

**ADVANCED GCE
HISTORY**

2589

Historical Investigations 1799–1955

TUESDAY 22 JANUARY 2008

Afternoon

Time: 1 hour 30 minutes

Additional materials: Answer Booklet (12 pages)



INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Read each question carefully and make sure you know what you have to do before starting your answer.
- Write your name, Centre number and candidate number in the spaces provided on the answer book.
- Write your answers in the separate answer book provided.

INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES

This paper contains questions on the following seven Options:

- Napoleon I (pages 2–3)
 - Gladstone and Disraeli 1846–80 (pages 4–5)
 - Bismarck and the Unification of Germany 1858–71 (pages 6–7)
 - Roosevelt's America 1920–41 (pages 8–9)
 - Lenin and the Establishment of Bolshevik Power 1903–24 (pages 10–11)
 - Chamberlain and Anglo-German Relations 1918–39 (pages 12–13)
 - Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55 (pages 14–15)
- Answer on **one** Option only. In that Option, answer the Passages question and **one** other question.
 - The number of marks for each question is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.
 - The total mark for this paper is 90.
 - You should write in continuous prose and are reminded of the need for clear and accurate writing, including structure of argument, grammar, punctuation and spelling.
 - The time permitted allows for reading the Passages of the one Option you have studied.
 - You are advised to spend equal time on the Passages question and the essay you select.
 - In answering the Passages question, you are expected to use your knowledge of the topic to help you explain and evaluate the interpretations in the Passages, as well as to inform your answer.
 - In answering an essay question, you are expected to refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations to help you develop your arguments.

This document consists of **16** printed pages.

Napoleon I

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 1** and **ONE** other question.

1 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Napoleon was the 'heir to the Revolution'. [45]

- A** From: F. L. Ford, *Europe 1780–1830*, published in 1989. This historian argues that Napoleon can be seen as both the heir to the Revolution and its betrayer.

Napoleon was at various times a revolutionary statesman and a populist dictator, an enlightened despot and an outsider from Corsica determined to make his fortune at any cost. He was as anti-Revolutionary as he was anti-royalist, determined to suppress criticism and opposition from both revolutionaries and royalists. Whether he revived a specific feature of the *ancien régime* or embraced some characteristic of the Republic he had overthrown, he acted without admiration for the principles of either. If its aims were personal liberty and social equality then the Revolution was betrayed by Napoleon. If the Revolution is viewed as aiming at governmental efficiency and the legal equality of all citizens, then Napoleon can be reasonably seen as its heir.

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- B** From: M. Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution*, published in 1994. This historian argues that Napoleon kept those parts of the Revolution which suited the interests of the bourgeoisie (middle classes).

The Consulate and Empire rested on the support of the notables. The notables were gathered from the successful revolutionary bourgeoisie of landowners, professional men and administrators, together with some business leaders. They supported Napoleon because he preserved the social gains of the Revolution. He himself was an enduring symbol of careers open to talent. He confirmed the abolition of feudalism and of aristocratic privilege. He confirmed the material gains of the bourgeoisie, especially the sale of the *biens nationaux**. He established a legal code which embodied equality before the law, and he introduced a system of secondary education which served the interests of the professional and administrative élite. Instead of birth and connections, social status would now depend on property wealth, personal talent and service to the state. The victorious revolutionary bourgeoisie accepted Napoleon's dictatorship because it guaranteed their social promotion. Napoleon was the consolidator of the bourgeois Revolution.

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* [*'biens nationaux'* = the ex-Church and aristocrat lands sold on to the middle classes during the 1790s.]

- C** R. Gildea, *Barricades and Borders, Europe 1800–1914*, published in 1996. This historian argues that Napoleonic rule had little to do with Revolutionary ideas and much to do with the desire for strong central government.

Napoleon was not just another despot, enlightened or otherwise. He was not a dictator in the strict sense, for he issued constitutions. He claimed legitimacy, like revolutionary governments, by the will of the people. For Napoleon, equality meant the equal subjection of every citizen to state power. Apart from equality before the law the Napoleonic regime made few concessions to equality. What characterized the Napoleonic regime above all was strong government, under the control of a single charismatic figure who appointed and dismissed ministers, generals, prefects, and bishops, commanded armies, directed foreign policy, codified the laws, and reorganized the systems of education, religious worship and administration.

- D** From: A. R. Matthews, *Revolution and Reaction, Europe 1789–1849*, published in 2001. This historian argues that Napoleon used those principles of the Revolution which best served his aims.

Napoleon preserved only those elements of the Revolution that suited his purposes – to bind the propertied classes to his regime and to secure himself in power. Where a revolutionary principle – such as free speech – might threaten him, it was refused. Where a revolutionary principle might help him – as with careers open to talents – he maintained it. Additionally he may have felt compelled to maintain some elements of the Revolution, whether he wanted to or not. To challenge the abolition of feudalism, for instance, might have provoked mass unrest. As he felt more secure in power, Napoleon’s attachment to certain revolutionary ideas seemed to decrease. The lip-service paid to popular sovereignty in the Consulate’s Constitutions largely disappeared during the Empire, and his creation of an imperial nobility seemed to contradict any commitment to equality. Napoleon’s approach was practical and pragmatic: he would do whatever was necessary to secure his ends. If it meant presenting himself as the heir to the Revolution, so be it. What he would not do was to follow policies that might threaten his power or position. Religious toleration was one thing, freedom of the press quite another.

Answer **either**

- 2** ‘Napoleon’s only concern in policy towards the satellite states and the Empire outside France was to subordinate them to the needs of France.’ How far do you agree with this view? [45]

or

- 3** To what extent do Napoleon’s campaigns from 1805 to 1815 support the claim that he was a great military commander? [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Gladstone and Disraeli 1846–80

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 4** and **ONE** other question.

4 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Gladstone's Irish policy to 1880 was determined by his moral outlook. [45]

- A** From: Paul Adelman, *Great Britain and the Irish Question, 1800–1922*, published in 1996. This historian believes that Gladstone was morally committed to solving the Irish problem.

Gladstone later denied that...

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Details:

An extract from *Great Britain and the Irish Question, 1800-1922*
by Paul Adelman

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...Church of Ireland could not be defended.

- B** From: Michael Bentley, *Politics without Democracy 1815–1914*, published in 1996. This historian argues that Gladstone hoped to win an advantage for his party with his Irish policy.

After Disraeli's great triumph in passing the Second Reform Act, Gladstone was unsure which way to go. But in 1867 Fenian disturbances returned to London and led to several deaths. Derby's government could not meet violence with anything more imaginative than repression. For Liberals, however, the situation in Ireland suggested both a threat, since some important Whigs owned land there, and an opportunity. If Gladstone could involve all wings of his party in an effective Irish policy, it might prove possible to throw out Lord Derby and Disraeli. Some historians dislike the thought of Gladstone acting for a party political purpose, as opposed to a moral purpose in 1868, but Gladstone's view of politics made no such distinction. He recognised the need to approach politics with a realistic idea about what could be achieved.

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- C** From: Angus Hawkins, *British Party Politics, 1852–1886*, published in 1998. This historian considers that Gladstone had a moral purpose in his Irish policy but was also aware that it was popular.

Gladstonian Liberalism offered a vision of a society of self-reliant and responsible citizens who could achieve social and material progress by their own merits. They would support any uplifting moral purpose and this could make Liberalism more popular. One such purpose was that all religious denominations needed to have equal civil rights and the ties between the established Anglican Church and the state needed to be slackened. Irish disestablishment thus provided such an uplifting moral purpose. Indeed it appeared the one issue able to restore Liberal unity. It allowed Gladstone to bring together progressive opinion in the traditional ruling class and popular feeling on a moral issue. Gladstone felt a deep sense of his own destiny; 'the Almighty seems to sustain me for some purpose of His own, deeply unworthy as I know myself to be'.

- D** From: Ian St John, *Disraeli and the Art of Victorian Politics*, published in 2005. This historian considers that Gladstone's main aim in his Irish policy was to benefit the Liberal party.

After his defeat in 1867 over the Second Reform Act, Gladstone's position was far from secure. It was a measure of his greatness that he responded to this crisis in his career with skill and vision, turning the tables on Disraeli and laying the foundation for a considerable electoral victory in 1868. Gladstone saw that he needed to do two things: reunite the Liberal party and find an issue about which he could enthuse the new mass electorate. The answer he came up with was Ireland. Gladstone realised that there were several aspects to the Irish problem. The main two he focused on were those of religion and land. Both were highly controversial and, in the case of the established Church, he had previously said that a solution would not be possible for at least five or ten years. But he revised his estimate and took up the issue.

Answer **either**

- 5** How far was Disraeli's contribution the main factor in the development of the Conservative party to 1868? [45]

or

- 6** To what extent were both Gladstone's and Disraeli's foreign policies motivated by a desire to promote British interests? [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Bismarck and the Unification of Germany 1858–71

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 7** and **ONE** other question.

7 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Bismarck was personally responsible for provoking war with France in 1870. [45]

- A** From: Otto von Bismarck, *Memoirs*, written in the 1890s. Bismarck claims that by editing and sending the telegram in July 1870 he had set a deliberate trap for the French.

After I had read out the shortened version to my two guests, Moltke (Prussian Chief of Staff) remarked, 'Now it has a different ring. In its original form it sounded like an offer to negotiate; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge'. I went on to explain: 'If in the carrying out of His Majesty's order, I at once publish this text, which contains no substantial alteration or addition to the telegram, it will be known in Paris before midnight. It will have the effect of a red rag on the French bull. We must fight if we do not want to act the part of the defeated without a battle. Our success, however, depends essentially upon the impression given to other states as to how the war starts. It is important that we should be the ones attacked'.

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- B** From: A. J. P. Taylor, *Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman*, published in 1955. This historian argues that the war was more a result of French blunder than Bismarck's planning.

Prussia had no reason for a war against France...

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Details:

An extract from *Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman* by A. J. P. Taylor

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...he believed events were still far from his control.

- C** From: Edgar Feuchtwanger, *Bismarck*, published in 2002. This historian suggests that the Ems telegram was only partly responsible for war with France.

The account given of the sending of the Ems telegram by Bismarck in his memoirs is seriously misleading...

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Details:

An extract from *Bismarck* by Edgar Feuchtwanger

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...Bismarck's real success was that he managed to convince the German public, north and south, that it was their duty to rise up against French aggression.

- D** From: Katherine Anne Lerman, *Bismarck – Profiles in Power*, published in 2004. This historian suggests the war was not the direct result of Bismarck's planning but more due to the nationalistic reactions of the French Government on one side and the Prussian Army on the other.

The French ambassador's demands at Ems, that the Prussian King should agree never again to support the Spanish candidature, presented Bismarck with the opportunity to snub France publicly. However, the war was not the product of a reasoned long-term policy and the decision to take up arms was made by the French Government. But ultimately neither side held back in 1870 and Bismarck, who felt under increasing pressure to act on the national question, recognised the favourable diplomatic and military situation. The French appeared the aggressors. Even the South Germans had been outraged by French statements and the subsequent treatment of the Prussian King. The Prussian army was ready with co-ordinated plans worked out with its South German Allies in accordance with their military obligations. By July 14 it was considered by all those in the know in Berlin that war was now unavoidable. There was a strange mood of satisfaction not only in the Prussian army, which was confident of victory, but also in the Foreign Ministry.

Answer **either**

- 8** To what extent did the *Zollverein* enable Prussia to dominate the other German States in the period from 1858 to 1871? [45]

or

- 9** How important were military factors in the expansion of Prussia in the period from 1862 to 1867? [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Roosevelt's America 1920–41

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 10** and **ONE** other question.

10 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the benefits of Prohibition outweighed its disadvantages. [45]

- A** From: Michael Parrish, *Anxious Decades*, published in 1994. This historian suggests Prohibition had a mixed impact on the USA.

More than fifty years after its repeal...

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Details:

An extract from *Anxious Decades* by Michael Parrish

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...that these changes arose because of Prohibition.

- B** From: Edward Behr, *Prohibition, the 13 Years that Changed America*, published in 1997. This historian suggests the benefits of Prohibition.

In the first few years of its existence, Prohibition worked...

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Details:

An extract from *Prohibition, the 13 Years that Changed America*
by Edward Behr

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...*The Grand Rapids Herald* acknowledged, 'The welfare of little children is too eloquent a voice to be howled down'.

- C** From: Doug and Susan Willoughby, *The USA 1917–45*, published in 2000. These historians argue that National Prohibition was not a complete failure.

National Prohibition was not a complete failure. There certainly were those, all over the USA, who devised imaginative ways to evade the law on a small scale by making their own illegal whiskey or by obtaining bogus medical prescriptions for alcohol. Others risked their own health by obtaining and consuming inadequately refined industrial alcohol. 'Bootlegging' became a lucrative business for some and the rapid rise in the number of 'speakeasies' is evidence of the defiance of the cities of the east. Nevertheless, there were large sections of the population who welcomed Prohibition. It is often claimed that the consumption of alcoholic beverages increased dramatically. Whilst this is true in large cities like Chicago, statistics do not support this claim nationally. On the contrary, figures show an overall drop from 9.8 litres of alcohol per person per year before the introduction of state Prohibition laws (1906–1910) to 3.7 litres by 1934. Moreover whilst the crime rate did increase, it was not as dramatic during the 1920s as is sometimes claimed. Concentration on the cities distorts the national picture. Generally, there was a drop in drink-related crime.

- D** From: Peter Clements, *Prosperity, Depression and the New Deal*, Third Edition, published in 2005. This historian suggests that there were costs and benefits to US society during the Prohibition years.

By the end of the 1920s...

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Details:

An extract from *Prosperity, Depression and the New Deal* by Peter Clements

...alcohol consumption dropped between 1917 and 1930.

Answer **either**

- 11** Assess the view that the Wall Street Crash of October 1929 was the **most** important reason for the Depression. [45]

or

- 12** How far did opposition reduce the effectiveness of the New Deal in the period from 1933 to 1941? [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Lenin and the Establishment of Bolshevik Power 1903–24

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 13** and **ONE** other question.

13 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the failures of the Provisional Government were more important than the activities of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in explaining their successful seizure of power in Russia in October 1917. [45]

- A** From: J. Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History, 1812–1986*, published in 1987. This historian emphasises the progress made by the Bolsheviks in gaining support in the autumn of 1917.

In mid-September 1917 two events showed how far the Bolsheviks had progressed. For the first time, the Petrograd Soviet passed a resolution proposed by its Bolshevik faction. In elections to the soldiers' section of the Soviet, previously dominated by the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Bolsheviks gained nearly half the votes. Lenin's decision to press for an immediate seizure of power represented a change of programme and it was difficult to persuade the party to accept it. Lenin argued that the party was now capable of obtaining majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets. Thus the early Bolshevik slogan of 'All power to the Soviets' was paying off. The Bolsheviks had at their disposal more armed strength than any of their opponents. Once having acquired power, the Bolsheviks could retain it because their first acts would be to legalise the seizure of land by the peasants and to promise an end to the war. These two policies would automatically assure the allegiance of the soldiers.

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- B** From M. McCauley, *Russia, 1917–41*, published in 1997. This historian focuses upon the inability of the Provisional Government to meet the needs of the people of Russia.

It is important to note that within hours of the setting up of the Provisional Government a Soviet was set up in the Tauride Palace as a parallel and rival power to the Provisional Government. A few changes were made immediately by the Provisional Government. Political prisoners were released, secret courts ended and the press liberalised. Apart from a decree for an eight-hour day, nothing was done for working people. Peasants who wanted land gained only a committee to consider land reform. The greatest feature of the Government was inactivity. Most damaging for their support was the Provisional Government's continuation of the war, notably the Kerensky offensive of June–July 1917. Its failure led to further food shortages and demonstrations by workers, soldiers and sailors. Troops were used to suppress these demonstrations.

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- C** From: G. Darby, *The Russian Revolution*, published in 1998. This historian argues that the Provisional Government was destined to fail from the outset.

Too much was expected of the Provisional Government in too short a time. Soldiers wanted an end to the war. Peasants wanted the land. Workers wanted better conditions. The liberals wanted freedom of association, freedom of the press and so on. Different nationalities wanted self-determination. The Allies wanted an offensive against the Germans. Any government would have found all these aspirations difficult to fulfil in peacetime let alone during a difficult war. Moreover, the government was only provisional. Its failure to call a Constituent Assembly was clearly a mistake. Furthermore its power was undermined by the Soviets. Thus it can be argued that it faced an impossible task. From February 1917 onwards the central government was simply drained of power as ordinary people took matters into their own hands. It is remarkable that the Provisional Government lasted as long as it did.

- D** From P. Oxley, *Russia: From Tsars to Commissars*, published in 2001. This historian argues that the Bolsheviks successfully filled the political vacuum created by the collapse of the Provisional Government.

The Provisional Government has been criticised for failing to act decisively to tackle the many difficulties it faced. It did not bring the war to an end and did nothing to meet the expectations of the peasants and workers. The Bolsheviks played the decisive role in organising the masses and undermining the Provisional Government in March and overthrowing it in October 1917. The other socialist parties also made an important contribution. Both the SRs (Social Revolutionaries) and the Mensheviks proved to be reluctant revolutionaries. Their decision to co-operate with, and finally join, the Provisional Government left a vacuum on the left of politics. It was this vacuum that the Bolsheviks were able to exploit.

Answer **either**

- 14** Assess the problems facing the Bolsheviks from 1903 to February 1917. [45]

or

- 15** Assess the view that necessity rather than ideology determined Lenin's policies from 1918 to 1924. [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Chamberlain and Anglo–German Relations 1918–39

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 16** and **ONE** other question.

16 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that economic interests were more important than political considerations in determining British policies towards Germany from 1919 to 1936. [45]

- A** From a private letter dated March 1936, written by a leading financial adviser in the City, Britain’s financial and banking centre, to a senior civil servant in the Foreign Office. He argues that Britain’s financial sector supported a sympathetic approach to Hitler.

The sentiment in the City is overwhelmingly pro-German. I confess I had never realized the depth of anti-French feeling in financial circles. The most extreme are the *Daily Mail* readers who are content to repeat like parrots, ‘You can’t keep a nation of 67 million Germans down for ever’. Next come those who disregard the Locarno Pact and defend the right of Germany to occupy the Rhineland. They look hopefully for a new era in Europe based on peace with Hitler. However, it does not follow that these are the reactions of the country as a whole. The City minimizes danger because of its financial needs. It concentrates on Hitler’s new promises and chooses to forget the breaking of past ones.

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- B** From: Anthony Adamthwaite, *The Lost Peace*, published in 1980. This historian argues that both economic and political factors were important in foreign policy.

Britain’s refusal to join France...

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Details:

An extract from *The Lost Peace* by Anthony Adamthwaite

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...encouraging Germany to accept the post-war settlement.

- C** From: Paul Kennedy, *The Realities behind Diplomacy*, published in 1981. This historian points out the importance of economic considerations to British foreign policy.

Economic considerations had a major impact on foreign policy...

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Details:
An extract from *The Realities behind Diplomacy* by Paul Kennedy

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...as the western democracies.

- D** From: Alan Sharp, *Peacemaking in Paris*, published in 1991. This historian argues that there were important political as well as economic motives behind British policy towards Germany in the interwar period.

Britain's main objectives at the Versailles conference were to eliminate Germany as a colonial and naval rival. Once this had been achieved, new factors came to dominate Britain's view of Germany's role. The first was trade. In 1913 Britain sold more to Germany than to anyone else except India, and bought more from Germany than from anyone else other than the USA. Where the French saw Germany as a military threat, Britain saw Germany as a commercial opportunity, and they came to associate the persistence of unemployment in Britain after 1920 with the collapse of trade in central Europe. Secondly, Germany could act as a barrier against the spread of Russian communism, and finally as a counter to French domination of Europe. However, this was more difficult to make public as there were too many British graves in France to suggest openly that co-operation would not continue.

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Answer **either**

- 17** Assess the view that the domestic critics of appeasement offered no realistic alternatives in 1938. [45]

or

- 18** To what extent was public opinion the main factor in bringing about changes in British policy towards Germany from October 1938 to September 1939? [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 19** and **ONE** other question.

19 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the development of Soviet atomic weapons was mainly responsible for raising Cold War tensions in the period from 1948 to 1955. [45]

- A** From: Godfrey Hodgson, *The People's Century*, published in 1996. This historian argues that the development of atomic weapons by the Russians led to increasing tension.

The atomic bombs that brought the Second World War to an end made the USA the most powerful country in the world. They also brought the fear of another even more terrible war. American scientists believed it would take the Soviet Union until 1954 to develop their atomic bomb. They were wrong. The Russians' first test explosions took place in 1949. Millions of people now lived in fear of nuclear war. In the USA the 'Alert America' campaign sought to reassure people that simple procedures would protect them in the event of nuclear war. Comic books were distributed to schoolchildren teaching them to 'duck and cover' in the event of an atomic strike. From 1953 a series of test explosions of hydrogen bombs took place in the Nevada desert, watched on television by millions of alarmed people.

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- B** From: Bradley Lightbody, *The Cold War*, published in 1999. This historian argues that the USA increased defence spending in the 1950s because of the Soviet threat.

An analysis of the Soviet threat to the USA, known as NSC-68, was presented to Truman in April 1950....

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Details:

An extract from *The Cold War* by Bradley Lightbody

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...This left the United States in no doubt about the causes of the crisis.

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- C** From: Steve Phillips, *The Cold War*, published in 2001. This historian argues that the development of the Cold War led to both the USA and the USSR wanting not to fall behind the other in terms of their ability to wage war.

By 1948 Germany continued to generate tension. West Berlin had become an island of prosperous capitalism in a sea of communism. In June 1948 Stalin blockaded Berlin. All road, rail and canal links with West Berlin were severed. Afterwards, both sides tried to ensure they did not fall behind in their capacity to wage war. In 1949 the USA set up NATO and the Soviet Union successfully tested its own atomic bomb. The arms race that developed was a result of the tension between the superpowers. By the end of 1955 both the USA and the Soviet Union possessed hydrogen bombs: the USA had 560 strategic bombers to the Soviet Union's 60. As both sides attempted to develop missiles with nuclear warheads, the arms race took on an increasingly destructive and dangerous dimension.

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- D** From: Bob Dylan, *Chronicles*, published in 2004. This author recalls the anti-Soviet hysteria of the 1950s.

In 1951 I was a ten year old schoolboy. One of the things we were trained to do was to hide and take cover under our desks when the air-raid sirens blew because the Russians could attack us with atomic bombs. When the drill sirens went off you had to lie under your desk facedown. As if this could save you! We were told that the Russians could be parachuting from planes over our town at any time. These were the same Russians that my uncles had fought alongside only a few years earlier. Now they had become monsters who were coming to slit our throats. The Reds were everywhere, we were told, and out for bloodlust. It seemed peculiar. It's one thing to be afraid when someone's pointing a shotgun at you, but it's another thing to be afraid of something that's just not quite real. There were a lot of folk around who took this threat seriously though, and it rubbed off on you. It was easy to become a victim of their strange fantasy.

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Answer **either**

- 20** Assess the view that Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe in the period from 1944 to 1948 were mainly a response to the suffering of the Soviet Union in the Second World War. [45]

or

- 21** Assess the view that the defence of freedom was the main reason why the USA developed the policy of 'containment' of communism in Europe in the period from 1945 to 1948. [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

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- Q.4 Source A Adapted from © P Adelman, *Great Britain and the Irish Question, 1800-1922*, p.75, published by Hodder Headline Ltd., 1996.
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- Q.7 Source A Adapted from O von Bismarck, *Memoirs*, 1890s, quoted in © A Stiles and A Farmer, *The Unification of Germany*, p.85, published by Hodder and Stoughton, 2001.
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- Q.13 Source A Adapted from © J Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History, 1812-1986*, pp.241-2, published by Hodder and Stoughton, 1992.
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- Q.16 Source B Adapted from © A Adamthwaite, *The Lost Peace*, pp.4-5, published by Arnold, 1980.
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