**General Certificate of Education
June 2012**

Philosophy   **PHIL1**

Unit 1

An Introduction in Philosophy 1

Final

Mark Scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation meeting attended by all examiners and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation meeting ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for the standardisation meeting each examiner analyses a number of students' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed at the meeting and legislated for. If, after this meeting, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been discussed at the meeting they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

AS PHILOSOPHY

GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR EXAMINERS

Deciding on a level and the award of marks within a level

It is of vital importance that examiners familiarise themselves with the generic mark scheme and apply it consistently, as directed by the Principal Examiner, in order to facilitate comparability across options.

The generic mark scheme must be used consistently across all questions. The question-specific mark scheme will indicate a variety of material and approaches that a student is likely to use. It is not, however, proscriptive. Alternative responses are possible and should be credited if appropriate.

It will be found that when applying the generic mark scheme, many responses will display features of different levels. Examiners must exercise their judgement. In locating the appropriate band, examiners must look to the best-fit or dominant descriptors. Marks should then be adjusted within that band according to the following criteria:

- understanding of philosophical positions
- accuracy and detail of arguments
- quality of illustrative material
- grasp of technical vocabulary where appropriate
- quality of written communication.

It must be noted that quality of written communication should only determine a level in cases where the meaning of a response is obscured. In most cases it will determine adjustments within a level.

It must also be emphasises that although the question-specific mark scheme is not proscriptive, examiners must familiarise themselves with its content. Examiners must recognise creditworthy material and the subject-specific mark scheme is an important tool for achieving this.

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 15 MARKS

AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–4 marks The explanation will lack detail, or the detail may be narrow and/or only partially addresses the question. Blurring or conflation of issues may result in some lack of clarity. There may be significant omissions. At the bottom end of the level responses may be vague, unfocussed or fragmentary.	**Level 1**
5–9 marks At the top end of the level there will be a clear, detailed and precise understanding of the relevant philosophical issues. Lower down the level, responses will be accurate and focussed but may lack balance. At the bottom end there may be some blurring of distinctions, but one issue will be clearly explained.	**Level 2**

AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–3 marks Where two illustrations are required, one may be clear and precise but the second confused or absent. Alternatively, there may be a blurring of points and their relevance to the explanation is not apparent. At the lower end of the level, examples will lack detail and clarity and may fail to serve their purpose. If only one illustration is required it will be vague or only partially succeed in achieving its purpose.	**Level 1**
4–6 marks At the top end of the level, the illustration(s) or example(s) will be clear and have a precise bearing on the issues being explained. Relevance will be apparent. At the lower end of the level, one illustration may be treated precisely with another illustration treated briefly, with only a partial grasp in evidence.	**Level 2**

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 30 MARKS

0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–4 marks There may be an extremely basic awareness of one relevant point without development or analysis. The response may be tangential with an accidental reference to a relevant point. Errors of understanding are likely to be intrusive. At the very bottom of this level there will be no creditworthy material. Fragments of knowledge will feature in this level. Technical language is not employed or is employed inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar are intrusive.	**Level 1**
5–9 marks There may be a basic or philosophically unsophisticated grasp of some issues. Analysis may be predominantly simple and/or lack clarity in places. There may be errors of reasoning and understanding. Evaluation, if present, will lack penetration or be very narrowly confined. The response may lack overall purpose and may fail to directly address the relevant issues. At the lower end of the level, the response may be disjointed. Technical language is limited in its employment or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.	**Level 2**
10–15 marks Responses in this level may be short or of limited scope. There may be narrow focus on one aspect or a range of issues may be referred to with limited understanding or analysis. Evaluation may be replaced by assertion or counter-suggestion. Sporadic insights may be present but they would lack development. Some knowledge will be present but it is likely to either lack detail and precision, or will not be analysed or evaluated. This is likely to feature at the lower end of the level. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.	**Level 3**
16–21 marks The response will explain and analyse some relevant material but positions might be juxtaposed rather than critically compared. Relevance will generally be sustained, though there may be occasional tangents at the lower end of the level. Knowledge of issues will be present but may lack depth and/or precision. Evaluative points are likely to be underdeveloped or applied to a limited range of material and may not be convincing. Examples are likely to be used descriptively rather than critically. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.	**Level 4**

22–25 marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and explained but there may be some imprecision. Examples will be deployed effectively but their implications may not be made fully apparent. Evaluation must be present but may lack philosophical impact, or it may be penetrating over a limited range of material. Knowledge and understanding of the issues will be apparent but not always fully exploited. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.	**Level 5**
26–30 marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and positions clearly and precisely explained. The analysis and use of examples will proceed from a secure knowledge base. Evaluation must be present and will show sophistication and direct engagement of the issues. The relation between argument and conclusion will be clear. The response is written in a fluent and sophisticated style with minimal, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response will read as a coherent whole.	**Level 6**

Theme 1: Reason and experience　　　　　　　　**Total for this theme: 45 marks**

01　　Explain and illustrate what is meant by the claim that experience is intelligible only because we possess a predetermined conceptual scheme.　　　　(15 marks)

Students may begin by noting that this claim is a criticism of empiricist claims that sense experience is the source both of our ideas/concepts and of our knowledge and/or by referencing the claim that without a predetermined conceptual scheme sense experience would be a 'buzzing confusion'. There could also be some clarification of what, exactly, a conceptual scheme is: for example, a conceptual scheme provides a linguistic structure for the organization of experience; or a conceptual scheme is a reference to the natural, or innate, tendencies of the mind.

The claim, essentially, is that without a conceptual scheme it is difficult to see how experience could get off the ground and/or be apprehended in an orderly fashion. One (or more) of the following accounts may be explained:

- A conceptual scheme is predetermined in the sense that it is innate; certain categories are imposed on or triggered by experience. Such categories render experience intelligible. This will probably be associated with Kant although Leibniz may also feature in explanations.
- A conceptual scheme is predetermined in the sense that it is linguistically relative and is acquired within and reflects a specific set of cultural/social practices and values. This will probably be associated with Sapir-Whorf but references to Wittgenstein or Quine would also be relevant.
- There could be references to evolutionary biological and/or psychological mechanisms. Carruthers might feature in explanations.

Illustrative examples will depend on the explanation provided:

- The Kantian view that certain concepts are required for but not grounded in experience might be illustrated via causation, time, space, identity etc. Kant's second analogy (on the succession of time according to the law of causality) involving a ship moving downstream may feature: Descartes' wax example could be employed to illustrate Kant's first analogy (concerning the permanence of substance through change). Similarly, Leibniz's block of marble may illustrate the innate capacities of the mind.
- Linguistic relativity may be illustrated, hopefully imaginatively, via examples of societies that deploy a range of concepts where we use only one (e.g. 'snow'); or through the ambiguity of concepts from culture to culture; or through examples of cultures that allegedly lack the conceptual apparatus of time or number etc. Expect references to Hopi Indian and Inuit conceptualisations. There may also be some references to forms of life and language games; contextualism and/or externalism about meaning.
- The impact of evolution on conceptualisation. This might be illustrated by references to folk psychology.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

02	Assess the view that no significant claims about what exists are known *a priori*.
	(30 marks)

The view will be identified as an empiricist approach to knowledge acquisition: the view that knowledge, or at least non-trivial or substantive knowledge, is acquired through experience. It is likely that some outline of empiricism will be provided. Expect references to Locke and Hume.

Students should select some of the following points for discussion:
Some development of empiricist views:

- The view that, at birth, the mind is a tabula rasa and is furnished through experience: Locke's view that there are no innate ideas and, therefore, no innate knowledge. Some of Locke's arguments in support of this claim may be given.
- Hume's fork: the distinction between 'knowledge' concerning matters of fact and knowledge concerning relations of ideas. The former is a posteriori and concerns substantive beliefs and expectations about the world; the latter is a priori and confined to empty tautologies or demonstrations of relations between quantities and numbers.
- Differences between Locke and Hume may be discussed: e.g. both give the example of the relation between property and justice but Hume sees this as a trivial tautology whereas Locke appears to regard it as substantive; Hume thought that belief in God was a matter of faith rather than reason whereas Locke thought that the existence of God could be known a priori.

Some account of rationalist views:

- There may be some attempt to generalise rationalist positions e.g. as the view that the use of reason is necessary to the acquisition of knowledge, or that knowledge provided by reason is superior to knowledge gained from experience.
- More specifically, the claim that some propositions can be known intuitively and that other propositions can be deduced from them; the claim that due to our rational natures we can simply see the truth of some propositions; the claim that experience 'triggers', but does not provide, concepts necessary for knowledge acquisition; innatism and nativism.
- Rationalist arguments for substantive knowledge that is known prior to or independently of experience might involve discussions of God, Platonic forms, universals, logic and mathematical/geometrical ideas, beauty, morality, justice, mind-body dualism, causation etc.
- For example, it might be suggested that claims such as God exists, the sum of the angles of a triangle equals two right-angles, that knowledge of the underlying structure of matter is mathematical, that knowledge of necessary truths cannot depend on experience of particular instances etc. all provide substantive knowledge. Expect references to Descartes and Plato (and innatism).

Discussion and analysis:

- Hume's view that 'though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would forever retain their certainty' – so they are not substantive knowledge. On the other hand, mathematics does seem to be about something over and above the relationship between our concepts. Different systems of geometry are available, all internally necessary, but their range of applications is not *a priori*. However, it could still be argued that mathematical knowledge is a posteriori (Mill). Yet

the nature of mathematical inquiry involves theorems which must be known prior to the inquiry (Plato).

- If morality is discussed it might be suggested that there are no 'queer' objective values, morality is subjective and concerns the way that we feel (Hume). On the other hand, moral issues extend beyond the way we feel and involve questions concerning what we ought to do and a search for general principles.
- If God is discussed it might be claimed that Descartes was wrong to claim that the idea of God is innate and could not be acquired through experience. Locke's argument that the idea can't be innate. Hume's account of how the idea is acquired. However, does this work for all of God's attributes (e.g. transcendence)?
- If causation is referenced views of how the concept is acquired (through experience or innate and triggered by experience) could be discussed e.g. via Hume and Kant.

It could be argued that:

On behalf of empiricism

- All knowledge is a posteriori.
- Some knowledge is a priori but it is not substantive knowledge – rather, it is analytic and trivially true or true in virtue of the meanings of the terms involved in a proposition. Furthermore, such truths are analytical developments of assumptions initially derived from experience.
- Notions of necessity exist 'in the way that we talk about things and not in the things we talk about' (Quine).
- What exists is completely physical and substantive knowledge is acquired through empirical research and investigation.
- It isn't clear what rationalists mean by intuition and there are strong arguments against innatism.

On behalf of rationalism

- Truths that are intuitively known, deduced through reason or given by our rational nature are not only known with certainty – which may be seen as an improvement on empiricism – but are substantive.
- Innate knowledge doesn't have to be defined as knowledge known at birth, it can be defined as knowledge which is programmed to appear at some stage in our development or as knowledge which is triggered by experience and which extends beyond what is provided in experience.
- For example, the nature of our acquisition of language extends beyond our sparse experiences of language use so that universal grammar is an innate capacity (Chomsky); similarly, the depth of a child's grasp of folk psychological concepts and applications extends beyond what is provided in their early experiences and has evolved through genetic or psychological programming (Carruthers); the view that without certain innate faculties or concepts it would not be possible to gain empirical knowledge (Kant and/or Leibniz)
- Generally, the mind is active rather than passive in acquiring and organising knowledge.

Theme 2: Why should I be governed?   **Total for this theme: 45 marks**

03	Illustrating your answer, explain the difference between hypothetical and tacit consent. (15 marks)

A brief explanation of the significance of consent generally – e.g. as the standard way in which liberals attempt to ground political obligations – might be given and/or there may be a brief account of some difficulties concerning the notion of *explicit* or *express* consent. Hypothetical and tacit consent are two ways in which philosophers have attempted to preserve the notion of consent.

Tacit consent is assumed – or implicit – consent. The view that we tacitly consent to be governed typically involves the ideas that:

- We haven't left the country.
- We haven't engaged in any attempts to persuade the authorities to change laws.
- We have engaged in certain political practices (such as voting)
- We have accepted and continue to accept the benefits of political organisation.
- Notions of justice and 'fair play'.

This is likely to be illustrated through references to Socrates' acceptance of his imprisonment and execution although more mundane accounts of the benefits bestowed upon us through political organisation should also be accepted as illustrations.

Hypothetical consent may be described in terms of social contract theory, that a social contract is not an historical fact but a useful fiction. It is what would be produced by rational individuals *either* when negotiating with one another *or* when engaged in solitary deliberations in an artificial context such as a state of nature or an original position. According to Kant it is 'an *idea* of reason which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality…an infallible *a priori* standard'. This typically involves the ideas that:

- Legislators are obliged to frame laws in such a way that they *could* have been produced by the united will of a whole nation.
- A state is administered in such a way as to secure the rights of all individuals within the state.

This is likely to be illustrated through references to Rawls' account of the principles that rational individuals *would* choose if in an original position under a veil of ignorance.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

04   'In order to be legitimate a government requires popular approval.' Discuss

(30 marks)

Legitimacy refers to the reasons given to explain and justify our political obligations; to the grounds on which the state merits our allegiance. It may also be connected to the achievement of certain outcomes e.g. securing the rights and liberties of individuals, promoting equality, welfare, happiness and/or to versions of the common good. A distinction may be drawn between authority as legitimate power based on recognition, consent and approval and power as illegitimately based on coercion, the threat and use of force (violence).

The question may be approached through a discussion of whether popular approval is either sufficient or necessary for legitimacy.

Discussions should apply and analyse some of the following points:

- An account of legitimate and (allegedly) illegitimate sovereign bodies – expect fairly crude but broadly accurate contrasts between e.g. 'rule by terror' and democracy.
- An account of how legitimacy is achieved showing how entitlement, acceptance and popular approval may be demonstrated: there may be references to voting, to the idea of a social contract and/or to the approach to legitimate government taken by some political philosophers.

Good answers will be those that relate points closely to popular approval. For example:

- Is a majority vote (e.g. 51%) sufficient to indicate popular approval? Where the winning party is the largest minority does that indicate popular approval? Does negative or tactical voting indicate approval at all?
- The utilitarian view that utility is the reason we are bound together in a state: 'the probable mischiefs of obedience are less than the probable mischiefs of resistance' (Bentham). But utility can be measured in different ways e.g. the quantity of happiness, the quality of happiness, preferences, welfare and not all of these are closely linked to popular approval. For example, Mill's utilitarian argument for a minimal state is hostile to 'the tyranny of the majority'.
- Locke's view that when, via a contract, individuals form a body politic 'every man…puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority'. If this were not so the body politic would dissolve and no rational creature would contract into something that isn't going to last very long. In this sense popular approval may be linked to rational interests, rights etc.
- Kant's view is similar: legitimate government has nothing to do with happiness. As long as it is 'not self-contradictory to say that an entire people could agree to…a law, however painful it might seem, then the law is in harmony with right' and people should obey it. Highly unpopular laws (e.g. austerity measures) are legitimate if it is not contradictory to say that everyone could see their necessity.
- Hobbes' view that sovereign rule is legitimate as long as security/safety is established – whether we approve of certain measures or not. (Although it might be suggested that power is stronger if it is approved.)
- Marxist views that popular approval/consent can be manufactured. People can be manipulated so that popular approval may be present but what they approve of does not coincide with their real interests.
- A legitimate government is one that enforces the general will – legitimacy and popular approval is one and the same (Rousseau). Our development as individuals (positive freedoms) is only possible in a body politic.

- The State is a fact – we are born into it – consent is usually a fiction. (Hume) Our obedience is required 'because society could not otherwise subsist'.
- In another sense of legitimacy, government is a skill and is best undertaken by those with the knowledge to exercise it (philosophers). Popular approval is not only not required it is positively dangerous. Plato's simile of the ship.

(Some of) the above points may be employed to advance a range of positions. For example:

- Government can be legitimate without popular approval. Legitimacy is distinct from popular approval.
- Securing certain political goods – safety, stability, individual rights, justice etc. – is more important than seeking popular approval.
- Popular approval can be linked to the will of the majority and, while not perfect, democracy is the best form of government.
- We don't need to define 'popular approval' in terms of popularity or happiness – interests, welfare, well-being etc. will do, and legitimacy is linked to this.
- The issue is less significant for any particular government then it is for the underpinning form of political organisation.

Theme 3: Why should I be moral?   **Total for this theme: 45 marks**

05	Explain and illustrate **two** criticisms of the contractual view of why we should be moral. (15 marks)

One or more versions of a social contract may be briefly described. The general idea is that there is no rift between enlightened or rational self-interest and moral values. Two criticisms of this view are likely to be drawn from:

- We haven't *actually* made a conventional agreement with others and/or even if we argue *hypothetically* (i.e. that we would agree to accept moral conventions if given the opportunity to do so) this may not generate the obligations that *actually* exist.
- Is tacit consent real consent? Does the lack of dissent on moral grounds indicate moral approval? Does it require us to do anything at all?
- Given differences in the contractual approach (concerning why we make a contract and/or what we contract to) this approach leaves the question of what is moral open. Contractual theories may lead to the view that some values are relative (dependant on whatever agreement we're willing to make). Should moral values be seen as absolute?
- Can morality be the product of a contract? Don't we need some moral principles in order to even think in terms of a contract? What we (would be prepared to) contract to must be the product of some pre-existing beliefs and values about what constitutes a worthwhile life. Some positions suggest that a conventional agreement is made to secure moral principles (e.g. natural rights) which, therefore, cannot be the product of a contract.
- If we can get away with not following moral conventions – while others think that we do – and we are self-interested rational egoists, then why shouldn't we do so? The 'free-rider' problem.
- Similarly, why don't more of us do so? What does this suggest about moral motivation? Are we Kantians concerning morality?
- Could conventional agreements favour the strong (as Marxists suggest)? Could they favour the weak (as Nietzsche would suggest). Some contractual theories might be said to licence a 'tyranny of the majority'. Do outsiders, or those who cannot express consent, have no moral rights?
- Is this really what morality amounts to? Is it the case that moral motivation can be described purely in terms of self-interest and mutual advantage? Isn't reciprocal altruism a better explanation of our moral behaviour?
- If it is a fact that we've reached an agreement does it follow that we ought to honour it?
- If morality is perceived as resulting from a conventional agreement how do we explain dissent on moral grounds?

Illustrations may draw from the literature. For example, the view of man, and the subsequent nature of the contract, presented by Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau; Rawls' promotion of the values of a western, liberal tradition favouring the autonomy and rights of the individual as well as a welfare ethic and/or Nozick's rejection of this; examples of dissent on moral grounds; examples of how rights are possessed by e.g. children or animals; the ring of Gyges; our social and altruistic nature; our rational nature; any other reasonable illustration.

No marks are available for evaluation. Students should offer criticisms of the view rather than merely describe two alternative views .

06	'Being moral does not require me to do anything more than conform to moral rules.' Discuss. (30 marks)

This should be treated as a relatively open question. In the specification the phrase appears in contrast to virtue ethics but it would be equally appropriate to develop a contrast with deontological theories. The phrase itself would seem to require unpacking in terms of (some versions of) contractual theories e.g. Hobbes. It may, therefore, be appropriate for students to repeat some points made in responses to the 15-mark question.

Discussions should apply and analyse some of the following, or similar, points:

What does conformity with moral rules imply?

- Insofar as the law might be said to uphold morality – either by reflecting popular moral values or by protecting the rights of individuals – does it simply imply obeying the law?
- Does it also imply respecting certain values which are not legislated for – e.g. queue-jumping is frowned upon but (in many instances) queuing is not covered by legislation – so conforming to social codes of conduct and expectations concerning behaviour?
- Either way, given that both might be said to reflect 'the wisdom of the ages', isn't compliance/obedience morally praiseworthy without reference to anything else?

What might a contractual view entail?

- No – being moral doesn't require anything more than conformity with moral rules. Following the making of a contract, such rules reflect the will of the sovereign body which is in place to secure the interests and rights of individuals. (There could be different versions of this.)
- Yes – given that our initial motivation was self-interest certain values must guide the contract we're prepared to make. Some versions (e.g. Rousseau) require the kind of commitment to 'the general will' that isn't really captured by 'conformity with moral rules'. Other versions might require dissent if rules or conventions fail to protect (Hobbes) or secure rights (Locke).

What might virtue ethics entail?

- Yes – being moral does require something more than conformity with moral rules. A virtuous person, or healthy personality, doesn't just *do* something because it falls under a law or code to be followed; they *feel* that it is the right action to take. Moreover, being moral also requires the capacity to make good judgements using practical wisdom, according to the circumstances, and this involves more than merely conforming to moral rules.
- No it doesn't – the virtues are learned from the virtuous and the virtuous are those (the good and the great), in any society, who have flourished by practising those traits that are valued in that society. This looks suspiciously like conformity to social codes of conduct and expectations concerning behaviour.
- Furthermore, would I be a worse person or morally blameworthy if I felt tempted to break a moral convention but, due perhaps to having concerns about the potential consequences, didn't act on the temptation and continued to conform? Are the 'moral saints' who never feel temptation more praiseworthy than the rest of us?

What might deontological ethics entail?

- Yes – being moral does require something more than conformity with moral rules. A moral agent acts from a good will and is motivated to do what is right or perform duties because they are right – and what is right is determined by reason and the recognition of duties as universal imperatives. This must conflict with moral rules or codes on occasion and even if it doesn't acting morally isn't simply passive compliance with some external moral code.
- No it doesn't – many laws/moral conventions that are in place have been informed by deontological ethics (preserving life, promise keeping) so following such laws/conventions must be right. Moreover, how could we know what the motivation for someone's action was? Is there any behavioural difference between preserving life out of duty and preserving life because it is the law?

Other positions might be referenced e.g. utilitarianism.

- No, rules are in place because they have been found to promote happiness (rule utilitarianism).
- Yes, on utilitarian grounds there must be instances where rules should be broken.

The question calls for a specific answer, following analysis it might be argued:

- Either that morality does involve something over and above conformity with moral rules – moral sympathies, having the right feelings, recognition of duty etc.
- Or that conformity with moral rules is all that is required of individuals – a good life is constituted by conformity to certain codes or expectations, one's duty frequently is to observe the law etc.
- Or that differentiating between the two options is difficult.

Theme 4: The Idea of God   **Total for this theme: 45 marks**

07	Explain and illustrate **two** difficulties with the claim that God is omniscient.
	(15 marks)

God's omniscience should be defined as 'God is all-knowing' or that 'God knows everything'. This may be further developed as 'God knows every true proposition' and possibly as the view that 'God knows every proposition that it is logically possible to know'. There are a number of difficulties involved in how to interpret or understand such claims:

- Is God's knowledge limited to propositional knowledge? Does He also possess practical knowledge (know-how)? If He is transcendent and incorporeal then it isn't clear that He knows how to engage in any physical activity. Does this limit His omniscience? Perhaps He knows everything there is to know about what is required for any creature to perform a task – but this doesn't seem to be the same thing.
- If God's knowledge is propositional then in what language does He possess such knowledge?
- If God's knowledge is limited to propositional knowledge there seems to be a further limit due to the idea that certain propositions can only be known by certain people. George can know that 'I feel anxious about this exam', God can know that 'George feels anxious about this exam'. These knowledge claims do not seem identical.
- Some propositions can only be known at certain times. God can only know which of two statements e.g. 'the UK will experience severe weather conditions in the winter of 2010-11' and 'the UK did experience severe …' is true if God knows what time it is now. However, if He knows what time it is now He is not eternal and transcendent (or timeless, viewing all events simultaneously); if He doesn't know what time it is now He is not omniscient.
- If He is transcendent and sees all events simultaneously does He know every possible future outcome of events (how things could have been otherwise) or every actual outcome of events? If God knows what future choices we will make then it is hard to see how we could have acted differently and, consequently, whether we were free to choose: if we are not free to do otherwise and God knows that some of us commit evil actions it is difficult to reconcile this with His benevolence.
- If we are free to choose and it is not logically possible for God to know what we will choose then God is not omniscient. Do we have the power (through free will) to render false a belief held by God? If so, this may conflict with His omnipotence or His essential infallibility.

One developed illustration could cover two points. Separate illustrations may be quite brief. No marks are available for evaluation although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

08	Assess the claim that the idea of God is not innate but formed through mundane social and psychological processes. (30 marks)

The idea of God may be given in terms of His attributes – eternal, immutable, transcendent, omniscient, omnipotent etc. – before questioning whether this idea is innate in all of us and what innateness might involve and before raising issues concerning mundane social and psychological processes. Accounts of these processes may include critical discussions of claims that the idea of God is innate as well as issues concerning *how* we conceptualise God and *why* we might do so.

Discussions should apply and analyse some of the following, or similar, points:

Contrasting philosophical arguments concerning how we obtain the idea of God:

- Arguments for innateness – such as Descartes' 'trademark' argument. Just as a craftsman leaves his mark on his product so too God stamps the idea of Himself in us.
- Hume's view that the idea of God is formed by 'reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit …qualities of goodness and wisdom'. Experience is the source of our ideas through sensation and then reflection on sensation.

Analysis of these arguments:

- Descartes' use of the causal adequacy principle to demonstrate that God is the source of this idea – the cause must contain as much reality as is present in the effect - may be subjected to some criticism: whether the causes of our ideas possess the same qualities as our ideas (primary and secondary qualities may be referred to but the sponginess of cakes is more likely); whether there are degrees of reality; whether it is legitimate to argue from effects to causes; whether the argument is contradicted by other scientific theories such as evolution, chaos theory or quantum physics.
- Does Hume's position cover all of God's attributes?
- Locke's arguments against the idea of God being innate: there are whole nations that don't possess the idea; even if everyone did possess the idea it wouldn't follow that it was innate, in fact different ideas of God are learned in different linguistic communities.
- There may be references to Leibniz – perhaps the idea of God is innate and theistic variations due to the idea being triggered by different experiences and/or different linguistic schemes doesn't affect this.
- Does Descartes confuse an idea of a perfect being with a perfect idea?

Mundane social and psychological processes – likely references include:

- Feuerbach's claim that our idea of the Divine Being is an abstraction from the being of man – 'poor man possesses a rich God'. Similarly, Marx's view that 'man dreams of a superman in the fantastic reality of the heavens' – in order to appease misery, distress, hardship. However, is it always the case that religious belief is the province of the poor and powerless?
- Dawkins claim that the idea of God is a useless by-product of a useful evolutionary process – the transmission of cultural knowledge, particularly learning from adults, is necessary for evolutionary success; unfortunately some are gullible enough to continue to believe myths/fictions. On this account shouldn't the gullible have died out?

- The Freudian view that belief in God represents the desire for a heavenly father figure, protection, security etc. This 'longing for the father', idealised and imaginary, is a neurotic transformation of helplessness. (Nietzsche may also be referenced.) However, Freud's account(s) of repression and transformation are suspect; what sort of observations could verify such claims? Are all religions patriarchal?
- To what extent do positivist accounts of religious belief square with accounts that agents themselves might give?

Following analysis a range of positions might be argued:

- Innateness is more convincing than mundane processes (or vice versa).
- There is little to choose between these positions: differences are exaggerated.
- The question can't be decided – there's no (or inadequate) evidence for either view and/or both views are unverifiable or unfalsifiable.
- Some accounts of how we gain the idea of God are irrelevant to the question of whether or not God exists.

Theme 5: Persons   **Total for this theme: 45 marks**

09	Explain and illustrate how *survival* through time differs from *identity* through time.
	(15 marks)

Identity (and continuity) through time seems to be an all or nothing affair: survival (and connectedness) is softer, a matter of degree.

The issue of personal identity through time concerns the grounds upon which a person can be said to be (numerically) *the same* person throughout a period of time – for example, a person might be said to be the same person at T1 and T2 if they are psychologically *continuous* throughout T1…T2. There may be references to Locke's view of a person as a being that 'can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places' and/or to the importance of identity and continuity.

However, questions concerning identity/sameness, such as 'is she the same person now as she was', may not always have a determinate answer – the degree of qualitative change in a person can make such questions difficult to answer. Also, we can question whether identity – or sameness - really matters to us: for example, whether we want to be the same after going to university as we were before. Consequently, *survival* through time and the level of *connectedness* between a person at T1 and T2 may be more appropriate. There may be references to Parfit and/or to the view that we should see ourselves as a series of connected selves. (The question might also be answered by pointing to the difficulties involved in demonstrating that identity is continuous through time and how survival through time might avoid such difficulties.)

Illustrations may draw from the literature – e.g. Reid's general or versions of Ned, Zed and Jed – to demonstrate the difference between identity and survival through time *or* provide actual or fictional examples of a person's development/transformation through time to demonstrate the difference. An actual example might be drawn from real life puzzle cases, such as some of those described by Sachs or from actual examples of diminution (e.g. Clive Wearing) or disassociative identity disorder (e.g. Shirley Mason). Fictional examples could include fugue amnesia (Bourne) or characters in which a strong sense of self seems to be lacking (Ripley).

No marks are available for evaluation although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded. Responses focused only on the difficulty of establishing identity through time, which do not include an account of survival, should not be placed in the top band.

> **10** 'Non-human animals possess some characteristics of personhood but no animal is sufficiently complex to be a person'. Discuss   (30 marks)

The concept of a person could be distinguished from that of a human through references to e.g. notions of potential persons, ex-persons, diminished persons, multiple persons etc. *or* it could be defined in terms of scale, i.e. a matter of degree rather than kind *or* it could be defined in terms of the attributes associated with personhood such as self-awareness (the possession of 'I-thoughts'), self-creation, higher-order reasoning and reflection about one's own motivations and those of others, a social being, a language user etc. The issue, then, may be developed in terms of avoiding speciesism; comparisons of where non-human animals stand on a scale in relation to (some) human animals; which attributes are possessed and with what level of complexity.

Some of the following, or equivalent, points could feature in discussions:

- Whether the possession of attributes identified is a matter of *kind* (or species) or a matter of *degree* and, if the latter, do some non-human animals possess sufficient degrees of complexity with regard to the relevant attributes.
- An 'optimistic' – or positive – response might cite evidence of some animals appearing to be self-aware (mirror tests); of animals able to convey meaning and, beyond this, associate signs with words; of 'reasoning' and problem-solving abilities such as those experiments devised by animal psychologists/behaviourists; sociability, roles within a group, awareness of others and 'empathy' with others; of sentience; of displays of memory (a continuing subject of experience).
- The most convincing examples will be those involving higher primates – chimpanzees, bonobos, orang utans and gorillas. There may be references to specific animals (e.g. Kanzi).
- Some may attempt to link the evidence to a philosophical theory (behaviourism perhaps) or to a philosopher (e.g. Hume). The latter may lead to references to the behaviour of birds and dogs. This is OK but caution should be exercised before drawing any conclusions, particularly if this line also leads to descriptive accounts of the behaviour of household pets.
- More pessimistic – or negative – responses are likely to focus on the levels of complexity present in non-human animals: particularly in relation to reasoning, higher order reflection, language use and self creation.
- Whether, for example, animals possess a conceptual framework or belief network; the difficulties of determining this; whether they have second or higher-order reflective capacities about their behaviour and the behaviour of others; the extent to which animals are language users, whether following instructions shows intentionality; doubts about self-creation – e.g. the lack of progress, the lack of 'culture', the lack of 'I-thoughts'. The limits of what it makes sense to say about animals.
- If references to philosophers are made expect Descartes, Kant, Davidson.
- Some may focus on the concept of a person itself – for example, if being a person is seen as a matter of degree, could it ever be decided at what point of complexity personhood is attained? Are all attributes necessary or only some?
- Some may refer to anthropomorphism and see this as an underlying difficulty affecting this question; some may question how prepared we are to use the term 'person' in relation to non-human animals (whether we can stretch our ordinary conceptualisation of the concept to include non-human animals); some may refer to our shared 'creatureliness' and question whether the bonds we form with animals indicate that we

are prepared to accept they are more like humans than unalike humans (particularly when compared to machines). There may be references to Gaita.

A range of argumentation, following points selected for discussion, is possible:

- Humans are persons no non-human animals are persons.
- Some humans are not persons but no non-human animals are persons. No non-human animal is sufficiently complex.
- Most humans are persons and so too are some animals (although they may not be complex persons). If we're prepared to accept that diminished or simple (human) persons are on the scale of personhood we should accept that some animals are too.
- Further empirical research on aspects of animal behaviour is necessary before a position can be established.
- Some positions are too chauvinistic – we should avoid speciesism.
- Some positions are too liberal - we should restrict our application of the concept (at least at present).

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15 mark question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 30 mark question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	9	9	18
AO2	6	12	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	**15**	**30**	**45**