



**General Certificate of Education**

**Philosophy 1171/2171**

**PHIL1      An Introduction to Philosophy 1**

**Mark Scheme**

*2009 examination – January series*

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## AS PHILOSOPHY

### Mark Scheme for part (a) questions

<b>AO1: Knowledge and Understanding</b>	
<p><b>11–15 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level provide a clear and detailed explanation of the relevant issue and demonstrate a precise understanding of philosophical positions and arguments. Illustrations, if required, are appropriate, articulate and properly developed.</p> <p>Answers at the bottom of this level are accurate and focused but <i>either</i> too succinct <i>or</i> unbalanced: for example, <i>either</i> one point is well made and illustrated but a second point or illustration is less developed <i>or</i> important points and/or illustrations are accurate but briefly stated so that significance is not fully drawn out.</p>	<b>Level 3</b>
<p><b>6–10 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level may <i>either</i> briefly list a range of points <i>or</i> blur two or more points together <i>or</i> explanation is clear but unbalanced so that a point is well made but illustrative material is less convincing <i>or</i> illustrations are good but the point being illustrated is less clear and perhaps left implicit.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>If two points are required answers in this level may <i>either</i> clearly identify, explain and illustrate one relevant point so that a partial explanation is given <i>or</i> one point may be well made and well illustrated but the second is very briefly stated or unclear, unconvincing and/or not illustrated.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The response is broadly accurate but prosaic, generalised and lacking detail and precision.</p>	<b>Level 2</b>
<p><b>0–5 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level <i>either</i> make one reasonable point with little development or without illustration <i>or</i> provide a basic, sketchy and vague account <i>or</i> a confused or tangential account which may only coincide with the concerns of the question in places.</p>	<b>Level 1</b>

## Mark Scheme for part (b) questions

	<b>AO1: Knowledge and Understanding</b>	<b>AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application</b>	<b>AO3: Assessment and Evaluation</b>
<b>Level 4</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<p><b>15-18 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level provide an integrated and sustained critical analysis of the issue applying and analysing at least three points in detail and with precision.</p> <p>Answers at the bottom of this band may be full and engaged but analysis may be less developed or one-sided.</p>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>Level 3</b>	<p><b>3 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level are focused, full and informed accounts of the relevant issue.</p>	<p><b>10–14 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level provide an uneven analysis. Discussion is directed at the relevant issues, links are present and the significance of points for the question is explicit but:</p> <p><i>Either:</i></p> <p>The response is clear but brief, only a couple of pertinent issues are analysed in detail and with precision.</p> <p><i>Or:</i></p> <p>Several issues are discussed but points raised lack detail and precision and analysis is more limited.</p>	<p><b>7-9 marks</b></p> <p>At the top of this level a critical appreciation of points raised is employed to advance a position.</p> <p>At the bottom of this level assessment is explicit and conclusions are supported but the support offered could be more convincing or more developed.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately with few, if any, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.</p>
<b>Level 2</b>	<p><b>2 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level are focused but <i>either</i> general responses lacking precision <i>or</i> partial accounts that are nevertheless accurate.</p>	<p><b>5–9 marks</b></p> <p>Answers in this level provide some relevant material but either this is applied descriptively rather than analytically or the relevance of certain points may be dubious or unclear.</p> <p><i>Or:</i></p> <p>The response is very brief and only one relevant point</p>	<p><b>4-6 marks</b></p> <p>Evaluation is not sustained, although it is present. Evaluation may take the form of an explicit juxtaposition of theoretical approaches <i>or</i> be implicit in points selected for discussion <i>or</i> there may be a reasonable but unsupported assertion (lower in the level this may</p>

		is developed and discussed.	follow a limited range of critical points). The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.
<b>Level 1</b>	<b>1 mark</b> Answers in this level demonstrate a basic and limited grasp of relevant issues. Responses may be sketchy and vague; lacking in detail and precision <i>or</i> accounts may be confused or largely tangential although at least one point should coincide with the concerns of the question.	<b>1–4 marks</b> Answers in this level are undeveloped, sketchy, vague fragmentary responses <i>or</i> the discussion lacks direction, may be largely tangential and there are only isolated points of relevance.	<b>1-3 marks</b> At the top of this band evaluative points are merely asserted without any support and may not follow from the discussion. Responses lower in the band may be quite full but largely descriptive. A personal view may be described rather than argued for, or argument may be confused. Technical language may not be employed, or may be used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.

**Theme: Reason and experience****1****Total for this question: 45 marks**(a) Explain and illustrate **one** account of the origin of our conceptual schemes. (15 marks)*Expect the following explanations:*

There could be some clarification of what, exactly, a conceptual scheme is: for example, a conceptual scheme provides a linguistic structure for the organisation of experience; without a conceptual scheme it is difficult to see how experience could get off the ground and/or be apprehended in an orderly fashion to begin with.

- The acquisition of a conceptual scheme could be regarded as an *a posteriori* process, one that is fundamentally grounded in experience. The empiricist approach of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, etc. This may be coupled with a brief account and/or illustration of ostension; the view that language is acquired via the empirical act of ‘pointing and naming’.
- The acquisition of a conceptual scheme could be regarded as an *a priori* process, one that is required for but necessarily precedes experience. The rationalist (or Kantian) approach.
- The acquisition of a conceptual scheme could be regarded as being linguistically relative; acquired within and reflecting a specific set of cultural/social practices and values (Wittgenstein, Quine, etc).
- There could be references to biological and/or psychological mechanisms.

Illustrative examples are likely to be drawn from the literature, for example:

- Hume’s account of how we acquire the concept of causation, or of what the concept of God amounts to.
- The Kantian view that certain concepts are required by, but not grounded in; experience might be illustrated via causation, time, space, identity, etc.
- References could be made to the alleged ‘innateness’ of conceptual schemes via Plato – mathematical abilities – or Chomsky – grammatical structures that are not reducible to the empirical act of ‘copying’.
- Linguistic relativity may be illustrated, hopefully imaginatively, via examples of societies that deploy a range of concepts where we use only one (eg ‘snow’); or through the ambiguity of concepts from culture to culture; or through examples of cultures that lack the conceptual apparatus of time or number, etc.
- The impact of evolution on ways of seeing.

*NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.*

*Expositions which list or blur together **more than one** account of conceptual scheme acquisition should be awarded marks in the middle band of this category. Responses focused on knowledge acquisition (rather than conceptual schemes) should be regarded as tangential and placed in the bottom band.*

- (b) How convincing is the view that we are born with at least some (innate) knowledge?  
(30 marks)

### Knowledge and Understanding

The view will probably be identified as a rationalist approach to knowledge acquisition: the view that some, if not all, knowledge is innate; there may be references to Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant and Chomsky. (*NB* students should not conflate the notion of innateness with necessary, *a priori*, and/or analytic knowledge.) It is possible that students may have referred to innate knowledge in part (a), in which case some knowledge and understanding may be implicit in this part-question.

### Interpretation, Analysis, Application

*Expect the following points of discussion:*

- A contrast with the view that the mind is a *tabula rasa* – there is nothing in the mind which doesn't stem from experience.

*Strengths of the view:*

- Appeal to innateness supports the existence of propositional knowledge without an experiential grounding (God, the propositions of logic, identity, universals, morality, causation, etc) and/or the intrinsic conceptual scheme under which our experience of the world is subsumed (Kant).
- Innate knowledge, given its disconnectedness from the world, develops a sceptical immunity which empirical knowledge lacks; it is regarded as being both necessarily true and true *a priori* (the converse is not necessarily true).
- There is some psychological/neurological support for the innate knowledge thesis; depth perception, facial recognition, genetic dispositions, etc.

*Weaknesses of the view:*

- Specific criticisms of particular accounts of the innate knowledge thesis; eg of Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, or Chomsky.
- The limitations of the 'strong' innate knowledge thesis (that *all* knowledge is congenital) could include examples of propositional knowledge that *necessarily* requires experiential input.
- Even 'weaker' formulations of the innateness thesis seem to require a correspondent knowledge base given in experience, even if only to 'draw out' that which is already latent within.
- Locke's appeal to 'lack of universal assent'.
- Similarly, infants appear to lack any 'innate principles' and this seems to support the *tabula rasa* account of mind.
- A Humean/empiricist critique of innate knowledge as either empty, metaphysical speculation or as trivial/uninformative.
- Whether the innate knowledge thesis is epistemologically restrictive? How much could we be said to 'know' on such an account?

## Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- Innateness provides the only viable grounds for knowledge acquisition; experience, to this effect, remains largely, if not completely impotent.
- The rationalist appeal to innateness underplays the role of experience; whilst there are certain 'characteristic' types of innate knowledge, experience must play some role in the 'unearthing' of such principles.
- Whilst experience is 'given', this is testimony to the existence of certain (synthetic *a priori*) principles which govern our experience of the world.
- It could be argued that an exhaustive account of that which is known can be given in experiential terms alone. All else is 'sophistry and illusion' (the radically empiricist approach).

Discussions of innate **ideas** as opposed to **knowledge** should be regarded as 'generalised' discussions.



**Theme: Why should I be governed?****2****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) Explain and illustrate **two** ways in which an individual might possess authority. (15 marks)

There could be some explanation of what authority involves. Authority is, typically, seen as a normative concept. It is *de jure*. The exercise of power, the control and organisation of resources, is recognised and consented to. In contrast, power is typically seen as a causal concept. The possession and application of power produces results, resources are controlled and organised. It is *de facto*.

*Expect the following explanations of ways that an individual might possess authority:*

- A general explanation of the importance of consent and its relationship to legitimacy: conventionally, the notion of authority is linked to legitimacy via other normative concepts like *entitlement*, *acceptance* and *popular approval*.
- Two ways may be drawn from the 'ideal types' of authority presented as sources of legitimacy by Weber: *rational-legal grounds*, *traditional grounds* and *charismatic grounds*.
- References could also be made to the distinction between being 'in authority' and being 'an authority': in the latter case, individuals are able to legitimately exert influence because they possess expertise.

Illustrations of two ways might include:

- The acceptance, or popular approval, afforded to an individual by a group.
- An individual who has been elected or (legitimately) appointed to a position of authority.
- An individual who commands respect in virtue of their personality and through certain qualities/characteristics they possess.
- An individual associated with an organisation – which may be a family group, church, etc – which has traditionally been respected.
- An individual with specific skills or knowledge.

Note that *one* illustrative example may cover *two* ways: for example, a teacher; a spokesperson for a pressure group, etc.

*NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.*

*Expositions which list or blur together more than two ways that individuals may hold authority should be awarded marks in the middle band. Responses focused on power should be regarded as tangential and placed in the bottom band.*

(b) Is any account of the condition of mankind in a state of nature convincing? (30 marks)
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### Knowledge and Understanding

The question is plural and details of different versions of the condition of man in a 'state of nature' are required: in a state of nature there is a war of all against all in which life is 'nasty, brutish and short' (Hobbes); in a state of nature men live together according to reason, in perfect freedom and equality without superiors (on earth) to judge them (Locke); in a state of nature men are happy and content, or noble savages (Rousseau).

### Interpretation, Analysis, Application

*Expect the following points of discussion:*

- More detailed descriptions of different accounts of life in a state of nature may be used to point out that there is no agreement concerning what life is like in a state of nature: whether it is characterised by mutual suspicion and hostility, an absence of faith or trust in others (Hobbes); or a state in which natural moral laws are present and generally prevail in man's relations with others (Locke); or a state in which men are, like 'brutes' driven by self-preservation *and* compassion (Rousseau).
- Is the state of nature supposed to be pre-social or a state which is ever-present, and suppressed, in society?
- Descriptions of man in a state of nature are not depictions of pre-social man but of man already corrupted by political society and/or the state of nature is civil society minus government.
- Whether the account offered by Hobbes is consistent or coherent: for example the state of nature is pre-moral yet there are laws of nature which appear to be moral guidelines; and/or whether our motivation to survive generates conflict/war or co-operation/peace.
- Whether the account offered by Locke is consistent or coherent: there are references to both the 'inconvenience' of not having a body to enforce the moral law as well as to the 'executive power of the law of nature'; is man's life in a state of nature relatively ordered, rational, moral and harmonious or is it inconveniently less than peaceful?
- Whether the account offered by Rousseau is consistent or coherent: if we are driven towards both self-preservation and compassion would life in a state of nature be as idyllic as he suggests? Is it likely that primitive life would be idyllic? If it is idyllic, why change?

### Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- Accounts of man in a state of nature may not be especially convincing but nevertheless the concept remains a useful fiction.
- Some accounts are less convincing than others because they describe post-social rather than pre-social man.
- No account does what it is required to do because the motivation for leaving a state of nature is less than convincing.
- The concept is not intended to describe pre-social man; it is intended to describe 'what lies beneath'.
- The notion of a state of nature fails to justify the State: anarchy seems equally plausible.
- There is a lack of coherence in some accounts.
- The kind of State that some accounts point to is less than attractive.

**Theme: Why should I be moral?****3****Total for this question: 45 marks**

- (a) Explain and illustrate **two** criticisms of the view that morality is the product of a social contract. *(15 marks)*

The view will be recognised as a ‘contractual’ approach to morality and one or more versions of a social contract may be briefly described. The general idea is that there is no rift between enlightened or rational self-interest and moral values. Two criticisms of this view are likely to be drawn from:

- We haven’t *actually* made a conventional agreement with others and/or even if we argue *hypothetically* (ie that we would agree to accept moral conventions if given the opportunity to do so) this may not generate the obligations that *actually* exist.
- Is this really what morality amounts to? Is it the case that morality can be described purely in terms of self-interest and mutual advantage?
- Can morality be the product of a contract? Don’t we need some moral principles in order to even think in terms of a contract?
- What we (would be prepared to) contract to must be the product of some pre-existing beliefs and values about what constitutes a worthwhile life.
- If morality is perceived as resulting from a conventional agreement, are some moral values ‘higher’ than others? How do we explain dissent on moral grounds?
- Some positions suggest that a conventional agreement is made to secure moral principles (eg natural rights) which, therefore, cannot be the product of a contract.
- Others might be said to licence a ‘tyranny of the majority’.
- Given differences in the contractual approach (concerning why we make a contract and/or what we contract to) this approach leaves the question of what is moral open.
- Are moral principles captured in the idea of a relativistic convention?
- Do outsiders, or those who cannot express consent, have no moral rights?
- Does the fact – if it were a fact – that we’ve agreed mean that we ought to honour our agreement?

Illustrations are likely to draw from the literature. For example, the view of man, and the subsequent nature of the contract, presented by Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau; Rawls’ promotion of the values of a western, liberal tradition favouring the autonomy and rights of the individual as well as a welfare ethic; examples of dissent on moral grounds; examples of how rights are possessed by eg animals or any other reasonable illustration.

*NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.*

*Expositions which list or blur together **more than two** criticisms of the contractual view should be awarded marks in the middle band. Accept responses focused on eg rule utilitarianism as partial responses to the question.*

- (b) 'I might believe that an action is morally right, but this does not give me a motive to perform it.' Discuss. (30 marks)

### Knowledge and Understanding

The question is quite permissive and the idea that a moral belief on its own doesn't provide one with a reason for acting may be linked to:

- Meta-ethical issues – the view that moral beliefs, on their own, are inert. Simply because we accept that an action or situation possesses a particular moral property does not seem to necessitate that we should act in any particular way. Some may refer to the Humean view that beliefs lack motive force, on their own they are insufficient to produce action which requires the presence of appropriate desires.
- Normative-ethics – for example, various forms of egoism and the view that if an action is not in my interest I have no motivation and/or (moral) reason to do it.

### Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some of the following or equivalent points will be raised and developed:

- Discussion of the is-ought, or fact-value, gap – an intuition or a perception may inform us that, for example, the act of abortion possesses certain immoral qualities but nothing follows from this about whether one *should* not abort.
- If morality is to guide conduct, is some kind of *internal* motivation, for example the presence of appropriate sentiments, sympathies, feelings, emotions, commitments or convictions, necessary? Or, is the realist view that belief, without desire, is sufficient to motivate action acceptable? Or, can moral beliefs be connected to desires/wants that we all have?
- There is scope for a discussion of 'moral weakness' (eg the belief that courage is a virtue coupled with one's own cowardice) or of 'amoralism' or of 'wickedness'.
- A range of different normative positions might be employed to suggest that one does have a reason to be moral and/or that there is no conflict between self-interest and morality: eg social contract theories; virtue ethics; utilitarianism and duty ethics.
- These may be assessed in terms of how convincing they are. For example, if we can get away with breaking a contract why shouldn't we? Can we tell what someone's motivation for action is?

Good answers may be rooted in any one of these approaches.

### Assessment and Evaluation

As noted, the question is permissive (relating to 'why be moral' generally) and it is necessary to reward different types of response to the question:

- Answers rooted in normative theories may, for example, link reasons to be moral to self interest through concepts like security, harmony, flourishing, duty and obligation. These may be seen as persuasive or as failing to persuade.
- Answers rooted in the is-ought gap might accept that the recognition that it is a moral obligation to eg keep one's promises is not actually to keep them. Does such recognition have to be supplemented by some argument of the sort that 'it pays to be moral'? And what might be meant by 'pays'? (Is being moral its own reward?)
- It could be argued that issues of moral weakness or wickedness, etc demonstrate that a belief that something is moral is not an adequate motivation to act.

**Theme: The Idea of God****4****Total for this question: 45 marks**(a) Outline **two** versions of the ontological argument.*(15 marks)*

Candidates will probably provide some background information on the nature of ontological arguments for the existence of God as, for example, a priori arguments which attempt to establish His existence without recourse to empirical evidence. From a purely formal consideration of the concept of God it is claimed that we can establish that God is a necessary being, that the concept of God is necessarily instantiated. Existence is part of the definition of God: to define God is to define a Being whose existence is necessary.

**Two** versions of the ontological argument will probably be those offered by Anselm and Descartes but alternative versions, possibly from Malcolm or Plantinga, should be rewarded. Given that candidates are not required to illustrate, it should be clear how God's existence is supposed to follow from a consideration of His nature and the details of each version given should be clear. Thus:

- Anselm: God is a being than which none greater can be conceived (even the fool understands this but denies that God exists outside of his conception); it is greater to exist both in the understanding and in reality than in the understanding alone; the greatest conceivable being exists both in reality and in the understanding; God exists. (Perhaps also that God is a being who cannot be thought not to exist).
- Descartes: some background may be given to Descartes argument (triangles, mountains and valleys, etc) but the argument itself can be stated quite simply: God is the supremely perfect being; a supremely perfect being possesses or contains all perfections; existence is a perfection; God exists.
- Plantinga: there is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness; so, there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness. (Plantinga's reformulation/defence of Anselm's original argument might also be given).
- Malcolm: if God does not exist His existence is logically impossible; if God does exist His existence is logically necessary; God's existence is, logically, either impossible or necessary; His existence is impossible only if the concept of God is absurd or contradictory; it is neither absurd nor contradictory; so God's existence is necessary.

*NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.*

*Expositions which blur **two** versions of the argument together should be awarded marks in the middle band. Responses focused on the general idea behind the ontological argument, lacking detail of specific versions, should be placed in the bottom band.*

(b) Assess the view that God is no more than a human construction.

(30 marks)

### Knowledge and Understanding

Given the part (a) question there may be an initial contrast with the view that the idea of God is innate in all of us – that the idea is not constructed – before raising issues concerning ‘construction’: these may include issues of *how* we conceptualise God as well as *why* we might do so.

### Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some of the following or equivalent points will be raised and developed:

- Anthropomorphism – God is conceived in the form of Man, if not physically then at least psychologically insofar as He is wise, kind, loving, forgiving, willing, etc (or, perhaps, vengeful, cruel, etc).
- It might be claimed that we have to conceptualise God in this way as it would be difficult (impossible?) to form any kind of relationship (whether awe or trust) with a Being without any ‘human’ qualities so that we couldn’t conceptualise Him at all.
- Nevertheless, this might be deemed to be a mistake. God is transcendent, beyond human understanding, and any attempt to conceptualise or construct an image of God is founded in error – whereof we cannot speak, thereof we should remain silent.
- There may be some ‘general’ critiques of religious belief as, eg ‘a suicide of reason’ (Nietzsche) or as ‘the sigh of the oppressed’ (Marx) – and these may lead to specific claims concerning *how* or *why* we construct the idea of God.
- A Humean approach is relevant: the idea of God is formed by ‘reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit ...qualities of goodness and wisdom’.
- In some respects the ‘left’ Hegelian view is similar: Hegel talked of the ‘treasures’ we have ‘squandered on the heavens’ and Feuerbach’s view of God as the projection of the sum of man’s qualities, so that ‘poor man possesses a rich God’, is similar.
- Marx’s materialist response to the above – religion as ‘the heart of a heartless world’ – is also relevant: ‘man makes religion, religion does not make man’. We construct religion in order to appease misery, distress, hardship. Religion is ‘the opium of the people’.
- Beyond this, it might be argued that belief in a pre-ordained natural order is an instrument of oppression – this might be stated in Marxist or Feminist terms (religious concepts are part of the armoury of ideas that enslave women).
- The Freudian view that belief in God represents the desire for a father figure, protection, security, etc.
- There may be references to Wittgenstein, forms of life and/or language games.

### Assessment and Evaluation

This is likely to produce strong (but not necessarily strongly argued) views:

- Some will argue that the concept of God is a construction – reflecting some kind of human need or perhaps some kind of error – and we would be better off without it.
- Although, it is also a construction that can/has served progressive interests. In some respects this may weaken the above arguments.
- Against this, some will argue that the idea of God is not a human invention but that knowing God is a genuine experience we can have; that we can find God through faith; that it is not irrational to believe in God.
- The trademark argument (the idea of God is innate).
- Kantian points about imposition of order.

**Theme: Persons****5****Total for this question: 45 marks**

(a) Explain and illustrate the claim that the concept of a person is primitive. (15 marks)

There will probably be references to Strawson, and possibly to either the Kantian nature of the argument or to similarities with Wittgenstein – *note that the argument is complex and explanations that are broadly correct, without being sophisticated, should be rewarded in the top band.* Expect (something like) the following points:

- The claim is aimed at defeating the starting point of Cartesian dualism – the immediacy and certainty of the ‘I’. (Some link to scepticism about other minds might also be referred to). Some might suggest that the use of the term ‘I’ already implies personhood. A ‘person’ is a kind of entity to which both ‘m’ and ‘p’ predicates apply.
- The concept of a ‘person’ is logically primitive. It is a concept we have to possess before we have the concepts of ‘self’ and ‘others’.
- We have to accept the concept in order to rid ourselves of two (sceptical) questions. Why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? Why states of consciousness are ascribed to the same entity as corporeal characteristics are?
- A necessary condition of ascribing states of consciousness at all is that they should be ascribed to the same entities as certain physical characteristics are.
- It would be impossible to ascribe states of consciousness to oneself unless one could also ascribe states of consciousness to others. The condition of considering oneself as the subject of experiences is that one should also recognise others as subjects of experiences.
- The condition for recognising others as subjects of experience is that they should be entities, like oneself, to which both corporeal and conscious predicates apply.
- The *logically adequate* criteria for ascribing states of consciousness to others are behavioural.
- We learn to self-ascribe without (always) needing to observe our own behaviour but we couldn’t self-ascribe at all unless we were able to other-ascribe, on the basis of behaviour, and we couldn’t do this unless we had the concept of a person.
- Unless we accept behaviour as logically adequate criterion for ascribing mental states to others we couldn’t ascribe them to ourselves (and claim that I know that I think) and couldn’t therefore begin to pose the sceptical question (how do I know that others think).

Much of this may be implicit in an illustrative example – Strawson uses the example of ‘depression’ – of how we are able to ascribe states of consciousness.

*NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts (of how this doesn’t imply correct other-ascription) although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts (if there are any) should be rewarded.*

*Responses focused on self-concept should be regarded as tangential and placed in the bottom band.*

- (b) How convincing is the claim that some non-human animals could be persons?  
(30 marks)

### Knowledge and Understanding

The concept of a person could be distinguished from that of a human through, eg notions of potential persons, ex-persons, multiple personalities, etc *or* defined in terms of attributes required like: self-awareness (through time), self-creation, reason and reflection, a social being, a language user, etc.

### Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some of the following, or equivalent, points could feature in discussions:

- Whether the possession of attributes identified is a matter of *kind* (or species) or a matter of *degree* and, if the latter, do some non-human animals possess sufficient degrees of complexity with regard to the relevant attributes.
- An optimistic response may cite evidence of animals appearing to be self-aware; of animals able to convey meaning; of sociability, roles within a group, awareness of others and, possibly, ‘empathy’ with others; of sentience; of displays of memory (a continuing subject of experience).
- There may be some attempt to link this to a philosophical theory (behaviourism perhaps) or to a philosopher (eg Hume).
- More pessimistic approaches are likely to focus on reason, reflection, language and self-creation. Whether, for example, animals possess a rational framework; whether they have second or higher-order reflective capacities about their behaviour and the behaviour of others; the difficulties of determining the extent to which animals are language users; the doubt about self-creation – eg the lack of progress, the lack of ‘culture’.
- If references to philosophers are made expect Descartes or Kant.
- Some may focus on the concept of a person itself – for example, if being a person is seen as a matter of degree, could it ever be decided at what point of complexity personhood is attained? Are all attributes necessary or only some? Some may refer to anthropomorphism and/or how prepared we are to use the term ‘person’ in relation to animals. Some may refer to ‘creatureliness’ and question whether animals are more like humans than machines (Hume and Descartes again).

### Assessment and Evaluation

A range of argumentation, following points selected for discussion, is possible:

- Humans are persons, no non-human animals are persons.
- Some humans are not persons but no non-human animals are persons.
- Most humans are persons and so too are some animals (although they may not be complex persons).
- Most humans are persons and so too are some animals and some other things as well, eg aliens and machines.
- Further empirical research on aspects of animal behaviour is necessary before a position can be established.
- Some points considered are too chauvinistic – we should avoid speciesism.
- Some points considered are too liberal - we should restrict our application of the concept (at least at present).