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General Certificate of Education
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Philosophy PHIL2

Final

Mark Scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation meeting attended by all examiners and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation meeting ensures that the mark scheme covers the candidates' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for the standardisation meeting each examiner analyses a number of candidates' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed at the meeting and legislated for. If, after this meeting, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been discussed at the meeting they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of candidates' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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AS PHILOSOPHY

GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR EXAMINERS

Deciding on a level and the award of marks within a level

It is of vital importance that examiners familiarise themselves with the generic mark scheme and apply it consistently, as directed by the Principal Examiner, in order to facilitate comparability across options.

The generic mark scheme must be used consistently across all questions. The question-specific mark scheme will indicate a variety of material and approaches that a candidate is likely to use. It is not, however, proscriptive. Alternative responses are possible and should be credited if appropriate.

It will be found that when applying the generic mark scheme, many responses will display features of different levels. Examiners must exercise their judgement. In locating the appropriate band, examiners must look to the best-fit or dominant descriptors. Marks should then be adjusted within that band according to the following criteria:

- understanding of philosophical positions
- accuracy and detail of arguments
- quality of illustrative material
- grasp of technical vocabulary where appropriate
- quality of written communication.

It must be noted that quality of written communication should only determine a level in cases where the meaning of a response is obscured. In most cases it will determine adjustments within a level.

It must also be emphasises that although the question-specific mark scheme is not proscriptive, examiners must familiarise themselves with its content. Examiners must recognise creditworthy material and the subject-specific mark scheme is an important tool for achieving this.

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 15 MARKS

AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–4 marks The explanation will lack detail, or the detail may be narrow and/or only partially addresses the question. Blurring or conflation of issues may result in some lack of clarity. There may be significant omissions. At the bottom end of the level responses may be vague, unfocussed or fragmentary.	**Level 1**
5–9 marks At the top end of the level there will be a clear, detailed and precise understanding of the relevant philosophical issues. Lower down the level, responses will be accurate and focussed but may lack balance. At the bottom end there may be some blurring of distinctions, but one issue will be clearly explained.	**Level 2**

AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–3 marks Where two illustrations are required, one may be clear and precise but the second confused or absent. Alternatively, there may be a blurring of points and their relevance to the explanation is not apparent. At the lower end of the level, examples will lack detail and clarity and may fail to serve their purpose. If only one illustration is required it will be vague or only partially succeed in achieving its purpose.	**Level 1**
4–6 marks At the top end of the level, the illustration(s) or example(s) will be clear and have a precise bearing on the issues being explained. Relevance will be apparent. At the lower end of the level, one illustration may be treated precisely with another illustration treated briefly, with only a partial grasp in evidence.	**Level 2**

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 30 MARKS

0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–4 marks There may be an extremely basic awareness of one relevant point without development or analysis. The response may be tangential with an accidental reference to a relevant point. Errors of understanding are likely to be intrusive. At the very bottom of this level there will be no creditworthy material. Fragments of knowledge will feature in this level. Technical language is not employed or is employed inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar are intrusive.	**Level 1**
5–9 marks There may be a basic or philosophically unsophisticated grasp of some issues. Analysis may be predominantly simple and/or lack clarity in places. There may be errors of reasoning and understanding. Evaluation, if present, will lack penetration or be very narrowly confined. The response may lack overall purpose and may fail to directly address the relevant issues. At the lower end of the level, the response may be disjointed. Technical language is limited in its employment or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.	**Level 2**
10–15 marks Responses in this level may be short or of limited scope. There may be narrow focus on one aspect or a range of issues may be referred to with limited understanding or analysis. Evaluation may be replaced by assertion or counter-suggestion. Sporadic insights may be present but they would lack development. Some knowledge will be present but it is likely to either lack detail and precision, or will not be analysed or evaluated. This is likely to feature at the lower end of the level. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.	**Level 3**
16–21 marks The response will explain and analyse some relevant material but positions might be juxtaposed rather than critically compared. Relevance will generally be sustained, though there may be occasional tangents at the lower end of the level. Knowledge of issues will be present but may lack depth and/or precision. Evaluative points are likely to be underdeveloped or applied to a limited range of material and may not be convincing. Examples are likely to be used descriptively rather than critically. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.	**Level 4**

22–25 marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and explained but there may be some imprecision. Examples will be deployed effectively but their implications may not be made fully apparent. Evaluation must be present but may lack philosophical impact, or it may be penetrating over a limited range of material. Knowledge and understanding of the issues will be apparent but not always fully exploited. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.	**Level 5**
26–30 marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and positions clearly and precisely explained. The analysis and use of examples will proceed from a secure knowledge base. Evaluation must be present and will show sophistication and direct engagement of the issues. The relation between argument and conclusion will be clear. The response is written in a fluent and sophisticated style with minimal, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response will read as a coherent whole.	**Level 6**

Theme 1: Knowledge of the external world

Total for this theme: 45 marks

01	Explain and illustrate **two** criticisms of idealism	*(15 marks)*

Anticipate the following:
Idealism is the view that physical objects be regarded as collections of ideas/sense-data. Expect references to Berkeley. Candidates that briefly outline idealism should be rewarded where this outline functions as a platform for enhancing the quality of the response. However, candidates that do not present an outline of idealism should not be penalised.

Candidates that only outline the theory should be placed in level 1 according to the level of detail presented.

Expect to see the following criticisms:

- The problem of explaining unperceived objects. Do objects cease to exist without the perceiver? References to Russell's hungry cat and whether idealism is the inference to the best explanation.
- Similarly, if other people are only regarded as collections of ideas, then doesn't this lead to solipsism?
- Berkeley's nominalism as inconsistent with his assumption of the existence of a mind. Is there any warrant for thinking that minds are not just bundles of impressions? References to Humean 'bundles'.
- To solve the problem of unperceived objects Berkeley postulates the existence of an Eternal Mind, i.e. God. But is this move warranted on empiricist grounds?
- The initial simplicity of idealism soon gives rise to increasing complexity; the availability of simpler, more systematic alternatives
- Given the postulation of an Eternal Mind, there may be confusion in the use of the term 'idea'. This may lead to the observation that Berkeley fails to distinguish between the act and the object of apprehension.
- There is a confusion regarding whether the idea is in the mind or before the mind (Russell).

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

02	Assess the claim that the immediate objects of perception are sense-data that represent the external world.	*(30 marks)*

The claim that the immediate objects of experience are sense-data that represent the external world is associated with representative realism. Candidates should not be penalised for associating this position with pre-Moorean philosophers that fail to clearly delineate the distinction between act and object. Expect accounts that draw upon literature in this area to refer to both Enlightenment and twentieth century philosophers such as Locke, Hume, and Russell.

Argumentation may be developed in a number of ways, including:

- The argument from illusion. The fact that objects do not always appear as they are (e.g. the bent stick in water) suggests that we are not immediately acquainted with the world.
- But is this enough to warrant reifying sense-data? Can we not account for cases of illusion by appeal to the physical nature of the object being perceived? The phenomenological fallacy; we are directly perceiving the property of looking bent in water.
- The argument from hallucination. In hallucination there is no physical object at all, so there is no object to refer to.
- Replies may refer to the rarity of such experiences, but nevertheless what *do* we experience in these rare circumstances? Alternatively, there may be a reference to the fact that hallucinations can always be corrected. Malcolm/Wittgenstein style arguments may be employed here; e.g. is it meaningful to talk about an indiscernible forgery?
- Arguments from perceptual variation. Expect references to Russell's table. Stronger candidates will note that Russell's account covers both primary and secondary qualities.
- Is it possible to explain away perceptual variation in terms of the physical nature of the objects being perceived? Is there any way of capturing the notion of an 'ideal' or a 'normal' position?
- Arguments that appeal to illusion, hallucination, perceptual variation fail to establish representative realism because non-veridical experiences can be explained away by appeal to the other senses
- Does the argument from perceptual variation lead to the collapse of the primary/secondary quality distinction? If, so what are the implications for representative realism?
- Time-lag arguments. Expect references to starter pistols and the light from the sun taking eight minutes to reach us.
- But is this enough to reify sense-data? Or does it just mean that we are immediately acquainted with the physical objects as they existed in the past?
- Causal arguments: science tells us that perception is at the end of a causal chain produced by physical and physiological conditions. But what we are aware of in ordinary experience is the sensation itself (in the mind or brain), not these causal conditions.
- Time-lag and causal arguments presuppose we know about physical objects qua physical objects. If so, then what it the motivation for positing a veil of perception?
- Scientific descriptions of reality. There may be references to the likes of Democritus and Susan Stebbing. Does the fact that science describes a world devoid of secondary qualities mean that science supports representative realism? Or is science neutral between the various theories of perception?
- With regard to the above, some candidates may note that this argument also applies to primary qualities, e.g. solidity.
- How is it possible to recognise deceptions? Doesn't this presuppose that I already know what counts as a veridical experience in the first place? There may be reference to Russell's point that if all I am aware of is pictures in a catalogue then I wouldn't have the concept that they are pictures.
- There may be appeals to Occam's Razor. Is representative realism the most parsimonious account of perception?
- Representative realism leads to scepticism. But is there anything uniquely difficult about this scepticism compared to the sceptical challenges we may mount against other theories?
- Even if there is sense-data, how do we even know that it is representing anything? The breakdown of Russell's 'map' analogy.
- The linking problem. If the sense-data is non-physical how is it caused by that which is physical?

The above considerations can be used to advance a case for the following:

- Representative realism is the most plausible account of perception available. It provides us with the best explanation of such phenomena as hallucinations, perceptual variations, etc. These strengths outweigh any weaknesses with the account.
- The representative realist fails to justify their claim that the objects of immediate perception are physical objects. This may take a variety of forms.
- For example, the failure of the perceptual variability argument (e.g. Reid's argument); the collapse of the hallucination argument into nonsense, c.f. hinge propositions; science does not support representative realism but changes the criteria for the application of the terms. (Stebbing)
- Representative realism cannot justify reifying sense-data to explain veridical experiences.
- This may lead to a disjunctive analysis of perception. When we have a veridical experience, which is at least *necessary* for knowledge of the external world, the immediate object of experience is the physical object. We are only acquainted with sense-data when something has gone wrong.
- Although representative realism is correct to say that the immediate objects of experience are sense-data, they are wrong to say that they are representations of an external world. Belief in an external world is strange and repugnant; the collapse of the primary/secondary quality distinction establishes this.

Theme 2: Tolerance

Total for this theme: 45 marks

03 Explain **and** illustrate **two** of the following conceptions of tolerance:

- Permission
- Co-existence
- Respect
- Esteem *(15 marks)*

These four conceptions of tolerance (or toleration) are developed by Rainer Forst. Below is a paraphrasing of his own account:

1. **The permission conception** refers to the relation between an authority or a majority, and a dissenting, "different" minority. The authority gives qualified permission to the minority to live according to their beliefs on condition that the minority accepts the dominant position of the authority or majority. So long as their being different remains within certain limits, that is, in the "private" realm, and so long as the minority groups do not claim equal public and political status, they can be tolerated. The relation of tolerance is vertical.

2. **The coexistence conception** refers to a situation in which differing social groups are roughly equal in power, and seek mutual toleration because they see it as the best of all possible alternatives. Both groups tolerate each other for the sake of social peace and the pursuit of their own interests. They prefer peaceful coexistence to conflict and agree to a reciprocal compromise. The relation of tolerance is no longer vertical but horizontal: the subjects are at the same time the objects of toleration.

3. **The respect conception** is one in which the tolerating parties respect one another in a more reciprocal sense. Even though they differ fundamentally in their ethical beliefs about the good and true way of life and in their cultural practices, citizens recognize one another as moral-political equals in the sense that their common framework of social life should — as far as fundamental questions of rights and liberties and the distribution of resources are concerned — be guided by norms that all parties can equally accept and that do not favour one specific ethical or cultural community. There may be references to the formal/qualitative equality distinction.

4. **The esteem conception** implies an even fuller, more demanding notion of mutual recognition between citizens than the respect conception does. Here, being tolerant does not just mean respecting members of other cultural life-forms or religions as moral and political equals, it also means taking them to be ethically valuable conceptions that — even though different from one's own — are in some way ethically attractive and held with good reasons. It involves a kind of positive acceptance of a belief that for some reason you still find is not as attractive as the one you hold. As valuable as parts of the tolerated belief may be, it also has other parts that you find misguided, or wrong. Diversity and difference are valued in themselves.

Illustrations are likely to involve religious pluralism but alternative examples of diversity/difference should also be rewarded. Illustrations may be drawn from numerous sources. E.g.: Edict of Nantes in 1598, the Augsburg Peace Treaty of 1555, the "secular republicanism" of the French authorities, the banning of the burqa, the Danish cartoonists, the *Satanic Verses*, etc. Applications of examples from Mill's *On Liberty* may also feature.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

04 'The tolerance practised in liberal societies may not be a good thing'. Assess this claim. *(30 marks)*

This question invites candidates to present a critical analysis of the tolerant, liberal society. Candidates may present a critical analysis from different positions on the political spectrum, including conservatism, socialism/Marxism, anarchism, internal critiques of liberalism, etc. In a balanced response candidates should also draw on some of the putative positive aspects of a liberal, tolerant society such as fallibility, pragmatism, the fact that coercion is ineffective and the threat posed by strife, the value of autonomy, the value of diversity. Expect references to Locke, Mill, Rawls, Devlin, Hart, Marx, Marcuse.

Argumentation may be developed in a number of ways, including:

Scepticism about tolerance

- Criticisms of tolerance may be drawn from the right. A tolerant, liberal society undermines social cohesion. Social cohesion provides the individual with security from the 'brutish, nasty, solitary and short' life that we would experience without government. Tolerance merely engenders this state of anarchy and, as such, should be avoided. (e.g. Hobbes)
- Regarding the above point there may be references to religious toleration leading to home-grown acts of terrorism against the state.
- This may lead to a comparative analysis of whether there should be a strict division between church and state, as religion arouses deep feelings. This kind of approach is likely to pursue a comparative analysis of Hobbes and Locke.
- Some candidates may draw upon economic arguments. Tolerant immigration policy leads to a breakdown in social cohesion as the immigrant population and the native population compete for the economic resources available.
- A tolerant, liberal society leads to a decline in moral standards. Expect references to Devlin, Hart. It may be argued, for example, that society is not merely an agglomeration of individuals, but is bound by a moral fabric. As such, if one unravels this fabric then this will lead to social breakdown.
- References to the institution of marriage may feature. The law imposes a moral sanction on the permissibility of certain actions in wedlock. These kinds of sanctions are indicative of the more general sanctions that are needed for stability
- There may be references to Burke's reaction to the Enlightenment and the ideals of the French Revolution. A society is an organic entity that has developed it laws and practices over time to meet the needs of its people. This entails certain levels of intolerance.
- Candidates may question whether the wisdom of the ages beloved of the conservative is really a wisdom regarding the interests of the whole of society, or merely a wisdom that is convenient for those in power.
- Candidates may question whether scepticism about tolerance is constitutive of conservatism. Conservatism, by its very nature, is supportive of piecemeal reform for the betterment of society. Thus, as society becomes more eclectic then the need for a more tolerant stance may become apparent.
- Criticisms from the left may also feature. For example, it may be argued that tolerant, liberal societies encourage repressive desublimation. The idea of repressive desublimation refers to a process where something which is typically seen as sublime, purified, or held in high ideal such as love, loses value as something else takes its place, such as the creation of the 'plastic beauty industry'.

- Some candidates may use this as a platform for a feminist critique of tolerance. The rise of pornography, which sublimates the body, especially the female body, as an object with an exchange value in the market place.
- The idea of tolerance is a bourgeois fiction. The forces of the free market create the appearance of choice, but we are not really tolerating anything because we have no power to change anything. Freedom to engage in 'experiments in living' is an illusion.
- But is the fact that a society is tolerant the most salient explanation for the rise in pornography? For example, would Mill's harm principle tolerate the proliferation of pornographic websites?
- Do people tolerate different ways of life because these different ways of life do not interfere with their happiness, or is this indifference? There may be replies that the attitude of indifference itself is a by-product of a liberal society, thus tolerance is a mask for indifference.
- Some responses may focus on Marcuse's idea that tolerance leads to a 'levelling down' of opinion. The misinformed may talk as long as the informed, and the pure toleration of sense and nonsense is justified by the democratic argument that all contesting opinions must be submitted to the people.
- Some responses may discuss what the content of the sublime is. Who is to say what counts as a real desire or need and a repressed desire or a false need? There may be attempts to give a criteria (e.g. via Freud)
- There may be references to positive freedom with the above point. I am really free when I don't follow my irrational desires? But who is to say what is rational?
- Do both the left and the right hold an unwarranted confidence in their ability to know what is constitutive of the good life? There may be references to the moral realism/anti-realism debate.
- Some candidates may produce an anarchist critique of tolerance. Tolerance is a by-product of handing the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence to the state. Without the state, which engenders both the friction between people and the subsequent need for tolerance, we would not need to *tolerate* anyone.
- Candidates may criticise this anarchist view of social cooperation in a post-state world as overly utopian

Optimism about tolerance

- Candidates may appeal to the fallibility of the individual. We do not always know the truth about morality, religion and, more generally, the 'good' life. But to fail to be tolerant is to assume that one is infallible.
- Expect references to Mill on the freedom of thought and opinion. To deny free expression entails denying the opportunity to learn from one's mistakes, or the opportunity, in the light of the said falsehood, to a have a livelier impression of the truth.
- Some candidates may draw on Rawl's argument from reasonableness; a society that is tolerant recognises that there will be inevitable disagreement even between parties acting rationally and in good faith and, as such, should promote a policy of reasonable tolerance. Some candidates may connect this to the issue of pragmatism.
- Candidates may appeal to pragmatic reasons for being tolerant. The fact that coercion is ineffective and the threat posed by strife. Adopting an attitude of tolerance outweighs the consequences of being intolerant towards each other. Some of our deepest held beliefs, e.g. religious and moral beliefs, cannot be changed by force, and if we fail to tolerate others it will lead to civil disobedience.
- Some candidates may draw on the economic consequences of rejecting tolerance. For example, the persecution of the Huguenots led to the French losing a highly skilled and industrious pool of labour. Some candidates may illustrate speculatively, e.g. if we did not tolerate Hindu's what would the consequence be for the number of physicians working in the UK?
- Candidates that draw upon pragmatic reasons for tolerance may align this kind of appraisal of tolerance with conservatism.

- Expect appeals to the value of autonomy. If we reject a policy of tolerance we reject the value of autonomy. This means we reject the very idea of 'self-rule'. But leading our lives in our own way, making our own choices and being able to engage in our own experiments in living is one of the core virtues of a liberal society. So if we reject the value of tolerance we reject the value of autonomy.
- Some candidates may argue that autonomy is valuable in its own right. Some candidates may argue that autonomy has instrumental value for promoting happiness and that happiness is the *summum bonum*.
- It may be replied that valuing autonomy creates all kinds of tensions for the tolerant, liberal tradition. For example, if valuing autonomy entails rejecting cultures that do not value autonomy then is this really tolerance? However, if it accepts such cultures then it seems to run into the paradox of moral tolerance; i.e. it ends up being morally right to tolerate what is morally wrong.
- Expect candidates to refer to the idea that a tolerant society promotes diversity, i.e. encourages 'experiments in living'. These experiments in living, even if partially flawed, may contain an insight into a better lifestyle.
- For example, the radical Puritan may fail to appreciate the fundamental human need for bouts of lavishness, pleasure and banality, yet we may learn from them the pleasures or freedoms that can be obtained from hard-work, honesty and loyalty.
- Similarly, without diversity society may not make radical advances as it encourages conservatism and piecemeal reform at the cost of promoting genius, flair and innovation. Without this context they cannot seek to improve their lives as they have little to draw inspiration from.

The above considerations can be used to advance a case for the following:

- A tolerant society is a good thing. Tolerance is a virtue that recognises the fallible nature of human beings. It allows for experiments in living which will enable people to flourish. To take any other stance is to assume a moral superiority that cannot be justified.
- The above point may be substituted or supplemented with arguments from either the liberal or the conservative that tolerance has pragmatic value (e.g. religious belief and practice).
- The above points may be substituted or supplemented with arguments to the effect that a liberal, tolerant society encourages autonomy, which has intrinsic or ultimate value.
- The above point may be substituted or supplemented with arguments regarding the stifling conditions that result from intolerance. With intolerance we do not allow the genius the freedom of expression needed to make us see the world aright.
- Tolerance is not a good thing. It leads to the view that all opinions are of equal value. The positive promotion of tolerance as a virtue creates a levelling down of society.
- Related to the above point it may be noted that tolerance nurtures repressive desublimation. A liberal, capitalist society does commodify the sublime, and a liberal, capitalist society is inherently tolerant.
- A tolerant society does not nurture repressive desublimation. A liberal, capitalist society, which is inherently tolerant, does not commodify the sublime. Instead it recognises that the fact that what is sublime is relative to the individual, and allows the individual to pursue their own happiness via accepting various experiments in living.
- Tolerance is not a good thing as it leads to the breakdown of social cohesion. In the end it leads to anarchy as individuals fail to restrain their tolerance. It is better to simply reject, by law and force, minority practices that require toleration.
- Tolerance is not a good thing as it leads to a decline in moral standards. Without these standards, which are often sanctioned by law, society would disintegrate into an unwieldy mass of individuals. We would lose our sense of social belonging.

Theme 3: The value of art

Total for this theme: 45 marks

05 Explain and illustrate **two** criticisms of the view that we value art because of its form.

(15 marks)

Broadly, formalism is the view that good art is good because it affords a peculiar aesthetic enjoyment of 'form', with reference to features such as balance, structure, proportion, harmony, wholeness, etc. It takes the view that we value art in virtue of the way in which the parts of the artwork, such as the notes, the words, the arrangement of hues, and so on, are related to each other. Candidates that briefly outline the position should be rewarded where this outline functions as a platform for enhancing the quality of the response. However, candidates that do not present an outline of the position should not be penalised.

Candidates that only outline the theory should be placed in level 1 according to the level of detail presented.

Anticipate the following responses:

- The notion of form is not clear. There are no recognisable formal universals displayed in art, even in art that is deemed to be good in virtue of its form. For example, what does the form of David's *Michelangelo* have in common with the form of a Shakespeare sonnet?
- Appeals to 'significant' form are circular. Art is valuable because it has significant form. Something has significant form because it produces a peculiar aesthetic enjoyment. But something produces a peculiar aesthetic enjoyment because it has significant form.
- Form is not necessary for us to value certain pieces of art because some pieces of art are valued despite having no form – or at least a form that is not typically regarded as good. For example, Emin's *My Bed*, Cage's *4'33"*.
- Form is not sufficient for us to value art. There are many things in the world that have form, even 'significant form', but does this make it art? For example, is a beautiful landscape at sunset 'art'? Is an elegantly organised room or dinner plate 'art'? Is the parabola of a well struck golf shot 'art'? Is it art if it were to be created by accident?
- Even if 'form' matters is it the 'essence' of art qua art? Doesn't some art have value because it informs or enlightens us? For example, Picasso's *Guernica* as valued because it informs us of the horrors of war, Segal's *Bus Riders* because it is a commentary about the anonymity of the mundane. Any form that these pieces have is instrumental to its informative qualities.
- Similarly, doesn't some art have value because of its ability to connect with the hurly-burly of human life, or to reveal deeper intellectual insights? For example, Lowry's capturing of the gloominess of the industrial age, Warhol's *Brillo Box*, Dali's visual depictions of the surreal as an intellectual tool for better grasping Freudian accounts of the sub-conscious.
- Some art has value because of its ability to emotionally move the audience via the artists' self-expression or because of how our own responses are occasioned by the art. For example, Larkins' *This Be The Verse*.

Several illustrations have been embedded in the points above, but candidates may draw on any relevant examples from the artistic canon. Examples drawn from popular culture are also relevant and should be rewarded providing they make a point of sufficient intellectual rigour. For example, the primordial nature of dance or death metal music may be illustrated as an example of art that is valued because it emotionally bonds the audience together in a state of Dionysian frenzy, or produces a feeling of being part of an organic whole.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

06 'The point of art is to lead us to the truth'. Discuss.

(30 marks)

The view that the purpose of art is to lead us to truth is associated with the view that good art should at least imitate or represent its subject convincingly or faithfully. Better still, it leads us to truth by illuminating our experience, articulating a 'vision', or being epiphanic. As such, it should be distinguished from the view that we value art qua art, or because of its formal qualities. It should also be distinguished from the view that we primarily value art as a vehicle for the revelation of the artist's feeling or emotions, or for having some kind of emotional function for the audience.

Argumentation may be developed in a number of ways, including:

- Art has the ability to imitate universals better than any particular physical instances can. For example, Michelangelo's *David* captures and conveys the universality of the beauty of the human form.
- As above, but with reference to abstract ideas. For example, Da Vinci's *Mona Lisa* captures the notion of the enigmatic in a better way than reading a definition in the dictionary; Munch's *Scream* captures and portrays terror. Although these works do elicit emotive responses, ultimately we value it because of its representational qualities.
- But don't the emotive qualities hinder our ability to use the art as a way of cognising the truth? References to Plato may feature: Art has the power to excite strong emotions which could lead the individual to act impetuously. But if we are guided by emotion and/or *thumos* rather than reason we cannot be led to the truth. The form of beauty, for example, will remain hidden from us.
- Art can convey universal truths. For example, Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*, or Aesop's fables reveal and illuminate moral truths, or at least truths about human desire, greed, and so on. This medium is more effective than reading a list of moral commands or making social observations. Moral, political, social messages inherent in art go beyond the mere articulation of a message but bring out central, timeless truths.
- Historically the majority of art, with the possible exception of music, has been commended because of the likeness between the subject and the work of art, e.g. historical portraits and landscapes are often praised for going beyond capturing anything temporary, fleeting, or accidental, instead representing an expression of the essential mood, character or moral/aesthetic qualities inherent in the subject.
- There may be examples of representation that go beyond imitation, but nevertheless still guide us towards the truth. For example, the impressionist movement draws attention to what we 'really' see in terms of a blooming, buzzing rush of sensations.
- But doesn't the focus on art as a representation or imitation lose sight of the fact that we value art for the vision, creativity and originality conveyed by the artist? The fact that we value this more than a piece of art's ability to convey truth is exemplified by the fact that we do not eulogise forgers or their forgeries.
- Similarly, the representation of truth is not sufficient for us to value it as art, even if it is illuminating or visionary. There are examples of things in the world that can do this which are not considered art. For example, witnessing child birth, or really grasping a profound philosophical point, or contemplating the starry sky above.
- Is representation necessary for us to value art? There are many pieces of modern art that are not valued for their representative qualities because they don't represent anything, e.g. Newman's *Covenant* or Pollock's *1A*. Instead they seem to be valued for their formal and/or expressive qualities.
- Similarly, even if some art does lead us to the truth, does that mean that this is the point of the artwork? For example, for Tolstoy art serves a social function that bonds together the

artist and the audience in a common understanding or experience. For Croce art is a medium for expressing our need to impose orderliness on the world, resulting in the production of aesthetic pleasure.
- This may lead onto discussions about whether art has a point at all. Maybe all art is utterly pointless, and that is part of what makes it art.

The above considerations can be used to advance a case for the following:

- The point of art is to lead us to truth. The majority of art in the artistic canon is valued for precisely this reason. Art is always about something, and good art is illuminating, visionary or epiphanic. If a piece of art is not about anything then it is worthless, or, at best, not as valuable as art that does lead us to truth.
- The point of some art is to lead us to truth, providing that this is the intention of the artist. As such, we can value a piece of art for its ability to lead us to the truth to the extent that this is the purpose for which the artwork was created.
- The point of art is not to lead us to truth, even if that is the purpose of the artist. To think otherwise is to commit the intentional fallacy.
- The point of art is to convey a peculiar feeling of aesthetic pleasure which is engendered by the formal qualities of the piece in question. Indeed, some art does not represent anything.
- The point of art is not to lead us to truth. Although art can lead us to the truth this is coincidental to our evaluation of it as good art. Instead, we value art for its expressive qualities.
- The point of art enables us to feel an emotional connection with the artist, or enables us to evoke a particular latent feeling.
- Representation is neither necessary nor sufficient for art to be considered good art, but neither perhaps is form or expressive qualities. We value art for a variety of reasons depending on the context in which the evaluation is being made.
- The point of art is not to lead us to truth. Truth is obtained through cognitive processes, such as reason.
- Art clouds our judgement by evoking emotional responses. It manipulates us and when it does represent truth, or lead us to knowledge, this is a cosmic accident; art is a copy of a copy, and, as such, cannot be valued for its truth guiding qualities.

- **Theme 4: God and the world**

Total for this theme: 45 marks

07 Explain and illustrate **two** problems with the argument from design. *(15 marks)*

The argument from design typically involves a) an argument *for* design, to the effect that the world displays sufficient levels of complexity, order, harmony, etc to establish the conclusion that the world does appear to be designed, and b) that if something appears designed then the most reasonable/probable/best explanation for this fact is that it *is* designed. This then leads to the further inference that this designer must be God. There may also be references to Paley's watch analogy. Candidates that briefly outline the argument should be rewarded where this outline functions as a platform for enhancing the quality of the response.

Candidates that only outline the argument should be placed in level 1 according to the level of detail presented.

The following responses are the most likely:

- The argument *for* design is unconvincing, as there are too many features of the world that seem to lack any design or purpose in the greater network of life. For example, the panda's thumb, the eye's blind spot, the human's appendix.
- Although the world appears designed, this does not mean that the best explanation for this appearance is design. Reference to Darwin's theory of evolution; the blind watchmaker.
- Problems with Paley's watch analogy/Aquinas' arrow analogy. For example, the watch analogy would work just as well if compared to a giant vegetable (Hume).
- The inference from 'the world is designed' to 'the designer is God' is not valid. This may include a reference to Hume's bungled and botched universes…
- Or the fact that designers don't have to be creators…
- Or it may be a team of Gods.
- Or it fails to establish the divine attributes (e.g. infinity, perfection)
- The argument is empirical/a posteriori. As such it is only probabilistic. However, to arrive at a probabilistic justification requires past experiences. But seeing as we have no knowledge of the causes of previous world making, the analogy breaks down.
- There may be replies to examples of intelligent design, e.g. the flagellum bacteria; Miller's reply to Behe.
- There may be replies to the anthropic/fine-tuning arguments, e.g. the multi-verse theory.
- The 'pack of cards' objection may feature.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

08 'Evil exists, so God doesn't'. Discuss

(30 marks)

The question invites candidates to consider whether the existence of evil counts against the existence of an all loving and all powerful God. The argument is that if God is all loving then God would not bring about or allow evil if it were within the power of God to do so. But given that God is all powerful, and evil does exist, it follows that God cannot be all loving. But a being that is not all loving would not be God, and a being that is not all powerful would not be God. Hence God does not exist. Candidates are also expected to recognise the distinction between

moral and natural evil and their relation to one another. Candidates may also acknowledge that the problem of evil can be characterised in both logical and evidential terms.

Argumentation may be developed in a number of ways, including:

- Soul-making: the evils that the world contains can be seen to be justified as an environment in which people, through their free choices, can undergo spiritual growth that will ultimately fit them for communion with God (e.g. Irenaeus, Hick).
- But is this theodicy satisfactory? Considerations of the evidential problem of evil may feature.
- Replies to the effect that the terrible suffering that many people undergo at the end of their lives, or during war, is to be viewed as suffering that has been ordained by God for the spiritual health of the individual in question (e.g. Eleonore Stump). But is this reply convincing?
- Can a soul-making theodicy provide any justification of the existence of any animal pain, and a world in general which is 'red in tooth and claw'?
- Can a soul-making theodicy provide an account for the suffering of young, innocent children before they have had any chance at all to master temptations, to respond to challenges, and to develop morally?
- If one's purpose were to create a world that would be a good place for soul-making, would *this* count as a job well done? Considerations of the distribution of evil may be considered. Some endure suffering so great that it is virtually impossible for them to develop moral traits that involve relationships with others whilst others enjoy lives of ease and luxury where there is virtually nothing that challenges them to undergo moral growth.
- Free will defence: Given the great value of libertarian free will it is better that God create a world in which agents possess free will, even though they may misuse it, and do what is wrong, than that God create a world where agents lack libertarian free will.
- Following on from the above point it may be argued that given that he created free will, this is not an infringement on his omnipotence. Or is it? There may be discussions about what actually counts as being omnipotent (e.g. Plantinga, Swinburne)
- The fact that libertarian free will is valuable does not entail that one should never intervene in the exercise of libertarian free will, or that it is a good thing for people to have the power to inflict great harm upon others.
- What about natural evils caused by events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and other weather conditions, and by a wide variety of diseases? Such evils certainly do not appear to result from morally wrong actions. If that is right, then an appeal to free will provides no answer to an argument from evil that focuses upon such evils.
- The best of possible worlds: an argument that provides for a justification for natural evils based on the need for natural laws to provide stability for effective action and/or moral progress to take place. (Tennant).
- But the extent and nature of natural evils a world contains depends not just on the laws, but on the initial conditions. Why did God make it like <u>that</u> *ex nihilo*?
- An omnipotent being could easily create a world with the same laws of physics as our world, but make it so that such things as extremely intense pains either did not arise, or could be turned off when they served no purpose.
- There may be references to Leibniz's idea of the best of all possible worlds, which includes the idea that evil is the privation of good whereby good is seen as logically requiring evil. Hick may also feature here. Other contrast theories, such as Augustine's may feature.
- There may be references to Swinburne's theodicy, which is a conjunction of a free will defence and an appeal to the best of all possible worlds.

The above considerations can be used to advance a case for the following:

- The existence of evil and God is consistent because there is a vale of soul making. If one views evil as a problem, it is because one mistakenly thinks that the world ought, instead, to be a hedonistic paradise..
- The argument from soul making is not sufficient for justifying the existence of both evil and God. What about the horrendous suffering that people undergo, either at the hands of others — as in the Holocaust — or because of terminal illnesses such as cancer? The idea that this suffering has been ordained by God for the spiritual health of the individual in question is unconvincing…
- Or the world could perfectly well have contained only human persons and herbivores…
- Or a world that is a vale of soul making should not have evil befall on those who have not yet had the chance to morally develop (e.g. young children, Rowe's dear)
- The existence of evil and God is consistent because God gave us free will, which entails the possibility of evil. But the price is worth it. For example, God created us with free will so we could 'love'. The price of the existence of love could be evil. To limit out free will is to create a 'toy world'. This may be combined with other features of theodicies, such as contrast theory, or the idea that this world is the best of all possible worlds.
- The existence of evil and God is inconsistent. Just because free will is valuable it does not entail that it should be unlimited. For example, should we not, if we could, intervene to prevent someone from committing rape or murder? Similarly God could have given individuals free will, but not have the power to torture and murder others.
- The existence of evil and God is consistent with evil because it is important that events in the world take place in a regular way, since otherwise effective action would be impossible without the stability provided by natural laws. But the operation of those laws will give rise to natural events that harm individuals. So, God's allowing natural evils is justified because the existence of natural evils is entailed by natural laws, and a world without natural laws would be a much worse world.
- The existence of evil and God is inconsistent. For example, why didn't God create a world which had the same laws of nature as our world, but which was devoid of non-human carnivores, or where the tsunami did not happen?

Theme 5: Freewill and determinism

Total for this theme: 45 marks

09 Explain and illustrate **two** distinctions between determinism and predestination**.**

(15 marks)

Anticipate the following suggestions:

Determinism is the view that a determinate set of conditions can only produce one possible outcome given fixed laws of nature. It is the view that whatever occurs is causally necessitated, and is consistent with the denial that there is any meaning or design inherent in the causal chain. Predestination, which is sometimes known as theological fatalism, is the view that when God created the world he determined the fate of the universe through all space and time. Differences between the two theories include the following:

- We infer that determinism is true (if it is true) on *causal* grounds regarding the fundamental nature of the physical universe. Arguments from universal causation/causal necessity.
- We infer that predestination is true (if it is true) via an argument regarding the fundamental nature of God. It does not require an argument from causal necessity, but can be drawn from the fact that God is omniscient; the possession of foreknowledge.
- There may be references to the role that choices play. In some versions of predestination (e.g. Calvinism) the damned and the saved have already been decreed. Determinism need not make such a commitment.
- Determinism is consistent with the view that the existence of the universe is a 'brute fact'. Predestination presupposes the idea of a divine plan.
- If determinism is compatible with freewill it is because freewill can be defined in such a way as to be consistent with the idea of universal causation (e.g. Hume). If predestination is compatible with freewill it is because the prima facie incompatibility between God being omniscient and the existence of free will is only apparent, rather than real.
- If determinism is incompatible with freewill it is because freedom of the will requires a gap in universal causation. If predestination is incompatible with freewill it is because there is a genuine incompatibility between God's omniscience and the existence of freewill.
- There may be references to how each doctrine, when combined with incompatibilism, undermines the idea of moral responsibility in different ways. For example, in hard determinism no one is morally responsible, whereas (arguably) in predestination one person, God, is entirely morally responsible.
- Some candidates may refer to psychological/socio-economic determinism, which is fine providing that the distinctions between these theories and predestination are drawn on similar lines to the about points.

Illustrations may be drawn from a variety of sources including: scientific explanations for particular phenomena that appear deterministic; God looking down on a man approaching a fork in the road; there may be references to the ideas of Hume, Swinburne, Plantinga, etc.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

10 Assess the view that 'ought implies can'.

(30 marks)

The view that 'ought implies can' is associated with Kant. To say that 'I ought to X' implies that if I do not X then blame and punishment may be permissible, and that, conversely, if I do X then praise and reward may be in order. But if I cannot do X, for whatever reason, then it seems to make no sense to blame and punish. Similarly, if I could not help but do X, then praise and reward seems to make no sense either. Thus the question is directing candidates to tackle the issue of moral responsibility. Both Kant and Sartre make the link between free will and moral responsibility explicit, though other philosophers may be referenced.

Argumentation may be developed in a number of ways, including:

- An analysis of 'can'. What does it mean to say that I *can* do X? Candidates could use this as a platform to explore various accounts of freedom.
- For example, libertarian views generally reject negative conceptions of freedom as insufficient. Undammed rivers ought to meander, but the 'ought' here is not a moral, or a normative 'ought'.
- Moral responsibility may be defined in terms of strict liability (Honderich). Punishment and blame go on as before, with lessened moral recriminations in many (but not all) respects. We do reward and praise people for things beyond their control (beauty, intelligence, and strength, etc.)
- This may lead to a discussion of various libertarian 'positive' accounts of freedom.
- For example, Descartes' view that freedom requires a gap in universal causation, so 'can' here has dualistic implications.
- There may be reference to indeterminism. Contemporary science posits indeterminacy at the quantum level. But is the right kind of metaphysical 'wiggle' room? Is randomness at the quantum level enough to this establish a strong enough 'can' needed for moral responsibility?
- Or Sartre's view that freedom is necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility may be invoked. Our freedom is a brute fact of our subjectivity.
- 'Can' may be interpreted in a compatibilist way. For example, candidates may present a Humean analysis of 'can' and then try to square this with our intuitions about praise, blame, punishment and reward. Can we be blamed for having the desires that we have?
- Similarly, there may be discussion of the difference between the kleptomaniac and the thief. Is there any criterion for distinguishing between the two?
- This may lead to a discussion of Frankfurt's distinction between first-order and second-order desires. Is the man with the trip switch implanted in his brain free? Differences between freedom of choice and freedom of action may be addressed.
- There may be a discussion on Strawson's ideas of freedom and resentment, which shifts the debate to the issue of attitudes rather than facts.
- Some candidates may discuss Kant's own account of moral responsibility, i.e. that the noumenal self is free and self-determining; there may be references to the categorical imperative and being one's own law maker.
- Although the question is directed at moral responsibility, it is legitimate to provide other kinds of examples, such as those related to the prudential. For example, it is no good telling me that I ought to beat Roger Federer at tennis.

The above considerations can be used to advance a case for the following:

- 'Ought' does imply 'can', but the proposition, though true, is redundant as no one is free in such a way as to make the normative force of the 'ought' stick.

- ‘Ought’ does imply ‘can’, and there exist persons who ‘can’ in a strong enough sense to be called ‘free’. This ‘strong enough sense’ is the sense in which the libertarian refers to the notion of freedom.
- We are able to define ‘can’ as implying a voluntary action as defined in terms of the type of cause from which it issues (e.g. Humean compatibilism).This analysis is sufficient to conclude that ‘ought’ does imply ‘can’.
- Although we are able to define ‘can’ in Humean terms, it does not imply an ‘ought’ because being able to act upon my desires is not sufficient for the ascription of moral responsibility.
- ‘Ought’ does imply ‘can’, but only if voluntary action is analysed as causally determined yet distinguishable from psychologically or physically constrained action. Kant may feature here.
- ‘Ought’ does not imply ‘can’, because there are ways of constructing logically plausible thought experiments that demonstrate that S ought to X, even though X could not have done otherwise.
- ‘Ought’ does not imply ‘can do’, but it may imply ‘can choose’.
- ‘Ought’ does imply ‘can’, providing that it can be given a successful analysis in terms of reactive attitudes.
- Responsibility can be equated with being held responsible as in cases of strict liability (Honderich). Criticism: not all liability could be like this.

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15 mark question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 30 mark question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	9	9	18
AO2	6	12	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	**15**	**30**	**45**

Converting marks into UMS marks

Convert raw marks into marks on the Uniform Mark Scale (UMS) by using the link below.

UMS conversion calculator: www.aqa.org.uk/umsconversion