

**ADVANCED GCE****HISTORY**

Historical Investigations 1799–1955

2589

Candidates answer on the Answer Booklet

OCR Supplied Materials:

- 16 page Answer Booklet

Other Materials Required:

None

Thursday 14 January 2010
Afternoon

Duration: 1 hour 30 minutes**INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES**

- Write your name clearly in capital letters, your Centre Number and Candidate Number in the spaces provided on the Answer Booklet.
- Use black ink.
- Read each question carefully and make sure that you know what you have to do before starting your answer.
- Do **not** write in the bar codes.

INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES

- The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.
- The total number of marks for this paper is **90**.
- This paper contains questions on the following seven Options:
 - Napoleon I (pages 2–3)
 - Gladstone and Disraeli 1846–80 (pages 4–5)
 - Bismarck and the Unification of Germany 1858–71 (pages 6–7)
 - Roosevelt's America 1920–41 (pages 8–9)
 - Lenin and the Establishment of Bolshevik Power 1903–24 (pages 10–11)
 - Chamberlain and Anglo-German Relations 1918–39 (pages 12–13)
 - Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55 (pages 14–15)
- Answer on **one** Option only. In that Option, answer the Passages question, and **one** other question.
- You should write in continuous prose and are reminded of the need for clear and accurate writing, including structure of argument, grammar, punctuation and spelling.
- The time permitted allows for reading the Passages of the one Option you have studied.
- You are advised to spend equal time on the Passages question and the essay you select.
- In answering the Passages question, you are expected to use your knowledge of the topic to help you explain and evaluate the interpretations in the Passages, as well as to inform your answer.
- In answering an essay question, you are expected to refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations to help you develop your arguments.
- This document consists of **16** pages. Any blank pages are indicated.

Napoleon I

If answering on this Option, candidates **must** answer **Question 1** and **one** other question.

1 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Napoleon was militarily successful because of his own abilities as a general. **[45]**

- A** From: Correlli Barnett, *Napoleon*, published in 1978. This historian criticises Napoleon both as a leader and as a general.

The Battle of Ulm in October 1805 was a success that only just escaped being a disaster – largely because of the incompetence of Bonaparte's enemy. The break-out of a single Austrian corps right across Bonaparte's communications indicates what might have been accomplished by a general more active than Mack, the Austrian commander. After his advance to Vienna, the precariousness of Bonaparte's situation was apparent to the Austrian and Russian emperors. They had only to hang on until all their forces were concentrated and Bonaparte must almost certainly have been defeated. But instead the allied sovereigns rashly decided to risk battle. There is little evidence of a plot to induce them to attack; indeed, rather more evidence to the contrary. It is likely Bonaparte simply reacted to the enemy advance with high-speed opportunism, and afterwards fabricated a story by which what happened became what he had planned all along. From the commencement of the battle, however, everything did go much as Bonaparte had planned. In half a day he routed a much larger army. Austerlitz in December 1805 stands as Bonaparte's supreme professional performance, but it was to become the grand set-piece of Napoleonic myth.

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- B** From: Owen Connolly, *Blundering to Glory*, published in 1987. This historian considers that Napoleon was an improvising general.

The greatest general of his time, Napoleon had no tactical doctrine; he was an improviser who profited from his enemies' mistakes. His advice on strategy was also simple: keep corps close enough together as to be able to concentrate them quickly; not to divide forces in the presence of an enemy; manoeuvre to have greater numbers on the battlefield than the enemy. Napoleon broke these principles time and time again, and got away with it. Often he blundered, but always he scrambled to victory – until his massed enemies overwhelmed him in 1815. Napoleon was probably the greatest commander of all time, but his genius lay in scrambling, not in carrying out a preconceived plan.

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- C** From: David Chandler, *The Illustrated Napoleon*, published in 1990. This historian argues that Napoleon had many good qualities as a general.

Napoleon dominated his opponents psychologically, keeping them acutely apprehensive, bewildered and off-balance. Secondly he sought to gain, and retain, the initiative. Napoleon fought no truly defensive campaigns before 1814, and even then he believed 'the best form of defence is attack.' Napoleon employed speed, deception and surprise to mount *Blitzkrieg* attacks of great energy. Napoleon was also able to heighten the morale of the French army. His charisma extended its magic over both officers and ranks. As Wellington observed, 'His presence in the field was worth 40,000 men'.

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- D** From: Gunther Rothenberg, *The Napoleonic Wars*, published in 1999. This historian praises Napoleon's qualities as a general.

The manoeuvre on Ulm was a classic example of a Napoleonic strike against the rear. In four weeks, a series of well-coordinated, tough marches brought Napoleon swift and complete victory. In the Ulm campaign, Napoleon achieved the annihilation of the enemy without fighting a major battle. But by the end of November 1805 Napoleon faced serious problems. He needed one great victory that would shatter the Coalition against him so he decided to lure the enemy into launching an attack near Austerlitz; the ground there was suitable for a protracted French defence while permitting a sudden counterstroke to destroy allied forces. To entice the enemy to attack, he pretended weakness, requesting an armistice, retreating from his forward positions in apparent disorder, abandoning the Pratzen Heights. Tsar Alexander decided to accept battle. In the ensuing fight, the Allies lost nearly a third of their number and ceased to exist as a fighting force. Austerlitz was Napoleon's perfect battle.

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Answer **either**

- 2** Assess the view that Napoleon betrayed the French Revolution in his domestic policy. [45]

or

- 3** To what extent was Great Britain responsible for the eventual defeat of Napoleon? [45]

Candidates are reminded they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Gladstone and Disraeli 1846–80

If answering on this Option, candidates **must** answer **Question 4** and **one** other question.

4 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that it was Gladstone's fault that there was a Conservative victory in 1874. **[45]**

- A** From: the Diary of the Earl of Kimberley, 21 February 1874. Kimberley was Colonial Secretary in Gladstone's first ministry and sees the Liberals' defeat as largely their own fault.

The result of the election was a surprise. It is clear that the chief cause of our fall was a vague general distrust of the Cabinet and especially of Gladstone. We had exhausted our programme and cautious men asked 'What will Gladstone do next? Might he seek to recover his popularity by extreme radical measures?' It must be admitted that those fears were not altogether groundless. We really had no policy except the financial changes promised by Gladstone: and once those measures had been passed, who can tell what our chief's restless spirit would have turned to? There is no evidence of a real Conservative reaction; and the other party must have their turn. Of course, the tameness of our foreign policy, the mismanagement of the beer question, the confusion of the Treasury and the other minor causes all helped to cause the defeat.

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- B** From: Michael Winstanley, *Gladstone and the Liberal Party*, published in 1991. This historian considers that changing circumstances caused the Liberal defeat.

It would be unfair to blame Gladstone personally for the defeat in 1874. His handling of situations may, on occasions, have highlighted divisions in the party but it did not create them. It is difficult to see what else he could have done as Prime Minister. Any attempts to meet in full the demands of one section of the party would have lost the support of others. Liberal divisions were not new and they had not prevented the party from winning easily in every election, except 1841, in the past fifty years. The problems in 1874 were more fundamental. They reflected a Liberal failing to come to terms with the priorities of the new mass electorate. The Liberals' issues were seen as increasingly irrelevant and their organization was outdated. The abolition of income tax was no longer a popular cause; only a small minority of the expanded electorate paid it. The Tories put forward few specific policies so Gladstone had no opportunity to unite his party against a common enemy.

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- C** From: Stephen Lee, *Aspects of British Political History 1815–1914*, published in 1994. This historian claims that Disraeli was responsible for the Conservative victory.

The crucial test in 1874 was whether Disraeli could persuade the electorate to support his policies: to maintain the institutions of the country, to preserve the Empire and to 'elevate the condition of the people'. His handling of the electoral campaign was masterly. He made the most of the weaknesses of the Liberals and sought to win over the groups who had been annoyed by the reforms of Gladstone's first ministry, which included much of the newly enfranchised working class who disliked his trade union legislation. Disraeli exploited their disillusionment and their support enabled the Conservatives to win an overall majority. He also launched an effective personal attack on Gladstone, accusing him of 'blundering and plundering' and of 'incessant and harassing legislation'.

- D** From: Terry Jenkins, *Disraeli and Victorian Conservatism*, published in 1996. This historian believes that better organization helped the Conservatives to win in 1874.

One explanation that is frequently put forward for the remarkable Conservative triumph in 1874 is that it was largely due to the improved state of the party's organization in the constituencies. This was allegedly due to the work of J.E. Gorst who was appointed as Principal Agent by Disraeli in 1870. But, contrary to the notion that Gorst had begun the improvement in party organization, a good deal of work had been done by the Conservative party managers of the 1850s. One cannot assume that it was just Gorst's work that delivered the gains in 1874. The key to explaining the Conservatives' electoral breakthrough is to be found in the drift towards Conservatism on the part of the middle classes, rather than the wonderful influence of a 'Tory Democracy' as claimed by Disraeli.

Answer **either**

- 5** Assess the criticisms made by Gladstone of Disraeli's foreign and imperial policies. [45]

or

- 6** To what extent did Gladstone achieve his aims in Ireland in the period from 1868 to 1874? [45]

Candidates are reminded they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Bismarck and the Unification of Germany 1858–71

If answering on this Option, candidates **must** answer **Question 7** and **one** other question.

7 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the North German Confederation was based on the principles of liberalism. **[45]**

- A** From: G. Grant Robertson, *Bismarck*, published in 1918. This historian argues that liberalism was defeated in 1867.

The democratic franchise of the new Reichstag of the North German Federation gave rise to deep misgivings in many quarters. Universal suffrage gave a superb democratic gloss to a truly anti-democratic system. Universal suffrage was not ideal, but it was simple, popular and practical. 'Direct election and universal suffrage,' Bismarck pronounced, 'I consider to be greater guarantees of conservative values than any artificial electoral law'. Defeated in 1848, frustrated in 1862, liberalism had its last real chance in 1866–67. The rejection in the constitution of virtually every vital element and principle of the liberal programme, coupled with the equally decisive failure to modify the Prussian constitution, provides a critical date in German history: 1 July 1867, when the constitution became effective, was the defeat of liberalism in Germany, comparable with the defeat of Austria at Sadowa.

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- B** From: A.J.P. Taylor, *Bismarck*, published in 1955. This historian considers that the German liberals were able to gain significantly in the constitution of 1867.

The German states approved the draft constitution early in 1867. It only seemed necessary for a constituent assembly to greet it enthusiastically. But the liberal politicians were on strong ground when it came to constitutional discussions. They held out firmly against any political tricks. There was an extraordinary and unexpected result. Bismarck went over to the liberals' side and between February and April agreed with them on almost every decisive point. He accepted the secret ballot, which ensured freedom for political parties. Greater concessions followed over the army. In his original draft, Bismarck had put the federal army beyond parliamentary control by giving it constitutional protection. The liberals held out. Bismarck compromised. He accepted that they would authorize the army. They accepted that they would authorize the army for the next four years rather than every year.

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- C** From: Golo Mann, *The History of Germany since 1789*, published in 1958. This historian considers that Bismarck did not see the concessions he made to the liberals as meaning much.

The constitution of the North German Confederation was a hasty compromise between Prussian tradition, Bismarck's ambition and that of the National Liberals. Although Bismarck defended his plans with his usual energy, and could always threaten to wreck the whole enterprise, he agreed to concessions. A compromise was reached over the army; for a transitional period a fixed sum would be allocated but, thereafter, army expenditure would be treated like any other budget item. The National Liberals insisted on a 'responsible' federal chancellor, accountable to the Reichstag for Confederation government policy. Bismarck agreed. As long as it was a question of mere words, he was conciliatory because he had no respect for words. Among friends, he said he would allow only a sham parliament.

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- D** From: Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, published in 1963. This historian argues that the liberals gained only limited concessions in the drafting of the 1867 constitution.

Naturally, one of the major objectives of the liberals was to strengthen the unitary and national aspect of the draft constitution. Two amendments tampered with the conservative safeguards in the election laws. While opposed to universal suffrage, the National Liberals dared not say so publicly. By adding the secret ballot, they hoped to prevent universal suffrage being used by the government to justify dictatorial behaviour. This Bismarck accepted. But he firmly rejected their request for the payment of deputies. He wished to prevent the appearance of professional politicians with selfish concerns for extending parliament's powers. While the grant of control over federal revenues and expenditures was an advance, it was largely robbed of its significance by the exclusion of the military budget. Only by challenging the constitution itself could parliamentary opposition attack the basic structure of the army.

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Answer **either**

- 8** To what extent was Prussia's growing industrial power the **main** reason for Prussia's rapid rise to ascendancy in Germany? **[45]**

or

- 9** Assess the view that Bismarck was not responsible for the outbreak of war against France in 1870. **[45]**

Candidates are reminded they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Roosevelt's America 1920–41

If answering on this Option, candidates **must** answer **Question 10** and **one** other question.

10 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the benefits of Prohibition outweighed its disadvantages. [45]

- A** From: Michael Parrish, *Anxious Decades*, published in 1994. This historian suggests that Prohibition had a mixed impact on the USA.

More than fifty years after its repeal, historians continue to debate the costs and benefits of the 'noble experiment'. Congress never gave sufficient money to ensure effective enforcement. There was a lack of political will which explains the gap between congressional good intentions and action. In both monetary and legal terms the true costs of effective enforcement would have been astronomically high. In the short run, Prohibition proved beneficial to boat operators, firearms manufacturers, car dealers and undertakers. It is claimed that Prohibition changed the country's drinking habits for the better. However, it is not always clear that these changes arose because of Prohibition.

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- B** From: Edward Behr, *Prohibition, the 13 Years that changed America*, published in 1997. This historian suggests that Prohibition was beneficial.

In the first few years of its existence, Prohibition worked and was indeed particularly successful. State budgets, in 1921 and 1922, reflected Prohibition's impact. Hospitals had fewer patients with alcohol-related illnesses. There were fewer cases of alcohol-related crimes, including street drunkenness, and a corresponding drop in the prison population. Some health figures were impressive. In the years immediately before America's entry into the First World War, the death rate from alcoholism varied between 4.4 and 5.8 per 100 000 people. As a result of State Prohibition, in 1917–1918, the drop was spectacular. It dropped to 2.7. To Prohibitionists, this was sufficient proof that America was indeed on the threshold of a new age. In 1925, a leading Prohibitionist could argue the benefits of Prohibition were huge. *The Literary Digest* reported in January 1925, 'Prohibition decreasing crime'. Violent domestic crime was down, as were arrests for drunkenness and brawling. 'Prohibition has saved a million lives,' Wayne Wheeler, a leading Prohibitionist, announced that year. *The Grand Rapids Herald* acknowledged, 'The welfare of little children is too eloquent a voice to be howled down'.

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- C** From: Doug and Susan Willoughby, *The USA 1917–45*, published in 2000.
These historians argue that Prohibition had mixed success.

Prohibition was not a complete failure. There certainly were those, all over the USA, who devised imaginative ways to evade the law on a small scale by making their own illegal whiskey or by obtaining bogus medical prescriptions for alcohol. Others risked their own health by obtaining and consuming inadequately refined industrial alcohol. 'Bootlegging' became a lucrative business for some and the rapid rise in the number of 'speakeasies' is evidence of the defiance of the cities of the east. Nevertheless there were large sections of the population who welcomed Prohibition. It is often claimed that the consumption of alcoholic beverages increased dramatically. Whilst this is true in large cities like Chicago, statistics do not support this claim nationally. On the contrary, figures show an overall drop from 9.8 litres of alcohol per person per year before the introduction of state Prohibition laws (1906–1910) to 3.7 litres by 1934. Moreover whilst the crime rate did increase, it was not as dramatic during the 1920s as is sometimes claimed. Concentration on the cities distorts the national picture. Generally there was a drop in drink-related crime.

- D** From: Peter Clements, *Prosperity, Depression and the New Deal*, published in 2005. This historian suggests that there were benefits and costs as a result of Prohibition.

By the end of the 1920s many people questioned whether Prohibition had been worth it. It had certainly led to an explosion in crime. Between 1927 and 1930 alone, there were 227 gangland murders in Chicago. Prohibition helped create organised crime. However, organised crime did not die out with its repeal. Moreover, illegal drinking made criminals of a high percentage of the population. Prohibition also worked to the detriment of the poor. However, support for Prohibition remained in rural areas. Supporters argued that alcohol consumption dropped between 1917 and 1930.

Answer **either**

- 11** Assess the view that in foreign policy the United States was interventionist from 1920 to 1941. [45]

or

- 12** To what extent were the policies of the Republican governments of 1921–1933 responsible for the economic collapse of 1929–1933? [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Lenin and the Establishment of Bolshevik Power 1903–24

If answering on this Option, candidates **must** answer **Question 13** and **one** other question.

13 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the **only** purpose of War Communism was to help the Bolsheviks win the Civil War. **[45]**

- A** From: R. Pipes, *The Russian Revolution 1899–1919*, published in 1990. This historian argues that War Communism had clear ideological goals but they were not easily achieved.

The goal of War Communism was to establish socialism or even communism rapidly. Its supporters had always believed that the socialist state would abolish private property and the free market, replacing them with a centralised, state-run and planned economic system. The main difficulty which the Bolsheviks faced in implementing this programme was that capitalist development would be a lengthy process. But in Russia, at the time of the Revolution, capitalism was still in its infancy. Her overwhelmingly 'petty bourgeois' economy, dominated by tens of millions of self-employed peasants and skilled workers, was further made worse by the Bolshevik policy of breaking up large estates for distribution to peasants and giving workers control of industrial enterprises.

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- B** From: O. Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891–1924*, published in 1996. This historian argues that War Communism was an essential element of overall Bolshevik strategy.

What about the argument that War Communism was a response to the demands of the Civil War? To be sure, the Bolsheviks, like all the wartime governments in Europe at this time, were trying to control the economy in the military interests of the state. But War Communism was not just a response to the Civil War; it was also a means of making civil war. The Civil War was fought not only on the battlefields. It was a fundamental aspect of the Bolsheviks' revolutionary strategy, and was also fought on what they called the 'internal front', in society and the economy, through the policies of War Communism. Unless one acknowledges this fundamental fact – that the policies of War Communism were seen by the Bolsheviks as an instrument of struggle against their social or 'internal' enemies – it is impossible to explain why these policies were kept in place for more than a year after the White armies had been defeated.

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- C** From: C. Corin and T. Fiehn, *Communist Russia under Lenin and Stalin*, published in 2002. These historians argue that War Communism arose as a result of economic and military necessity.

The food shortages got worse and as early as February 1918 the bread ration had reached an all-time low of only 50 grams per person per day. There were food riots in many cities in early 1918. Workers started to flee from the cities, leaving factories short of men. The situation was desperate. Lenin was faced with two main problems: first, keeping the workers in the cities to produce munitions, essential war supplies and other desperately needed goods; second, feeding the workers. It was not only economic problems that Lenin faced in the summer of 1918. He was also confronted by the full onslaught of the Civil War. From this point onwards the Bolsheviks were fighting for their lives. As a result, the whole economy of the Red-held part of Russia was geared towards the needs of the army by the policy of War Communism.

- D** From: M. Lynch, *Bolshevik and Stalinist Russia 1918–56*, published in 2005. This historian sees War Communism as a means of winning the Civil War.

War Communism is best understood as another aspect of the Red Terror. It was a series of harshly restrictive economic measures that Lenin began to introduce in the summer of 1918. It replaced the system of state capitalism that the Bolsheviks had operated during their first nine months in power. The chief reason for adopting it was the desperate situation created by the Civil War. Lenin judged that the White menace could be met only by a tightening of authority in those regions that the Reds controlled (approximately 30 of the 50 provinces of European Russia). The change in strategy has to be seen, therefore, as part of the terror that the Bolsheviks imposed in these years. Every aspect of life (social, political and economic) had to be geared to the task of winning the Civil War.

Answer **either**

- 14** How successful was Lenin as leader of the Bolsheviks from 1903 to February 1917? **[45]**

or

- 15** Assess the view that the role of the Provisional Government in causing the October 1917 Revolution has been exaggerated. **[45]**

Candidates are reminded they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Chamberlain and Anglo-German Relations 1918–39

If answering on this Option, candidates **must** answer **Question 16** and **one** other question.

16 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that there was no realistic alternative to the policy of appeasing Germany in 1938 and early 1939. **[45]**

- A** From: Winston Churchill, a speech in the House of Commons on 14 March 1938. Churchill puts forward a clear alternative to the policy of appeasement.

If a number of states were assembled around Great Britain and France in a solemn treaty for mutual defence against aggression; if they had their forces assembled in what might be called a Grand Alliance; if they had their military arrangements organized jointly; if all this rested, as it can honourably rest, upon the Covenant of the League of Nations; if it were sustained, as it would be, by the moral approval of the world; and if it were done in 1938 – and believe me it may be the last chance there will be for doing it – then I say that you might, even now, prevent this approaching war.

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- B** From: William Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, published in 1977. This historian argues that Churchill's reputation as a rebel prevented his proposals from being taken seriously.

Churchill was not a determined opponent of appeasement before 1938, partly because its ultimate form and direction were ill-defined. In March 1938, after Eden's resignation and the shock of the Austrian *Anschluss*, he swiftly emerged as an outspoken critic of what he now believed was the sheer inadequacy of government policy. From then on Churchill's outlook consisted of his proposal for a Grand Alliance and the belief that a continuation of appeasement would mean a series of surrenders until all of Britain's friends had been 'thrown to the wolves' and Britain was left to face its fate alone. But his long reputation as a Conservative party rebel, and an aggressive one at that, prevented his views from carrying full weight until the international situation had drastically deteriorated.

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- C** From: R.A.C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*, published in 1993. This historian argues that there was an alternative policy.

In 1938 and early 1939 there was a clearly stated alternative to the government's policy towards Germany. Where the government stressed reconciliation towards Hitler, Chamberlain's opponents preferred 'the language of the mailed fist'. They wanted military alliances to encircle Germany; alliances dressed up in the language of the League of Nations. Opposition to Chamberlain's appeasement was widely spread by September 1938. The almost complete agreement on policy towards Germany which had existed in 1936 was gone. An intense and well-matched political struggle replaced it. Chamberlain's opponents were superior to his supporters in talent and eloquence. On the other hand, they were dispersed and did not form a united campaign front. To add to Chamberlain's workmanlike debating skill and his careful preparation, the Prime Minister had the advantage of an obedient majority in the House of Commons. Chamberlain was compelled, after the German occupation of Prague to accept in appearance much of the alternative policy pressed on his government.

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- D** From: John Charmley, *Churchill: the End of Glory*, published in 1993. This historian argues that the Grand Alliance was an unrealistic alternative.

The 'Grand Alliance' was a wonderful slogan but it was not practical politics. Britain was not ready for war; nor were the French. In any case, neither of them was preparing for an offensive war. Russia, whom Churchill wanted to join the proposed Alliance, had recently purged her armed forces extensively. Moreover, Russia caused more problems than she solved as a member of the potential 'Alliance'. The Czechs, the Poles and the Rumanians all distrusted the Russians at least as much as they distrusted the Nazis. Then there remained the problem of the Americans. Churchill was always apt to become a slave of his own ideas and to assume that to coin a brilliant phrase was to solve a problem. However, the road to the 'Grand Alliance' was a long and hard one. It came about only when dire necessity convinced its possible members that if they did not hang together they would each hang separately.

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Answer **either**

- 17** Assess the view that the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were the **main** reason for changing British attitudes towards Germany in the period from 1919 to 1929. **[45]**

or

- 18** How far do you agree with the view that the only reason why the British government declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939 was because it was pushed into doing so by the British House of Commons? **[45]**

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55

If answering on this Option, candidates **must** answer **Question 19** and **one** other question.

19 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the USA misinterpreted the communist take-over of Eastern Europe after the Second World War. **[45]**

- A** From: Tony Howarth, *Twentieth Century History: The World since 1900*, published in 1979. This historian argues that the USA had good reason to fear the threat of communism after the Second World War.

Back in 1848, Marx and Engels had issued their *Manifesto*, which began with the words 'A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of communism'. Exactly one hundred years later, President Truman was certainly prepared to believe that communism was haunting Europe. By 1947, an American had only to glance at a map to justify his alarm. The 'Iron Curtain' had been slammed down across Europe: Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia had all fallen to the communists. Not only that, but the communists also had their hands on half of Germany. There were also strong communist parties in France and in Italy, and the civil war in Greece was still going on. Such a view of a world in peril from the Russian menace was not altogether accurate. Truman was unable to grasp Stalin's justifiable concern for the security of the USSR and interpreted all these events as evidence of Stalin's expansionism.

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- B** From: Robert Conquest, *Stalin: Breaker of Nations*, published in 1991. This historian argues that Stalin was brutal in his control of Eastern Europe after the Second World War.

The Cominform condemned or expelled the Yugoslavs and Stalin seems to have thought of going to war with Yugoslavia. Stalin, meanwhile, had gone on to tighten his grip on the Communist parties of the rest of the Soviet bloc. Everywhere, from now until the end of his life, large groups of plotters were 'exposed' in their top leaderships. In purges supervised by senior Soviet police officers, supposed agents of Tito, of the West and of the Gestapo were 'discovered' and exposed. Laszla Rajk, Minister of the Interior in Hungary, was tortured and made to confess at a public trial in Budapest. Traicho Kostov, Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, was tried but he withdrew his confession in open court in Sofia and, as a result, Kostov was tortured to death.

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- C** From: Steve Phillips, *The Cold War*, published in 2001. This historian argues that local communists had some degree of support in Eastern Europe after the war.

The establishment of communist regimes across Eastern Europe was aided by a substantial degree of sympathy with, if not actual support for, the policies put forward by local communist groups. Communist parties called for radical change from the situation that existed before the Second World War. This was in tune with popular opinion. The desperate need for reconstruction after the devastation of the War fitted in with the communists' message of building a new society. Communists advocated land reform, a policy particularly popular with peasants everywhere. The communists had often played a leading role in resisting the German occupation during the War and in consequence had gained respect for doing so. Despite these factors, which resulted in considerable support for communist groups across Eastern Europe, it would be misleading to exaggerate the level of support.

- D** From: Peter Oxley, *Russia 1855–1991 From Tsars to Commissars*, published in 2001. This historian argues that the USSR wanted to control Eastern Europe for reasons of security.

It is not difficult to understand why Soviet troops stayed on in Eastern Europe after 1945. German armies had invaded Russia twice in 27 years. Though the USA, France and Britain had fought alongside the USSR in the struggle against Nazism, in 1918 and 1919 all three of these states had sent troops to assist the anti-communist armies in the Russian Civil War. Russian leaders continued to believe that there was an inevitable rivalry and conflict between capitalist and socialist societies. Accordingly, the USSR had to do what was necessary for self-defence and so it tightened its control over all the 'satellite states'; the government of Czechoslovakia finally becoming totally communist in 1948. In March 1946, Churchill had said that 'an iron curtain has descended across the continent'. The Americans believed that they had good reason to detect the hand of the Soviet Union in almost every trouble spot around the world.

Answer **either**

- 20** Assess the view that US motives for the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were entirely selfish. **[45]**

or

- 21** Assess the view that disputes over the future of Germany were the **main** reason for the break-up of the Wartime Alliance. **[45]**

Candidates are reminded they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

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