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**General Certificate of Education
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GCE Philosophy PHIL4

Unit 4

Philosophical Problems

Final

Mark Scheme

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GCE PHILOSOPHY UNIT 4**GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (a) questions (Total: 15 marks)**

	Knowledge and Understanding	Interpretation, Analysis and Application
	AO1	AO2
Level 2	<p>5–8 marks</p> <p>At the top end of this level, there is a clear grasp of textual material. Detail must be present.</p> <p>At the lower end of this level subtle detail may be lacking without affecting the general grasp of the material.</p> <p>Philosophical sophistication should be present at the top end of the level.</p>	<p>4–7 marks</p> <p>At the top end, relevance will be sustained. Examples are appropriate and their implications made apparent.</p> <p>Some detail may be lacking at the lower end of the level.</p> <p>Textual material is applied in a directed manner regarding the requirements of the question.</p>
Level 1	<p>1–4 marks</p> <p>There is a partial grasp of arguments/positions. Detail is omitted.</p> <p>At the bottom end of this level there is little grasp of the material. At the top end a grasp of at least one topical idea is in evidence.</p>	<p>1–3 marks</p> <p>Analysis of arguments or positions is partial or lacking. Examples are not fully analysed. Implications may not be drawn out.</p> <p>The response may not always sustain relevance and there may be misinterpretation of key ideas.</p>
0 marks	No relevant philosophical points.	No relevant philosophical points.

GCE PHILOSOPHY UNIT 4

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions (Total: 45 marks)

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 5			<p>20–24 marks</p> <p>The evaluation displays accuracy and penetration. At least two arguments are treated in detail. A sophisticated grasp of the issues is apparent. Depth is demonstrated through the exploration of points, examples and their implications. Counter-arguments are considered. Positions are argued for and clearly related to the material discussed.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.</p>
Level 4			<p>15–19 marks</p> <p>There is an accurate and developed treatment of at least one argument. Counter argument is in evidence. A detailed treatment is expected at the top end of this level. Alternatively, a range of arguments may be present but a detailed treatment is lacking. Examples and counter-examples are used evaluatively. The assessment shows a sophisticated grasp of a position.</p> <p>The response is legible, and technical language is employed with partial success. There may be occasional errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar and the response reads as a coherent whole.</p>

GCE PHILOSOPHY UNIT 4**GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions continued**

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 3	8–10 marks There will be a clear grasp of the issues with appropriate detail. The text will have been engaged. Key positions/arguments are presented with clarity and philosophical sophistication.	9–11 marks The analysis is detailed. Examples are well constructed and their implications are apparent. Textual material is appropriately directed and relevance sustained.	9–14 marks At the top end of this level there is clear grasp of evaluative issues, but the assessment lacks penetration. There may be a juxtaposition of contrasting stances rather than developed assessment of a position. Use of examples may be limited to illustration with evaluative issues underdeveloped. This features strongly at the lower end of this level. Generality, rather than detailed treatment is likely to be a dominant characteristic. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.
Level 2	4–7 marks There is a general grasp of the material shading into a basic grasp at the lower end. Textual detail is lacking. At the top end of this level a clear understanding of at least one argument must be present.	5–8 marks Examples or analogies should be present. The implications may not be fully drawn out but there is a clear sense of directedness. Detail is present at the top end, though the analysis as a whole may lack sophistication or be characterised as 'general'.	5–8 marks Evaluative points may be asserted rather than argued. There is little development of points and examples might be met with counter-assertions. Some arguments might be tangential. Sophistication may be lacking. The response may be legible, with a basic attempt to employ technical language, which may not be appropriate. There may be frequent errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.
Level 1	1–3 marks A rudimentary or fragmentary grasp of the material is in evidence. Textual detail is lacking or misunderstood. At the top end a partial grasp of an argument or position must be in evidence.	1–4 marks The material may not directly impinge on the question. Examples are not fully analysed or explained. At the lower end of this level material may be misinterpreted. The analysis might be characterised as 'basic'.	1–4 marks Evaluation is misdirected or lacking in any detail. Arguments may be weak or absent. There is no development of issues. At the top end of this level there must be an indication of one evaluative issue. Technical language may not be employed, or it may be used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.
0 marks	No relevant philosophical points.	No relevant philosophical points.	No relevant philosophical points.

Section A

Hume: An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding

01 Explain **and** illustrate Hume's Principles of Association and their purpose. (15 marks)

AO1

The principles should be stated.

- Resemblance.
- Contiguity in time or place.
- Cause and effect.
- Explanation should refer to their naturalistic and automatic operation – like any natural law.
- Principles operate between ideas in the mind (thinking).

AO2

- Illustrations may be drawn from the text, but this is not necessary. Resemblance – picture/original, contiguity – rooms in a building, cause and effect – wound/pain.
- Purpose is to explain *all* human thinking. Ideas are conjoined through the operation of one or more of these Principles.
- Complex reasoning, poetic associations, everyday thinking are all subsumed under these Principles.

AND EITHER

02 'There must be more to the relation of cause and effect than the mere succession of objects and events.'

Assess whether Hume's account of causation is vulnerable to this criticism. (45 marks)

AO1

- The role of repetition and constant conjunction in Hume's account plus examples.
- Habit and expectation.
- The definitions of 'cause' objects of type A are followed by objects of type B. The thought of A or seeing A conveys the thought of B. If A had not been, then neither would B.

AO2

- The 'must' in the quote suggests natural necessity; this is denied by Hume.
- No impression of such a necessity. The idea must therefore have another source, repetition.
- Hume's search for the origin of the idea, bodies in the world, mind – body, mind – its own ideas, God – laws of nature.

AO3

- Without some kind of necessity how can we distinguish genuine causal laws from accidental generalisations? Many examples of regularly conjoined events are available.
- Genuine causal laws support counterfactuals, accidental generalisations do not. How is Hume going to explain this?
- A similar point can be made regarding the persistence of causal laws.
- Hume's definition, if not – A, then not – B suggests necessity. This is inconsistent.

- The three definitions do not mean the same. Not only are they intensionally different, they may also be extensionally different. Examples may fit one but not the others.
- Hume places too much emphasis on repetition. Causal connections may be inferred from single instances. Astronomical examples.
- Hume's use of 'similarity' can be criticised. Objects may be judged similar *after* their causal powers have been established. Physical resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient.
- Vagueness with Hume's use of 'many'. How many is 'many'? Does it depend on the phenomena under investigation? And how do we arrive at such judgements?
- The problem of how we designate cause and effect in cases of simultaneous causation.
- Hume presupposes the notion of causation in his account of how we acquire the concept.
- Over-reliance on the copy principle neglects important features of mind and fails to explain imaginative leaps of scientists, our ability to extrapolate, abstract and apply to new circumstances.
- Hume concedes we have an idea of causal necessity. This is inconsistent as he can find no corresponding impression.
- He speaks of another principle of equal weight and authority when his empiricist standpoint tells us there is only one.

Hume's view may be critically compared and contrasted with other positions on causality.

OR

03 Critically discuss Hume's attempt to solve the free will problem. <i>(45 marks)</i>
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AO1

- Long standing philosophical debates would benefit from analysis of key terms.
- Key terms are liberty and necessity.
- They are thought of as incompatible – that is the source of the problem.
- Moral responsibility, praise and blame, can be preserved.
- No inconsistency in saying that an action is both free and determined. Hume's position is compatibilism or soft determinism.
- There may be some reference to how the problem is generated, eg clash between our moral presuppositions and a broadly scientific outlook.

AO2

- Analysis of 'liberty' in terms of the absence of felt constraint. Acting in accordance with the determination of the will. Distinguish from randomness. Free actions are not capricious.
- Analysis of 'necessity' in terms of regularity and constant conjunction. This same regularity is present in human actions and natural events. Although we *feel* differently about them, this feeling does not imply any real difference.
- An action can be both free (no felt constraint) and determined (regular).

AO3

- Hume's analysis of liberty is inadequate or incomplete. He omits any reference to being able to act differently in the same circumstances. To imply that there would have to be a change in the circumstances is not compatible with free will. It infringes Kant's dictum that ought implies can.
- What Hume means by liberty is closer to political liberty rather than liberty of the will.
- Absence of felt constraint is not sufficient for saying that an action is free. Drug induced states, hypnotic trances.

- If the reference to 'felt' is dropped, then how do we know when unfelt constraints are present?
- Determinists would want to claim that there is more to necessity than regularity.
- Regularity is neither necessary nor sufficient in saying that an action/event is determined.
- All necessary connections are regular does not imply that all regularities are necessary.
- If there is no real difference between voluntary acts of men and natural events, then *how* can Hume explain why we feel differently about them? There will be no impression for this feeling.
- There should be a distinction drawn between reasons and causes. Even if both result in regularity, it doesn't follow that all we mean is 'regularity' when we use these different frameworks.
- Punishment is not just an event in a causal chain. There must be some reference to what is deserved.
- Honderich's attempt to salvage the thesis by appealing to strict liability fails. Such a concept is parasitic on genuine cases of responsibility. It also fails to distinguish being held responsible from being responsible.
- The status of the will needs clarification. Does it operate naturalistically and mechanically like other psychological phenomena?
- What account is to be given to phenomenological aspects of freedom? We can feel compelled to act or be helpless (emotional blackmail) and yet this is not a physical constraint like Hume's prisoner in chains. Remorse can be regarded as an inescapable acknowledgement of responsibility.

Hume's view may be critically compared and contrasted with other positions on free will.

Section B
Plato: The Republic

04 Outline Plato's simile of the large and powerful animal (beast) and **two** of its purposes.
(15 marks)

A01

Description of the simile as presented in the text. There should be reference to:

- Beast is dangerous.
- Trainers learn what pleases/displeases it.
- They study its reactions and call such 'knowledge' a science.
- They give it what it wants, not what it needs.
- They *pander* to its whims, no idea of what is good for it.

A02

- Comparison of beast with populace (large, powerful, dangerous).
- Comparison of trainers with sophists/democratic leaders.
- Trainer's study follows empirical method.
- Purposes might include: criticism of direct democracy, criticism of sophists plying their trade, criticism of the nature of empirical study – no real knowledge. A sad comment on the ability of the general public, supporting elitism.

AND EITHER

05 'Claims to have knowledge of a world beyond sense-experience are doomed to fail.'
Discuss in relation to Plato's theory of Forms.
(45 marks)

A01

- Explanation of the theory of Forms: relation of Forms to particulars, participation, hierarchical structure, Form of the Good.
- Plato regarded the Forms as a requirement of reason.
- Universals, application to moral qualities.
- Similes used to demonstrate theory.
- The quote may be taken as a verificationist criticism, or, more generally, an empiricist one.

A02

- Detail of similes, cave and divided line are most likely to feature.
- Chained prisoners, freed one, fire, sun, cave, journey to light and what they represent.
- Divided line, reasoning and object.
- Knowledge and object, characteristics of such objects, eternal, immutable.
- Faculties appropriate to object.
- Differences between Forms and particulars, eg beautiful things and beauty itself.

A03

- Verificationist theory of meaning – this would rule the theory out as nonsensical. The status of the principle is an issue. If it is just contingent, the Forms could be a counter-example. Other counters to the principle might feature, the dancing toys, dark matter.

- Discussion of whether the Forms are required by reason. Different faculties do not require objects of a different ontological status.
- Relation of Forms to particulars is unclear. Problem of whether *all* objects require a Form – the examples of dung and hair from the Parmenides.
- Why should ontological status be enhanced by eternal existence? Similar points could be made regarding immutability and other characteristics.
- Alternative accounts of the relation between universals and particulars are available, eg Aristotle. Abstracted qualities are not real as abstractions.
- Other attempts to show that the theory cannot survive through appeals to reason. Third man arguments of Parmenides generate an infinite regress.
- The theory implies a too restrictive account of knowledge. This may be discussed from an empiricist standpoint. There may be discussion of the limits of *a priori* knowledge (Russell, Ayer, Hume, *et al*).
- Form of the Good may be regarded as incoherent, mystical apprehension. Aristotle's rejection, eg too many diverse accounts of 'good' for there to be *one* good.
- Wittgensteinian criticisms of essentialist doctrines. There does not have to be a common essence to explain the applications of the same term.
- Can there be unqualified knowledge?

Plato's view may be critically compared and contrasted with other positions on knowledge.

OR

06 Discuss the claim that Plato's rulers would administer perfect justice. (45 marks)

AO1

- Plato's rulers would be philosophers with rigorous training.
- They would know the Forms.
- They would have particularly suitable personal qualities: honesty, modesty, bravery, be disinterested in material wealth, reluctant to rule.
- There may be some discussion of the Form of Justice, not simply giving what is due. There are some circumstances in which that would fail. Justice itself must apply in all circumstances.

AO2

- There should be some discussion of the 'knowledge is virtue' thesis.
- Rulers will know the Form of the Good, they will know perfect justice.
- Given this knowledge, they must act in accordance with it.
- Similes might be used to stress the importance of knowledge, eg the ship, emphasis on the navigator, stars – philosopher, Forms.

AO3

The direction of the evaluation should be towards the philosopher ruler, not democracy.

- Dangers inherent in any claim to have absolute knowledge. It may be argued that this is particularly true in the ethical/political sphere. There may be reference to absolute power and corruption. The Noble Lie.
- No guarantee that knowledge will result in right action. We can be bloody-minded or weak-willed.
- It is not clear that all problems can be solved by the acquisition of knowledge. Moral/political dilemmas.
- Not all wrong-doing is through ignorance.

- Defence of Plato's position against the above points by appeal to the personal qualities of the philosopher.
- This defence may involve *defining* perfection into the make-up of the ruler. This could trivialise the thesis, or make it unrealistic, or fail to acknowledge facts of history.
- The ship simile may be used to illustrate a difference between knowledge and skills, means and ends. Plato fails to make these distinctions.
- How desirable are some of the ruler's qualities in a ruler? Will a failure to care for oneself result in care for others? Would Churchill have been a better leader with a reluctance to rule and a lack of ambition?
- Rulers could be too remote. Any workable concept of justice must bear some relation to common morality.
- What is just is not an absolute matter revealed through pure reason. It is relative to circumstances.
- Talk of perfect justice is not appropriate in a state where the individuals have their role and position decided for them.
- Apprehension of the Good is not a justification for ruling. Too nebulous, too mystical. Aristotle's point that the Good could not be the end for political science.

Plato's view may be critically compared and contrasted with other positions on justice and/or power.

Section C
Mill: On Liberty

07 Outline **and** illustrate Mill's case for regarding democracy with suspicion. (15 marks)

AO1

- Expect some reference to historical background and the dangers inherent in absolute rule.
- Democracy seems to address this problem; it enacts the will of the people. People need not fear their own will.
- But in practice the will of the people will mean the will of the greatest number or of those who are more politically active.
- They may seek to oppress minorities.
- Government powers need to be limited.

AO2

- Mill uses the term 'tyranny of the majority' to highlight the danger.
- This is extended to cover majority opinion on moral issues.
- Use of current opinion, prejudice and superstition.
- Majority views could be wrong; there must be no dictating on moral issues.
- Illustrations of absolute monarchies and contentious moral issues might be given. There may be some reference to pressure groups.

AND EITHER

08 'There is no place for censorship in a free society as individuals must decide for themselves.'

Examine the adequacy of Mill's arguments in support of freedom of expression.

(45 marks)

AO1

- Fallibility argument.
- Supplement argument.
- Dead dogma argument.
- Heretical ideas argument.
- Illustrative examples are likely to feature, eg Christianity.
- No legitimate power to suppress opinion.
- Discussion is necessary for eliciting truth. This involves listening to both sides.
- Truth and utility. The utility of an opinion is itself a matter of opinion.

AO2

- Censorship/suppression *logically* amounts to an assumption of infallibility – you are deciding for others.
- Truth/utility distinction dubious as the truth of an opinion is part of its utility.
- Censorship not only bad for dissenters, but also for the receivers of opinion.
- It hampers mental development.
- Man as a progressive being.

AO3

- Some have argued (Gibbs) that the censor need not assume he is infallible. This is a psychological point which fails. Mill is saying that deciding for others, without their having the opportunity to hear both sides, involves *logically* assuming you know best. This is the sense of ‘infallible’ that Mill is working with.
- Mill sees too close a connection between truth and utility. There can be genuine clashes where they are separate and distinct. Examples might be given where truth could damage the public interest.
- Might be some reference to Mill’s individualism and the benefits of discovering truth for yourself. This can only be achieved through a free exchange of ideas.
- A democracy/free society should allow minorities the opportunity to become majorities. An *informed* public is the ultimate arbiter.
- Discussion of incitement cases. Censorship might be beneficial or justifiable on utilitarian grounds.
- Issues of consistency with Mill’s utilitarianism and two absolute principles.
- Mill’s own treatment of incitement cases (angry crowd) and the immediacy of *physical* harm.
- Limited censorship and the problem of setting out the limiting criteria in an unambiguous way.
- Mill has been accused of being obsessive about freedom. Defence: giving a theoretical structure for your views plus justifications is not characteristic of obsessiveness. Mill is vigilant rather than obsessive.
- Vigilance is necessary in the preservation of a free society. Historical examples, what the burning of books leads to.
- The free discussion of issues which Mill advocates is empty without access to the mass media.
- Mill underestimated the protection needed by the weak, especially in a media/image dominated society.
- Mill overestimated the levels of rationality in a society. Reply: his estimation is only that which is consistent with democratic participation.
- Pessimistic views of rationality should be an incentive to improve the levels, not suppress free speech.
- Mill’s principle of free speech is noble but misguided. It is open to abuse. Sensationalism, intrusion and profit can be pursued under the guise of free speech/inquiry. Response: they can only be recognised and exposed through further free speech. The possibility of abuse is not sufficient for abandoning valuable principles or institutions.
- Revitalising an opinion is often done by new ways of presentation rather than by unlimited questioning. Such questioning can lead to scepticism and set up a further clash with utility.

Mill’s view may be critically compared and contrasted with other positions on freedom of expression and/or censorship.

OR

09 Assess whether Mill’s Harm Principle is a successful device for achieving its purpose.
(45 marks)

AO1

- A clear grasp of purpose – to draw limits to state interference in personal liberty.
- The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
- The agent’s physical or moral good is not sufficient for interference.

- Exceptions: children, idiots, barbarian nations.
- Distinction between self-regarding/other-regarding acts.

AO2

- Text illustrations, or similar, of self/other-regarding.
- Harm Principle would not apply in cases of free competition.
- Applications of the Principle. These can be from text, eg sale of poison, or original to make the same points.
- ‘Harm’ to be understood as physical harm. Offence not sufficient for intervention.

AO3

- There may be a difficulty in distinguishing self-regarding and other-regarding acts. Examples of borderline cases.
- But borderline cases denote that generally we do know what lies on either side. The existence of such cases shows that we do as we can recognise them as problematic.
- A more general criticism could involve Donne’s no man is an island.
- Mill’s reference to ‘social acts’. How convincing is this as society becomes more interdependent?
- What counts as ‘harm’? There may be reference to psychological damage as distinct from mere offence. Laws regarding the promulgation of religious views/activities might be discussed.
- Difficulty of establishing the causation of psychological damage.
- Harm Principle needs to cohere with the connection between morality and law. Incestuous relationships between consenting adults or the generation of certain computer images *need* not harm anyone. They are, however, regarded as legitimate targets for state interference.
- There are possible clashes between the principle and Mill’s utilitarianism. Examples to illustrate possible conflicts.
- Expect some discussion of non-interference in financial markets after recent events in the banking system. People consent to deposit money, hunt around for high interest rates.
- Is Mill consistent with his applications? The example of slavery may be discussed. Mill seems to want to exclude this on logical grounds. Attempted suicide might be discussed in the light of the social circumstances of the attemptee.
- Mill avoids paternalism, allows experiments in living, moral growth and individuality. Such values involve some risk-taking. This is the price of a free society, an open society.

Mill’s view may be critically compared and contrasted with other positions on freedom and the individual.

Section D
Descartes: Meditations

10 Explain **and** illustrate Descartes' method of doubt and its purpose. (15 marks)

AO1

- Description of the method in accordance with textual sequence: beliefs acquired through the senses, waking/dreaming problem, total deception exemplified with evil demon hypothesis.
- Culminates in logical certainty of the *cogito*. This is immune to error.
- Purpose – to find an absolute certainty upon which human knowledge can be constructed. Sceptical doubt used as a weapon/method against scepticism.

AO2

- Sceptical method – doubting all beliefs – a positive use.
- How the stages lead into each other. Sense deception not tenable with objects in close proximity. But dreams have deceived him in such cases. Some general principles still hold in dreams. Demon is deceiving us about these, eg mathematics.

AND EITHER

11 'Descartes fails to establish that mind and body are two separate and distinct substances.' Assess whether this criticism can be justified. (45 marks)

AO1

- An understanding of what Descartes meant by 'substance' – exists in its own right, could only be destroyed by God.
- What Descartes meant by 'essential nature'; how it differs for mind and body.
- The arguments: knowledge argument he can doubt body, not mind. Things we know cannot depend on things we do not know. Appeal to God's omnipotence. Indivisibility argument.

AO2

- The arguments are intended to show that the mind is neither identical with nor causally dependent on body.
- Detail in arguments, eg Descartes' own anticipated response to his indivisibility argument – faculties response.
- Pilot/ship example or intermingling thesis should be interpreted as a disanalogy.

AO3

- Talk of two radically distinct substances leads to the interaction problem. Inadequacy of pineal gland response.
- Failure of the knowledge argument. Leibniz' Law fails in intentional contexts and 'doubting' is such a context. Comparisons might be made with loving, worshipping or similar.
- Failure of knowledge argument in its second form. Things we know may very well depend on things we don't know, eg diseases and bacteria.
- Epistemological priority does not imply ontological priority or status.
- The appeal to God's omnipotence presupposes the existence of God and fails to show that God has exercised his power. Descartes needs that to show that mind and body are actually *separate* and distinct.

- The mere possibility of distinctness may be accepted by contingent identity theorists.
- Indivisibility argument involves a more promising appeal to Leibniz' Law.
- Objections to indivisibility. Freudian divisions, appeals to cases of split or multiple personality. There may be sustained discussions of such cases, eg over-reliance on memory as criterion for identity, or not *literally* different persons.
- Difficult for Descartes to accommodate cases of brain damage, surgery having effects on the mind.
- Pilot/ship example may be regarded as inconsistent with his official position. May also be regarded as more consistent with our ordinary way of talking about persons.
- Is the concept of an immaterial substance a coherent one? Being substantial implies being material.
- If the essence of mind is consciousness, do minds cease to exist when not conscious? Problem of dreamless sleep and inadequacy of Descartes' response.
- Identifying thinking as an essential attribute is not the same as identifying it as the *sole* attribute.
- Some form of dualism needs to be retained in order to accommodate undeniable facts of consciousness, qualia, subjective inner life, intentionality, the possibility of ordered, structured, meaningful experiences.
- There may be a discussion of Descartes' arguments/position in relation to a particular version of materialism, eg identity theory, epiphenomenalism. What Descartes said or might reasonably be expected to say should figure rather than a mere juxtaposition of alternatives.

Descartes' view may be critically compared and contrasted with other positions on mind/body.

OR

12	Assess Descartes' arguments for the existence of God.	<i>45 marks</i>)
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AO1

As the question refers to arguments, there should be reference to the ontological *and* trademark arguments.

- The reformulated argument derived from Anselm defines God as the perfect being, existence is implied by perfection. 'God exists' is a necessary truth.
- Analogy with triangles, mountain/valley. Anticipated objection results in identifying God as a unique concept. Internal relation between God/existence.
- Trademark argument appeals to causation of our idea of a perfect being.
- Causal adequacy principle holds for ideas and things. Greater cannot come from lesser.
- Idea of God stamped upon us, hence 'trademark.'

AO2

- Ontological argument is purely *a priori*. Attempts to demonstrate existence through pure reason (rationalism).
- Some unfolding of 'necessary' 'analytical', 'logically necessary properties'.
- Trademark argument is a form of cosmological argument. Tracing an idea back to its source.
- Some discussion of formal, objective reality might feature. This need not be detailed.
- I, as a thinking thing, can only have been created and sustained in existence by God.

AO3

- In the trademark argument, ‘reality’ specifically refers to existence. It is not clear that the concept can admit of degrees in this context.
- Relations between items in the world cannot simply be transferred to ideas of such items.
- There is a difference between an idea of a perfect being and a perfect idea.
- Failure of causal adequacy principle. Evolution seems to be an example of the greater (more complex) coming from the lesser (simpler organisms). Expect references to emergent properties. Cake mixture and sponginess is likely to feature.
- Alternative accounts of the origin of the idea of God are available. It need not be regarded as innate. Hume’s account in terms of sense experience plus augmentation, enlargement, etc.
- The empiricist account is more plausible for some of God’s properties than others.
- In regard to the ontological argument, Kant’s criticisms are likely to figure prominently. Existence is not a property or predicate. We do not add to conceptual content when we say something exists. The subject-predicate form of the sentence is superficial and confusing. There are likely to be examples of genuine predicates contrasted with ‘exists’.
- Attributions of existence do make differences to our knowledge (black holes and sea monsters). Kant’s own example of 100 real thalers might be discussed. Differences between knowledge and conceptual content might be explored.
- Kant’s analysis might be refined by Russell’s treatment of the issue. Existence (and non-existence) are to be analysed in terms of the propositional function. To say that men exist is to say that the propositional function ‘x is a man’ is true for some values of x.
- Schopenhauer-type objections might be used. If you include ‘existence’ in the concept under discussion, then there are no limits to what you can *define* into existence. Gaunilo’s island might be adapted accordingly.
- There might be a discussion of the above in terms of contingent connections contrasted with God where the connection is internal or necessary.
- Another disanalogy: when we talk of the perfect unicorn or Gaunilo’s perfect island, these are known in advance not to exist. This not the case with God.
- Would an attribution of existence add something to what was formerly thought to be a fictional character?
- Standard objections within the empiricist tradition, no existential proposition is logically certain, *a priori* arguments cannot tell us what exists, circularity issues. Cannot bridge the gap between ideas and real existence – ie he can’t separate existence from the *idea* of God.
- There may be some reference to the Cartesian circle but these arguments can be formulated independently of Descartes’ general epistemological concerns.

Descartes’ view may be critically compared and contrasted with other similar arguments.

Section E

Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil

13 Outline Nietzsche’s account of the sceptic, the critic and the new philosopher. (15 marks)

AO1

- Scepticism is characterised by being disdainful, undermining. The sceptic withholds belief, has freedom of spirit. The heart is kept in check.
- The critics are the experimenters. They subdue the past, codify it, render it intelligible, tame it. They present a history of morals.
- The new philosopher commands. He does not say what has been, he says what will be. Here the will to truth *is* the will to power.

AO2

- Expect some historical references. The new scepticism emerged with the coming of Frederick the Great – German or manly scepticism. German spirit dominates Europe.
- New philosophers may push experimentation beyond that of the critics, beyond the socially acceptable.
- Scepticism not essential to the new philosopher.
- Scepticism/criticism may be stages the philosopher passes through. They are his tools, not his ends.

AND EITHER

14 ‘Nietzsche’s position on religious belief relies on the identification of motives and effects rather than reason and argument.’

Assess whether Nietzsche’s account of religious belief is vulnerable to this criticism. (45 marks)

AO1

- References to what religion involves – sacrifice of freedom, of pride, of spiritual self-confidence, subjugation, self-derision.
- Religion as a neurosis, solitude, fasting, sexual abstinence. Denial of world/will.
- The above imply an ongoing suicide of reason. Clear indication of irrationality.
- Religion as cause of superstition and nonsense.
- Religious belief caused by instinctual fear.
- Ladder of sacrifice.

AO2

- Effects of religion – create leisure time, useful tool for new philosophers, source of comfort for those who can only serve.
- Responsible for reversal of natural values.
- Responsible for the present sickly, mediocre human being.
- Emphasis on causes and effects with the assumption of an implicit judgement of truth.

AO3

- To regard religion as irrational through a consideration of its practices needs to be supplemented with an account of where reason should lead us. His emphasis on instincts and what is natural tends to neglect this.
- If it can reverse values, then it is in the self-interest of the weak to pursue it. It protects them against the harsher aspects of Nietzsche's new morality. Is it not rational to pursue protective self-interest?
- Nietzsche is primarily concerned with the psychology of religion though there are implied and stated points regarding its ultimate falsehood. Are such judgements derivable from psychological descriptions? There is a gap, a lack of rational argument, regarding the ultimate truth of religious claims.
- Removing religious practices from their context is an easy way of portraying them as absurd. But this is not to show that the context *itself* is absurd. To think that it does is philosophically naïve – you can do it with *any* practice, education, sport, dancing.
- There may be some discussion of the philosophical respectability of the appeal to a religious instinct, or to instincts in general. The explanatory power of such appeals is dubious.
- Do religion and reason have to oppose each other? Attempts to provide rational accounts of faith are not to be dismissed by motivational or *ad hominem* arguments.
- The sacrifices made by Christianity need to be seen in the context of the fundamental belief in God's ultimate sacrifice for man.
- Religion must be regarded as an end in itself not a means to an end. Nietzsche offers a quasi-functionalist account. If you observe any practice from an external viewpoint, then that practice will never be a meaningful option for you.
- There may be Wittgenstein/Winch type critiques of regarding entire belief systems as irrational.
- Complex religious systems may offer understanding/explanation of the world, eg a scientist seeing himself unfolding God's plan.
- There may be some discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism, eg he is being consistent in providing the kind of account he does, or, he is not concerned with 'ultimate' truth, or, discussion of effects is sufficient to establish falsity or irrationality.
- Problems inherent with a perspectivist account of truth. The religious offer a different perspective and there is nothing left to say.
- Even if Nietzsche is not concerned with ultimate truth, he seems to regard religion as an 'ultimate' falsehood.
- Religion is described as an effect of leisure time: we are also told it can be its creator.
- A supporter of Nietzsche might claim that reason and argument of any kind is merely a function of the will to power. However, there is a paradox in that this claim cannot be supported by reason and argument.

Nietzsche's view may be critically compared and contrasted with other positions on religious belief.

OR

<p>15 Critically discuss Nietzsche's idea that his new morality would be beyond good and evil. (45 marks)</p>
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AO1

- Distinction between master and slave morality – two basic types.
- Master-type determines value.
- Importance of severity. What is noble?
- Subjugation of and exploitation of the weak should not be judged on the moral plane.

- Exploitation is an organic function. Will to power.
- It is part of life and cannot be denied without denying life itself.

AO2

- There might be discussion on the stages of morality, with particular reference to the extra-moral stage.
- Unpacking master/slave morality with examples of values.
- Reversal of natural values.
- In slave morality 'good' is closer to stupidity.
- Slave morality a product of fear, self-protection.
- There may be some references to aristocratic values, the noble.

AO3

- There is a strain in Nietzsche between giving an account that is beyond morality and yet at the same time moral. If there are moral implications, then it is open to rejection on moral grounds.
- There is an implication that the master *ought* to exploit.
- The above point could open up the fact-value gap. From a description of exploitation as an organic process, what follows in terms of what *ought* to be done?
- We have the ability to resist exploitation opportunities and this sets us apart from the rest of nature. That is why moral judgement is appropriate.
- It might be argued that Nietzsche's judgements are not ultimately moral. However, any judgements regarding the treatment of others are inherently moral. To deny this is to alter our concept of morality beyond recognition.
- Seeing exploitation as an organic function could be regarded as an unwelcome intrusion of pseudo-science or evolution into ethics (cf Spencer and the genocide of American Indians).
- What is meant by 'organic' function? Growth, nutrition, pumping of the blood? Is our choice in the treatment of others like these?
- What is the rationale of selecting exploitation as the essence of life? Are there other possibilities? How do we decide the selection criteria?
- Consistency problem. His central idea relies on *truths* about nature. How is this reconciled with perspectivism?
- It might be argued that such judgements do not require truth, just that they are life-enhancing. But then the majority can reject them.
- The majority (herd) could be regarded as the strong. Socrates argued this against Callicles.
- For the master, what is good for him is good *per se*. This seems to imply that he could never question the goodness or rightness of what he is doing. Is this a satisfactory account of transcending morality?
- Nietzsche's historical account may be questioned:
 - (i) values cannot sensibly be transported across epochs. The conditions in which they flourish matter
 - (ii) can you separate off individuals or types from the actions they perform?
- Social, political consequences of the new morality.

Nietzsche's view may be critically compared and contrasted with other positions on nature of morality.

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID

A2 Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15-mark question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 45-mark question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	8	10	18
AO2	7	11	18
AO3	0	24	24
Total	15	45	60