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Philosophy PHIL1

(Specification 2170)

Unit 1: An Introduction to Philosophy 1

Final

Mark Scheme

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Philosophy Unit 1: An Introduction to Philosophy 1

General Guidance for Examiners

Deciding on a level and the award of marks within a level

It is of vital importance that examiners familiarise themselves with the generic mark scheme and apply it consistently, as directed by the Principal Examiner, in order to facilitate comparability across options.

The generic mark scheme must be used consistently across all questions. The question-specific mark scheme will indicate a variety of material and approaches that a candidate is likely to use. It is not, however, prescriptive. Alternative responses are possible and should be credited if appropriate.

It will be found that when applying the generic mark scheme, many responses will display features of different levels. Examiners must exercise their judgement. In locating the appropriate band, examiners must look to the best-fit or dominant descriptors. Marks should then be adjusted within that band according to the following criteria:

- understanding of philosophical positions
- accuracy and detail of arguments
- quality of illustrative material
- grasp of technical vocabulary where appropriate
- quality of written communication

It must be noted that quality of written communication should only determine a level in cases where the meaning of a response is obscured. In most cases it will determine adjustments within a level.

It must also be emphasised that, although the question-specific mark scheme is not proscriptive, examiners must familiarise themselves with its content. Examiners must recognise creditworthy material and the subject-specific mark scheme is an important tool for achieving this.

Generic mark scheme for questions with a total of 15 marks

AO1: Knowledge and understanding
Level 2 5–9 marks At the top end of the level there will be a clear, detailed and precise understanding of the relevant philosophical issues. Lower down the level, responses will be accurate and focused but may lack balance. At the bottom end there may be some blurring of distinctions, but one issue will be clearly explained.
Level 1 1–4 marks The explanation will lack detail, or the detail may be narrow and/or only partially addresses the question. Blurring or conflation of issues may result in some lack of clarity. There may be significant omissions. At the bottom end of the level responses may be vague, unfocused or fragmentary.
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit

AO2: Interpretation, analysis and application
Level 2 4–6 marks At the top end of the level, the illustration(s) or example(s) will be clear and have a precise bearing on the issues being explained. Relevance will be apparent. At the lower end of the level, one illustration may be treated precisely with another illustration treated briefly, with only a partial grasp in evidence.
Level 1 1–3 marks Where two illustrations are required, one may be clear and precise but the second confused or absent. Alternatively, there may be a blurring of points and their relevance to the explanation is not apparent. At the lower end of the level, examples will lack detail and clarity and may fail to serve their purpose. If only one illustration is required it will be vague or only partially succeed in achieving its purpose.
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit

Generic mark scheme for questions with a total of 30 marks

Level 6 26–30 marks

Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and positions clearly and precisely explained. The analysis and use of examples will proceed from a secure knowledge base. Evaluation must be present and will show sophistication and direct engagement of the issues. The relation between argument and conclusion will be clear.

The response is written in a fluent and sophisticated style with minimal, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response will read as a coherent whole.

Level 5 22–25 marks

Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and explained but there may be some imprecision. Examples will be deployed effectively but their implications may not be made fully apparent. Evaluation must be present but may lack philosophical impact, or it may be penetrating over a limited range of material. Knowledge and understanding of the issues will be apparent but not always fully exploited.

The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.

Level 4 16–21 marks

The response will explain and analyse some relevant material but positions might be juxtaposed rather than critically compared. Relevance will generally be sustained, though there may be occasional tangents at the lower end of the level. Knowledge of issues will be present but may lack depth and/or precision. Evaluative points are likely to be underdeveloped or applied to a limited range of material and may not be convincing. Examples are likely to be used descriptively rather than critically.

The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.

Level 3 10–15 marks

Responses in this level may be short or of limited scope. There may be narrow focus on one aspect or a range of issues may be referred to with limited understanding or analysis. Evaluation may be replaced by assertion or counter-suggestion. Sporadic insights may be present but they would lack development. Some knowledge will be present but it is likely to either lack detail and precision, or will not be analysed or evaluated. This is likely to feature at the lower end of the level.

The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.

Level 2 5–9 marks

There may be a basic or philosophically unsophisticated grasp of some issues. Analysis may be predominantly simple and/or lack clarity in places. There may be errors of reasoning and understanding. Evaluation, if present, will lack penetration or be very narrowly confined. The response may lack overall purpose and may fail to directly address the relevant issues. At the lower end of the level, the response may be disjointed.

Technical language is limited in its employment or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.

Level 1 1–4 marks

There may be an extremely basic awareness of one relevant point without development or analysis. The response may be tangential with an accidental reference to a relevant point. Errors of understanding are likely to be intrusive. Fragments of knowledge will feature in this level.

Technical language is not employed or is employed inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar are intrusive.

0 marks

Nothing worthy of credit

Theme 1: Reason and experience **Total for this question: 45 marks**

0 1 Illustrating your answer, explain the difference between inductive and deductive arguments.

(15 marks)

Explanations should incorporate something like the following:

Induction:

- Induction may be linked to empiricism.
- Typically inductive arguments draw an inference from particular instances to a general conclusion (although some inductive arguments, eg analogous arguments, don't do this). An inference drawn from experience of particular instances supposes that the future will resemble the past – future experiences of further instances will resemble past experiences of particular instances – or that unobserved events follow the same pattern as observed events.
- Inductive inferences are supported but not entailed by the reasoning or premises stated. Conclusions extend beyond what is stated in the premises. It may be suggested that such inferences are no more than probable; that while we may expect or believe eg that immersion in water will suffocate this cannot be conclusively demonstrated through inductive reasoning.

Deduction:

- Deduction may be linked to rationalism.
- In a deductive argument – or where an inference is drawn deductively – the conclusion must follow from the premises, the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises. It would be contradictory to accept the premises and the negation of the conclusion. The conclusion of a deductive argument is contained within the premises.
- Some may refer to certainty.

Illustrations of both are likely to be brief: for induction expect references to swans or ravens although some may refer to Humean examples or to scientific experimentation or to well-known examples in the literature such as Russell's turkey; for deduction expect references to bachelors, spinsters and aunts although some might employ mathematical examples or logical symbols.

Care should be exercised to ensure that illustrative examples are accurate.

The difference may be implicit in good illustrative accounts of both but some may add a concluding comment – possibly expressed in terms of probability/certainty – to make it explicit.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

- Inductive arguments are contingent.
- Deductive arguments are necessary, either could not have been different or, in the case of maths, denial results in self-contradiction.
- Deductive arguments may be illustrated by syllogistic examples.

0 2 'The mind contains an innate grasp of the way the world is.' Discuss.

(30 marks)

The phrase in the specification refers to 'innate knowledge' – here 'grasp' is preferred to cover this as well as a wider content (ideas, knowledge, skills and capacities) without the need to relate it all to 'knowing that…'. The question may be approached in different ways but knowledge and understanding should include at least one account of what 'an innate grasp' might refer to:

- Ideas, principles or knowledge present in the mind at birth – this might be linked (in different ways) to Locke, Descartes and Plato.
- Concepts not given in experience and which must exist prior to experience – this might be linked to Leibniz or Kant.
- Capacities or abilities that are genetically inherited or programmed into us and which allow us to learn – this might be linked to Chomsky, Fodor, Pinker or Carruthers.

Discussion is likely to be approached in different ways:

The view in question may be rejected:

- In favour of the view that there is nothing in the mind that isn't first in the senses, that at birth the mind is a tabula rasa, a piece of white paper devoid of any characters (Locke). Innate knowledge requires there to be innate ideas or principles but no idea is innate: all of our ideas derive from sensory experience and reflection on sensory experience.
- Locke's arguments include the view that if a proposition is innate its component elements must be innate – but there are no such innate elements. Nobody is born knowing that 3+4 = 7 because this requires five ideas to be in the mind. Similarly, universal assent does not imply innateness because it doesn't exist; 'whatever is, is' is unknown to children and idiots; neither is innate knowledge dormant until discovered by reason – one doesn't discover what is already known and reason is present long before the laws of logic are appreciated or formulated in the mind.
- Examples of where sensory impairment and/or an inability to reflect deprive us (allegedly) of knowledge might also be given and linked to either Locke or Hume.
- Similarly, examples of where the addition or restoration of senses provides knowledge, eg Condillac's statue.
- Other Lockean applications might also feature: moral principles and rules; God and substance. Alternatively, Humean accounts of how we obtain the idea of causation/necessary connection or God through experience might be given *or infinity*.

The view in question may be accepted:

- An appeal to innateness supports the existence of propositional knowledge without an experiential grounding. There might be references to God (trademark argument), the propositions of logic, identity, morality, causation, infinity, etc.
- Some may refer specifically to the Platonic world of the Forms, or universals, and to examples of *a priori* knowledge latent within us at birth which is eventually recollected or perceived through the intellect. This might be related to mathematics and/or to notions of beauty or justice (this may be countered via the problem of infinite regress).
- If mathematics is referred to it ought to be linked to 'the way the world is'.

- References to an innate conceptual scheme under which our experience of the world is subsumed (Kant) are likely to feature. The mind structures experience which is not possible unless certain concepts are in place: the most likely to feature are, perhaps, unity, substance, causality, space, time and the self (our grasp of the way the world is doesn't equate with knowing reality).
- There may also be references to Leibniz's block of marble and or to his principles of reason, eg nothing can come from nothing.
- Both Kant and Leibniz may be linked to nativism – the view that certain abilities are 'hard-wired' into the brain – which may also be developed via Chomsky (language acquisition) or Carruthers.

Good discussions may contrast both views and focus on one or two concepts to do so, eg God, morality, causation, the self.

It could be argued that:

- There is no such thing as an innate grasp of the way the world is.
- *A priori* knowledge can't be located in a contingent facticity.
- Most formulations of the innate knowledge thesis seem to require a correspondent knowledge base given in experience to 'draw out' that which is allegedly latent within.
- The claims of innatism and/or nativism are frequently vague and not obviously falsifiable – some of it is speculative metaphysics, some of it is pseudoscience.
- It might be claimed that innate ideas/knowledge is a default position, explaining what can't be explained in other ways *or* that better explanations are beginning to emerge.
- It might also be claimed that while the innate knowledge thesis isn't especially convincing, or isn't especially far-reaching, we do have either innate concepts or innate capacities without which it would be impossible to gain knowledge. Also, that the alternative of a tabula rasa is naïve and unconvincing – there might also be references to intuitions without concepts as blind and/or to 'blooming, buzzing confusions'.
- It might be claimed that innate concepts or capacities structure what we can know but this doesn't equate to knowledge of the way the world is (eg Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal).

Theme 2: Why should I be governed? **Total for this question: 45 marks**

0 3 Illustrating your answer explain **two** reasons why civil disobedience may not always be justifiable.

(15 marks)

Civil disobedience will probably be defined as public, unlawful but non-violent political conduct designed to change a law (or policies) without rejecting the rule of law generally. Some might point out that while we may have a right to exercise dissent this may itself be subject to various constraints. Two reasons why particular acts of disobedience may not be justifiable are likely to be selected from:

- While one might have a right of dissent in principle it isn't always prudent to exercise that right: if civil disobedience is designed to appeal to a sense of justice in the majority and the chances are that actions might fail to do so then it is difficult to justify the action/irrational to undertake the action.
- Civil disobedience may not be justified if a law, or policy, does not infringe the liberty and rights of citizens (or of a group) – if the law is not clearly an unjust law.
- It may not be justifiable if lawful attempts to redress an unjust law or policy have not been made – ie when disobedience is not employed as a last resort.
- It may not be justifiable if a sense of injustice extends to so many that the scale of action threatens serious disorder or a crisis of legitimacy (civil disobedience is not revolution).
- It may not be justifiable if actual law does not conflict with natural law and/or as a private action taken on grounds of individual conscience when an individual feels they have a higher duty than to obey the law (as the act is no longer a public act).
- It may not be justifiable where laws or policies enacted by the state do not exceed its legitimate role and/or do not contradict or infringe core principles of justice.
- Violent protest is thought to be unjustifiable, partly because it won't be successful in winning hearts and minds but mainly because it does not exhibit fidelity to the law in general.
- It would be unjustifiable if the group or groups involved are unwilling to accept punishment for infringements of the law which, again, does not exhibit fidelity to the law.

Claims that civil disobedience is *never* justified would not be adequately focused on the question.

It may be easier to provide illustrations of disobedience which *are* justifiable on the grounds that…and then claim that if this were otherwise then the action would be unjustifiable. However, some references to recent actions which may express grievances but which also undermine the role of law, alienate the public, deploy violence etc could also be made. Note that *one* illustration may sufficiently cover two points (NB riots are not obviously acts of civil disobedience).

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

0 4 'The concept of authority simply masks the possession of power'. Discuss.

(30 marks)

Typically these concepts are distinguished:

- Power is a causal concept – the application of power produces results – it is 'de facto'.
- Authority is a normative concept – it might be seen as legitimate power, the possession of a right or entitlement to exercise power or influence – it is 'de jure'.

The question concerns the extent to which this distinction is valid, given that these concepts can be related to each other in quite confusing ways, and, if not, the extent to which power is the dominant concept. (Note that it might be argued from the outset that the view in question is simply wrong and that authority does *not* simply mask the possession of power).

It is possible that the question will provoke different types of discussion:

There *is* a valid distinction to be drawn:

- There may be discussions of legitimacy: the grounds, or reasons, given as an explanation and justification of why the state merits our allegiance. This may be connected to consent or to the achievement of certain outcomes eg securing the rights and liberties of individuals, promoting equality, welfare, happiness or the common good.
- It may be suggested that authority *is* legitimate power in which case a distinction may be drawn between authority as legitimate power based on recognition, consent and approval and power as illegitimately based on coercion, the threat and use of force.
- There may be references to the 'ideal types' of authority presented by Weber: legitimacy based on rational-legal grounds, traditional grounds and charismatic grounds.
- References could also be made to individuals and/or groups able to exert influence because they are 'an authority'.
- Examples may be given of legitimate authorities that have no power (eg a government in exile) or of powerful bodies that have no authority (eg a military junta).

The distinction is less than clear-cut:

- There may be some elaboration of the nature of power, eg 'power to' (obtain some good or satisfy some desire) and 'power over' (the use of physical and organisational resources, the activities of other individuals).
- Some may refer to Hobbes: the power of the sovereign is virtually unlimited although it is based on consent and is legitimate; without virtually unlimited power the sovereign is of no use to those who consented because they want order, security, etc. Authority reduces to power.
- Some may refer to Marx: authority is power legitimising itself; a dominant class has the power to manufacture consent (through ideological state apparatuses) and to suppress dissent (through repressive state apparatuses). Power is employed to secure the interests of that class.
- In a more liberal sense, perhaps, authority is a power-base. The source of power lies in the fact that someone, or some group, is in authority. The concepts overlap.

- Similarly, someone possessing the qualities necessary to hold charismatic authority may be able to co-ordinate the activities of followers to dissent, rebel and revolt – this seems to be charismatic power, particularly if it leads to control over resources (although a charismatic leader might lose the approval of followers if they were perceived to be not very good at exercising control over physical and organisational resources).
- One might have authority in one sense (eg rational-legal) but not in another (eg popular approval). If authority is challenged it dissolves but the exercise of power might remain.

A range of argumentation is possible. For example:

- The two concepts are distinct and it is important that they remain distinct. Legitimate power (authority) is based on consent, approval, the acceptance that influence is eg for the common good. The right to exercise power is subject to certain obligations and is mirrored by a right to dissent. Moreover, we can (and do) distinguish between power without authority and authority without power.
- The fact that we can draw such distinctions might stem from extreme examples, typically involving conflict, but in states where, over time, widespread conflict is rare the concepts of authority and power seem to overlap in confusing ways.
- Power is the dominant concept: this is clear when authority is challenged and also the reason why dissent is not widespread. The threat of force, the ability to define illegitimate force as violence and/or to manufacture consent (the velvet glove and the fist of steel) is what underpins authority.

Theme 3: Why should I be moral? **Total for this question: 45 marks**

0 5 Explain and illustrate **two** reasons for thinking that morality should *not* be identified with whatever is advantageous to us.

(15 marks)

The view that it *should* be identified with whatever is advantageous to us may be linked to egoism, contractual theories and, to an extent, virtue ethics. Two reasons might be drawn from:

- If psychological egoism is referred to – the view that we always do act in our self-interest – then some actions we take will clearly not be moral and/or will not take into consideration the moral interests of others. Any number of relatively mundane examples would serve to illustrate the point.
- Similarly, if the view is that we would act in our self-interest providing we can get away with it then there will be occasions when we act immorally because we're able to do so. Some may illustrate this with the 'ring of Gyges'.
- If our self-interest is served by *appearing* to be moral do we have a reason to *actually* be moral? Versions of the 'free-rider' problem might appear as illustrations.
- If ethical egoism is referred to – the view that we should act in our self-interest – then it might be questioned whether everyone could be an ethical egoist: there must be occasions (where interests' conflict) when an ethical egoist would advise others not to be egoists.
- Similarly, the fact-value gap may be referenced and illustrated: the fact that an action is in my interests does not mean that I ought to do it.
- The point that the pursuit of self-interest might yield highly irrational outcomes. Versions of the 'prisoner's dilemma' might appear as illustrations.
- If morality is the product of a contract and if we are self-interested creatures then would we honour the contract if our self-interests were harmed? Illustrations of when consent, or a consensus, breaks down.
- Isn't the moral hero (someone who acts morally against their own interests and desires) as valuable, or more valuable, than the moral saint (someone who acts morally and lives well because they've developed the appropriate interests and desires)? Kantian examples of preserving life, keeping promises etc might be offered as illustrations.
- The point that self-interest is not a genuinely moral motivation – morality requires impartiality and/or universality. This might be illustrated through examples linked to Kantian views (eg concerning promising or preserving life).
- The view that morality operates in the interests of the powerful (Marx) or the herd (Nietzsche) and, consequently, can't be identified with what is in our interests (whoever 'we' are taken to be). This point might be illustrated with reference to particular laws insofar as they are held to uphold moral values.

Other reasonable points should be credited.

No marks are available for evaluation (eg in accounts of the opposite view) although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

0 6 'Disregarding self-interest leaves us without any motivation to act morally'. Discuss.

(30 marks)

Candidates will probably interpret the claim as one directed at deontological ethics and the emphasis on moral duties rather than moral interests. This may be developed in terms of the importance of reason, autonomy, motive, intention and the good will; various formulations of the categorical imperative (universal law, respect for persons and the kingdom of ends) as attempts to establish maxims, principles or laws which apply universally. Any other motive for deciding which actions are right – such as self-interest or motives that might be linked to self-interest – cannot be moral: moral motives are rational, impartial and universally binding.

The question may provoke different types of discussion. Some may focus on a critical discussion of Kantian ethics; others may develop discussion in relation to other theories, particularly if this takes place in a context of what 'disregarding self-interest' means eg a virtuous person acts for the right reasons (not self-interestedly) but by doing so, allegedly, she will flourish; similarly, someone might be motivated by self-interest yet act against any short-term self-interests they may have.

A focus on Kant might cover some of the following points:

- Examples (such as the shop-keeper) might be used to bring out the contrast between duty and self-interest or inclination. Kant's claim that there is a difference between a moral motive and a non-moral one might be contested in terms of consequences or in terms of how any difference could be detected.
- A description of Kant's distinctions between duties to self and duties to others and/or between perfect and imperfect duties (examples such as suicide, falsely promising, developing talents and helping others might feature). Some may detect a degree of self-interest in some of these examples.
- Whether universalisability is a sufficient test for deciding what might count, or what can't count, as a moral maxim? Even if it is, various versions of the categorical imperative might be regarded as too formal and/or abstract to be useful as a guide to action, eg the requirement to treat others as ends in themselves.
- Is reason alone a sufficient motivation for action – or is it a slave to the passions?
- The approach is too rigid and insensitive to feelings or circumstances – examples might be given of where we would be guided by our feelings or by circumstances.
- There is a problem concerning conflicting duties or grounds of obligation – whether we could decide what to do without recourse to something other than duty.

If other theories are introduced some of the above points might be countered:

- The development of moral thinking may be seen as *a posteriori* rather than *a priori*. There may be accounts of certain contractual theories and/or of virtue ethics.
- It is doubtful that a moral community could be founded on reason, autonomy and good intentions alone and/or that an individual's moral actions could be consistently grounded in these. Do we not also need certain conventions? Shouldn't we also feel for others?
- Sympathy for others is natural and does have moral worth – the presence of feelings of sympathy also frequently provides us with a motivation to act altruistically (examples may be given).
- On occasions when we act self-interestedly this may not be opposed to morality.

Different lines of argument might run through the points selected for discussion:

- Deontological ethics is an important contribution to moral thinking and connects to many aspects of our moral experience: respect for persons, the concept of rights, the idea that it is always wrong to… or never right to…, that we do consider intentions when we blame or praise someone, the idea that morality should be a constraint on emotion, inclination and desire, etc. Moreover, 'because it is right' is an answer to the question 'why should I perform this action?' Disregarding self-interest leaves moral motivation intact.
- The approach is too strict, demanding and unemotional to be consistently applied and we frequently do consider circumstances, interests, consequences and attachments before acting. Also it is too formal to be of much practical use. Some may argue, via the moral argument for God, that the view is not entirely divorced from interests.
- It may be the case that there are some universal imperatives but moral sensibilities are also relative to time and place: interests can transform a sense of what is right and wrong, sympathies will be affected by different discourses on fairness or justice and living well or flourishing may depend on what is regarded as a virtue at different times and in different places. Self-interest is not irrelevant to moral motivation.
- There is a difference between interests and self-interest: the pursuit of the former may be driven by notions of universal rights (eg civil rights campaigns).

Theme 4: The idea of God **Total for this question: 45 marks**

0 7 Explain and illustrate **two** reasons for rejecting the view that our idea of God is innate.

(15 marks)

The question could be answered through references to Locke and Hume:

- The idea of God is a complex idea arrived at by coupling other ideas with the idea of infinity (Locke) or by augmenting without limit ideas derived from impressions (Hume), eg notions of power/omnipotence or wisdom/omniscience etc.
- The idea of God is not innate because it is not universal: there are 'whole nations' without a notion of God; also atheists are incapable of a 'due application of thought'.
- The idea of God is not innate because it not a natural impression on the mind (Hume) nor known at birth (Locke) because it derives from ideas expressed in language.
  The idea could be arrived at adventitiously – through augmentation.
- Contrary and inconsistent ideas can't be the work of God.

However, candidates will probably associate the view with Descartes' 'trademark' argument: the cause of an idea must possess as much reality as the idea represents its object as possessing; only God possesses as much reality as our idea of God represents Him as having; the cause of our idea of God is God; God exists (or, only God could bring about the existence of thinking things possessing the idea of God). If so, two reasons could be drawn from:

- Causes and effects are distinct events: one cannot be 'discovered' in the other. This might be illustrated via Hume, motion in billiard balls, or by rocks hitting windows and windows breaking.
- We can't work out causes purely by using reason.
- If effects merely inherit properties of causes this would entail that there are no genuinely emergent properties. This might be questioned and illustrated by references to eg consciousness, the emergence of life on earth, etc.
- Can we make sense of the idea of 'degrees of reality'? Can we ask is there as much reality in a discarded cigarette as there is in the fire on the heath that it causes?
- Specific counters to the causal adequacy principle: eg evolution, the butterfly effect, etc.
- It may be the case that a complex representational content requires a complex cause but need that cause be God? Feuerbach, Marx, Freud, Russell or Dawkins might be referenced to illustrate the point – this may be linked to the claim that the idea could be adventitious or fictitious.
- Confusion of a perfect idea with idea of a perfect being. May be illustrated by the difference between a perfect memory and a memory of something perfect.

No marks are available for evaluation although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

0 8 'The ontological argument shows that God must exist'. Discuss.

(30 marks)

Candidates should outline at least one version of the ontological argument – most responses will probably be based on Anselm. Beyond this some may develop an account of how ontological arguments for the existence of God work: eg they are *a priori* arguments which attempt to establish His existence without recourse to empirical evidence; from the definition of God, or from a purely formal consideration of the concept of God, it is claimed that we can establish that God is a necessary being, that the concept of God is necessarily instantiated; existence is part of the definition or concept of God; to define or conceive of God is to define or conceive of a Being whose existence is necessary; there may also be references to modal versions of the argument.

Clear, detailed and precise answers will not blur the arguments of Anselm and Descartes. There may also be references to more recent versions of the argument (eg Malcolm, Plantinga).

Detailed developments of one or more versions of the ontological argument should be credited:

- Anselm: God is a being than which none greater can be conceived; it is greater to exist both in the understanding and in reality than in the understanding alone; the greatest conceivable being exists both in reality and in the understanding; God exists.
- Descartes: God is the supremely perfect being; a supremely perfect being possesses or contains all perfections; existence is a perfection; God exists.
- Plantinga: there is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness; an entity that possesses maximal greatness must exist in all possible worlds; God necessarily exists in all possible worlds.
- Malcolm: if God does not exist His existence is logically impossible; if God does exist His existence is logically necessary; God's existence is, logically, either impossible or necessary; His existence is impossible only if the concept of God is absurd or contradictory; it is neither, so God's existence is necessary.

Critical responses might address a number of, generally familiar, critical points.

- There could be criticisms of specific arguments: the definite descriptions criticism of Anselm ('the' unsurpassable being assumes such a being); Malcolm's argument requires logical necessity to succeed but he substitutes aseity for logical necessity.
- The argument has absurd consequences (the overload objection). We can conceive of the perfect island (or perfect anything else) and some versions of the ontological argument seem to bring these into existence.
- Various responses to Gaunilo's argument on behalf of the fool.
- Parallel arguments, eg the Devil is a being than which none worse can be conceived.
- Whether the overload objection applies to Descartes' version of the argument.
- If it does not, and there is only one supremely perfect being, it may still be possible to ask 'which one is it' (God, super-Pegasus, etc).
- The argument bridges a gap between the conceptual and the real but this is invalid. Conceptually there may be necessary links between subjects and their predicates but this doesn't imply that such a subject exists. There may be references to Schopenhauer.
- Necessity does not apply to existence.
- Existence is not a perfection, property, predicate. Existence doesn't function like a real or descriptive predicate, it doesn't describe the subject. Kantian arguments.

- There is nothing in the world corresponding to our description of God – the concept is not instantiated. There may be references to Russell and propositional functions.

Good answers will probably also consider counter-arguments to some criticisms.

Argumentation could develop any of the following views:

- Some may reject the idea that God's existence can be proven in this way. But do objections about logical reasoning confuse a point about the existence of God with a point about proving the existence of God. Nevertheless, there seems to be a difference between the idea of God produced by the ontological argument and the idea of God in religious traditions.
- It may be claimed that an ontological argument proves that if there is such a Being as God then His existence is necessary.
- It may be denied that 'God has necessary existence' entails 'necessarily, God exists'.
- Some may argue that (a version of) the ontological argument appears to have a valid form and/or, from a non-realist view, that the argument works. The idea of an existing God is a concept that we must have.
- Some will conclude that the properties that things possess in one sphere (eg our imagination or understanding, fiction, religious texts) have no bearing on reality. The ontological argument is 'a charming joke' (an attempt to define God into existence).

Theme 5: Persons **Total for this question: 45 marks**

0 9 Explain and illustrate **two** reasons for accepting the possibility that a machine could be regarded as a person.

(15 marks)

It is likely that candidates will refer to various characteristics of personhood and the extent to which they do (or may in the future) apply to 'intelligent' computational machines, robots or androids. Particularly, if the possession of the attributes identified is seen as a matter of degree then do or could some artificial systems possess sufficient degrees of complexity in regard to those attributes to qualify as persons?

Two reasons are likely to be drawn from the possession of one or more of:

- Reasoning and rationality.
- Language or communication skills.
- The ability to learn through the artificial equivalent of human senses.
- The ability to form judgements about 'experiences'.
- The potential for consciousness, self-awareness and emotion to 'emerge' in functionally equivalent systems.
- The possibility of identities, sociability, roles within a network emerging.
- The possibility that a machine will pass the Turing Test and/or the view that we have no more reason to ascribe eg beliefs to humans than we do to machines. The possibility of adopting an 'intentional stance' towards machines (Dennett).
- Progress in AI achieved in the last 40-50 years and the possibility of further developments (are there any limits to what we might imagine machines to be capable of?).
- Transhumanism and particularly the blurring of the line between biological and artificial.
- The avoidance of 'speciesism'.

Responses should be rewarded according to how convincing they are: ie the identification of *any* two attributes of machines may not be sufficient for regarding a machine as a person. Answers may be more convincing if supplemented by an argument that the attributes identified, either now or in the future, would be jointly sufficient for personhood.

There may be some attempt to link some points to a philosophical theory (functionalism perhaps) or to a philosopher (eg Putnam, Turing).

Illustrations may be actual or fictional. Some may employ examples of what intelligent machines or robots, like ASIMO, can already do and some may look to science fiction to consider future possibilities (eg *Bladerunner*, *I Robot* etc).

No marks are available for evaluation although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

1 0 What really matters to us, in discussing personal identity, is not identity through time but survival through time.
Discuss.

(30 marks)

Some candidates may provide relevant background: that is, this view is a reaction to claims that a person is the same person at T1 and T2 if they are psychologically or physically continuous throughout T1…T2. Thus, the view in question might be seen as a claim that there are too many difficulties involved in demonstrating that identity is continuous through time and that survival through time is all we have (in different degrees) and all we need. There will probably be references to Parfit and there may also be some discussion of Locke and/or the difference between psychological connectedness and psychological continuity.

Some of the following issues should be discussed:

- The issue of personal identity through time concerns the grounds upon which a person can be said to be (numerically) *the same* person throughout a period of time.
- There may be references to Locke's view of a person as a being that 'can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places' and/or to the importance of identity and continuity.
- Puzzle cases and thought experiments, for example fission, that question the presence of numerical identity.
- Various illustrations might be given, eg Brownson, Parfit's adaptation of Brownson, cloning, etc. There may be references to fictional examples in which identity, or sameness, is in question (eg Bourne, Freaky Friday, etc) and/or to actual examples concerning the impact of eg amnesia, dementia, etc on identity.
- The point that questions concerning identity/sameness, such as 'is she the same person now as she was', may not always have a determinate answer – the degree of qualitative change in a person can make such questions difficult to answer.
- Whether identity – or sameness – really matters to us: for example, whether we want to be the same after going to university as we were before.
- Survival through time, the level of *connectedness* between a person at T1 and T2, may be a more appropriate concept.
- Whether we should see ourselves as a series of connected selves.
- Whether we can view ourselves as surviving via some psychological connectedness with our offspring.
- Discussion may focus on how we characterise what it is that survives through time? What is it that is 'connected' and/or what does the 'connecting'? Must this be psychological? Doesn't this also raise the same issues as questions concerning identity?
- Whether there are moral complications of seeing ourselves as a succession of selves (obligations to future selves, responsibility for the actions of past selves etc).
- If this view is a response to puzzle cases then the intelligibility of such cases might be questioned.

Argumentation, following points selected for discussion, might either be for or against the view in question:

- For: identity (and continuity) through time seems to be an all or nothing affair whereas survival (and connectedness) is softer, a matter of degree; survival through time is a more appropriate concept than psychological continuity and identity – or bodily continuity and identity – as there are too many problems with these views; survival is more appropriate because it is what we in fact have, gives us what we need and resolves puzzle cases as well as being applicable to real life experiences of change and future technological possibilities.
- Against: can we do without a continuous 'I' (whether a convenient fiction or a reality)? Is an 'I' a basic feature of our conceptual scheme (eg via a transcendental argument)? What would the socio-economic, political, legal, moral, etc implications be if we replace identity with survival? Expect a focus on morality here: particularly praise, blame and moral responsibility. Additionally, can a meaningful answer be given to the question of what it is that survives through time – or to how connectedness is achieved? Is it true that survival is all we have and all that really matters to us?

Assessment objective grid

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15 mark question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 30 mark question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	9	9	18
AO2	6	12	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	**15**	**30**	**45**