



General Certificate of Education

Philosophy 1171/2171

PHIL1 An Introduction to Philosophy 1

Mark Scheme

2010 examination – January series

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AS PHILOSOPHY

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (a) questions (Total: 15 marks)

AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	
Level 3	<p>11–15 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level provide a clear and detailed explanation of the relevant issue and demonstrate a precise understanding of philosophical positions and arguments. Illustrations, if required, are appropriate and properly developed.</p> <p>Answers at the bottom of this level are accurate and focused but <i>either</i> too succinct <i>or</i> unbalanced: <i>either</i> important points and/or illustrations are accurate but briefly stated so that significance is not fully drawn out <i>or</i> one point is well made and illustrated but a second point or illustration is less developed.</p>
Level 2	<p>6–10 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level may <i>either</i> list a range of points or blur two or more points together <i>or</i> explanation is clear but unbalanced so that a point is well made but illustrative material is undeveloped or unconvincing <i>or</i> illustrations are good but the point being illustrated is less clear and perhaps left implicit. OR If two points are required answers in this level may <i>either</i> clearly identify, explain and illustrate one relevant point so that a partial explanation is given <i>or</i> points may be well made but not illustrated. OR The response is broadly accurate but prosaic, generalised and lacking detail and precision.</p>
Level 1	<p>0–5 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level <i>either</i> make one reasonable point with little development or without illustration <i>or</i> provide a basic, sketchy and vague account <i>or</i> a confused or tangential account which may only coincide with the concerns of the question in places.</p>

NB Answers may demonstrate characteristics of more than one mark band, for example:

- *Points are clearly identified and explanation is detailed and precise (level 3) but only one point is illustrated (level 2). The response should be placed at the bottom end of level 3 (ie 11–12 marks).*
- *Two points are required but only one relevant point is clearly identified, explained and illustrated (level 2) and the second point and illustration is confused or tangential to the question asked (level 1). The response should be placed at the top end of level 2 (ie 9–10 marks).*

AS PHILOSOPHY
GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions (Total: 30 marks)

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 4	N/A	15–18 marks A clear and closely argued discussion of the issue incorporating a well-developed appreciation focused on some relevant philosophical issues by applying and analysing a range of points in some detail and with precision.	N/A
Level 3	3 marks A sound understanding of some issues raised by the question, identifying relevant ideas/evidence.	10–14 marks Answers in this level are directed at the relevant issues but: <i>Either:</i> a narrowly focused response but detail is pithy and organised intelligently. <i>Or:</i> several issues are discussed but the application of points is less well-organised, the focus may drift or analysis may be less developed and unconvincing in places. Answers at the bottom of this band may be full but largely descriptive responses.	7–9 marks Answers at the top of this level provide a well thought out appreciation of some problematic issues raised by the specific demands of the question. Reasoning is employed to support the conclusion advanced. Lower in the band the critical discussion is not sharp and reasoning employed to support the conclusion is less well-developed. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately with few, if any, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions (continued)

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 2	<p>2 marks</p> <p>Answers are relevant but <i>either</i> fail to maintain a focus on the specific question <i>or</i> partial ideas/examples lack detail.</p>	<p>5–9 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level provide some relevant material but:</p> <p><i>Either:</i> points are raised but not developed, analysis is limited and the answer lacks organisation.</p> <p><i>Or:</i> the relevance of points may be unclear.</p>	<p>4–6 marks</p> <p>Evaluation is not sustained, although it is present.</p> <p><i>Either:</i> alternative approaches are juxtaposed without explicit comparison or assessment.</p> <p><i>Or:</i> a position is briefly stated but not adequately supported by the preceding discussion.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>
Level 1	<p>1 mark</p> <p>Answers in this level demonstrate a basic grasp of aspects of relevant issues. Responses may be sketchy and vague; <i>or</i> confused <i>or</i> largely tangential although at least one point should coincide with the concerns of the question.</p>	<p>1–4 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level are sketchy, fragmentary responses <i>or</i> an isolated relevant point appears in an otherwise tangential <i>or</i> confused response.</p>	<p>1–3 marks</p> <p>Critical comments are sketchy and fail to contribute to any explicitly reasoned conclusion <i>or</i> argumentation may be confused so that the conclusion advanced does not seem to follow.</p> <p>Lower in the band a view may be outlined without any critical discussion.</p> <p>Technical language may not be employed or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.</p>

Theme: Reason and experience**1****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) Explain what is meant by the claim that the human mind starts as a *tabula rasa* and give **one** reason for holding this view. (15 marks)

Expect the following explanations:

The view of the mind as a *tabula rasa* (Gassendi) or as a piece of white paper devoid of any characters (Locke) should be well understood. Candidates are likely to spend some time ‘translating’ *tabula rasa*, eg the mind is pictured as a ‘blank slate’, or finding some alternative image that does the same work, eg the mind is perceived as an ‘empty cabinet’.

Beyond this, explanations are likely to focus on the view that there are no innate ideas and that all of our ideas derive from sensory experience and reflection on sensory experience. There may be references to Locke and/or Hume and a reason for holding this view is also likely to be drawn from Locke or Hume, for example:

- Locke’s view that if a proposition is innate its component elements must be innate – but there are no such innate elements.
- Universal assent does not imply innateness. So, while ‘whatever is, is’ looks like a proposition that is known a priori, independently of experience, and should be universally assented to, its component elements are so abstract that no child knows the truth of it.
- Examples of other propositions which may be held to be innate, such as ‘the square on the hypotenuse...’ for example, which in fact are drawn out through reason and are demonstrated or proven. There may be criticisms of Plato’s argument in the *Meno*.
- Similarly, other self-evident, or necessarily true, propositions that may be universally assented to are not innate because they involve ideas drawn from experience – ‘whatever is white all over is not black all over’ is necessarily true but not innate because it requires ideas of white black and difference.
- Examples of where sensory impairment and/or an inability to reflect deprive us (allegedly) of certain ideas. Humean examples might feature.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

Expositions which provide general accounts of empiricist hostility to innate ideas but which do not provide any illustrative reasoning or precise explanation of one reason for holding the view should be placed in the middle band according to the depth and detail presented.

- (b) How convincing is the view that sense experience is the source of all knowledge? (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

The view will probably be identified as an empiricist approach to knowledge acquisition: the view that knowledge, or at least non-trivial knowledge, is acquired through experience. There may be references to Locke and/or Hume. It is possible that students may feel that they have provided a background in their response to part (a) in which case some knowledge and understanding may be implicit in this part-question.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Expect the following points of discussion:

- A contrast with the view that some knowledge is innate or is gained purely through reasoning.

Strengths of the view:

- Specific criticisms of particular accounts of the innate knowledge thesis; eg of Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant or Chomsky.
- Examples of propositional knowledge that *necessarily* requires experiential input – particularly in relation to claims that are typically proposed as examples of innate knowledge.
- Examples of how trivially true claims are uninformative.
- The view sets a clear limit on appropriate objects of knowledge and allows us to proceed without getting distracted by empty metaphysical speculation.
- The view reflects our experience of learning, where knowledge is acquired through new experiences.

Weaknesses of the view:

- Do all knowledge claims require an experiential grounding – do claims about eg God, the propositions of logic, identity, universals, morality, necessity etc escape the empiricist framework? Some ideas are best regarded as innate, (eg a Euclidean straight line, God). The view is problematic in relation to general terms or universals.
- The conceptual scheme under which our experience of the world is subsumed is acquired via experience and something else. The active power of the mind in shaping our knowledge.
- Some support for innate knowledge may refer to psychological research into depth perception, facial recognition, genetic dispositions etc.
- We might justify a claim to know that something is the case by demonstrating it (experientially) but that doesn't mean that we acquired the concepts employed in the claim experientially. At least some ideas, (eg a missing shade of blue) do not appear to derive from sense experience.
- Empirical justifications are not immune from scepticism.
- Experience, and making a knowledge claim about experience, is a social activity but, if all my ideas derive from my sense experience and all your ideas derive from your sense experience, we can never share the same idea or make a knowledge claim which means the same thing.
- Does thinking things through involve the manipulation of mental images?
- Solipsism.

Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- An exhaustive account of (non-trivial) knowledge can be given in experiential terms alone. All else is 'sophistry and illusion'.
- Most empiricists do not claim that *all* knowledge derives from sense experience.
- Whilst experience is 'given', this is testimony to the existence of certain (synthetic *a priori*) principles which govern our experience and knowledge of the world.
- We possess some (non-trivial) knowledge which is not rooted in experience and not justifiable in experiential terms.

Theme: Why should I be governed?**2****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) 'Demonstrating that power is legitimate is difficult.' Explain **and** illustrate **one** reason for this. (15 marks)

Legitimate power is authority. This is a normative concept justifying the exercise of power. Authority is power that is recognised and consented to. Legitimate power is power that is rightfully held.

Explanations of **one** difficulty may involve:

- An explanation based on the importance of consent and the difficulties of demonstrating *that* we have consented, *what* we have consented to, whether our consent is *limited* in any way etc. This may be linked to specific notions of consent eg tacit consent and/or to versions of the social contract.
- A post-contractual position may be adopted in which case there may be difficulties in demonstrating that a government is preserving rights or affording protection. There may be references to Locke or Hobbes.
- An explanation based on a critique of popular approval. How popular is popular? Whether we're dealing with large minorities or the majority this could instantiate a self-interested, possibly ignorant, tyranny. Is this really legitimacy? There may be references to Mill or Plato.
- An explanation drawing from the 'ideal types' of authority presented as sources of legitimacy by Weber. Is charisma consent or the abnegation of choice? How significant is tradition in a rapidly changing society? Do rational-legal grounds legitimate power or are they power legitimating itself? (Legitimacy is a myth.)
- References might also be made to the difficulty of defining what constitutes the common good, or of demonstrating the existence of human rights, or whether any moral principle is likely to be widely accepted in increasingly diverse, pluralistic societies.

Illustrative examples will obviously depend on the difficulty identified:

- Acts or laws that we have not consented to (eg going to war, increased surveillance and the storing of private details, intrusions into a private sphere etc).
- Acceptance, or popular approval, for acts that are illegitimate on moral grounds (eg because they discriminate against or target unpopular groups).
- Examples of authority being out of touch with the popular mood (attempts at political correctness perhaps).
- Examples of manufactured consent – where we're persuaded to consent to something that is not obviously in our interests.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

*Expositions which list or blur together **more** than **one** difficulty should be awarded marks in the middle band. Responses that claim that power is de facto and does not require legitimacy should be regarded as tangential and placed in the bottom band.*

(b) Is unlawful conduct for political ends ever justifiable?

(30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

Unlawful conduct may involve civil disobedience or direct action. Our justification for using such conduct should be seen in moral terms. (It is likely that most responses will focus on civil disobedience as this is more accessible in the philosophical literature.) It is likely that some will refer to social contract theories and grounds for dissent.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Expect the following points of discussion:

- Detailed descriptions of what civil disobedience involves. Rawls' description is likely to feature: public, non-violent, conscientious action, aimed at changing a law or policy, without undermining political stability and the rule of law, through appealing to a wider societal sense of justice.
- Similarly, Rawls' account of when civil disobedience is justified may be seen to impose some limits on what a just action would involve. It is justified when a law or policy poses a significant threat to liberty or equality; when normal political appeals have failed or met with indifference; when it doesn't spread so that political stability is undermined. The rider that while one may have a right on these grounds it may not be prudent to exercise it may also be seen as a pragmatic limit to what can and what can't be justified.
- Protest through direct action, on the other hand, does seek to challenge established cultural, economic and political orders. Direct action is associated with new social movements which, again, can also be seen to adopt a moral stance but one aimed at changing values and lifestyles through active participation. Direct action has been associated with the extension of rights (feminist, anti-racist, gay and animal rights movements) and the protection of the environment (greens, eco-warriors).
- The justification for direct action is more contentious. The established order is seen as repressive, materialistic, patriarchal, racist etc and, against this, the idea that the personal is political has been used. Active participation to improve or protect the quality of society, and of one's individual life, is seen as empowering. Some groups are prepared to use various forms of violence – against what they see as state violence – to achieve a desired end. The established order is seen as too bureaucratic and remote to deal with local issues adequately (eg concerns about the impact of a by-pass on an area) and too powerless to deal with global issues adequately (eg global warming, famine etc).
- It is likely that examples of civil disobedience and/or direct action will be employed.
- There may be references to Hobbes and/or Locke and to grounds for removing governing bodies.

Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- All unlawful conduct weakens the rule of law generally and that, because we all benefit from political order and stability, it is not in our interests to engage in unlawful conduct.
- That, despite the moral grounds involved, it is never appropriate to violate law. Law is divorced from morality.
- The end may justify the means but are the means likely to be successful in securing the end?
- Concepts like rights, justice, autonomy, equality etc are more important than law and order and the latter can be challenged when the former are threatened.

- These concepts may also impose some limits on the form and extent of unlawful conduct we might use.

There is no limit to dissent or to the form unlawful protest might take. Attempts to impose a limit undermine what they try to uphold.

Theme: Why should I be moral?**3****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) Outline **and** illustrate **two** ways in which an action may be both self-interested and altruistic. (15 marks)

An altruistic action is one that would be, typically, described as unselfish: an action motivated by a concern for others, one that disregards or overrides self interest as the motivating factor. A self-interested action is performed for one's own advantage; the motivation for performing the action is that it will be beneficial to oneself. The key idea here is that there may not be a rift between the two or, perhaps, that it is sometimes not easy to distinguish between them. Two ways in which an action may be both altruistic and self-interested may be drawn from:

- Altruism may lead others to think more highly of you, which is of benefit to you, and also to you feeling better about yourself.
- It isn't in one's self-interest to act selfishly – if others were to do the same then one's own interests might be undermined.
- Acting unjustly damages the soul so it is in our interests to be just (altruistic).
- We're social animals and a genuinely rewarding life is one that contributes to sustaining a healthy, flourishing community in which relationships with others are positive and fair: if we did not respect the interests of others we may begin to lose respect for ourselves.
- To stand up for my rights is to stand up for rights generally – and vice versa.
- Socio-Biology: we are driven to protect our gene pool so that 'the selfish gene' may seek to protect or advance the cause of those who are genetically linked.
- We should recognise others as 'ends' – there may, eventually, be some reward for doing so – and recognise that our moral duties include a duty to help others because situations may arise where we require the help of others.
- Self-interested motivations may have altruistic consequences.

Illustrations may draw from the philosophical literature – for example, from Hobbes, Locke, Plato, Aristotle, Kant etc – or employ actual, or construct fictional, examples of altruism – eg a charitable donation, or a seemingly selfless act of courage – which may be construed as self-interested.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

*Expositions which list or blur together **more than two** ways should be placed in the middle mark band. The claim that no action is altruistic should be seen as tangential.*

- (b) Does morality demand that we suppress our own inclinations and desires for the benefit of others? (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

The question is quite permissive and may be approached in different ways:

- Is there a distinction between morality and human inclinations and desires? Can either be articulated without reference to the other?
- If there is a distinction are we led to a dual conception of man (base-noble, lower-higher etc)? Is such a distinction a matter of fact or value?

- If there is a distinction do the demands of morality or the presence of certain inclinations and desires provide the stronger motivation for action?
- Is morality repressive? Is self-interest ignoble?

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some of the following or equivalent points will be raised and developed:

- If morality does demand that we suppress interests, inclinations, desires etc for the benefit of others should this be seen as ‘for the benefit of all others’ – including our present and future selves – or should it be seen as for the benefit of some others?
- If the latter, then what is morality? A system of values that benefits the powerful? A system of values that protects the weak? Something essentially coercive or something that reflects herd mentality and leads to social degeneration? Should morality be resisted or abandoned in favour of something that is life-enhancing? Would social transformation resolve the problem?
- If the former then it might be suggested that one does have a reason to be moral – in fact reason informs us of what our duties are. These are universal, given through reason, and our motivation to perform them is moral – to act out of a sense of duty rather than self-interest. The ‘moral hero’ is someone who overcomes inclinations and desires to act morally. But, is someone’s motivation for action visible in the action? How do we know that an action is being performed for moral reasons?
- The view that there is no conflict between self-interest and morality may be developed through an account of a contractual theory, virtue ethics, or some form of egoism. Virtue ethics is, perhaps, the most profitable – there is no gap between ‘moral sainthood’ and enlightened self-interest. In other theories there may be a gap. For example, if we can get away with breaking a contract why shouldn’t we?
- There is scope for a discussion of ‘moral weakness’ (eg when we know that something is right but can’t bring ourselves to do it).
- Certain meta-ethical problems might be aired, such as the is-ought, or fact-value, gap in relation to some positions: does the fact that an action is rational or will promote happiness lead to the view that it ought to be carried out?
- If morality is to guide conduct, is some kind of *internal* motivation, for example the presence of appropriate sentiments, sympathies, desires, feelings, emotions or inclinations necessary? Or, is the belief that something is right sufficient to motivate action without an accompanying desire? Or, must moral motivation gain its force through attempts to show that morality is connected to desires/wants that all of us should have? But what if, as a matter of fact, some of us don’t possess these desires?

Good answers may be rooted in a couple of these approaches.

Assessment and Evaluation

As noted, the question is permissive and it is necessary to reward different types of response to the question:

- It might be argued that morality is inextricably connected to human inclinations and desires and that reasons to be moral do not conflict with self interested desires and inclinations (survival, security, peace, harmony, flourishing etc).
- It might be argued that there is a conflict between self-interested and moral motivations and that this is brought out in notions like duty and obligation. Some might argue that concepts like rights and duties outweigh self-interested attempts to dodge them.
- Alternatively, if there is a conflict, it might be argued that morality and moral concepts ought to be abandoned – precisely because they repress desires and inclinations and prevent individual or social development.

Theme: The idea of God**4****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) Outline **and** illustrate how God's transcendence might conflict with **one** of His other attributes. (15 marks)

Transcendence will probably be defined as the view that God is an entity beyond sense experience and/or as the view that God is not part of the universe and does not exist in space or time. So, God is beyond or outside of the physical world and beyond human sensibility.

This is potentially problematic for other qualities attributed to Him and one point of conflict is likely to be drawn from:

- God is typically viewed (eg in Judaism and Christianity) as benevolent and caring – a personal God who believers can relate to and who is responsive to their communicated needs (prayer). However, it is difficult to conceive of and form a personal relationship with a transcendent Being.
- God is also seen as immanent – as present within all things (some may refer to omnipresence). However, it is difficult to see how a Being that transcends His creation, that is not in time or physical, can also be present within it, act within it, create and sustain it or reveal Himself through intervention.
- There may also be references to problems concerning His omniscience.

Illustrations are likely to focus on 'acts' that question transcendence. For example, feelings that God is present and listening, that He has responded to prayer; the evidence of miraculous events, like the virgin birth or the resurrection, to demonstrate His intervention in the world.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

NB Critical points that are not focused on God's attributes – for example, points about mysticism, religious language, religious experience, arguments for the existence of God – should be regarded as tangential. Also, no marks are available for attempts to resolve the conflict identified.

- (b) How convincing is the view that the idea of God is innate in all of us? (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

The question concerns the origins of our idea of God – it is not a question about whether belief in God is justified – and specifically whether the idea of God is an innate idea. If the idea of God is innate then it is in us from birth, inseparable from us, it is part of our nature to have this idea. If this is the case then the idea of God should be found in every human mind and the idea should find articulation in every human society (if it is drawn out appropriately).

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some of the following or equivalent points will be raised and developed:

- There may be some (socio-anthropological) discussion of whether the idea of God is found in all societies.
- Arguments for innateness – such as Descartes' 'trademark' argument. Just as a craftsman leaves his mark on his product so too God stamps the idea of Himself in us.

- Descartes' use of the causal adequacy principle to demonstrate that God is the source of this idea – the cause must contain as much reality as is present in the effect. It isn't necessary to assess this point in terms of whether it provides a justification for believing in the existence of God. It is more useful to stress that the idea is not gained through sense experience and neither is it a creation of our own given that we can't change it – rather the idea has been imposed upon us and is innate. This may be presented as a version of the cosmological argument.
- Whether the causes of our ideas possess the same qualities as our ideas may be questioned. (Primary and secondary qualities may be referred to or, more simply, whether the 'x' factor has as much reality as someone's idea of the 'x' factor).
- Locke's view that if a proposition is innate its component elements must be innate – but is it likely that we are born with the idea of eternity, immutability, omniscience, omnipotence etc?
- Hume's view that the idea of God is formed by 'reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit...qualities of goodness and wisdom'. So that experience is the source of our ideas through sensation and then reflection on sensation.
- Similarly, Feuerbach's claim that our idea of the Divine Being is an abstraction from the being of man – 'poor man possesses a rich God'.
- Psychological and socio-economic claims that we do construct the idea of God and explanations of *why* we do so. Marx's view that 'man makes religion, religion does not make man'. The idea is constructed in order to appease misery, distress, hardship. The Freudian view that belief in God represents the desire for a father figure, protection, security etc.
- There may be references to anti-realism, Wittgenstein, forms of life and/or language games.

Assessment and Evaluation

It may be argued that:

- Even if the idea is innate we can question whether what is represented in the idea is universal – or, perhaps, that if there is something universally represented it is too vague and abstract to be of much use (eg there is something 'other' which is 'awesome').
- Some will argue that the idea of God is not innate or a human invention but that knowing God is a genuine experience we can have and/or that we can find God through faith.
- If it is accepted that the idea is innate there may be some attempt to develop innateness – eg we have the capacity to grasp the idea of God, a capacity triggered by various experiences.
- Some will argue that the idea of God is a construct – and either a useful or damaging fiction.

Theme: Persons**5****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) Explain **and** illustrate **one** criticism of the view that our identity as persons through time is given by our physical continuity. (15 marks)

Some candidates may clarify the view in question prior to identifying a criticism: thus, a person is the same person at T1 and T2 if their body is spatially and temporally continuous throughout T1...T2. There may also be some discussion of how, while we all lose skin cells, brain cells and some of us have organ transplants, implants and other modifications, we don't suppose that such changes, especially if gradual and continuous, amount to a different body. We retain the same form and underlying structure (the same DNA, fingerprints, blood type etc). So, physical continuity shouldn't be taken to mean immutability – although there is, perhaps, a question concerning how much physical change is possible without any change in personal identity. One criticism is likely to draw from:

- Physical continuity isn't a *necessary* condition of identity. We can conceive of attributing identity through time in cases where physical continuity isn't satisfied.
- The claim that we could retain our personal identity in a disembodied existence and so bodily continuity can not be *necessary*.
- Physical continuity isn't a *sufficient* condition of identity. We can conceive of refusing to attribute identity through time where physical continuity is satisfied.
- The continued existence of the whole body isn't required for identity through time, only the continued existence of the brain: but is the continued existence of the *whole* brain necessary or sufficient for identity?
- The continued existence of the brain (or part of it) won't give identity through time if mentality isn't reducible to the functioning of the brain and mentality is what matters.
- The claim that bodily continuity is necessary but not sufficient and so personal identity over time involves more than mere bodily continuity.
- The claim that personal identity over time is not dependent on continuity (bodily or otherwise). I can exist intermittently and still be one and the same.
- The claim that survival through time is a more useful concept.
- The claim that personal identity 'is what it is' and cannot be analysed into or reduced to anything else.

Illustrations are likely to draw from the literature eg thought experiments such as Shoemaker's brain transplant (Brownson) or Parfit's teletransporter (possibly in the form of Star Trek) and/or case studies where, although bodily continuity is present, we would hesitate to ascribe identity eg amnesia, personality disorders etc.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

NB no marks are available for evaluative accounts stressing the importance of psychological criteria. Responses focused on physical change – so that one loses identity following an operation to remove a wart – should not be highly rewarded.

- (b) 'Rights attach to persons, beings who are autonomous and responsible, not necessarily to all humans.' Consider the implications of this view. (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

Candidates cannot be expected to possess an in-depth knowledge, drawn from moral or political philosophy, of moral theories or of rights. A broad grasp of the fact that, if a distinction can be drawn between 'human being' and 'person' there may be some ethical implications will suffice.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Expect some of the following points to be made:

- The concept of a person could be distinguished from that of a human through eg being a matter of degree rather than kind. This may have ethical implications with regard to eg whether diminished persons are seen as having diminished responsibilities and as being less accountable, and punishable, for their actions. They may have fewer legal rights and be less able to exercise some natural rights. Conversely, if some non-humans were accepted onto the scale of personhood they may be seen to possess some rights: this point is likely to be linked to animal rights.
- This could lead to a discussion of the attributes connected with personhood and how they affect our relationship with others – attributes such as self-awareness, self-creation, reason and reflection, sociability, language use, sentience etc. There may be some discussion of speciesism and whether this is or is not like racism or sexism. This is most likely to be applied to animals but could be stretched to cover artificial systems – if an automaton were sufficiently sophisticated, in terms of the relevant attributes, would it have the right not to be dismantled?
- The concept of a person could be distinguished from that of a human through there not being a 1:1 relationship between human and person. If some humans can be said to be more than one person this may raise ethical issues concerning moral responsibility – such as which person is morally responsible for what or, if there is a controlling personality, has another person been damaged?
- Again, if personal identity involves our survival through time as a series of related selves do any of our early selves have ethical obligations in relation to some of our later selves? Is it right to punish one of our later selves for an action undertaken by one of our former selves? Alternatively, if identity through time is based on psychological continuity what are the implications for personhood, and for rights and obligations, if psychological continuity is lost? Is not being able to recollect the same as innocence? If a present self is not responsible for a past action then who is?

Assessment and Evaluation

It should not be expected that explicit links to moral or political theories will be made or that implicit links will be sophisticated, rather an earnest grapple is required:

- We have the concept of human rights and, ordinarily speaking, this concept serves a moral and political purpose. It doesn't apply to non-humans and we risk weakening it by opening it to scrutiny.
- The law, and relevant moral concepts, relates to humans.
- Closer scrutiny narrows the scope of rights – some humans, mainly vulnerable ones, lose rights. This surely can't be intended.
- Closer scrutiny increases the scope of rights – if humans have a right to life as biological systems that house (or used to or will house) persons then other sufficiently similar systems should also enjoy rights. Obligations may also be increased.

- There are not good grounds for denying rights to other species or systems – and this may be argued on the basis of their possession of one or more relevant attributes.

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective part (a) question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective part (b) question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	15	3	18
AO2	0	18	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	15	30	45