compelled physically or psychologically to act).
- This also avoids any troubling metaphysical issues concerning how 'free will' escapes the usual natural causal laws.
- Frankfurt on first and second order desires. First order desires include our basic wants (for example desiring a cigarette, not enjoying classical music) and second order desires are our desires about first order desires. We are not free when we act only on our first order desires without reflection (wantons).
- Humans have the capacity for reflection on first order desires. The ability to impose second order desires allows humans to have free will. We are not free when our second order desires are too weak to control the first order desires.
- Frankfurt examples could also be used to show that inevitability does not rule out moral responsibility, which could be seen as an advantage of compatibilism.
- Genes and the environment, etc may cause our first order desires, but we have free will if we can act or not act upon them in accordance with second order desires. The same action could be caused (if unreflective) or free (if in accordance with second order desires).
- Hobbes claimed that God is the ultimate cause of every action, but as long as a person is not physically forced to act, they are free. Jumping off a cliff as opposed to being pushed – the latter has no immediate material cause so is free.

- Ryle claimed that certain neural responses constantly follow certain stimuli, but this only provides the framework in which we can freely choose how to operate. An act is still voluntary if we have the opportunity and competency to perform it.
- Aristotle claimed despite causal determinism we act freely if the ‘movement of the limbs ...has its origin in the agent...’ giving them the power to act or not act.
- An advantage of the compatibilist view is that it allows for varying degrees of free will, rather than it being an all-or-nothing affair. This accords with our notions of extenuating circumstances.
- There are problems of verifiability when a libertarian claims we could have acted differently in the same situation. This is a metaphysical notion.

Arguments against the claim could include:

- There may be some discussion of the incompatibilist approach; either determinism or libertarianism, to show that determinism contradicts free will.
- The hard determinist would claim that an absence of physical constraint does not rule out causal determinism.
- Similarly, an absence of felt constraint is not enough to show that we act freely (for example a hypnotic trance).
- The presence of psychological pressure is not sufficient to show that an action wasn't free or that responsibility doesn't apply (e.g. emotional blackmail).
- Character is the result of factors outside of our control, so acting in accordance with our character does not entail freedom.
- Alternatively, Sartre claimed that character cannot be a separate cause of action, as it is the result of action. Man has no nature/character until he forms it through action.
- The libertarian would say claiming that if one had chosen differently one would have acted differently is too weak to be defined as freedom. The different choice would still be causally determined.
- To properly account for free will it must be said that I *could* have acted differently in the same circumstances. The same desire could have produced a different action.
- Freedom is not the ability ‘to act on the determinations of the will’ (Hume) but rather to have ‘power over the determination of the will’ (Reid).
- Only a complete rejection of determinism accounts for the phenomenological aspect of choice, such as deliberation and remorse.
- Not being physically hindered in a determined action does not mean the action was performed freely, any more than a ball rolling down a hill unobstructed is acting freely.
- Hume's account is too strong. If we acknowledge that regularity does not mean causal necessity (as he does) then there should be an acknowledgement of the possibility not acting in a regular manner given certain motives, even hidden ones.
- The redefined notion of freedom employed in compatibilism/soft determinism really confuses free will with political freedom.
- Compatibilism/soft determinism confuses causal explanations and justification citing reasons. The link between a desire of a particular kind and an action of a particular kind is not a relation between distinct existences, but rather an intrinsic conceptual connection.
- The above accounts imply that the actions of a maniac are free. They desire to act, nothing stops them acting.

- There may be some discussion of whether a compatibilist view can give an adequate account of praise and blame. If the ability to choose otherwise in the same situation is removed, responsibility is hard to accommodate. Praise and blame are more than just links in a causal chain.
- There may be a critique of Frankfurt. Do second order desires really allow for free will? Can I choose not to want to smoke? Frankfurt does not account for where second order desires come from. If they are determined, then we aren't really free.
- Can we distinguish first and second order desires from merely conflicting desires? Why are second order desires any more indicative of a person's true nature?
- Kant claimed that to act freely is to act contrary to one's desires and to follow rational principles. The phenomenal world may be determined but to make sense of moral responsibility we postulate a noumenal self with free will, even if we cannot prove it.
- It seems essential a free act that the agent could have acted differently in the same circumstances. But for Hume and Flew et al it seems that there would have to be change in the circumstances. Might be illustrated with Flew's shotgun wedding.
- Hume leaves it wholly mysterious as to why we should feel differently about voluntary acts of men and the movement of bodies as both involve the same impressions (constant conjunction).

The above points could be used to argue a number of conclusions, for example:

- There is no contradiction in claiming that an act is both caused and free, if we properly understand causation to mean regularity and freedom to mean the absence of constraint.
- There is no contradiction in claiming that an act is both caused and free, if we understand desires as a particular type of cause. If an action is caused by our desire, it is free.
- An act cannot be both caused and free. If the same desire will always cause the same action then there is no freedom. The most we can say is that a different desire will cause a different action. The desire will still be the result of a causal process.
- If we take our usual definition of 'caused' as implying necessity and 'free' as the ability to have chosen otherwise in the same situation, then the claim in the question is an oxymoron and hence a contradiction.

Other relevant discussion points and positions should be credited. Higher level responses will develop evaluation and top band will argue rather than assert a position.

Assessment Objective Grid

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15 mark question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 30 mark question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	9	9	18
AO2	6	12	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	15	30	45