Please check the examination details below before entering your candidate information		
Candidate surname	Othe	r names
Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level	Centre Number	Candidate Number
Friday 24 Jan	uary 202	0
Morning (Time: 2 hours)	Paper Refere	nce WHI04/1D
History International Advanced Paper 4: International S Option 1D: The Cold Wa	tudy with Histori	•
You must have: Extracts Booklet (enclosed)		Total Marks

Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- Fill in the boxes at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- Answer Question 1 in Section A and ONE question in Section B.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
 - there may be more space than you need.

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 50.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets
 - use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

Turn over ▶



SECTION A

Answer Question 1. Write your answer in the space provided.

Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

1	How far do you agree with the view that the main reason for Truman's decision
	to go to the aid of South Korea, in June 1950, was to make a stand against global
	communist aggression?

to this controversy.			eu	
to this controversy.				(25)













(Tatalifan Onestian 1 25 1)
(Total for Question 1 = 25 marks)
TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 25 MARKS



SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B.

You must start your answer to your chosen question on the next page.

EITHER

2 How far do you agree that US commitment to the Diem government was the main reason why the US became increasingly involved in South Vietnam in the years 1954–63?

(Total for Question 2 = 25 marks)

OR

3 How accurate is it to say that there was an economic transformation in South-East Asia in the 1980s?

(Total for Question 3 = 25 marks)



nosen question number:	Question 2	Question 3	



















TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 25 MARKS

TOTAL FOR PAPER = 50 MARKS

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Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level

Friday 24 January 2020

Morning

Paper Reference WHI04/1D

History

International Advanced

Paper 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Extracts Booklet

Do not return this booklet with the question paper.

Turn over ▶





Extracts for use with Section A.

Extract 1: From V D Cha, *Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia*, published in 2016.

Before the June 1950 invasion, there was agreement amongst US foreign policy officials that South Korea was no longer of importance. Korea was merely a geographical add-on to the Asian continent and of no importance in the US grand strategy in Asia. The last US armed military unit had already departed from South Korea, leaving only a 500-man advisory group.

And yet the North Korean invasion was such a blatant act of aggression, Truman felt compelled to respond. The best explanation for why the United States changed its own policy by going into Korea had less to do with the threat posed by the invasion to the strategic situation in Asia and more to do with US status in the world order. Truman was outraged and angered by the nature of the attack. It was an all-out armoured invasion against a weak US partner state. He reportedly told his Secretary of State on the day of the attack that he would stop the communists at all costs. Policymakers were concerned that Korea was just a diversionary tactic. They feared it was actually being used to advance communist interests in the most important areas of the cold war – Europe and the Middle East – on the other side of the world. They were concerned that it was really being used by the communists to test America's determination to defend its spheres of influence.

Having seemed unimportant, Korea now mattered. The Truman administration could no longer separate US prestige in the world from defending remote Korea. 20

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Extract 2: From M Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*, published in 1989.

Truman, and Acheson, his Secretary of State, knew, even if they did not say so, that party politics in the United States had to be taken into consideration in any decision made about Korea. For months, Republican critics, including the strongly anti-communist Senator McCarthy, had accused Truman of not standing up to Asian communism and abandoning China to the communists.

A leading Republican working within the Truman administration warned that 'to sit by while South Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war.'

Truman and Acheson may have hoped that by standing up to communist aggression in Korea they could keep control of events. Also, they may have hoped that they would be able to prevent further pressure to take direct action against China being placed upon them. Both men were reluctant to admit that party politics in the US motivated the decision to become involved in the Korean crisis. As a result, Truman and Acheson portrayed the Korean crisis as part of a global challenge directed from the Soviet Union against the American spheres of influence.

