



General Certificate of Education

Philosophy 1171

PHIL1 An Introduction to Philosophy 1

Mark Scheme

2009 examination - June series

This mark scheme uses the [new numbering system](#) which is being introduced for examinations from June 2010

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AS PHILOSOPHY**GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (a) questions (Total: 15 marks)**

AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	
Level 3	<p>11–15 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level provide a clear and detailed explanation of the relevant issue and demonstrate a precise understanding of philosophical positions and arguments. Illustrations, if required, are appropriate, articulate and properly developed.</p> <p>Answers at the bottom of this level are accurate and focused but <i>either</i> too succinct <i>or</i> unbalanced: for example, <i>either</i> one point is well made and illustrated but a second point or illustration is less developed <i>or</i> important points and/or illustrations are accurate but briefly stated so that significance is not fully drawn out.</p>
Level 2	<p>6–10 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level may <i>either</i> briefly list a range of points <i>or</i> blur two or more points together <i>or</i> explanation is clear but unbalanced so that a point is well made but illustrative material is less convincing <i>or</i> lacking <i>or</i> illustrations are good but the point being illustrated is less clear and perhaps left implicit.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>If two points are required answers in this level may <i>either</i> clearly identify, explain and illustrate one relevant point so that a partial explanation is given <i>or</i> one point may be well made and well illustrated but the second is very briefly stated or unclear, unconvincing and/or not illustrated.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The response is broadly accurate but prosaic, generalised and lacking detail and precision.</p>
Level 1	<p>0–5 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level <i>either</i> make one point with little development or without illustration <i>or</i> provide a basic, sketchy and vague account <i>or</i> a confused or tangential account which may only coincide with the concerns of the question in places.</p>

AS PHILOSOPHY

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions (Total: 30 marks)

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 4	N/A	<p>15–18 marks</p> <p>A clear and closely argued discussion incorporating a well-developed appreciation of some of the philosophical issues at stake by applying and analysing a range of points in some detail and with precision.</p>	N/A
Level 3	<p>3 marks</p> <p>A sound understanding of some issues raised by the question, identifying relevant ideas/evidence.</p>	<p>10–14 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level are directed at the relevant issues but:</p> <p><i>Either:</i> a narrow focus but the detail is pithy and organised intelligently.</p> <p><i>Or:</i> Broad and accurate detail but analysis, while present, is undeveloped or not always convincing.</p> <p>Answers at the bottom of this band may be full but largely descriptive.</p>	<p>7–9 marks</p> <p>Answers at the top of this level provide a well thought out appreciation of some problematic issues raised by the specific demands of the question. Reasoning is employed to support the conclusion advanced.</p> <p>Lower in the band conclusions are supported but the reasoning is not sharp <i>or</i> critical discussion is good but not employed to support a conclusion.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.</p>

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions (continued)

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 2	<p>2 marks</p> <p>Answers are relevant but <i>either</i> fail to maintain a focus on the specific question <i>or</i> are partial responses, where ideas/examples lack detail.</p>	<p>5–9 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level provide some relevant material but:</p> <p><i>Either:</i> points are made but not developed and analysis, if present, is limited.</p> <p><i>Or:</i> the relevance of some points may be unclear although analysis is present.</p>	<p>4–6 marks</p> <p>Evaluation is not sustained, although it is present implicitly or explicitly.</p> <p><i>Either:</i> alternative approaches are merely described, without explicit comparison or assessment.</p> <p><i>Or:</i> relevant critical material is selected but the conclusion advanced does not seem to follow from the argument.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>
Level 1	<p>1 mark</p> <p>Answers in this level demonstrate a basic grasp of aspects of relevant issues. Responses may be sketchy and vague; <i>or</i> confused <i>or</i> largely tangential although at least one point should coincide with the concerns of the question.</p>	<p>1–4 marks</p> <p>Answers in this level are sketchy, fragmentary responses <i>or</i> an isolated relevant point appears in an otherwise tangential <i>or</i> confused response.</p>	<p>1–3 marks</p> <p>Critical comments are vague and the reasoning sketchy. Lower in the band argumentation may be confused <i>or</i> a response to the question may be barely outlined without any critical discussion.</p> <p>Technical language may not be employed or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.</p>

Theme 1: Reason and experience**Total for this question: 45 marks**

01 Explain and illustrate **two** ways in which it is possible to have a *a priori* knowledge.
(15 marks)

Anticipate the following explanations:

Candidates *may* associate a *a priori* knowledge with rationalism and there *may* be references to Plato, Descartes, Kant and/or to the (classical) empiricist view that such knowledge is trivial. There is likely to be some description of a *a priori* knowledge as knowledge held before, or independently of, experience (or, perhaps, justifiable independently of experience) and this may be further developed in terms of logical necessity, innate knowledge, analytic statements and necessary truths (there is likely to be some blurring here). Accept any two of the following:

- Intuition: rational insight, grasping the truth of a proposition, ‘seeing’ it to be true by ‘the light of reason’ (or, possibly, having a clear and distinct idea that...). This might be connected to logically necessary truths;
- Through understanding the meanings of terms in analytic statements which are true by definition (or in which the concept of the predicate is contained within the subject). This may also be linked to necessity;
- There may also be references to synthetic a priori knowledge (Kant and mathematics) and/or to contingent a priori knowledge (Kripke);
- Deduction or demonstration: deriving further conclusions from intuited or necessarily true premises through valid argumentation;
- Innate knowledge: knowledge not learned through either sense experience or intuition and deduction (Plato, learning as remembering).

Illustrative examples may be drawn from the literature, although this may depend on which points are made:

- The laws of logic: eg whatever is green all over can’t also be red all over;
- Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas – which might be linked to innate ideas, intuition or demonstration – that, eg God can be known to exist *a priori*, the internal angles of a triangle = two right angles, etc;
- Hume’s $3 \times 5 = \text{half of } 30$; or, if injustice is defined as the violation of property, where there is no property there can be no injustice;
- Kant’s view that the truths of mathematics – eg that $7 + 5 = 12$ – are a priori, necessary and synthetic (and, possibly, that moral principles are a priori);
- Plato’s view that mathematical truths are recalled (with some prompting) – the slave boy in the Meno or an equivalent example eg of how beauty is grasped;
- The claim (cf Kripke) that, eg ‘a gobbet = 1000 bits’ is *a priori* and contingent;
- Various truths claimed for all logically possible worlds or any other proposition which illustrates a point (expect references to bachelors and spinsters).

NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

Expositions which focus on innate ideas (or conceptual frameworks or faculties) or instincts should be regarded as tangential and placed in the bottom band.

02	Critically discuss the view that all knowledge comes from, and is justified by, sense experience.	<i>(30 marks)</i>
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Knowledge and Understanding

The view will probably be identified as an empiricist approach to knowledge acquisition: sense experience may be described as the source of all knowledge or as the source of important rather than trivial knowledge (although this may also be what is concluded). Genuine, or important, knowledge claims describe that which can be verified or falsified through sense experience. There may be references to accounts offered by specific philosophers, eg Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Russell, Ayer, etc and/or to *a posteriori* knowledge, empiricist foundationalism and/or sense data.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Anticipate the following points of discussion:

Strengths:

- The view that the mind is a *tabula rasa* – there is nothing in the mind which doesn't stem from experience; illustrations of the acquisition, and/or legitimacy, of ideas, concepts and knowledge; the claim that meaningful talk is expressed in experiential terms; scepticism about the validity of knowledge claims not defined in experiential terms – for example claims about ethics, religion, universals, causation and so on – and scepticism about the role of reason, intellect and intuition in gaining knowledge; the radical empiricist view that all knowledge, including analytic propositions, is rooted in experience and/or that no knowledge is genuinely *a priori*.

Weaknesses:

- A discussion of the limitations of empiricism and/or the significance of reason; whether all *a priori* truths are trivial, whether they are all analytic and whether reason is downgraded too far; issues concerning what is revealed directly and non-inferentially in sense experience, and what can be inferred from it; the status and/or alleged incorrigibility of sense data; problems concerning the justification of inferential knowledge, eg the problem of induction; whether justification requires non-empirical assumptions to be made; problems concerning general, abstract or relational terms; problems concerned knowledge which is known *a priori*, such as mathematical knowledge; whether empiricism leads to scepticism; the problem of solipsism; the view that some knowledge is innate; the view that some (non-trivial?) knowledge is possessed without experience; the paradox of empiricism – are empiricist claims empirically based?

Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- This isn't what empiricists argue, they hold that non-trivial knowledge comes from sense experience;
- Experience is clearly important to concept formation and to the generation of knowledge or belief networks;
- *Although* it is less clear how experience justifies knowledge, this may lead to a sceptical conclusion;
- General principles which are not derived empirically, so are *a priori*, underpin our experience and the acquisition of knowledge;
- Divisions between empiricism and rationalism have been drawn too sharply and/or both mistakenly pursue certainty and result in scepticism.

Theme 2: Why should I be governed?**Total for this question: 45 marks**

03	Outline and illustrate two criticisms of the concept of tacit consent.	<i>(15 marks)</i>
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There could be some explanation of the significance of the notion of consent generally – eg as the standard way in which liberals attempt to ground political obligations – and/or an account of difficulties concerning the notion of *explicit* or *express* consent. The notion of tacit consent is *one* attempt to get round these difficulties. The view that we tacitly consent to government typically involves the ideas that we haven't left the country, we continue to accept the benefits of political organisation and we participate in political practices.

Anticipate the following criticisms of the concept of tacit consent:

- The notion of consent is intended to establish the obligations that rational individuals accept – but how many individuals understand what it is that they're tacitly consenting to?
- Isn't this concept, or the way it is typically unpacked, equally applicable across all political regimes? If so, is the concept credible? If not, what makes it only applicable in 'free' states?
- Related to the above, where does this leave the concept of dissent?
- Are people at liberty to leave the country?
- Do people have somewhere else to go?
- Is it true that we all benefit – or, perhaps, benefit equally – from political organisation?

Illustrations of two criticisms might include:

- Evidence of political ignorance;
- Evidence of dissent – for example in forms of direct action;
- The significance of economic, social and cultural factors in preventing the disenchanted from leaving the country;
- The significance of political factors in preventing dissenters from going somewhere else;
- Evidence of inequality, discrimination and prejudice.

Note that *one* illustrative example may cover *two* ways.

NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts claiming that consent is hypothetical rather than tacit although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

*Expositions which list or blur together **more** than **two** criticisms should be awarded marks in the middle band. Responses focused on explicit consent should be regarded as tangential and placed in the bottom band.*

04 Why, if at all, might civil disobedience be justified?

(30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

Civil disobedience will probably be defined as unlawful conduct designed to change a law (or laws) without rejecting the rule of law generally. Consequently, such unlawful conduct is typically non-violent, non-revolutionary and the group or groups involved are willing to accept punishment for infringements of the law. Civil disobedience is political, concerned with issues of justice and rights, rather than with social or religious interests. As such, the action involved is public.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Anticipate the following points of discussion:

- Examples of civil disobedience will probably be provided – eg civil rights campaigns, refusals to pay the poll tax etc;
- This may involve references to specific individuals – Thoreau, Martin Luther King, Gandhi, etc;
- Attempts to distinguish civil disobedience from other forms of protest – eg those that are more narrow/sectional (such as strikes) or more violent (forms of direct action) or more individual (conscientious objection) or social (direct action again);
- References to how (and why) disobedience may be indirect – involving a refusal to comply with one law in order to protest another – or direct – a refusal to comply with a law deemed to be ‘unjust’;
- References to specific grounds for disobedience. For example, where a law does not uphold individual rights or where rights are not extended to certain groups; where a law fails to treat individuals equally; where actual law does not coincide with natural law and where individuals feel the law to be unjust and/or that they have a higher duty than to obey the law; where the state exceeds its role;
- Some may refer to a right of dissent and link this to why rational individuals accept political obligations generally – this might also be linked to the idea that the consensus is strengthened through dissent and disobedience.

Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- Civil disobedience is never justified: this view might be taken on the grounds that illegal actions undermine the rule of law generally and/or on the grounds that it is hypocritical to enjoy the benefits afforded by political organisation and, at the same time, to object to aspects of that organisation (some may refer to Socrates);
- While one might have a right of dissent in principle it isn’t always prudent to exercise that right: if civil disobedience is designed to appeal to a sense of justice in the majority, such an appeal might fail; alternatively, if government is not being pressured by the majority or if it is insensitive to public opinion and particularly to minority opinion, again the appeal might fail and lead to a deterioration in political relations;
- In certain situations non-violent disobedience may be less likely to succeed than more forceful direct action;
- Civil disobedience is justified when a law infringes the liberty and equal rights of citizens (or of a group), when lawful attempts to redress this have failed and when disobedience does not extend to so many as to threaten serious disorder or a crisis of legitimacy (some may refer to Rawls).

Theme 3: Why should I be moral?**Total for this question: 45 marks**

05 Explain and illustrate two ways in which self interest may conflict with morality. <div style="text-align: right;"><i>(15 marks)</i></div>
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This question may be approached in different ways. The general idea is that there is a rift between enlightened or rational self-interest and moral values. Two reasons why there might be a rift are likely to be drawn from:

- A critical account of morality – for example, as a set of beliefs that expresses the values and interests of the powerful – as something ‘external’ to me and as something acting against my ‘real’ interests;
- A similar point may be made in the context of a more positive account of morality: it might be accepted that there are objective moral truths but that these fail to provide moral motivation especially when they conflict with self-interest;
- Particular circumstances (eg social and economic circumstances) may generate immoral (and self-interested) actions and/or the view that if we can gain by acting self-interestedly and get away with it then we would do;
- As a matter of fact (allegedly) we always act to pursue self-interest (psychological egoism) and this may not coincide with the demands of morality;
- The loss of faith, or trust, in others to act morally may weaken our moral motivation (or commitment to a contract) and strengthen the desire to protect our own interests;
- The above point expressed in a pre-contractual context (eg Hobbes);
- The view that morality has nothing to do with self-interest, rather morality requires us to overcome self-interest, recognise our duties and act accordingly.

Reward other reasonable points.

Illustrative examples might be constructed by candidates; be taken from literature or film or draw from the philosophical literature (eg the ring of Gyges, the prisoners’ dilemma, examples offered by Kant, etc).

NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts of, for example, whether some of the above reflect what is strictly required by morality or what is strictly in our interests, although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

*Expositions which list or blur together **more than two** ways should be awarded marks in the middle band.*

06 It pays to be moral. Discuss.

(30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

Given the part (a) question a relevant knowledge-base might be found in critical responses to points previously raised. Beyond this, references to appropriate normative theories – such as social contract theories and/or virtue ethics – are likely to feature. Some may address the question through concepts (rather than theories) such as happiness, well-being, justice and rights.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some of the following positions may be referred to:

- The view that we can't articulate our interests independently of morality. This may be linked to (ethical) egoism, various contract theories and virtue ethics and/or to concepts such as happiness, well-being, security and justice.

Critical discussion could select from:

- Whether the idea of a moral community of self-interested ethical egoists is convincing and whether such an idea has anything informative to say about what morality is;
- Whether the idea that self-interest is secured via a social and moral contract is convincing. Can morality be the product of a contract? Some versions suggest that a covenant is made to secure moral principles (eg natural rights) which, therefore, cannot be the product of a contract. Others might be said to lead to a 'tyranny of the majority'. Do outsiders, or those who cannot express consent, have no moral rights? Does the fact – if it were a fact – that we've agreed mean that we ought to honour our agreement? Again, given differences in the contractual approach (concerning why we make a contract and/or what we contract to) does this approach leave the question of what is moral open?
- Whether the idea that it is in our interest to be moral/virtuous is convincing. Standard difficulties here include whether it 'pays' to be moral or whether virtue is its own reward; whether the notion of morality here is relativist or essentialist; whether this provides a complete account of morality; whether it is a circular theory (a virtuous person is one who develops the right traits and lives well: the right traits are those displayed by the virtuous person). Some may refer to the 'ring of Gyges';
- If our self-interest is served by appearing to be moral do we have a reason to actually be moral?
- Can we tell what someone's motivation for action is?
- Do moral beliefs provide reasons for action?
- Isn't the moral hero (someone who acts morally against their own interests and desires) as valuable, or more valuable, than the moral saint (someone who acts morally and lives well because they've developed the appropriate interests and desires)? This point may lead to an account of duty ethics;
- If we accept the view in the question have we (legitimately) closed the is–ought gap?

Assessment and Evaluation

A range of argumentation is possible:

- Answers rooted in certain normative theories may, for example, link reasons to be moral to self-interest through concepts like security, harmony, flourishing, happiness, equality, justice, etc and/or to the general claim that morality is clearly connected to human well-being. This may be seen as persuasive or as failing to persuade. Non-moral reasons for being moral may seem corrupt;

- Some may argue that there are countless examples of situations or virtues where it clearly wouldn't be – or hasn't been – in somebody's interests to act morally: in a failing state, for example, it may be moral to commit treason but if this results in the death penalty it isn't obvious that it would be in one's interests to commit treason;
- Some are likely to argue that it is necessary to divorce morality from self-interest; morality consists in overcoming self-interest and in doing what is right;
- Some may suggest that, until we can offer some definitive explanation of what 'being moral' consists in, the issue is vacuous.

Theme 4: The idea of God**Total for this question: 45 marks**

07	Explain and illustrate one criticism of the ontological argument.	<i>(15 marks)</i>
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Candidates will probably provide some background information on the nature of ontological arguments for the existence of God as, for example, a priori arguments which attempt to establish His existence without recourse to empirical evidence. From a purely formal consideration of the concept of God it is claimed that we can establish that God is a necessary being, that the concept of God is necessarily instantiated. Existence is part of the definition of God: to define God is to define a Being whose existence is necessary.

Candidates are likely to select and apply *one* of the following or equivalent critical points:

- We can imagine the perfect island (or perfect anything else) and ontological arguments seem to bring these into existence. Thus, the argument has absurd consequences;
- The overload objection: how many perfect beings are there? Or, if there's only one, which one is it?
- The definite description criticism (against Anselm);
- It is not possible to define something into existence. Conceptually there may be necessary links between subjects and their predicates but this doesn't imply that such a subject exists;
- The denial that there are any necessarily existing beings that actually exist is not a contradiction;
- Necessity does not apply to existence;
- Existence is not a perfection, property, predicate. Existence doesn't function like a predicate, it doesn't describe the subject; the application of a predicate already assumes there is a subject to which it belongs. Russell's account of propositional functions;
- It is inappropriate to use logic to demonstrate the existence of God — His existence is revealed experientially and our experiences of God do not include experiences of His logical necessity.

Illustrative material is likely to draw upon familiar examples — Gaunilo's perfect island; super unicorn; Kant's real and possible thalers; Malcolm's future chancellor; Anscombe's dodo; examples of meaningful predicates contrasted with 'exists'. Hopefully, some candidates will construct their own examples to reinforce their point.

NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts, eg Anselm's reply to Gaunilo, examples of where 'exists' might be used as a genuine predicate or whether the argument does have absurd consequences, etc although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

Expositions which list or blur more than one criticism together should be awarded marks in the middle band.

08 'The concept of God is incoherent.' Discuss.

(30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

Given the wording, as well as the part (a) question, it is likely that candidates will begin with a list of God's attributes: God is eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, supremely good, immanent and transcendent. The issue is whether these attributes are mutually, or singularly, coherent. Can we make sense of God?

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some of the following or equivalent points will be raised and developed:

- Can we make sense of omnipotence? Can God create an object that is so heavy that He cannot lift it? Whichever answer is given limits His omnipotence. Does the problem disappear if God is corporeal? Is it OK to suggest that omnipotence is limited by the laws of logic? Can we describe His limitations if we cannot describe what He can't do?
- Perhaps a more significant question is whether God can create beings (ourselves) over whom He has no control (because we have free will)?
- The issue of free will might also be used to raise questions concerning omniscience: if God is omniscient then He knows what we will do and we could not have acted differently; if we have free will then we could have acted differently;
- If God is atemporal then perhaps the above issue is resolved, but if God is atemporal, eternal (rather than everlasting) and immutable, can He also be omniscient?
- If God is immutable is there any point in prayer? Can he respond to the way I feel?
- Can God be both immanent and transcendent?
- If He is transcendent, how and why does He intervene in His creation? Is the notion of the miraculous coherent?
- Can God be infinitely just and infinitely merciful?
- Can we make sense of supreme goodness? The Euthyphro dilemma: is 'x' good because God commands it or does God command 'x' because it is good? Should we do 'x' because it is good, or should we do 'x' because God has commanded it? If the latter, is our motivation moral or prudential?
- If He is omnipotent, omniscient and supremely good why does evil exist? If He knows about it and doesn't stop it then either He is not good or He is not able to stop it. Is there a convincing solution to the problem of evil?

Good answers may discuss the issue by either briefly developing a range of the above points or by concentrating on one or two points in depth (for example, a critical discussion of the problem of evil in relation to the Divine attributes).

Assessment and Evaluation

This is an issue which is likely to produce strong (but not necessarily strongly argued) views:

- Some will argue that the way we conceptualise God is mistaken: either it is a mistake to attempt to conceptualise what is beyond our understanding or we need to rid God of some of these attributes or not multiply attributes to infinity;
- Some will argue that there are convincing theistic responses to at least some of these issues. Expect to see references to Swinburne, Hick, etc. Some may adopt the view that faith should prevail where reason will not;
- Some will argue that, following a discussion of the above, we should be led to atheism rather than theism.

Theme 5: Persons**Total for this question: 45 marks**

<p>09 Explain and illustrate two reasons why some humans might become diminished persons. (15 marks)</p>

There will probably be some references to the view that ‘personhood’ is, arguably, a matter of degree (rather than kind) and/or to the view that there are, or may be, both complex and simple persons. Diminution refers to a lessening (rather than a complete loss) of personhood, so that in certain important respects one becomes less complex, weakened or reduced in some way. The issue here, therefore, involves potential reasons for the decline of a previously complex self.

This may be approached through an account of some proposed characteristics of personhood. So that one becomes diminished if there is a decline in:

- Self-awareness through time;
- Self-control or self-creation: a decline in autonomy or a decline in one’s ability to reason and reflect;
- Sociability: one is less able to identify, understand and/or relate to others;
- Communication: language skills are lost.

However, more descriptive responses may focus on situations, illnesses or disorders effecting a gradual or sudden loss or change of identity (rather than a total loss of personhood). For example:

- Dementia;
- Amnesia;
- Brain damage;
- Disassociative disorders following traumatic events.

These are also likely to be employed to illustrate diminution. Note that *one* illustrative example may be used to bring out two reasons.

NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts of the concept of a person although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts (if there are any) should be rewarded.

Responses which list or blur together more than two reasons should be seen as generalised and placed in the middle band. Responses focused on ex or potential persons should be regarded as tangential and placed in the bottom band.

10 How convincing is the claim that our personal identity through time is given by psychological continuity? (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

The view in question may be expounded as the view that a person is the same person at T1 and T2 if their mind/psyche (or mental history or memories) is continuous throughout T1...T2. There may be references to a Cartesian approach (mind as the 'essential' self) or to Locke (identity is determined by memory or the unity of conscious experience). Essentially, identity is given by thinking of oneself as 'the same thinking thing in different times and places'.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some of the following, or equivalent, points could feature in discussions:

- A distinction between numerical and qualitative identity. The question of how much qualitative change is possible for someone to remain, numerically, 'the same';
- The difficulties of identifying and re-identifying an incorporeal substance as 'self' and/or whether it is possible to describe 'the same consciousness' as that which unites experiences without reference to body. The problem of 'ghostly' persons;
- Whether psychological continuity through time is a necessary condition of identity. There may be references to cases where psychological continuity isn't present yet we still wish to attribute identity so psychological continuity is not a necessary condition for personal identity;
- Whether psychological identity through time is a sufficient condition of identity. There may be references to cases where psychological continuity is present but we refuse to, or cannot, attribute identity so psychological continuity isn't sufficient for identity;
- Whether this view involves us in circularity (Butler);
- Whether it involves us in contradiction (Reid's general);
- The implications of the memory criterion, reincarnation, forgetfulness and para-memory: whether a succession of different persons could inhabit the same body or whether the same consciousness could inhabit two bodies etc. Psychological continuity is not simply about memory;
- There may be references to other puzzle cases (either as thought experiments and/or scientific possibilities) such as split brains, brain transplants, cloning etc;
- The claim that psychological continuity depends on the brain and is, in fact, physical continuity. But does it depend on the whole brain? Also, is it the brain that is important or what is 'in' it?
- The significance of physicality for identity.
- Whether 'survival' through time is a more useful concept than 'continuity' and identity through time – the view that we don't have identity through time. But how do we characterise what it is that survives through time? Must this be psychological?
- Identity, 'I' or self, are, somehow, false ideas;
- Personal identity is 'what it is' and cannot be reduced to anything else. The intelligibility of 'puzzle cases' might be questioned.

Assessment and Evaluation

A range of argumentation, following points selected for discussion, is possible:

- Psychological continuity is important for both personhood and personal identity: this might be described as a 'standard' philosophical view. It may be backed up by references to problem cases concerning alternative criterion such as bodily continuity, eg cloning; brain damage, division and transplants; amnesia; personality change etc. These suggest that what matters is psychological;

- The body is more significant to our identities than most have been prepared to admit;
- Our (psychological) survival through time is of more significance than psychological continuity or identity – survival is the more significant concept and gives us what we want (although it may lead to some difficult moral questions).

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective part (a) question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective part (b) question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	15	3	18
AO2	0	18	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	15	30	45