Please check the examination details bel	ow before ente	ring your candidate information
Candidate surname		Other names
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Pearson Edexcel Inter	nation	al Advanced Level
<b>Time</b> 2 hours	Paper reference	WHI04/1D
History		•
International Advanced		
PAPER 4: International Study v	vith Histori	ical Interpretations
Option 1D: The Cold War and Ho		-
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You must have:		Total Marks
Extracts Booklet (enclosed)		

#### **Instructions**

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- Answer Question 1 in Section A and ONE question in Section B.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
  - there may be more space than you need.

#### Information

- The total mark for this paper is 50.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets
  - use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.

#### **Advice**

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

Turn over ▶





#### **SECTION A**

#### Answer Question 1. Write your answer in the spaces provided.

### Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

1	How far do you agree with the view that China's decision to intervene in the Korean War was mainly due to Soviet persuasion?	
	Explain your answer using Extracts 1 and 2 and your knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.	
		(25)















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**TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 25 MARKS** 

#### **SECTION B**

#### Answer ONE question in Section B.

You must start your answer to your chosen question on the next page.

#### **EITHER**

2 How far did the support of the US public for US involvement in the Vietnam conflict change in the years 1965–73?

(Total for Question 2 = 25 marks)

#### OR

3 How far do you agree that the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was the most important reason for the ongoing confrontation between China and Vietnam in the years 1979–89?

(Total for Question 3 = 25 marks)





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TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 25 MARKS



**TOTAL FOR PAPER = 50 MARKS** 

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## **Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level**

Time 2 hours

Paper reference

**WHI04/1D** 

# History

**International Advanced** 

**PAPER 4: International Study with Historical** 

**Interpretations** 

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

**Extracts Booklet** 

Do not return this Booklet with the question paper.

Turn over ▶





#### Extracts for use with Section A.

**Extract 1:** From Niu Jun, *The birth of the People's Republic of China and the road to the Korean War*, published in 2011.

At the beginning of the Korean War, Stalin had limited China's direct involvement. However, at the decisive point at which North Korea failed to turn back US troops, he urged China to send troops. On 1 October, after being asked to do so both by the Soviets and the North Koreans, Mao made the decision to enter the war. Yet he did not have the majority support of the Chinese leadership.

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Stalin tried to persuade the Chinese leaders as best he could. In a telegram to Mao on 5 October, Stalin cited the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty. He said that the United States had not made adequate preparations for a large-scale war and that, if the Americans were to attack China itself, the USSR would assist China in resisting them. Stalin also stated that China's entry into the war would force the United States to make concessions, including abandoning Taiwan. He also warned that, if China did not send troops, it would lose any hope of gaining Taiwan.

At about the same time that Stalin sent this telegram, the CCP Central Committee took the final decision to send troops into Korea. Stalin's confirmation of the promises in the Sino-Soviet treaty certainly played a role in encouraging Chinese leaders to overcome their fears that war might spread into their own country.

#### **Extract 2:** From D Rees, *Korea: The Limited War*, published in 1970.

In September 1950, the US thought China could still be persuaded by America not to intervene. Truman announced, 'We hope in particular that the people of China will not be misled or forced into fighting against the United Nations.' But China saw the situation very differently.

To China's Communist-Maoist political structure it seemed as if the military action of the US and its UN allies in Korea could significantly threaten China. Even if their action did not threaten China itself physically, then it could threaten China's internal stability and China's position as both a great Asian and a Communist power. To China, not just MacArthur's actions in the Far East but the whole of American policy represented America's imperialist intentions. America could easily attempt the destruction of the new China. Such a powerful enemy in control of a unified, non-Communist Korea might also attempt to exploit opportunities within China.

Helping North Korea was not only a defensive measure but a necessary means of upholding Communist power in Asia. China's initial intervention claimed to have no real intention beyond keeping some of Kim Il Sung's North Korean state intact. In reality, China's aim was only partially to defend North Korea. Depending on the developing situation, China saw offensive possibilities with the ultimate aim of advancing Beijing's interests in Asia.

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