



**General Certificate of Education (A-level)
January 2013**

Philosophy

PHIL2

(Specification 2170)

Unit 2: An Introduction to Philosophy 2

Final

Mark Scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all examiners participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each examiner analyses a number of students' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

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Philosophy Unit 2: An Introduction to Philosophy 2

General Guidance for Examiners

Deciding on a level and the award of marks within a level

It is of vital importance that examiners familiarise themselves with the generic mark scheme and apply it consistently, as directed by the Principal Examiner, in order to facilitate comparability across options.

The generic mark scheme must be used consistently across all questions. The question-specific mark scheme will indicate a variety of material and approaches that a candidate is likely to use. It is not, however, prescriptive. Alternative responses are possible and should be credited if appropriate.

It will be found that when applying the generic mark scheme, many responses will display features of different levels. Examiners must exercise their judgement. In locating the appropriate band, examiners must look to the best-fit or dominant descriptors. Marks should then be adjusted within that band according to the following criteria:

- understanding of philosophical positions
- accuracy and detail of arguments
- quality of illustrative material
- grasp of technical vocabulary where appropriate
- quality of written communication

It must be noted that quality of written communication should only determine a level in cases where the meaning of a response is obscured. In most cases it will determine adjustments within a level.

It must also be emphasised that, although the question-specific mark scheme is not proscriptive, examiners must familiarise themselves with its content. Examiners must recognise creditworthy material and the subject-specific mark scheme is an important tool for achieving this.

Generic mark scheme for questions with a total of 15 marks

AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–4 marks The explanation will lack detail, or the detail may be narrow and/or only partially addresses the question. Blurring or conflation of issues may result in some lack of clarity. There may be significant omissions. At the bottom end of the level responses may be vague, unfocussed or fragmentary.	Level 1
5–9 marks At the top end of the level there will be a clear, detailed and precise understanding of the relevant philosophical issues. Lower down the level, responses will be accurate and focussed but may lack balance. At the bottom end there may be some blurring of distinctions, but one issue will be clearly explained.	Level 2

AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–3 marks Where two illustrations are required, one may be clear and precise but the second confused or absent. Alternatively, there may be a blurring of points and their relevance to the explanation is not apparent. At the lower end of the level, examples will lack detail and clarity and may fail to serve their purpose. If only one illustration is required it will be vague or only partially succeed in achieving its purpose.	Level 1
4–6 marks At the top end of the level, the illustration(s) or example(s) will be clear and have a precise bearing on the issues being explained. Relevance will be apparent. At the lower end of the level, one illustration may be treated precisely with another illustration treated briefly, with only a partial grasp in evidence.	Level 2

Generic mark scheme for questions with a total of 30 marks

<p>0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.</p>	
<p>1–4 marks There may be an extremely basic awareness of one relevant point without development or analysis. The response may be tangential with an accidental reference to a relevant point. Errors of understanding are likely to be intrusive. At the very bottom of this level there will be little creditworthy material. Fragments of knowledge will feature in this level. Technical language is not employed or is employed inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar are intrusive.</p>	Level 1
<p>5–9 marks There may be a basic or philosophically unsophisticated grasp of some issues. Analysis may be predominantly simple and/or lack clarity in places. There may be errors of reasoning and understanding. Evaluation, if present, will lack penetration or be very narrowly confined. The response may lack overall purpose and may fail to directly address the relevant issues. At the lower end of the level, the response may be disjointed. Technical language is limited in its employment or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.</p>	Level 2
<p>10–15 marks Responses in this level may be short or of limited scope. There may be narrow focus on one aspect or a range of issues may be referred to with limited understanding or analysis. Evaluation may be replaced by assertion or counter-suggestion. Sporadic insights may be present but they would lack development. Some knowledge will be present but it is likely to either lack detail and precision, or will not be analysed or evaluated. This is likely to feature at the lower end of the level. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>	Level 3
<p>16–21 marks The response will explain and analyse some relevant material but positions might be juxtaposed rather than critically compared. Relevance will generally be sustained, though there may be occasional tangents at the lower end of the level. Knowledge of issues will be present but may lack depth and/or precision. Evaluative points are likely to be underdeveloped or applied to a limited range of material and may not be convincing. Examples are likely to be used descriptively rather than critically. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>	Level 4
<p>22–25 marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and explained but there may be some imprecision. Examples will be deployed effectively but their implications may not be made fully apparent. Evaluation must be present but may lack philosophical impact, or it may be penetrating over a limited range of material. Knowledge and understanding of the issues will be apparent but not always fully exploited. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.</p>	Level 5
<p>26–30 marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and positions clearly and precisely explained. The analysis and use of examples will proceed from a secure knowledge base. Evaluation must be present and will show sophistication and direct engagement of the issues. The relation between argument and conclusion will be clear. The response is written in a fluent and sophisticated style with minimal, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response will read as a coherent whole.</p>	Level 6

Theme 1: Knowledge of the External World

Total for this question: 45 marks

0 1

Explain and illustrate what is meant by the secondary qualities thesis.

(15 marks)

There may well be references to Locke. It is only the primary qualities that are objectively real. They would exist even if there were no perceivers. Secondary qualities are subjective; they depend on a relation between object and perceiver. They do not belong to the object in the way primaries do. The objectivity of primaries may be demonstrated by appeal to such features as their mathematical measurability or that some of them are knowable by more than one sense. Secondary qualities may be caused by the internal structure of objects (Locke's corpuscles) in modern terms, atomic structures.

A scientific account of the world would not include secondary qualities as part of the world's furniture. Some responses may concentrate on the variability of secondary qualities (Locke), but as Berkeley, Russell et al have pointed out, primaries are also subject to such variation. Give credit for this point. Illustrations are likely to include references to primaries such as size, shape, weight, density, temperature. Secondary qualities are likely to include colour, taste, smell, felt temperature. They should be applied to an object and the distinction made apparent. There may be illustrations of how primaries can be measured or known by more than one sense. 9+6 marks.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

0 2 Assess the claim that we do not have direct knowledge of physical objects.

(30 marks)

Candidates are likely to identify the claim with sense-data theory, and representative realism in particular. Scepticism may also be identified. There should be a statement of such a position and what it involves. An understanding of key terms should be rewarded. Sense-data may be explained by contrast with physical objects, eg Russell's table. There should be a statement of realism and some of its attendant problems.

Arguments against realism most likely to feature are the argument from illusion, phenomenal variability, qualitative similarity, time-lag arguments, the causal argument and scientific descriptions of reality. The external world may be regarded as a hypothesis that best explains the sense-data. There should be a critical discussion of these arguments or selection of them: illusions are corrected by other senses, as are hallucinations, what are the preconditions of recognising illusions? In the case of illusions, it is not the world that becomes distorted but our view of it. Examples of mirages etc are likely to feature.

Reid's objection to phenomenal variability or similar may feature. That an object should appear differently under different conditions is exactly what we should expect and we can predict and explain these differences. This is not a reason for supposing that we do not directly perceive the object. What should happen does happen.

In the case of time-lag arguments, Ayer's point that it is no more paradoxical to say that our eyes see into the past than it is to say that we do not perceive physical objects may feature. Such arguments are self-defeating if used to support scepticism as they assume knowledge about physical objects and conclude that we have no such knowledge. There is also a problem for representative realism which wants to claim we can know of objects via the sense-data. The problem concerns the justification of such a claim given that direct awareness is restricted to sense-data. The difference between what representative realists **want** to say and what they are **justified** in saying could be discussed. Similar arguments may be used in conjunction with the causal argument. In regard to scientific descriptions, it could be argued that such descriptions revise our concepts or change their meaning rather than show we are mistaken, eg it is not a mistake to think the chair we are sitting on is solid given what we mean by 'solid'. The objective reality claim of scientific descriptions may be challenged by contextualist arguments, eg a witness in court does not make a mistake in describing a getaway car as red, even if he affirms it really was red. Reality is fixed by context.

Candidates may also discuss problems with the view. These are most likely to include problems with representative realism:

- If all we are aware of are sense-data, we can never know there are physical objects nor can we know of their causal powers.
- If all we had were representations, we would not have the concept of a representation. Problems with Russell's catalogue example of pictures if all we have are pictures.
- The external world as a hypothesis has difficulties. It is not like a scientific hypothesis as it is not clear what counts as confirmation, probability or falsification. There are hypotheses about the world but not that there is a world. Framing hypotheses presupposes that there is a world.
- The notion of inferential knowledge may be questioned, eg it's an inference we are unaware of or it's not clear what counts as confirmation.

There may be contrasts with genuine inferences, eg Crusoe's footprint, therefore person. There are problems with automatic, unconscious inferences. It should be noted that some of these arguments may be provided in detail and this will affect the range on offer. Credit should be given for philosophical detail. A candidate may, eg set out a detailed account of the argument from qualitative similarity regarding the bent stick and provide a sophisticated account of the reification of appearances issue. This should be marked positively in terms of what is actually there and not dismissed as 'narrow'.

Theme 1: Tolerance

Total for this question: 45 marks

0 3 Explain and illustrate any **two** features that a tolerant individual may be said to require.

(15 marks)

- He will tolerate things of which he disapproves. Disagreement is required as a matter of logic. It makes no sense to talk of tolerating that of which you approve. Some actions and viewpoints may clash with his values. Illustrative examples should be given. There may be a contrast with cases of indifference or agreement. Examples should be present.
- He must be empowered to prevent or intervene but chooses not to exercise that power. Arguably, he shows considerable restraint in not exercising that power. Logically, he does not tolerate that over which he has no control. Tolerance needs to be distinguished from impotence. Examples should illustrate these points. Reasons might be given for not exercising the power such as respect for others' rationality, integrity, autonomy or liberty.
- He must care about the issue in question; it will be something that matters. He would not be said to tolerate something to which he was indifferent. In order not to trivialise the value of tolerance, it may be claimed that the issue is a substantive one. Examples may be chosen from a religious, moral, social or political context as opposed to cases where a special background has to be supplied to give it a sense, eg tolerance towards arranged marriages and towards eating plain chocolate.
- He does not have to tolerate everything. A tolerant individual may be distinguished from a permissive one. Illustrations may refer to what is tolerated, opposing viewpoints, artistic expression, political expression.
- He may regard his own beliefs as fallible or open to the possibility of revision. Historical examples might support this. Tolerance of other beliefs may be grounded in rationality and experience.
- He may favour a neutral approach as to what constitutes a good life. Illustrations may include Mill's experiments in living or Voltaire's defence of the right of expression.
- He may hold tolerance to be an integral component of his value system without implying unlimited application. Examples of its use might be given; its coherence with other values may be illustrated.
- He may reasonably expect his tolerant attitude to be reciprocated. If not he is not holding tolerance as a value but is weak or foolish. A person who tolerates loud music from his neighbour may reasonably expect his neighbour to tolerate the same. Tolerance need not be unconditional. 9+6 marks.

0 4 Assess the extent to which tolerance of different lifestyles is essential to a liberal society.

(30 marks)

Candidates should make a connection between liberal, free and tolerant societies. One can only be free to pursue a particular life-style if society tolerates it. Without this freedom becomes empty, it reduces to determining what you want, not doing what you want. Such freedom is traditionally associated with liberal societies. There may be reference to particular freedoms, freedom of expression, of worship, of association, economic freedoms. Expect references to Mill. There may also be reference to pluralist societies, what they presuppose, what they require to flourish. Points for discussion may include the following:

- Disagreement or disapproval should not in itself imply intolerance. Much will depend on the **content** of the life-styles. The key issue becomes the criteria for tolerance. A liberal society is not required to tolerate **any** practice simply because it's practised. Limits do not have to imply an intolerant or illiberal society.
- A pluralist society requires different life-styles, but does this imply that they somehow all lie on a level? Does it need to? One may argue whether this is desirable or even possible.
- There could be a discussion of tolerance in relation to legal issues. For example France's prosecution of veiled Moslem women raises issues of intolerance towards a particular life-style. Are the measures necessary for the preservation of another life-style? This might be explored in relation to Mill's Harm Principle. It may be argued that France and Switzerland are de facto liberal societies in spite of their recent legislation.
- Tolerance may be a virtue but not with unlimited application. Liberalism does not require this. Some life-styles may clash with fundamental moral principles and it may be argued that we have a duty to actively oppose some life-styles. It may be argued that tolerance would be a vice under certain circumstances. Examples should be given.
- Related to the previous point, different life-styles are not like different rules of etiquette. They may involve something we find abhorrent, or may conflict with some universal moral principle. Would Cortez have appeared liberal in tolerating the Aztec practice of child sacrifice? Or does this have nothing to do with liberalism?
- A free or liberal society involves securing the liberty of **all** its citizens and must oppose any practice that impinges on that liberty. This is a governmental duty but does it involve a paradox? To qualify as liberal the society must tolerate that which is illiberal.
- In any nation state the law is sovereign and cannot be subordinated to any other practice.
- Traditional liberal democracies afford opportunities to minorities to become majorities, even if tolerance is not a characteristic feature of such minorities' life-styles. It could be argued that the very nature of a liberal society involves risk-taking. Traditionally held values can be vigorously defended and the majority ultimately decides. Historical examples may be used to illustrate this or charges of intolerance.
- There may be some discussion of the advantages of pluralism, tolerance and diversity. Mill-type arguments are likely to feature. There may be a discussion of whether tolerance is contingently valuable. There may also be reference to Mill and the need for vigilance in protecting minorities.
- There is a difference between tolerance and promotion. Switzerland is still a de facto liberal society even after a negative referendum on the promotion of Islam. Should tolerance be understood in terms of what is not done rather than in terms of what is done?

The above point may feature as a general approach that candidates might take. Other such approaches might include tolerance and neutrality or security. Issues that might feature here include whether neutrality is possible or desirable, eg can a state remain neutral towards its own official religion, if it has one? There may be a discussion of possible clashes between tolerance and other values. On the issue of security, the primary duty of government is to protect its citizens. Anti-terror legislation may be discussed in relation to this and the need for consistent application, ie applied to

any group posing a threat to other citizens. Toleration of one group cannot be at the expense of the demise of another group as they too have an expectation to be tolerated. There might be a contrast of recent legislation with historical examples that were not primarily aimed at protection, eg Nazi legislation.

Theme 3: The value of art

Total for this question: 45 marks

0 5

Explain and illustrate **two** reasons for supposing that the value of art does not consist in imitation.

(15 marks)

- We do not regard deceptive 3D images giving a false impression of reality as the height of artistic achievement. This may be a scientific goal rather than an artistic one. Examples could include an orrery or similar.
- To ask whether a work is a good likeness or a good copy may not be an artistic question at all. Examples of forgeries or portrait painting might feature. Similarly, not being a good likeness is not necessarily an artistic criticism.
- If all art is concerned with is copying, then why bother with it? If we already have the reality, then why not be content with that? There might be reference to Plato's account and the difficulty of explaining why we should care about art, though Plato's position is complicated by art being a copy of a copy. This may reinforce the problem.
- The way an artist represents the familiar leading us to see it in a new light is hard to account for in terms of imitation. Examples could be taken from Picasso or Matisse's elongated figures or impressionistic art in general.
- An artist may also represent the unfamiliar and this may have little to do with imitation if that is understood in terms of a kind of copy. Dali's representation of Freud's key ideas or abstract art in general may feature as examples.
- There is ambiguity in what is meant by 'imitation'. It is not clear how this cashes out with different art forms. Does it mean resemble, simulate, represent, copy? Examples may be taken from different art forms to illustrate the problem. There is clearly a difference in intent between recordings of steam trains and atonal music.

It may be claimed that imitation is more plausible with some art forms than others and cannot be essential to **all** art.

- A work of art can succeed artistically even if it lacks factual accuracy. An atmospheric, evocative, attention-grabbing picture of a particular city may, eg locate a church in the wrong place without failing as a work of art.
- Black and white photography may succeed in being more evocative even though colour would be a closer resemblance. The use of shade is an artistic device that may be better served in black and white. Classic films may be used as examples or Woody Allen's decision to film *Manhattan* in black and white.
- There is an irreducibly personal element in art, eg a picture that could only have been painted by _____. This may be compared with science in a broad sense. We would not say this about copying or imitating. Examples can be drawn from a diverse field of arts.
- If imitation is so vital, then why do we value imagination? Reality may be seen as the springboard for the imagination, rather than something that is slavishly imitated. Examples are likely to be drawn from art or literature.
- Does a collage imitate? The juxtaposition of representative chunks of reality is not itself an attempt to copy or imitate reality. Examples of such forms should feature. 9+6 marks.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

0 6

Assess the claim that form alone matters when judging artistic merit.

(30 marks)

Candidates are likely to identify formal features as balance, symmetry, coherence, order, structure, harmony and proportion. Diverse fields of art may be discussed. Clive Bell may well be taken as a leading exponent of formalism. Note that candidates may argue for an alternative to formalism but this should be firmly related to the theory in question.

- Formal features lead us into a work of art. They focus our attention and concentration on qualities within the work. They are the pathway to the possibility of critical appreciation.
- Although form can be realised differently in different arts, it is the common feature that unifies the work and makes it art. Examples are likely to be drawn from poetry, music and painting. This is related to the next point.
- Form is **the** intrinsic property. It is distinct from the object represented, the emotion evoked or informative content. It is the work itself. It underpins the work's success in other areas. There is a problem here: if form cannot be separated from the art, can we talk about it as a distinct property?
- Formal features are necessary for conveying beauty and, as beauty is the concern of art, it is essential to aesthetic appreciation. Even if it's not beauty that is conveyed, the emotion that is will depend on formal features. Form and aesthetic emotion cannot be separated.
- Form is central to conveying information. Structural features of art may illuminate structural features of emotion, experiences or the human condition. Munch's *The Scream* relates to fundamentals of human existence or emotion. Harmony and balance may be used to illustrate this point.
- Form enables us to understand art and appreciate it independently of the ideas or feelings of the artist or original audience.
- There might be some level of description at which virtually anything can be described as having form. If so, how does form distinguish art from anything else? Does a beautiful landscape copy or capture a form already present in nature?
- Form is too formal or abstract to be **the** criterion of aesthetic judgement. It is too restrictive, elitist or esoteric. It leads to experts whose language becomes incomprehensible to those who otherwise value art. There may, however, be Mill-type points that appreciating art, as opposed to merely reacting to it, requires other things being learnt.
- The circularity problem: aesthetic emotion is elicited by form and form is that which elicits aesthetic emotion. Response: form can be identified independently of eliciting emotion.
- Features of art other than form might be discussed. It is the features related by form that matter. Formal features may channel emotion but emotional responses are not guaranteed by purely formal features.
- In restoring damaged works of art, the primary concern is to preserve the artist's original intention, rather than with capturing formal features.
- The TV series *The Prisoner* was described as the ultimate triumph of form over content. If form is all that matters, it's hard to see how such a criticism is possible or even understandable. Similar remarks have been applied to films directed by Sergio Leone.
- Form is present in copies and forgeries and their failure as art may not be explicable in terms of formal features alone. Different art forms may be used to illustrate this point as it is not confined to painting.
- The importance of form may depend on the art form and no general claim is possible. This may be related to a discussion of whether essence questions are appropriate for the whole of artistic activity (anti essentialism).

As a general point examples may feature prominently in the responses. They should be rewarded for illustrating relevant points. However, examples should not be multiplied to illustrate the **same** point. They supplement the argument rather than replace argument.

Theme 4: God and the world

Total for this question: 45 marks

0 7

Explain and illustrate **two** responses which a religious believer may make to the problem of natural evil.

(15 marks)

- Hick's view that this world is not intended to be an earthly paradise may be appealed to. The world is part of the process of soul-making or moral development. We develop more worthy souls or grow morally in the face of adversity. Examples can be given of natural evils which involve such adversity.
- For the purpose of moral development, it is vital that good situations emerge from bad ones. They are not just better by comparison. Examples of natural evils which afford this opportunity should be provided. Although it may not happen, the point is that the chance is provided.
- Natural evils, with examples, provide the opportunity for the use of our free-will to turn them into goods or to achieve a greater good. The central idea is using our free-will positively, meeting challenges that are more challenging through their unpredictability, and bringing good out of them.
- We need a stable background for the possibility of moral development. Laws of nature provide this background but once they are in place they contain the possibility of harm. Natural disasters occur within those laws. They are the price of stability. For example laws of gravity and motion will have implications for the movement of bodies and what happens to us.
- Natural evils provide the conditions necessary for the attainment of the highest moral qualities. Examples could include courage, sympathy and compassion. These qualities distinguish us from the rest of the natural order. Logically they require gratuitous, undeserved or unpredictable evils. Natural evils satisfy these conditions.
- Natural evils increase, or at least provide the possibility to increase, our sense of being part of the 'human family'. The impetus to help each other ensures moral progress on a global scale. Examples could include responses to natural disasters or fighting against evils which afflict humanity such as diseases.
- A more religious response may involve appeals to tests of faith, ie if religious belief holds independently of the problem of evil, then we should have faith that God intends to bring a greater good out of such evils even if our limited perspectives prevent us from seeing the full picture. Or, they are a price we pay for the misuse of free-will, the doctrine of original sin.
9+6 marks.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

0 8 Assess whether belief in God should be regarded as a hypothesis.

(30 marks)

There is likely to be a distinction between belief as a way of seeing and experiencing the world in a particular way or regarding it as a hypothesis which explains facts about the world. Religious belief may be regarded as a system of concepts for categorising the world and events within it. It is from such a point of view that eg certain actions are perceived as sinful or certain events as a source of gratitude. There might be reference to Wittgenstein, Winch, Hick, forms of life, language games. As a hypothesis, belief in God may explain the order in the world, the regularity of nature, or why there is anything at all (something rather than nothing). Some difficulties with God's existence as a hypothesis might include:

- Flew's parable and the immunity against falsification being bought at too high a price. A fine, brash hypothesis dies the death of a thousand qualifications. There might be references to Hare's 'blicks', Wisdom's point regarding whether the gardener parable is a factual dispute or Hick's 'journey' to the celestial city. Ayer's claim that religious language is meaningless because it fails the verification process.
- As a hypothesis, it would lack predictive power. There is a difficulty in saying what you can predict with it that you could not predict without it.
- There are no practical differences with eg Hume's Epicurean hypothesis.
- Hypotheses should exclude some possibilities but God's existence seems compatible with any eventuality.
- There are alternative ways of accounting for the same facts and these ways are more systematic.
- If God's existence competes with other hypotheses for the same ground, there is the risk of having a God of the gaps.

It might be argued that the existence of God should not be regarded as a hypothesis but rather a way of seeing the world, an expression of commitment, a form of life.

- It is not a factual hypothesis, but rather a way of classifying the world and our experiences. Belief in God involves embracing a fundamental set of concepts which are not to be justified in terms of something else. Any attempt to do so would collapse the situation into absurdity.
- What is real is given in the concepts we use. There might be reference to Winch's point regarding no external relation between language and reality. Our concepts fix what is real and this applies to religious ones.
- Religious belief is one way of seeing among others. Do they all lie on a level? You cannot judge one belief system or set of concepts by the criteria of another, eg the woman in Matisse's studio who remarked: "Surely the arm of that woman is too long", and getting the reply, "Madam you are mistaken, that is not a woman it is a picture".
- Religious belief is a way of seeing and the question of whether it is the right way does not arise. This might be supported by appeals to various ambiguous figures, cross and flower, girl and old lady, duck-rabbits, etc. It makes no sense to ask which one is the right way of seeing. Problems may be discussed. Are examples of such figures strictly analogous with entire sets of concepts? It may be argued that the possibility of ambiguous interpretation presupposes a level of unambiguous interpretation.
- That there are different ways of seeing does not in itself imply that they all lie on a level. It might be argued that there is something fundamental about broadly scientific or physical object statements. Basic observational statements are true or false in the sense that their truth conditions are wholly present at the time of utterance. This is not the case for religious statements.

- Religions such as Christianity cannot be just ways of seeing as they involve making historical claims about the world. There can be overlaps between ways of seeing that one particular way cannot resolve.
- God's reality has to amount to more than saying this language game is played. It may be argued that many believers would want to claim more than this.
- If the use of religious concepts is not a question of right or wrong, but rather one of agreed meanings and practices amongst its users, then there are no unbelievers just those who do not understand or participate (Tertullian's Paradox). There might be references to meaning and usage.
- It is not clear how supportive the appeal to language games is to the point regarding ways of seeing. Typical Wittgensteinian examples of language games are wishing, hoping, commanding and it's not clear how they constitute an analogy with religion as a whole. Wittgenstein's remarks on Frazer's '*Golden Bough*' may be used as more supportive.
- Wittgenstein's *obiter dicta* that 'see you in the after-life' seems like a prediction of a future state of affairs may be discussed.
- If being religious amounts to the use of a set of concepts, so that adopting that set of concepts is what it is to adopt the religious point of view, then how is it possible to understand Wittgenstein's comment that although he is not a religious man he sees every problem from a religious point of view?

There might be references to the design argument but these should be closely connected to the notion of a hypothesis. For example, Swinburne's best explanation or preferable explanation of laws of nature rather than in terms of brute, unexplained facts. There may also be a discussion of the appeal to God's will as an explanatory tool. We get the same answer to a variety of different questions. Is everything that happens compatible with God's will?

Theme 5: Free Will and determinism

Total for this question: 45 marks

09

Explain and illustrate **two** ways of distinguishing actions from bodily movement.

(15 marks)

- Actions are explicable in terms of reasons; they are amenable to ‘why’ questions. Movements are explicable in terms of causes; they are amenable to ‘how’ questions. This should be illustrated with an example to elucidate the difference. There may be reference to actions and happenings.
- Actions are appropriate subjects of moral judgments; praise and blame, whereas bodily movements are not. An example of each is sufficient for illustration.
- It makes sense to say that you ought not to have performed that particular action where ‘ought’ has clear moral import. It would not make sense to talk in this way about bodily movement. A course of action and a bodily movement should exemplify the point.
- The issue might be approached through the notion of justification. We justify our actions; they are appropriate subjects of such discourse. Bodily movements are not the kinds of things that can be justified. They either happen or do not happen. Examples of each should be used to illustrate the point.
- Actions are socially defined. They could not be described or even specified without taking a background as given. Physical movements require no such background. Making a purchase or voting presuppose economic or political stage-setting before the descriptions become possible. This is not so for, eg a knee-jerk.
- Some actions are passive, eg waiting for a train, whereas physical movement necessarily involves movement together with example.
- Actions may be preceded by mental events, eg intention, desire. Physical movements require no such antecedents. A reflex action may illustrate the distinction.
- Actions are directed; they have an object or may be aimed at bringing about states of affairs (intentionality). Physical movements either occur or do not occur; they do not point to anything else. This is essential to our ability to understand actions. Instrumental actions may be contrasted with movements.
- The same physical movement may be subsumed under different action descriptions. For example, winking may acknowledge someone, be a signal, constitute a bid at an auction, etc. Many such examples are available. A bodily movement has one description.
- Movements are amenable to the framework of physical science. They are studied objectively with an objective ontology. Actions have subjective qualities or dimensions to them. There are differences in the appropriate methods of study for action and movement, eg interpretation, participatory understanding, goal-directedness with illustrations. Natural and social sciences may feature as examples.
- Reasons, motives and actions are conceptually connected. Movements are causally related to prior movements. They are contingently connected. They are discovered. Conceptual connections are like constitutive principles or a background. We do not, for example, discover that an interest in literature is connected to reading books. 9+6 marks.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

1 0

Assess the view that we are free and therefore morally responsible for our actions.

(30 marks)

Candidates may argue for a connection between free-will and responsibility. Moral responsibility strictly implies freedom and choice. There might be references to Kant's 'ought implies can'. Freedom and determinism are opposed and thus determinism implies we are not morally responsible and it is irrational to praise and blame actions. Alternatively, it may be argued that free-will and determinism are compatible and we can preserve moral responsibility, eg Hume and Honderich. Some of the following points are likely to be discussed.

- There might be a general discussion of the presuppositions of determinism. All events are the outcome of caused causes. This is the basis of scientific thinking and human actions are no exception to this. It is implausible to regard human actions as different in kind to other events. Laplace's demon might feature together with the issue of prediction.
- The scientific assumption seems to conflict with our subjective sense of freedom. The phenomenological aspects of choice might be appealed to. Freedom is revealed through such structures as remorse, regret, forgiveness, anguish. Sartre might be discussed in this context. An alternative account of determinism might be argued for in terms of an escape from freedom, a way of avoiding responsibility, an act of bad faith.
- There are physical laws but no comparable social or psychological laws. Is this just a temporary inconvenience? Such laws are possible in principle it's just that we have not formulated them yet. There could be a discussion of whether this response is simply assuming the truth of determinism, or whether the lack of such laws is what we would expect given the differences in the phenomena under investigation.
- The conceptual structures of physical science and human science are too dissimilar for there to be similar laws. There might be references to reasons and causes, intentionality, goal-directed behaviour, the nature of action and its presuppositions. Such differences will carry implications for the kinds of explanation we can expect.
- What kind of theory is determinism? If it's an empirical theory, then counter-examples should at least be possible. It is not clear what a determinist would be prepared to regard as such a counter. This appears to be behind Moore's unease about the thesis. It appears to be something unclear.
- There might be a discussion of freedom and randomness and whether this could have any relevance. A recent talk by Searle suggests it might. Freedom has application at the sub-atomic level. This is similar to von Bonin's point that actions might be free if we could establish random, unpredictable events in the brain. Searle regards this as a desperate remedy to a desperate problem. There are problems here as this seems to have nothing to do with what we **mean** by freedom of action. It is also unclear how it would relate to the issue of responsibility. Hume's point that 'free' cannot mean random or capricious might feature. At the level of action it is those actions that appear random that are **more** likely to arouse our interest in the direction of causal explanation.
- There might be a discussion of freedom and predictability. The fact you can predict how someone will behave, and get it right, does not imply that their action was not free or that they were not responsible. Much will depend on the nature of the prediction.
- The more we discover about the causes of human behaviour the less appropriate it becomes to talk of responsibility. For example shell-shock was once regarded as cowardice but now it is not and so not blameworthy. There are problems, eg could we recognise it as not being cowardice without knowing genuine cases of cowardice? It is not clear that **all** behaviour is subject to revision, or could be.
- There might be discussions of various versions of compatibilism. Hume is likely to feature. A free action is one that is not subject to felt constraint, pressure or force. Determined simply means 'regular' so there is no real conflict as an action can be both. Flew's example of the smiling groom and the groom at a shotgun wedding may feature. The actions of the first are free

even though they are the outcome of caused causes. There are characteristic problems with this view:

- The analysis of a free action is defective as it omits the most important feature, namely the ability to choose differently in the same circumstances.
- It is contradictory to say you have a choice between X and Y, and that a set of causal factors exist which completely determine you do X and not Y.
- A person in a hypnotic trance feels no pressures but their actions would not be described as free.
- There are cases where you might feel pressures but the action is regarded as free and you are regarded as responsible. Cases of emotional blackmail may feature. In the film *Double Indemnity* the main character is seduced into committing murder but is still morally and criminally responsible. Hume and Flew fail to provide necessary or sufficient conditions for free actions.
- There are problems with compatibilism and responsibility. Praise and blame may be regarded as elements within a causal chain which themselves increase or decrease the frequency of certain actions (Hume). But this tends to neglect the question of what is deserved especially when translated into the legal context of crime and punishment. Proportionality becomes problematic if deterrence is all that matters.
- There is also an issue with moral judgement and rationality. It would be difficult to regard our moral judgements as being part of a causal chain. This would not show that they were not, but we could not talk about ourselves in such a way without talking nonsense.
- Free-will is an illusion or fiction that we cannot help but regard as genuine. Response: what would need to be the case for it to count as genuine?
- Determinism presupposes rationality and, at least, an intellectual responsibility in assuming we can be **rationally** persuaded of the truth of determinism.
- There might be a discussion of Honderich's claim that an action can be an effect and the agent still can be held responsible. He appeals to the legal concept of strict liability where regardless of intentions, desires, etc. the agent is held responsible if the action is performed. There are difficulties here, eg the failure to distinguish being **held** responsible from actually being responsible. You could not have a legal system that consisted of strict liability alone as your ability to describe and recognise such cases presupposes distinguishing cases. Strict liability is an unusual and exceptional feature of the legal system and thus not appropriate as a general model.
- There might be a discussion of Frankfurt's distinction between first and second order desires. Persons are distinguished by the ability to reflect on their desires, take a point of view on those desires; they are not confined to acting on first order desires as opposed to 'wantons'. There are problems regarding whether desires could be the intentional object of desires, or in establishing the criteria for distinguishing the two orders, or how we distinguish this from conflicting desires. There may also be a discussion of responsibility and inevitability. Different types of inevitability may be distinguished and the appropriateness of assigning moral responsibility discussed. Issues relating to moral and legal responsibility may be pursued. To be legally responsible there must be both *mens rea* and *actus reus* with the first bringing about the second (except for cases of strict liability where *actus reus* is sufficient). Is moral responsibility different? If all that mattered were the *mens rea*, then it's hard to understand why we regard murder as worse than attempted murder. Frankfurt's murder case may be discussed or cases like the intending murderer who shoots an already dead body.
- There may be discussion of actual cases in law and the defence of psychological compulsion (Darrow). How compulsion differs from strong desire may be discussed or the difference between desires and cravings. Is it possible to be at the mercy of our **own** desires? Can we be slaves to our **own** desires? It may be argued that such descriptions ultimately refer to the objects of those desires rather than desires themselves.
- Candidates may approach the issues through a discussion of a particular theory which has implications for the way we regard human behaviour, eg Freudian theory.

The points in the indicative content mark-scheme are not prescriptive. They indicate a number of approaches and arguments that are likely to feature. Other approaches may be equally acceptable and will be credited accordingly. The generic level descriptors operate on the indicative content and determine the mark awarded.

Assessment Objective Grid

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15 mark question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 30 mark question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	9	9	18
AO2	6	12	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	15	30	45