



General Certificate of Education

Philosophy 1171/2171

PHIL2 An Introduction to Philosophy 2

Mark Scheme

2010 examination – January series

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AS PHILOSOPHY**GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (a) questions (Total: 15 marks)****AS PHILOSOPHY****GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (a) questions (Total: 15 marks)**

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding
Level 3	<p>11–15 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level provide a clear and detailed explanation of the relevant issue and demonstrate a precise understanding of philosophical positions and arguments. Illustrations, if required, are appropriate and properly developed.</p> <p>Answers at the bottom of this level are accurate and focused but <i>either</i> too succinct <i>or</i> unbalanced: <i>either</i> important points and/or illustrations are accurate but briefly stated so that significance is not fully drawn out <i>or</i> one point is well made and illustrated but a second point or illustration is less developed.</p>
Level 2	<p>6–10 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level may <i>either</i> list a range of points or blur two or more points together <i>or</i> explanation is clear but unbalanced so that a point is well made but illustrative material is undeveloped or unconvincing <i>or</i> illustrations are good but the point being illustrated is less clear and perhaps left implicit. OR If two points are required answers in this level may <i>either</i> clearly identify, explain and illustrate one relevant point so that a partial explanation is given <i>or</i> points may be well made but not illustrated. OR The response is broadly accurate but prosaic, generalised and lacking detail and precision.</p>
Level 1	<p>0–5 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level <i>either</i> make one reasonable point with little development or without illustration <i>or</i> provide a basic, sketchy and vague account <i>or</i> a confused or tangential account which may only coincide with the concerns of the question in places.</p>

NB Answers may demonstrate characteristics of more than one mark band, for example:

- *Points are clearly identified and explanation is detailed and precise (level 3) but only one point is illustrated (level 2). The response should be placed at the bottom end of level 3 (ie 11–12 marks).*
- *Two points are required but only one relevant point is clearly identified, explained and illustrated (level 2) and the second point and illustration is confused or tangential to the question asked (level 1). The response should be placed at the top end of level 2 (ie 9–10 marks).*

AS PHILOSOPHY**GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions (Total: 30 marks)**

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 4	N/A	<p>15–18 marks</p> <p>A clear and closely argued discussion of the issue incorporating a well-developed appreciation focused on some relevant philosophical issues by applying and analysing a range of points in some detail and with precision.</p>	N/A
Level 3	<p>3 marks</p> <p>A sound understanding of some issues raised by the question, identifying relevant ideas/evidence.</p>	<p>10–14 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level are directed at the relevant issues but:</p> <p><i>Either:</i> a narrowly focused response but detail is pithy and organised intelligently.</p> <p><i>Or:</i> several issues are discussed but the application of points is less well-organised, the focus may drift or analysis may be less developed and unconvincing in places.</p> <p>Answers at the bottom of this band may be full but largely descriptive responses.</p>	<p>7–9 marks</p> <p>Answers at the top of this level provide a well thought out appreciation of some problematic issues raised by the specific demands of the question. Reasoning is employed to support the conclusion advanced.</p> <p>Lower in the band the critical discussion is not sharp and reasoning employed to support the conclusion is less well-developed.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately with few, if any, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.</p>

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions (continued)

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 2	<p>2 marks</p> <p>Answers are relevant but <i>either</i> fail to maintain a focus on the specific question <i>or</i> partial ideas/examples lack detail.</p>	<p>5–9 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level provide some relevant material but:</p> <p><i>Either:</i> points are raised but not developed, analysis is limited and the answer lacks organisation.</p> <p><i>Or:</i> the relevance of points may be unclear.</p>	<p>4–6 marks</p> <p>Evaluation is not sustained, although it is present.</p> <p><i>Either:</i> alternative approaches are juxtaposed without explicit comparison or assessment.</p> <p><i>Or:</i> a position is briefly stated but not adequately supported by the preceding discussion.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>
Level 1	<p>1 mark</p> <p>Answers in this level demonstrate a basic grasp of aspects of relevant issues. Responses may be sketchy and vague; <i>or</i> confused <i>or</i> largely tangential although at least one point should coincide with the concerns of the question.</p>	<p>1–4 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level are sketchy, fragmentary responses <i>or</i> an isolated relevant point appears in an otherwise tangential <i>or</i> confused response.</p>	<p>1–3 marks</p> <p>Critical comments are sketchy and fail to contribute to any explicitly reasoned conclusion <i>or</i> argumentation may be confused so that the conclusion advanced does not seem to follow.</p> <p>Lower in the band a view may be outlined without any critical discussion.</p> <p>Technical language may not be employed <i>or</i> used inappropriately. The response may not be legible, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.</p>

Theme: Knowledge of the External World**1****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) Explain **and** illustrate **two** the following arguments for the existence of sense-data:
- illusion
 - perceptual variation
 - the time-lag argument
 - scientific descriptions of reality.
- (15 marks)*

Anticipate the following kind of explanation:

In perception I see, taste, smell, feel or hear *something*. That sensed something is not necessarily a physical object or a property of a physical object, as I am liable to misperceive or misrepresent. Nevertheless there is a distinct something I am aware of: whether or not, as a matter of fact, my inferences from that something (ie sense-data) are justified. So sense-data and physical objects are distinct existences.

Illusions: I am aware of something. It turns out that what I am aware of is not a fact about the external world (ie it is an illusion). The something I am aware of is sense-data, from which I wrongly infer a fact about the external world.

Perceptual Variation: I am aware of something varying. Physical objects do not vary in the same way as the something I am aware of. Therefore, the something I am aware of is not the physical object, but sense-data from which I infer non-relative facts about the external world.

Time Lag: I am aware of something occurring. What occurs in my perception might not coincide with what is unfolding in the external world. Therefore, the objects of my awareness, sense-data, are instances from which I infer sequences of events in the external world.

Authority of Science: in seeing, tasting, touching, hearing, and smelling, I am aware of qualities. According to science, not all these qualities are properties of the external world; and science is right. Nevertheless, I am aware of these qualities in experience: these qualities are properties of sense-data. Appeals to physiological facts relating to perception – the causal argument.

Illustrative examples are likely to differ depending on the points being made and can be drawn from various sources:

Illusions (eg bent sticks, mirage, hallucinations), perceptual variation (the real shape of the coin, the real properties of the table), time-lags (seeing the ‘sun’, thunder and lightning, starter pistol), science (the real nature of solid tables, frequency and colour and sounds). Description of a Perceptual Process and awareness of final event in a causal chain.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

- (b) Consider whether idealism provides a satisfactory account of the nature and existence of physical objects *(30 marks)*

Knowledge and Understanding

Idealism: physical objects are perceiver-dependent aggregates of ‘ideas’. If these ideal objects are sustained in the over-arching mind of God, then a God-constituted physical object could cause my particular mundane perceptions. Otherwise, my perception causes physical objects to be (solipsism).

Expect references to Locke and Berkeley, but other philosophers might feature. *Esse est Percipi* Principle.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Anticipate some of the following points of discussion:

- Being a physical object does not imply being a material substance 'we know not what'.
- Being a physical object does not imply being an experience-transcendent cause of experience. Causation only transverses observable items in sequence.
- Being a physical object does not imply being ontologically different from perceiving minds; physical objects are also 'ideas'.
- Being a physical object does not involve bearing primary qualities distinct from perceiver-dependent secondary qualities: how can you make that distinction on the basis of observation?
- To be a physical object is to be contingent: dependent on the sustaining activity of God.
- Idealism treats 'idea' ambiguously.
- Idealism confuses the act of apprehension with the physical object apprehended.
- Idealism cannot satisfactorily explain how physical objects persist unobserved.
- If physics is an attempt to understand the physical and the physical is a function of our perception then physics is actually an attempt to understand thought (mine or God's).
- Mind-independent physical objects and their intrinsic properties are a necessary condition for objective enquiry and communication.
- Idealism limits the power of mind to know anything outside of itself. (Russell)

Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- Idealism gives a comprehensively true or false account of physical objects.
- Berkeley's claim that no subject of common sense is lost. Dr Johnson's mistake.
- Idealism avoids the linking problem.
- Berkeley's arguments against material substance apply equally to mental substance.
- Idealism requires an independent proof of God's existence.
- If we were acquainted with ideas in the mind of God, how much of a limitation would this be?
- Can an idealist provide a convincing account of the reality of some ideas rather than others?

Theme: Tolerance**2****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) Illustrating your answer, briefly contrast being tolerant with being **two** of the following:
- indifferent
 - powerless
 - indulgent.
- (15 marks)*

Expect the following:

Indifferent: tolerance is an attitude towards alternative perspectives regarding issues you care about – not a matter of indifference. I tolerate your taste in music, but your taste in socks is a matter of indifference

Powerless: a person who fails to suppress/attack the views of others because they are unable to is not being tolerant, just impotent.

Tolerance is a matter of how you should/ought to think and act which implies you are able to.

Indulgent: allowing what would otherwise be impermissible on the grounds that the actor is someone you favour or like is not being tolerant, just indulgent (cf parents).

Requirement of consistent application.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

- (b) Consider the view that in tolerant societies no particular way of life should be promoted as superior.
- (30 marks)*

Knowledge and Understanding

Tolerance grounded in rights and duties, utility, respect, reflective equilibrium and advancing different ends. Examples like family, state sponsored religious schools, media, health care and economic life illustrating ways in which superior ways of life might be promoted as superior. Expect references to Mill and Rawls.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application*Anticipate some of the following points of discussion:*

- Tolerance is an ideal of liberal pluralistic democracy.
- Why shouldn't a tolerant society promote one way of life over another? Tolerance requires freedom from substantial interference, not value neutrality.
- Is a lack of favouritism a consequence of the value of autonomy and diversity; or the practical problems of establishing conformity and avoiding strife?
- Tolerance advances utility: experiments in living.
- Tolerant society isn't a 'thing' – tolerant societies devolve the promotion of ways of life to individual citizens.
- Perhaps 'tolerance' is an ideological smokescreen for 'repressive desublimation' thrown up by capitalism and functioning as such, it 'should' remain neutral.
- Why think tolerant societies are value-neutral? In fact they promote substantially liberal ideals and way of life.

Assessment and Evaluation*It might be argued that:*

- Tolerant societies should remain value-neutral.
- Tolerance permits and even encourages promoting particular ways of life.

- 'Tolerant societies' aren't really tolerant at all: they promote the interests of the privileged class.
- Tolerance has to have limits; and so some ways of life will be ruled out whilst others are ruled in.
- Diversity may be seen as intrinsically valuable.
- Can all ways of life peacefully co-exist?
- There may be some discussion as to what counts as 'promoting'. Presumably it must mean more than just being pursued by members of society.
- Does a way of life become valuable because someone has chosen it? The issue of what it involves.
- Is value neutrality a possible goal for any society given the connection between morality and law?
- Are some life-styles inherently destructive in regard to other life-styles?
- Would positive discrimination be possible in a value-neutral society?
- Liberal democracies and the use of referenda on specific issues.

Theme: The value of art**3****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) 'This instrumental music expresses sadness.' Suppose we agree it does: outline **two** reasons why this is philosophically puzzling. **(15 marks)**

Anticipate two from the following ideas:

- How can a piece of music express sadness: sadness is associated with bodily states and music does not have a body?
- Is the music sad because it simulates bodily processes (tempo, timbre, rhythm, harmony, melody)? How?
- How can instrumental music express sadness: what is the music sad *about*?
- Is the music sad only if it evokes sadness in me? What if it doesn't?
- Is the music sad because the composer was sad when they wrote it? What if they weren't?
- We value expressions of sadness in music, but not in ourselves: why?
- Is sadness in music a special 'musical' sadness? If so, how does it tie-up with non-musical sadness?
- Is *this* instrumental music the particular music I'm hearing or is it what I ought to be hearing (eg 'this is a sad piece of music and that musician has just butchered it').
- Relation of the music to specific occasions.

Some of these points might be developed through illustration.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

- (b) Discuss the view that art should seek 'truth'. **(30 marks)**

Knowledge and Understanding

Various positions might be used to motivate the discussion:

Plato criticises art for dealing in illusion rather than truth: all endeavour should seek the Good and the true. Kant thinks art should seek to capture, disinterestedly, the sublime (is that the 'Truth?'). Tolstoy recommends art should seek to convey simple moral and religious truth. Marx sees that art can have an obfuscating ideological function, but it can also express truth about the human condition and inform revolutionary praxis. Formalists disengage art from anything outside the work itself and reject truth as an aesthetic standard. Postmodernists reject the notion of a universal artistic imperative.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

- Does art propose truth? If so, what kind of truth? Even if it does, is that why we value it?
- Non-representational art cannot propose truth, so it cannot seek it.
- Representational art (eg fiction) is not primarily concerned with proposing truth, even if it contains some true statements. Perhaps fiction is a pleasurable distraction from the truth.
- Truth is extrinsic to a work of art: art should be concerned with intrinsic aesthetic properties.
- Art is a product of the imagination, concerned with constructing ideal possibilities not recording mundane actualities.

- Unless representational art referred to the world – at least sometimes – truthfully, we would have no way of making sense of it (eg the uniformity of nature, universal causation, human psychology and so on).
- We value art that is ‘true to life’ or ‘captures the reality’ and criticise art that falsifies experience, and so ‘truth’ features as a criterion of assessment.
- Art can inform us and make us more sensitive towards the truth.
- ‘Truth’ might mean genuine or authentic, but these terms are themselves ambiguous.
- Philosophically ‘truth’ is either trivial or ‘truth’ is being used to mean something else.
- ‘Truth’ cannot be the purpose of art because art should be purposeless.

Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- Art should not seek truth, because truth is not an aesthetic quality.
- Art should seek truth as its function is to inform and edify.
- Art should seek ‘the Truth’ – some kind of epiphany.
- Art should not seek truth, but truth must be an element of representational art.
- There is no universal imperative guiding ‘art’.
- The meaning of ‘truth’ in this context is ambiguous so the claim ‘art should seek truth’ is unhelpful.
- What counts as truth in art is fixed by the internal criteria of that art. It is not an external relation with something outside itself.
- Art can aim at general truths regarding the human condition.
- Art can capture what is common in diverse experiences.
- Imagination and truth are not incompatible. Imagination may be contrasted with fantasy.
- Truth may be **one** value of art, but not necessarily the **only** value. That we can praise a work of art for its truth-bearing qualities does not imply we must criticise another for not having them.
- ‘Truth’ is not confined to representation in the sense of exact correspondence.

Theme: God and the world**4****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) 'Religious believers and non-believers experience "the world" differently.' Explain and illustrate this claim with reference to the idea of 'seeing as'. (15 marks)

Anticipate the following kind of explanation:

Version 1: the content of experience inevitably falls under a schema. This schema contributes to the interpretation of the content: 'seeing as'. Schematized one way, the glass is seen as half full; another way, the glass is seen as half empty. Nevertheless, there is a scheme-independent fact that any interpretation is answerable to. The religious and non-religious schematise the scheme-independent facts differently. According to Hick 'seeing-as' (or 'experiencing-as') is a commitment to interpret events religiously and he links this to a non-propositional view of faith (eg 'sin' as opposed to wrong-doing).

Version 2: there is nothing 'given' in experience. Our experience of the world is always an interpreted world; and there is nothing over and above the way we read experience within an interpretation. The religious perspective constructs a different world from the world of the non-religious. There are no perspective neutral principles or facts. This might be linked to postmodernism or Neo-Wittgensteinian Fideism.

Illustrative examples are likely to differ depending on the points being made and can be drawn from various sources:

For the scheme/content version gestalt examples like duck/rabbit, young woman/old hag might feature, or blind men and elephants. Illustrating how the religious conceptual scheme frames reality differently from the non-religious: this frame might be incapable of confirmation (cf Wisdom's garden) or verifiable (cf Hick's eschatological journey to the celestial city). For pluralism examples of the incommensurability of scientific/religious accounts of the order of nature, or different responses to suffering (but the 'order of nature' and 'suffering' are referred to 'ironically'). Might be examples where criteria of one schema are inappropriately applied to another.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

- (b) 'Life is terrible, thank God.' Explore the relation between suffering and the existence of God. (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

A candidate should understand the problem. Suffering counts against the existence of an omnipotent loving Creator. Perhaps this suffering is a necessary condition for us to flourish; perhaps we brought it on ourselves through free will. Perhaps there is no rational reconciliation between suffering and God: suffering is a paradox at the heart of faith.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Anticipate some of the following points of discussion:

- Suffering makes the existence of God impossible, or improbable.
- Life did not have to be terrible, but God gave us the supreme gift of free will; and subsequently we have brought the punishment of suffering justly on ourselves.
- Life isn't really terrible, it just appears terrible from our limited perspective.
- Overcoming what is terrible develops our soul and produces what is most divine in us.

- Distinction between natural and moral evil.
- Either what we fear is evil, or the act of fearing is itself evil. (St. Augustine)
- God is struggling to overcome evil in a process towards perfecting creation. Terror is a risk justified by the possibility of supreme benefit.
- Suffering forces the existential realisation that we must go beyond reason.
- Blaming God for a terrible life is a form of bad faith.

Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- The quote exposes the problem of evil.
- The quote implies a solution to the problem of evil.
- The quote expresses the complex relation between God and suffering.
- The quote is obscure as is our understanding of the relation between suffering and God.
- Moral evil and free will.
- Natural disasters and their opportunities.
- But the above presupposes knowledge of the evil.
- Why do some rather than others suffer?
- Life is not terrible for everyone, equally. Either God is unjust or is impotent.
- Is free-will worth it? Alternatives.
- Natural disasters happen within regular order of nature and the latter is the necessary background for the possibility of culture and value.
- Some of our most valued goods **logically** require evils – but so do some of our most despicable evils. Credit for good examples (sympathy, callousness).
- The evidence for moral progress – that better situations have **emerged** from poorer ones as a result of our exercise of free will.
- Souls become more worth through facing adversity.
- Not all souls have the opportunity to develop.
- Our limited perspective is the only one **possible** for us.
- Difficulty in understanding how some evils **could** be components of a greater good – no matter what perspective you have.

Theme: Free will and determinism**5****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) 'One and the same action can be both free and determined.' Explain **and** illustrate **two** criticisms of this view. **(15 marks)**

Anticipate the following:

Candidates might refer to 'this view' as soft determinism or refer to Hume, Hobbes, Honderich *et al.*

- This view changes the subject by ignoring 'free will' (the ability to do otherwise) and employing a redefined notion of 'freedom'.
- This view fails to capture what we mean by 'deliberation'.
- This view treats 'the will' as a kind of appetite rather than a transcendental condition for the possibility of being a rational agent.
- This view confuses causal explanation and justification citing reasons.
- This view is really epiphenomenalism.
- Issues of praise and blame.

Illustrations:

Smokers who are free to smoke, my arm raised and I raised my arm, Sartre's student, the large and powerful animal, steam trains and hypnotics and so on.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

- (b) 'Because we have free will, we are morally responsible.' Discuss. **(30 marks)**

Knowledge and Understanding

Kant and Sartre make the link between free will and moral responsibility explicit. Crimes of passion more leniently treated; Skinner's behaviourist community; Thrasymachus's assertion of irresponsible freedom. Might be some reference to Aristotle.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application*The following issues could be discussed:*

- Freedom is necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility (Sartre).
- We have free will but sometimes circumstance negates our moral responsibility.
- If determinism is true and there are prior sufficient conditions for all decisions and actions, then decisions and actions are necessitated by these prior conditions. Therefore, the assumption morality makes that we 'could do otherwise' is false and the foundations of morality are undermined.
- There is no free will. Nevertheless there is a role for a kind of revised 'morality' where punishment and praise have a place (cf Skinner).
- Free action is regular action (Hume).

Assessment and Evaluation*It could be argued that:*

- Free will is a necessary and sufficient condition for moral responsibility.
- Free will is necessary but not sufficient for moral responsibility.

- The relation between free will and moral responsibility is a practical rather than metaphysical issue.
- Responsibility revealed phenomenologically – guilt, remorse, anguish.
- Responsibility can be equated with being held responsible as in cases of strict liability (Honderich). Criticism: not all liability **could** be like this.
- Praise/blame, reward/punishment should be seen as links in a causal chain, but this runs into difficulties regarding what is **deserved** and proportionality.
- Discussion of Kant's 'ought implies can'. Issues of rationality are likely to feature here.
- Is Determinism a clearly defined thesis? e.g. we could predict all outcomes if we had sufficient knowledge. But 'sufficient' here means the ability to predict all outcomes. The circularity problem.
- How plausible is the view that we are the only being with the properties of freedom and responsibility?

- **ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID**

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective part (a) question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective part (b) question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	15	3	18
AO2	0	18	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	15	30	45