

**ADVANCED GCE
HISTORY**

Historical Investigations 1799–1955

WEDNESDAY 4 JUNE 2008

2589

Morning
Time: 1 hour 30 minutes

Additional materials (enclosed): None

Additional materials (required):
Answer Booklet (16 pages)



INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Write your name in capital letters, your Centre Number and Candidate Number in the spaces provided on the Answer Booklet.
- Read each question carefully and make sure you know what you have to do before starting your answer.
- Write your answers, in blue or black ink, on the separate Answer Booklet provided.

INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES

This paper contains questions on the following seven Options:

- Napoleon I (pages 2–3)
- Gladstone and Disraeli 1846–80 (pages 4–5)
- Bismarck and the Unification of Germany 1858–71 (pages 6–7)
- Roosevelt's America 1920–41 (pages 8–9)
- Lenin and the Establishment of Bolshevik Power 1903–24 (pages 10–11)
- Chamberlain and Anglo-German Relations 1918–39 (pages 12–13)
- Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55 (pages 14–15)
- Answer on **one** Option only. In that Option, answer the Passages question, and **one** other question.
- The number of marks for each question is given in brackets [] at the end of each question.
- The total mark for this paper is **90**.
- You should write in continuous prose and are reminded of the need for clear and accurate writing, including structure of argument, grammar, punctuation and spelling.
- The time permitted allows for reading the Passages of the one Option you have studied.
- You are advised to spend equal time on the Passages question and the essay you select.
- In answering the Passages question, you are expected to use your knowledge of the topic to help you explain and evaluate the interpretations in the Passages, as well as to inform your answer.
- In answering an essay question, you are expected to refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations to help you develop your arguments.

This document consists of **16** printed pages.

Napoleon I

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 1** and **ONE** other question.

1 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Napoleon's reputation as a military genius has been exaggerated. [45]

- A** From: C. J. Esdaile, *The Wars of Napoleon*, published in 1995. This historian argues that the secret of Napoleon's success lay in his direct control of the armed forces, his dynamism and his clarity of purpose.

As remodelled by Napoleon, the French army was a powerful instrument that outclassed the forces it faced in the period 1805–7. In the French army, all authority was held by Napoleon, who was both head of state and commander-in-chief. As such he was able in the first place to prepare the way for his armies by means of diplomacy. Once preparations for war were complete, moreover, all military planning for the campaign was carried out by Napoleon himself. With Napoleon in complete control, it followed that the *grande armée's* operations were generally better co-ordinated than those of its opponents. Even more importantly they were also marked by greater clarity of aim – the destruction of the enemy's means and will to resist through a decisive battle. Napoleon was a commander of extraordinary capacities, being the master of detail, calculation, deception, speed, concentration and morale. The secret of Napoleon's generalship lay in a commitment at all times and in all situations to the offensive and in an almost unparalleled ability to ensure that this was achieved in conditions of superiority. No enemy commander was able to match such dynamism.

- B** From: J. Merriman, *Modern Europe, Volume Two, From the French Revolution to the Present*, published in 1996. This historian argues that Napoleon's greatness as a general arose from his powers of planning, organisation, motivation and flexibility.

Napoleon's genius was his ability to organise, oversee, and assure the supplying of and communication between larger armies than had ever before been effectively assembled, and to move them more rapidly than anyone before him. He built on the French innovation in 1792–3 of using combat divisions that combined infantry, cavalry and artillery, and subdivided his armies into corps, each with its own sense of pride and morale. Napoleon's ability to select able marshals, and to inspire officer and foot soldier alike, drew the admiration of even his most bitter enemies. Napoleon analysed all possible moves by his opponents and made decisions quickly. He remained flexible, believing that in warfare there are no fixed rules.

- C** From: O. Connelly, *Blundering to Glory, Napoleon's Military Campaigns*, published in 1999. This historian argues that Napoleon was no great strategist, but an improviser who overcame his mistakes.

Napoleon said many things about the 'art of war', some of which are contradictory. These statements confirm that Napoleon had no tactical doctrine: he was an improviser who profited from his enemies' mistakes. His advice on strategy was also simple: to keep corps close enough together so as to be able to concentrate them quickly, not to divide forces in the presence of the enemy, and to manoeuvre to have greater numbers on the field of battle than the enemy. Often Napoleon had blundered, but he had always scrambled to victory until the masses of his enemies overwhelmed him. Two rather dull quotations from Napoleon seem to give away his major secrets of success: 'True wisdom, for a general, is in energetic determination'. And 'the essential quality of a general-in-chief is strong character and the determination to win at all costs'. Napoleon's genius lay in scrambling, not in carrying out a pre-conceived plan.

- D** From: A. Uffindell, *Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars and their Battles 1805–1815*, published in 2003. This historian argues that Napoleon's generalship was always flawed.

Napoleon, despite his long catalogue of victories, made mistakes. Over-confidence and vague communications were primarily responsible for his worst defeats. He also failed to ensure that his campaigns were adequately supplied, most notoriously when he invaded Russia in 1812. His methods of war became increasingly predictable and this allowed opponents to devise counter-measures. In later years he faced some more capable enemy commanders. The mistakes that undid him in 1815 were the same errors of judgement and over-confidence as those he had made at Marengo, Aspern-Essling and Smolensk, but never before had he faced a combination of two such formidable opponents as Wellington and Blücher.

Answer **either**

- 2** Assess the view that order was Napoleon's prime objective in domestic policy. [45]

or

- 3** Assess the view that the attempt to enforce the Continental System was the **main** reason for the downfall of Napoleon's empire in Europe. [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Gladstone and Disraeli 1846–80

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 4** and **ONE** other question.

4 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Disraeli's success in the Conservative party was very limited to 1865. [45]

- A** From: Terry Jenkins, *Disraeli and Victorian Conservatism*, published in 1996. This historian believes that Disraeli enjoyed little success in the party before 1865.

In 1865 the likelihood of Disraeli reaching the highest office of all seemed remote. Although he is often credited with inventing the concept of opposition for opposition's sake, Disraeli was showing signs of losing his appetite for politics. In February a colleague observed that 'Disraeli's increasing apathy towards public affairs is becoming a subject of general comment: I myself have noticed it for the last two or three years'. Disraeli's age and the unpromising political outlook for the Conservatives were obvious explanations, but there was also the old problem of relations between Disraeli and Lord Derby which were not always cordial. Disraeli became so inactive that in 1865 he voted just nine times in the House of Commons out of a possible 104.

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- B** From: Duncan Watts, *Tories, Unionists and Conservatives 1815–1914*, published in 2002. This historian argues that although Disraeli faced problems, his abilities brought him success.

It was no small achievement for Disraeli to reach the top. His was not a promising background. It was a steep ladder to climb and there is no doubt that in ascending it he came up against the prejudices and hostility of many in his party. That he was successful was partly a matter of ability. He was a superb parliamentarian; skilful and courageous and a master of the memorable turn of phrase. He was often opposed by many great speakers in the House of Commons, but he invariably countered their oratory with his own particular brand of eloquence. His speaking and debating talent was recognised by Lord Derby, even if he doubted whether Disraeli was a man of honour. Another key fact was the absence of any real competition. The longer the party had remained in the wilderness, the more it was apparent that there was no one else of remotely comparable quality. He was still not liked by many Conservatives and was seen as an outsider but, despite his lack of rank and his Jewish background, he established an obvious ascendancy over those around him.

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- C** From: Stephen Lee, *Gladstone and Disraeli*, published in 2005. This historian considers that Disraeli made a positive and successful contribution to the Conservative party.

Disraeli boosted the popular appeal of the Conservative party. He prevented it from becoming merely an aimless remnant of a once larger body. Instead he aimed to give the party a vision which involved competing with the Whigs, whom he considered corrupt and with no other object but their own enrichment. Conservatism, by contrast, was more in the interests of the nation as a whole, since it would appeal, as he said, 'to the passions of the millions'. He aimed to provide a new ideological structure which would broaden his support base and justify a policy of social reform. He needed a layer of voters from the upper working classes, which he tried to achieve through the Second Reform Act in 1867. Throughout the 1860s he attempted an extension of his party's base, undermining the Liberals in the process.

- D** From: Ian St John, *Disraeli and the Art of Victorian Politics*, published in 2005. This historian considers that Disraeli faced many problems in achieving success in the Conservative party.

It is essential to emphasise the circumstances and constraints within which Disraeli operated. From the start of his political career, the odds were against him. He had tried to overcome them with a combination of determination, imagination and opportunism. Yet, the greatest single step he took, the destruction of Peel, not only shattered the prospect of Conservative domination in the mid-nineteenth century, but fatally damaged his own personal reputation. He laboured long and hard to restore the fortunes of his party. It was, however, an uphill struggle against the Liberals and one in which he was hindered by his own personality, the character of the Conservatives themselves, and his subordination to Lord Derby both politically and socially. Only when Derby and Palmerston had left the political stage was he able to establish a real claim to power.

Answer **either**

- 5** Assess how far Gladstone's development from Conservative to Liberal resulted from his desire for sound financial policies. [45]

or

- 6** To what extent can the social reforms of Disraeli's government of 1874–1880 be described as 'Tory Democracy'? [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Bismarck and the Unification of Germany 1858–71

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 7** and **ONE** other question.

7 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the German Constitution of 1871 was based on the principles of liberalism. [45]

- A** From: W. N. Medlicott, *Bismarck and Modern Germany*, published in 1965. This historian argues that the Reichstag, despite being elected by universal male suffrage, had very little effective power.

There was to be a Reichstag or parliament, elected by universal male suffrage. This seemed a thoroughly democratic innovation. But the new parliament was in no sense an instrument for providing responsible government. It was to have no control over the Bundesrat (Federal Council). It would have the power to legislate on various matters, but to become law each bill would have to be approved by the Bundesrat. Moreover, in Bismarck's plan the main item of expenditure, the maintenance of the armed forces, was virtually taken out of the hands of the Reichstag. Instead, the size of the army and the amount that it was to cost per head were to be permanently fixed at an agreed percentage. Thus the Reichstag would have merely the function of passing the military budget annually without any scope for modification.

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- B** From: W. G. Shreeves, *Nationmaking in Nineteenth Century Europe*, published in 1984. This historian suggests that the concessions Bismarck made towards the Liberals were highly significant ones.

When Bismarck gave the Germans universal male suffrage for all men over 25 he was in fact ahead of most other countries in Europe. The Russians could only vote in local elections, British agricultural labourers did not get the vote until 1884 and domestic servants not until 1918. In the USA the Blacks of the South were deprived of their vote by their local states. To have persuaded William I and the army to accept universal male suffrage and a Reichstag which could block government legislation was a considerable feat for which Bismarck is given very little credit. The Reichstag was given enough power to make the future development of democracy possible in Germany.

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- C** From: B. Waller, *Bismarck*, published in 1985. This historian suggests that, even though Bismarck made significant concessions to the Liberals, in essence he did not weaken his own position of power within the Constitution.

Bismarck's experience with the Prussian Constitution taught him that he had little to fear from the Liberals. Giving way on even fairly important issues would not necessarily diminish his personal position of power or lead to disastrous change. After 1866 he came to terms with the Prussian parliament and produced a reasonably liberal constitution for the North German Confederation. He also won over much of the opposition – although in doing so he lost the support of most of the Conservatives. The Constitution of the Confederation and that of the new German Empire set up in 1871 adopted many liberal reforms. It had a democratic element too – universal male suffrage and the secret ballot. The federal structure with its large variety of parliamentary institutions also provided a balance to Prussian dominance. Despite what some historians believe, the German Empire had a constitutional government which was quite capable of enacting laws which were liberal for their time. It is wrong to say that Imperial Germany was without constitutional government and it is absurd to argue that her government was absolute or even semi-absolute.

- D** From: A. Stiles, *The Unification of Germany*, published in 2001. This historian suggests that, whilst universal male suffrage did not lead to democracy in 1871, it did show that Bismarck had grudgingly accepted the need to secure popular support for the smooth running of the state.

Bismarck was anxious for political power in Germany to remain in traditional hands – in those of the Emperor, his army officers, his ministers – and particularly with Bismarck himself. Arguably, the Constitution gave little opportunity for the exercise of democracy. Bismarck regarded the Reichstag with some contempt – as a collection of squabbling politicians who did not reflect popular opinion. However, the Reichstag could withhold consent to legislation and money bills. It was able to exert influence, if only of a negative kind. Universal male suffrage promoted the development of mass political parties with popular appeal. While these parties were in no position to form governments, Bismarck could not afford to ignore them. However, Bismarck was only ready to work with the Reichstag on condition that it accepted his proposals or some compromise acceptable to him. If agreement could not be reached, he could dissolve the Reichstag and call for new elections.

Answer **either**

- 8** To what extent can Bismarck's claim that he planned for war with France be supported by his handling of events in the period from 1866 to 1871? [45]

or

- 9** Assess the view that German Unification in the period from 1858 to 1871 was made possible only because of a favourable international situation. [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Roosevelt's America 1920–41

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 10** and **ONE** other question.

10 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the first New Deal promised much but delivered little. [45]

- A** From: John Maynard Keynes, 'An Open Letter to President Roosevelt', published in *The New York Times*, December 1933. A British economist criticises Roosevelt's National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).

Now I am not clear, looking back over the last nine months, that recovery is more important than reform. I cannot see any aid to recovery in the NIRA. The driving force, which has been behind the vast administrative task set by this Act, has seemed to represent a wrong choice in the order of priorities. There is too much emphasis on maintaining high prices for industrial and agricultural goods. This is a serious misunderstanding about the part prices can play in achieving economic recovery. The right way to get economic recovery is to increase the purchasing power of the economy through increases in government expenditure, which is financed by loans. Nothing else counts in comparison to this.

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- B** From: William Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*, published in 1963. This historian believes the first New Deal was a considerable success.

When Congress adjourned on 16 June, precisely 100 days after the special session opened, it had written into the laws of the land the most extraordinary series of reforms in the nation's history. It had committed the country to an unprecedented programme of government–industry co-operation and accepted the responsibility for the welfare of millions of unemployed. It agreed to engage in a far-reaching experiment in regional planning and pledged billions of dollars to save homes and farms from closure. For the first time the government had established federal regulation of Wall Street. The next day, as the President sat at his desk in the White House signing several bills Congress had adopted, he remarked, 'More history is being made today than in any one day of our national life'.

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- C** From: James Patterson, *America in the Twentieth Century*, published in 1994. This historian argues that the National Recovery Administration (NRA) brought only partial success.

The central aims of the NRA were to stabilize industrial prices and provide minimal guarantees to trade unions. The NRA showed that Roosevelt wished to work with, rather than against, business interests. Indeed, the NRA favoured big business. Under Johnson, the NRA's chief executive, the NRA had established price codes and wage levels for more than 500 industries. Between March and July 1933 factory production had nearly doubled. However, by mid-Autumn the NRA was having serious troubles. Trade union leaders complained the NRA harmed small business. Opposition from business interests also hurt the NRA. Some major industries such as oil delayed signing up to NRA practices. Others, such as carmaker Henry Ford refused to co-operate with the NRA. The NRA was not a total failure. It gave people the idea that the New Deal was trying to help them. The National Recovery Act gave trade unions power to increase their membership.

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- D** From: Paul Boyer, *The Enduring Vision*, published in 1995. This historian suggests that the first 100 days of the New Deal was generally seen as a success due to Roosevelt's political skill.

Despite the New Deal's brave beginnings the Depression continued as 1934 ended. Major problems gripped the NRA. Conflict flared over farm policy, and the need for federal relief spending appeared to expand rather than decrease. But the New Deal remained highly popular, reflecting both its achievements and Roosevelt's political skills. Roosevelt commanded the public stage and got support for his programmes because of his self-assurance, energy and good humour. Although many Republican newspaper publishers remained hostile, Roosevelt enjoyed excellent relations with the working press. Reporters painted an overwhelmingly favourable picture of his government. Roosevelt liked public appearances and took naturally to radio. Roosevelt's easy mastery of the radio provided a model for his successors in the TV age. The mid-term elections of 1934 ratified the popular verdict on the New Deal. The Democrats increased their majorities in both houses of Congress.

Answer **either**

- 11** To what extent was the USA isolationist in foreign policy in the period from 1920 to 1941? [45]

or

- 12** Assess the view that the main reason why the Depression worsened from 1929 to 1933 was Hoover's policies. [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Lenin and the Establishment of Bolshevik Power 1903–24

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 13** and **ONE** other question.

13 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the Bolsheviks won the Civil War mainly as a result of the disunity of their opponents. [45]

- A** From: M. Lynch, *Reaction and Revolutions: Russia 1881–1924*, published in 1992. This historian emphasises the advantages held by the Red Army in terms of both geography and resources.

The various White armies fought as separate detachments. They were never bound together by a single aim. They were unwilling to sacrifice their individual interests in order to form a united anti-Bolshevik front. This allowed the Reds to pick off the White armies one by one. In the rare cases in which the Whites did consider co-operating, they were too widely scattered geographically to be able to bring sufficient pressure to bear on the enemy. The Reds, in contrast, remained in control of a concentrated central area of western Russia which they were able to defend by maintaining their inner communication and supply lines. The two major cities, Petrograd and Moscow, the administrative centres of Russia, remained in their hands throughout the war, as did the railway network. The Reds also possessed a key advantage in that the areas where they had their strongest hold were the industrial centres of Russia. This gave them access to munitions and war supplies denied to the Whites.

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- B** From: G. Hosking, *A History of the Soviet Union, 1917–1991*, published in 1992. This historian focuses upon the failure of the White armies to appeal to both the peasants and the workers.

The Whites were ultimately unsuccessful. This was partly because of political disunity; at the very least they failed to act as a focus for all the various anti-Bolshevik forces. They failed even to attract a mass following among the population, though both the workers and the peasants were becoming very disillusioned with Bolshevik rule as it had turned out in practice. The Whites' political programmes were vague and inadequate. They did nothing to reassure the peasants that the land they had won in 1917 would not be taken away from them again in the event of a White victory. They failed to offer the workers a secure status for the trade unions, factory committees and other new representative organisations of 1917. In fact their only consistent political message was 'Russia one and indivisible' – which of course alienated the non-Russian nationalities who might otherwise have been inclined to support the Whites.

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- C** From: S. Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, published in 1994. This historian argues that the Bolshevik policy towards land redistribution was more attractive to the peasants.

Both the Red Army and the White armies conscripted peasants in the territories they controlled, and both had a substantial desertion rate. As the Civil War progressed, however, the Whites' difficulties with the peasant conscripts became markedly greater than those of the Reds. The peasants resented the Bolsheviks' policy of grain requisitioning but the Whites were no different in this respect. The peasants also were reluctant to serve in anyone's army, as the experience of the Russian Army in 1917 had amply demonstrated. However, the mass desertions of peasants in 1917 had been closely related to the land seizures and redistribution by the villages. This process was largely completed by the end of 1918 and the Bolsheviks had approved it. The Whites, on the other hand, did not approve of land seizures and supported the former landowners. Thus on the crucial issue of land, the Bolsheviks were the lesser evil.

- D** From: P. Oxley, *Russia 1855 to 1991: From Tsars to Commissars*, published in 2001. This historian highlights the role of Trotsky and the Red Army.

The Red Army did not exist in March 1918, but by 1920 it was 5 million strong. In 1918 the Communists introduced conscription into the areas they controlled and, although they suffered heavy desertions, they had almost limitless human resources to draw upon. It has been estimated that the largest combined total of White forces facing the Reds at any one time was no more than 500,000, and they were divided between different armies. Greater numbers alone do not win wars, though they certainly help. Trotsky also reintroduced ranks and military discipline into the Red Army. To remedy his lack of experienced officers, against much opposition within his party, Trotsky recruited 50,000 former Tsarist officers. To ensure their loyalty on the battlefield, he also appointed Bolshevik political commissars to supervise the officers.

Answer **either**

- 14** Assess the reasons why the Bolshevik Party was successful in seizing power in October 1917. [45]

or

- 15** 'Nothing more than a brutal dictatorship'. Assess this view of the Bolshevik regime from October 1917 to 1924. [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Chamberlain and Anglo-German Relations 1918–39

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 16** and **ONE** other question.

16 Study all the Passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the British policy of appeasement ended as a result of the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. [45]

- A** From: Sir Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission*, published in April 1940. Henderson was the British ambassador in Berlin from 1937 to 1939. He had supported the Munich agreement and had been a strong supporter of appeasement. Here he argues that the occupation of Prague in March 1939 was a major turning point.

Until the occupation of Prague, the world, passionately anxious for peace as an end in itself and fully conscious of the likely horrors of the next war, had watched Hitler progress from success to success. Until then the world had appeared to forgive, or to be taken in by, the hateful methods and technique which he invariably employed. But Prague was the limit. There was no sense of security left anywhere in Europe, nothing but an atmosphere of complete lack of confidence in Hitler's good faith. I telegraphed Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, 'The invasion of Czechoslovakia is a wrong which will always be calling for remedy'. The government took the only course and summoned me back to London. My mission to Berlin was already a failure, and from that moment on I had no real hopes of peace.

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- B** From: Paul Hayes, *Modern British Foreign Policy, The Twentieth Century*, published in 1978. This historian argues that the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 by Germany had greater impact on the public than on Chamberlain and the supporters of appeasement.

Opinion in Britain about Hitler's latest coup in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was hostile. The press took a very strong line against the breaking of the pledges that Germany had made at Munich in 1938. Many MPs agreed, though they knew that nothing would be done; yet the initial reaction of the appeasers was mild. Chamberlain told the House of Commons on 15 March that as Czechoslovakia no longer existed, Britain's guarantee to it was void. The Chancellor of the Exchequer gave full support and both men made it plain that they thought the work of appeasement should go on. Chamberlain and his supporters were compelled by public opinion to shift their stance, but their faith in appeasement, though shaken, was not destroyed. In his speech at Birmingham on 17 March Chamberlain said that he shared public indignation at Hitler's actions, but nothing was said about new measures such as conscription. Chamberlain slightly changed his tone only in response to a Conservative revolt against him.

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- C** From: Robert Blake, *The Decline of Power 1915–1964*, published in 1985. This historian argues that Hitler's occupation of Prague ended appeasement.

By March 1939 Chamberlain had made one of the most startling U-turns in the history of British foreign policy. The explanation lies in two developments, one gradual and one sudden. The first was the realization that British security could not be maintained if France were defeated. By February 1939 the Chiefs of Staff recommended that an expeditionary force for possible use in France should be created, and the cabinet decided to create an army of 32 divisions. The second development was the unexpected occupation of Prague. March 15 is one of the rare days that can be described as a turning point in history. The seizure of Czechoslovakia, a non-German country, destroyed appeasement. No one could now imagine that Hitler's objectives were confined to remedying the grievances of Versailles.

- D** From: Peter Neville, *Neville Chamberlain, A Study in Failure?*, published in 1992. This historian argues that there was considerable continuity in foreign policy before and after the events of March 1939.

There were sizable changes to foreign policy in March and April 1939, but the essence of the dual approach, rearmament and appeasement, still remained in place. Rearmament was in full swing, but Chamberlain had not given up hope for better relations with Germany and Italy. Economic appeasement of Germany through better trading relations was still pursued. Chamberlain was forced to look again at the concept of the Grand Alliance with Russia but did so without enthusiasm. He continued to work for an understanding with Germany. Pre-eminently a man of peace, Chamberlain continued to hope that Hitler could be persuaded to see reason, but the pace of rearmament showed that he never totally relied on Hitler's good faith.

Answer **either**

- 17** How far was British policy towards Germany between 1919 and 1929 the result of a belief that the Treaty of Versailles had treated Germany unjustly? [45]

or

- 18** Assess the view that Chamberlain's pursuit of appeasement in 1937 and 1938 did no more than continue the policies of previous British governments since 1933. [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 19** and **ONE** other question.

19 Study all the passages.

Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the Soviet Union was mainly responsible for causing the Cold War crisis in Berlin in 1948. [45]

- A** From: John W. Mason, *The Cold War 1945–1991*, published in 1996. This historian argues that Soviet fears of a German revival contributed to the crisis in Berlin in 1948.

Germany's position in the centre of Europe, coupled with its industrial potential, made it the crucial country in the European balance of power. Lenin's saying that 'whoever has Germany has Europe' still held true. There was strong pressure in the West to revive Germany economically and to integrate the three western zones of Germany into the European recovery programme. This was precisely what the Soviet Union feared. Alarming to the Soviets was the possibility that a West German state, closely allied to the USA, might one day become a military power again and threaten the Soviet fatherland. On 24 June 1948, one day after the Western powers introduced a new currency into their sectors of Berlin, the Soviets cut off all passenger and freight traffic to West Berlin. The Berlin Blockade had begun. The Berlin airlift caught the world's imagination and cast the Soviet Union, portrayed as trying to starve women and children, in a bad light.

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- B** From: Chris Ward, *Stalin's Russia*, published in 1999. This historian argues that the USA provoked Stalin into blockading Berlin.

Stalin feared that Germany would rise from the ashes of the Second World War to attack the Soviet Union once more. In February 1948 a Soviet-backed coup overthrew Czechoslovakia's coalition government. The following month Stalin publicly accused the West of plotting to split Germany. When the USA introduced a new currency in Berlin in June, the Soviet Union accused the West of breaking the Potsdam agreement and introduced their own currency in the Soviet sector of Berlin. A few days later, Stalin blockaded West Berlin. Allied policy towards Germany undoubtedly fuelled Stalin's long-standing suspicions of the West, and with good cause. There is no reason to suspect the existence of a Soviet plot to swallow up Europe.

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- C** From: Oliver Edwards, *The USA and the Cold War 1945–1963*, published in 2002. This historian argues that Germany became a Cold War battleground by 1948 because of its geographical position and strategic importance to both sides.

The rise of Soviet power in Eastern Europe persuaded the USA to revive Germany more quickly than had been planned. Germany straddled the frontier between non-communist and Soviet-controlled Europe and was emerging as a vital battleground in the Cold War. The combination of the three western zones into a West German state would create a solid buffer against communism in central Europe. The alternative prospect of a single Soviet-dominated German state was alarming. According to the strategy of containment western Germany was seen as a prime site of Soviet pressure. The western zones of Germany became one of the chief beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan. The Soviets were horrified. The unwelcome prospect of an economically strong and rearmed Germany revived fears of an invasion from the West. Stalin's response was to initiate a land blockade of Berlin. 25 30

- D** From: John Philip, *Stalin*, published in 2004. This historian argues that Stalin's expansionist tendencies were clearly apparent in the late 1940s.

By 1946 the Cold War battle lines had been drawn. In March 1946 Winston Churchill concluded that 'an Iron Curtain has descended across Europe', emphasising the plight of communist dominated Eastern Europe. The Cold War was an unavoidable consequence of Stalin's paranoia and an extension of the way he dealt with opposition within the Soviet Union. By 1947 every Eastern European country except Czechoslovakia had a communist government modelled on the Soviet Union's. Each country had influential Soviet 'advisers'. Leading opponents were purged. In February 1948 the 'Czech Coup' brought the only 'free' state in Eastern Europe under Soviet control, further proof of Stalin's expansionist tendencies. The division of Germany and Berlin at Potsdam was causing problems by 1948. Western plans to introduce a new currency within their zones of Germany and Berlin were the catalyst for Stalin's Berlin blockade in 1948. Stalin aimed to starve West Berlin into the Soviet zone of Germany by cutting all routes between Berlin and western Germany. 35 40 45

Answer **either**

- 20** Assess the view that the disputes between the wartime allies from 1941 to 1945 were caused more by the western allies than by Stalin. [45]

or

- 21** 'Marshall Aid was designed more to benefit the USA than Europe.' Assess this view of American policy. [45]

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

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