

Examiners' Report
June 2019

GCE History 9HI0 1E

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Introduction

Once again it was pleasing to see candidates being able to engage effectively across the ability range in this 1E paper, Russia, 1917-91: from Lenin to Yeltsin. Candidates were generally well prepared and centres are to be commended for the wealth of knowledge that candidates deploy in their answers to breadth questions. Many of the responses were interesting and enjoyable to read.

The paper is divided into three sections. Both sections A and B comprise a choice of essays – from two in each – that assess understanding of the period in breadth (AO1) by targeting the second order concepts of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance. Section C contains a compulsory question which is based on two given extracts. It assesses analysis and evaluation of historical interpretations in context (AO3).

The majority of candidates organise their time effectively, although there are still some cases of candidates not completing one of the three responses in the time allocated. This year examiners commented on a notable rise in the number of responses where the handwriting was illegible. Although it is acknowledged that candidates probably do not write in longhand as much as they once did in the past, candidates need to be aware that legible handwriting is important in communicating their arguments; examiners can only give credit for the material that they can read.

It is noticeable that candidates who plan their responses often produce more focused answers. Planning allows candidates to determine their line of reasoning and to formulate an argument and counter-argument from which to establish extent and relative significance in coming to a judgement. It also ensures that candidates focus on key words in the question and, in particular for breadth essays, establish the time period under discussion. Awareness of the key dates, along with a solid understanding of the chronology of the leadership periods, allows candidates to determine the situation at the beginning and the end and to determine the extent of change over the period covered by the questions.

Candidates tend to approach the responses to sections A and B either by using a chronological approach or a more thematic approach. Both approaches are valid but both can lead to candidates not covering sufficient chronological range to fulfil the knowledge requirements at the higher levels (see paragraph below). The chronological approach, particularly with questions across the whole period, often 'run out of steam' before the end and the thematic approach can fail to include exemplification from throughout the time period specified. However, well planned thematic or factor driven responses often provide better opportunities for analysis and exploration of the key issues. These responses are also able to establish the situation at the beginning of the time period of the question and at the end (using turning points within the time period where appropriate) and so are able to make reasoned and substantiated judgements in relation to the second order concept being tested.

Sections A and B deal with breadth questions of varying periods of time ranging from several decades to the whole time period of the specification. Candidates are reminded that this has important implications for the higher levels in bullet point 2 of the mark scheme. To access bullet point 2 at level 4, candidates are expected to meet most of the demands of the question and at level 5 candidates are expected to have responded 'fully' to the demands of the question. Therefore, it is important that the majority of the time period be covered by candidates to enable them to access all levels.

With regard to the appropriate level and quality of knowledge, candidates and centres should recognise the expectation of Advanced Level. In short, it is a combination of the knowledge a candidate is able to bring to the essay, married with their ability to effectively marshal this material towards the analytical demands of the question. It is fair to say that on Paper 1, where candidates

study a range of themes across a broad chronological period, the expectations regarding depth of knowledge will not necessarily be as great as in the more in-depth periods studied. As well as offering more depth of knowledge, candidates who have engaged in wider reading tend to be more successful as they are able to select and deploy the most appropriate examples to support analysis and evaluation.

In section C, the strongest answers demonstrate a clear focus on the need to engage with the different arguments given within the two extracts recognising that these are historical interpretations. These responses provide a comparative analysis of the merits of the different interpretations offered in relation to the view presented in the question. High-scoring responses explore the validity of the arguments offered by the two historians in light of the evidence, both from within the extracts, and the candidates' own contextual knowledge. Weaker responses often attempt to evaluate the extracts in relation to the quantity of factual evidence provided or present a generalised discussion of the view with little reference to the extracts themselves. The question requires a judgement as to 'how convincing' the candidate finds the stated view but many responses provide a very limited conclusion or merely sum up the views in the two extracts with reference to 'reconciling' the extracts.

Some centres appear to prepare candidates by providing a lengthy generalised introduction to the debate regarding the different explanations for the downfall of the Soviet Union for them to memorise and write before moving on to discuss the extracts. These introductions rarely focused on the specific view stated in the question meaning that candidates wasted time writing lengthy introductions with limited rewardable material. Candidates who focus on the relationship between the view stated in the question and the interpretations provided in the extracts from the beginning of the response were often able to produce stronger responses.

Finally, in all sections this year, there was a tendency for some candidates to replicate the words and phrases of the mark scheme in their response and, in some cases, to use the mark scheme as a scaffold in which to insert analysis and contextual knowledge. In many cases this resulted in candidates limiting their access to the higher levels. For example, many candidates asserted that they had provided a sustained analysis or a substantiated judgement rather than actually doing so or confused criteria with issues and so found it difficult to measure extent to weigh up relative significance. The mark scheme is designed to be applied by examiners and the level descriptors are the qualities of the written response that the examiner is looking for when rewarding the response.

Question 1

This was the more popular of the two section A questions and was generally well done with most candidates having a good knowledge of the economic policies of the time period. Stronger responses concentrated securely on the focus of the question, analysing the statement that the failures of Soviet economic policy outweighed the successes in the years 1917-53. Most candidates divided their essays into periods chronologically, mainly focusing on War Communism, the New Economic Policy, the Five Year Plans and collectivization. Other responses considered the question more thematically with reference to ideological, political, military and human consequences as well as the economic successes and failures. There were some excellent responses that really engaged with the concept of failure and success and, using the language of the question, were able to use the term 'outweigh' to establish criteria for judgement. Many of the better responses came to the conclusion that, despite the overall success in improving Russian/Soviet economic performance by 1953, the human cost and suffering outweighed the gains. There were some responses with nuanced commentary on the 'ups and downs' of the economic policies across the period; these were often well organised and a pleasure to read.

Weaker responses tended to work chronologically through the period explaining the different economic policies and briefly commenting on a number of them in order to be able to determine success or failure. These responses often ended in a short assertive conclusion. Only very few candidates confused the chronology, but a disappointing number did not take their analysis past 1939 in the chronology or made fleeting references to the 'post-war' period. This meant that many responses were limited to level 3 or low level 4 for bullet point 2. There were also a large number of responses that failed to consider agriculture, specifically collectivisation.

This is a mid-level 4 response.

Throughout 1917-53, Soviet economic policy fluctuated, from Lenin's introduction of a mixed economy in 1921 to ~~Brezhnev's~~ Stalin's industrial expansion throughout 1924-53. Although the policies varied, the successes significantly outweighed the failures as it achieved the ultimate aim; industrialisation, albeit at the cost of the agricultural sector ~~and human costs~~.

A substantial yet not significant failure of Soviet economic policy, was the expansion of agriculture which remained unsuccessful throughout 1917-53. Lenin's introduction of war communism in 1918 enforced strict military discipline alongside forced requisitioning of grain, not only was this immensely unpopular amongst the peasants, but it also had devastating effects causing significant food shortages as well as famines. Similarly, Stalin did not prioritise the agricultural sector under his economic policy, the initiation of collectivisation ~~both~~ as a matter of fact worsened the state of agriculture.

The liquidation of kulaks halted productivity as the most skilled workers were extracted and the significant under investment made agricultural expansion simply impossible, ^{moreover the fact that the USSR continued exporting grain exacerbated} resulting in famines as demonstrated by ^{the failure} Holodomor and increases in prostitution and criminality.

(Section A continued) activity in rural areas. Therefore the neglected agricultural policies contributed to the creation of an unbalanced economy in which the expansion of industry was prioritised over agriculture. Although agricultural policies proved to be a failure ~~the~~ ~~the~~ ~~economic situation~~ in regards to the Soviet economy, it does not outweigh the overall success of industrialisation, as in order for a country to industrialise it has to focus on the expansion of heavy industry thus in order for the USSR to transform into a superpower the industrial sector had to claim priority over agriculture.

Most significantly, economic policy succeeded in bringing about industrialisation. * Under Stalin the introduction of the first five year plan drastically transformed the economy from a previously agrarian society to an industrial superpower. This was achieved through astronomical targets and the achievement of full employment in 1928 which meant the Soviet economy was producing at maximum output. Steel production increased by four fold and coal production increased by six fold and although consumer goods and overall wellbeing of the workforce ~~was~~ ^{were} sacrificed as demonstrated by the fact that many workers resided in tents and barracks outside ~~the~~ ~~work~~ factories, it does not deter from the idea that the USSR was able to achieve its ultimate

(Section A continued) aim of industrialisation. This proved largely significant in expanding the USSR's international prestige, as they were presented as a communist superpower amidst capitalist nations, such as America and Britain.

Therefore although certain values were sacrificed in order to achieve industrialisation, the mere fact that the USSR was able to transform its economy rapidly and effectively, reinforces the fact that the success of industrialisation outweighed the failures.

Another significant aspect of soviet economic policy, was the expansion of infrastructure which occurred due to vast industrialisation. Although the expansion of infrastructure was rather stagnate under Lenin it does not deter from the fact that Stalin's process of industrialisation resulted in the creation of infrastructure that proved largely beneficial in the long run. The creation of the Dnieper Dam was particularly successful, as it continues to operate to date; providing citizens with electricity, highlighting the long term success of infrastructure. Moreover the expansion of Magnitogorsk from a population of 25 to 250,000 ~~ex~~ demonstrates the effectiveness of economic policies as infrastructure was widely expanded. Therefore

Stalin's economic policy not only outweighs the lack of infrastructure under Lenin, but also significantly outweighs the failures, as not only did it provide

(Section A continued) benefit to both the Soviet state and its citizens, it provided long term benefits such as the Dnieper Dam which continues to operate, signifying that economic policy throughout 1917-53 was largely a success.

* Under Lenin there was an attempt to revitalise the economy through the establishment of the NEP in 1921 which increased overall production in the economy which equated to economic growth, however Stalin exacerbated this process by introducing rapid industrialisation.

In ultimately, the success of economic policy between 1917-53, such as industrialisation and the expansion of infrastructure significantly outweighed failures of the agricultural sector, as the successes provided long term benefits and established the USSR as a superpower. All which would be impossible without the process of industrialisation therefore although the agricultural sector suffered it does not outweigh the overall fact that the USSR was able to successfully industrialise and revitalise its economy.



The response is thematic and there is a clear focus on success and failure. Key issues are explored and there is an attempt to establish criteria to determine the weight of success and failure with an emphasis on production and benefit over time. However, there is greater coverage of Stalin than Lenin and little sense of economic achievements post-1939 so limiting bullet point 2.



Ensure that you cover the whole time period of the question whether you are approaching the question thematically or chronologically.

This is a level 5 response.

To assess how far the failures of Soviet economic policy outweighed the successes in the years 1917 to 1953, it is important to consider agricultural policies, industry pre-World War Two and industry post-World War Two and to what extent these areas of policy had a widespread and drastically damaging effect significant enough to negate the achievements. Despite the impressive successes in pre-war industrial development which enabled the USSR to defeat the 1941 Nazi invasion, the chronic failing in agriculture and the way in which this entrenched a fundamentally flawed and damaging system of command economy leads to the conclusion that the failures far exceeded the successes.

The area with the most profound and widely-felt negative impact was Soviet agriculture. The policy of War Communism from 1918 to 1921 had success in feeding the Red Army, however, the grain requisitioning led to a famine in the 1920s in which 20 million died. Despite the

pragmatic move from Lenin to the New Economic Policy in 1921, which allowed private plots of land and small scale private industry, grain production in 1921 was still only 48% of 1913. If given time the NEP might have improved the agricultural situation, however Stalin's decisive move to a command economy and policy of collectivisation in 1928 proved to be the fundamental weakness in the Soviet economy. Grain production fell, leading to 4 million deaths from famine in 1933, and ~~that~~ Stalin's attitude that agriculture was expendable in favour of industry led to a chronically weakened and inefficient system. It could be argued that the decision to allow private plots during the Second World War was a positive step in the right direction, however this did not significantly improve grain production and tight state control was reinforced in the post-war period. Overall, the inefficiency and low productivity of Soviet farms (they were six times less productive than US farms) was to hamper the Soviet economy for years to come, and even limited the positive impact of industrial

growth, ~~How~~ This coupled with the millions who died as a result of failures in agriculture, means it must be concluded that the failures indeed outweighed the costs.

Industry in the lead up to WW2 had more success, with Vesenkha ensuring state control of industry proving effective for the duration of the Civil War (1918-21). Despite industrial production falling to 10% of its 1913 level in 1921, the small-scale private industry allowed under the NEP remedied this. The most significant turning point in industrial success proved to be Stalin's move to a command economy in 1927. The First Five-Year Plan (1928-32) focused on heavy industry, and despite the negative impact of removing 'bourgeois' experts, this, coupled with the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-37), had undeniably impressive results. Steel increased four-fold and coal six-fold, and the increased arms production due to the growing threat of Hitler proved invaluable for the defeat of the German invasion. There were obvious drawbacks, the use of slave labour (180,000

Culgy innovations were used to build the White Sea Canal) and the enormous human and environmental costs being clear examples. However, in isolation the pre-war industrial policies ~~was~~ proved successful, as the Soviet Union almost fully industrialized in an impressively short time, and it can be argued that the lives of millions of Soviet people would have been much worse off under Nazi control. When evaluated in a wider context, though, the pre-war industrial policies created a system plagued with inefficiencies and waste due to Gosplan, and set the precedent for an ultimate decline in the Soviet economy. Thus, in this instance too the long-term failures can be seen as more significant than the short-term successes.

The post-war industrial policies can be viewed as a success in the rapid recovery they enabled the Soviet Union to make. The economic exploitation of Eastern European countries (especially heavy reparations from East Germany) funded recovery, along with the use of 2 million slave labourers. The use of

retraining programmes for workers and the focus on ~~the~~ arms production in light of the Cold War during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-55) provided undeniable success in economic recovery and stabilisation. However, the lack of new technology (which was in part due to low agricultural production) and the rigid nature of the command economy meant that the system returned to the priorities of the 1930s. Whilst the pre-war industrial policies had fed economic growth, they also entrenched an inflexible system which remained post-war and would ultimately lead to economic decline.

Additionally, it cannot be argued that the millions who suffered, both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, was justifiable for the success of the economy. For that reason, the failures of Soviet economic policy undoubtedly outweighed the successes.

In conclusion, despite the unprecedented level of industrial growth achieved from a very small starting point (the Soviet Union became the fastest-growing economy in the

world in the 1940s), the negative impact this had on both agriculture (which was chronically neglected in economic policy) and the long-term sustainability and efficiency of the Soviet economy, mean the failures outweighed the successes. The system was geared to rapid industrial growth, and although this did have success in the 1930s, it proved to be unadaptable. The neglect of consumer goods and the high human cost meant that many suffered for very little material gain, especially in rural areas where the effects of collectivisation caused famine. Stalin undoubtedly achieved his aim of industrialising the economy, but the widespread negative impact of this shows policy to be overall a failure.



From the introduction onwards there is a sustained exploration of the key issues and a clear discussion of the extent of failure and success. The response understands the need to cover the whole period of the question and to establish criteria for judgement. The conclusion pulls together the argument creating a substantiated judgement of the relative failure and success of the economic policies across the period.



A good conclusion does not just state the extent of success or failure but draws together the points made in the main body of the essay and shows the criteria used to reach a judgement.

Question 2

The less popular of the two choices, candidates were required to consider the statement that Khrushchev's approach to government was fundamentally similar to Brezhnev's approach to government. There was a wide-ranging definition of 'approach to government' but most candidates considered government as Party organisation and structure, use of the police state and cult of the personality. Discussion of economic policy was rewardable as long as it focused on the approach rather than the details and did not dominate the response. In general, sufficient knowledge of both leaders was apparent with most candidates tending towards difference rather than similarity.

Stronger responses focused on whether the approaches were 'fundamentally similar' and were able to use this to determine criteria for measurement. Many suggested that the approaches in general were different, particularly Brezhnev's reversal of many of Khrushchev's reforms, and even where they were similar, for example, their wish to discontinue the worst excesses of the police state, they were not fundamentally similar. Others suggested that overall, despite some differences, both were wedded to the one-party state and one-party rule and so 'fundamentally' they were the same. There was some excellent knowledge of the changes to the structure of government and regional bodies.

Weaker responses simply stated that Brezhnev reversed Khrushchev's reform without providing evidence of how he did this and so created an imbalance in the response with more evidence for Khrushchev's policies being provided. These responses also often outlined each leader's approach separately and only really compared them in the conclusion. A few responses drifted from the focus of the question by either writing in detail about policies or by spending too much time outlining Stalin's approach when explaining Khrushchev's changes. Many candidates also just stated that Brezhnev's approach went back to Stalin's time without appreciating the more nuanced approach under Brezhnev, despite his reversal of Khrushchev's reforms. Most candidates were able to compare the two leaders in some form.

This is a level 3 response.

I believe that it is fairly ~~unaccurate~~ inaccurate to say that Khrushchev's approach to government was fundamentally similar to Brezhnev's approach to government.

Under ~~Khrushchev~~ Khrushchev, there were many changes to the government due to Khrushchev's aim of de-Stalinisation. As Stalin had ensured the stability of position after Lenin's death, his position was considered stable after 1928, however he aimed to remove those individuals in powerful positions within the government who were to remain loyal ^{to} under Lenin and replace them with individuals loyal to himself and owed their positions in power to Stalin. This resulted in the power of the Sovnarkom decreasing considerably more than it had under Lenin, along with the Politburo; ultimately, this allowed Stalin to be in a position where he would not (or rarely) be opposed. ~~Khrushchev~~ ^{Khrushchev} wanted to restore power to the Sovnarkom and the Politburo in a way that would allow the people to be

(Section A continued) ^{As a way to} represented. ~~To~~ ~~to~~ de-stalinise the country, Khrushchev introduced a policy of ~~decentralisation~~ decentralisation which meant that power would then be distributed to the Sovnarkom and Politburo rather than the leader of the Communist Party, and therefore the Soviet state. Furthermore, Khrushchev introduced fixed terms for positions of power. This meant that individuals would be limited to 16 years in the same position. This battled the corruption that had emerge under Stalin in which individuals would serve Stalin in order to keep their position, power and wealth for the longest time possible before they were ousted due to either ^{their} ^{real} ~~the~~ opposition to Stalin or his paranoia which saw those with power as a threat to his own. Fixed terms battled a corruption in away that allowed for promotions and young individuals who wished for reform to enter government ~~a~~ and ~~possib~~ support or enact this change.

Brezhnev's view towards the government and reform was different. He ~~blie~~ believed that under

(Section A continued) Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev, the aim to achieve socialism in Russia was completed and that the revolution was over. Therefore, some changes that were made by Khrushchev were reversed, ~~these~~^{this} including abolishing the fixed terms policy. Due to Brezhnev's belief that socialism had been achieved within Russia, he believed nothing needed to change. This meant that by abolishing the fixed terms ~~policy~~ policy, the individuals in positions of power did not change and so the country and the government began a period of stagnation. Those within the Sovnarkom when Brezhnev's reign began were still there ~~years~~ many years later with an average age of 77. This meant that there were limited ~~opportunities~~ options for a career within the government, preventing young people with new ideas to better and modernise the country were not able to do so as the positions were filled. It also meant little opportunities for promotion, therefore as well as increasing wealth and power which lead individuals to begin to sell items on the black market. An example is the

(Section A continued) lover of Brezhnev's daughter who smuggled in ~~thousands~~ expensive diamonds into the country. Therefore, under Brezhnev's reign, corruption returned and began to ~~thrive~~ thrive.

In conclusion, despite both Brezhnev and ~~Khrushchev~~ Khrushchev ~~making some changes~~ reversing changes made by ~~his~~ their ^{predecessor} ~~successor~~ ~~successor~~ ~~the successor~~, their approaches to government were ultimately different rather than similar. Khrushchev wanted to reform the country for the better and move on to the future of the country through both government and economy (splitting agriculture and industry to produce a better focus on the two); whereas Brezhnev did not produce ideas like these as he believed that the initial aim of the Communist Party for Russia had been achieved, and no change was needed which caused stagnation and reintroduced corruption within the government. Therefore, I believe that it is fairly inaccurate to say that Khrushchev's

(Section A continued) approach to government was fundamentally similar to Brezhnev's approach to government.



There is a brief introduction, followed by a separate descriptive explanation of the approach to government of each of the leaders, followed by a conclusion which compares the two approaches. It comes to the judgement that the two approaches were not fundamentally similar.



In a similarity and difference question try to explore the second order concept by directly comparing and contrasting the two periods under consideration.

Question 3

Q3 was the more popular of the Section B questions. Candidates were asked to consider how significant state control of the mass media and propaganda was in sustaining the Soviet regime from 1917-85. As this question was **not** asking whether the given factor was the 'most' significant factor, candidates could either approach this question by focusing on the extent to which the given factor was or was not significant or by considering its relative significance in relation to other factors, such as terror and control of religion. Most candidates tended to consider relative significance but needed to discuss the given factor in sufficient detail to meet most of the conceptual demands of this question. Centres should note that questions that ask 'how significant' require a clear discussion of the given factor in order to be able to explore the key issues. This was problematic for the many candidates who seemed determined to focus on terror as the key issue and whose responses left little room for a discussion of the given factor. In addition, some candidates defined mass media as being the arts and culture while others deployed evidence with regard to the cult of the personality both within propaganda and as a separate factor.

Stronger responses were targeted on the wording of the question and focused on the impact of state control of the mass media and propaganda in keeping the Soviet regime in charge. These included an analysis of relationships between key issues and a focus on the concept (significance/impact) in the question. These responses were able to chronologically or thematically cover the whole period in a balanced discussion of the different leadership regimes, although there was usually more evidence available for the government of Lenin and Stalin. There was discussion of the impact of state control of mass media in indoctrinating the masses and encouraging the popularity of leaders. Those candidates who took the 'was significant/was not significant approach' often cited the breakdown in state control in the later period as evidence that it was not as significant later as it was earlier in the period. Those who considered relative significance usually argued that, despite having a major impact, it was the fear engendered by the police state and use of terror that was more significant in sustaining the regime.

Weaker responses tended to be generalised in their coverage or concentrated mainly on a discussion of Lenin and Stalin. However, a significant number of candidates missed an opportunity to discuss the impact of propaganda by not selecting evidence pertaining to Stalin's cult of the personality. Some candidates confused the different time periods and a significant number referred to Lenin's control of television. Many weaker responses explained different factors sustaining the Soviet regime rather than exploring their contribution. These responses often just asserted in the conclusion that one factor, usually terror, was more significant than another. Other responses just described factors of control rather than considering the impact that they had. Such responses were often limited in development and lacking in coherence and structure.

This is a level 5 response.

It is evident that state control of mass media and propaganda from 1917-85 was hugely significant in sustaining the Soviet regime. However, its relative significance may be diminished when other methods of control are considered like that of terror, ^{and} the secret police, ~~and the control of Soviet~~ ^{while mass media's influence varied between Soviet} leaders.

From 1917, state control of mass media and propaganda was used as a means of sustaining the Soviet regime ~~from 1917~~ all the way through to 1985 and was hugely significant in doing so. Under both Lenin and Stalin, from 1917-53, propaganda was used extensively to manipulate the Soviet population into supporting and supporting the communist regime. Newspapers were one element of mass media which spread propaganda and Lenin was quick to realise its significance, banning all non-socialist papers in November 1917 and then all non-Bolshevik papers in 1920. Daily newspapers like Pravda and Izvestiya were forced up on workplace notice boards to ensure that its propaganda was widely viewed. Papers often included successes of economic policies like figures from Stalin's Five-Year Plans or news of successful aviation missions to the Arctic or Siberia. These messages indoctrinated the population ^{which} ~~and~~ meant that their respect for the regime rose, increasing its sustainability from 1917-53. Both Lenin and Stalin made heavy use of radio to spread propaganda also from 1917-53. ^{68% of} ~~more than 60% of~~ the Russian population were illiterate in 1917 so to spread messages Lenin ~~introduced~~ introduced the Spoken Newspaper radio station in 1921 whilst radios were mass produced cheaply to ~~be~~ distribute across the USSR. Stalin's use of radio emphasised its significance in ~~maintaining~~ sustaining the regime when it was used to

Mass media motivate the population in June 1941 when Nazi-German forces were only 50 miles away from Moscow. Propaganda was even spread in sport magazines with Red Sport in 1944, followed by Sovetski Sport in 1946, providing honest reports of Soviet sport while focusing political messages on its front cover. Thus, Stalin and Lenin's use of mass media to spread propaganda from 1917-53 was hugely significant in maintaining the regime as it was so wide-ranging, reaching out to the vast proportion of the population.

Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, from 1953-82, mass media continued to be used to spread propaganda but became less significant than it was in maintaining the regime compared to Lenin and Stalin. This is because both Khrushchev and Brezhnev's economic policies promised an increase in material benefits and consumer goods for the population, seen under their respective five-year plans. These policies ~~promoted~~ ~~helped~~ ~~to~~ ~~gradually~~ ~~increased~~ the average living standards in the USSR to such an extent that ~~propaganda~~ ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~needed~~ to keep the Soviet people under control as much. Harris said all this, despite its declining significance, propaganda was still important in ensuring that the regime's control was maintained. By 1982, the circulation of Pravda reached 10.3 million which ensured that political messages continued to be conveyed. ~~Mass~~ ~~propaganda~~ ~~was~~ ~~still~~ ~~important~~ ~~as~~ ~~during~~ ~~the~~ ~~years~~ ~~1917-53~~ ~~with~~ ~~many~~ ~~events~~ ~~that~~ ~~may~~ ~~upset~~ ~~the~~ ~~regime's~~ ~~reputation~~ ~~not~~ ~~being~~ ~~reposed~~ ~~eg.~~ ~~the~~ ~~1950's~~ ~~Kuybyshev's~~ ~~nuclear~~ ~~explosion~~ ~~which~~ ~~killed~~ ~~200~~ ~~people~~ ~~as~~ ~~well~~ ~~as~~ ~~a~~ ~~large~~ ~~fire~~ ~~in~~ ~~Moscow~~ ~~in~~ ~~1972~~. Television began being mass produced under Khrushchev during the 1950s and by 1982 over 90% of the population had access to one with two state-controlled channels. ~~Moreover~~ ~~despite~~

this continued use of mass media to spread propaganda, Brezhnev did become more lenient in terms of radio which reduced its significance in sustaining the regime. He introduced two extra radio stations in 1964, one being called *Maia* which played western music, popular amongst the Soviet youth. It is evident that under Khrushchev and Brezhnev ~~the~~ from 1953-82, mass media's significance declined in maintaining the regime's control due to the promise of material benefits and the introduction of *Maia* but it still remained important, especially through censorship in newspapers.

However, it can be said that throughout the period of 1917-85, the state's use of terror and the secret police was far more significant than mass media in sustaining the regime. This is because without the element of fear which the apparatus of terror imposed, propaganda messages used in the media may not have so easily moulded people's ~~own~~ views into viewing the regime in a positive light. Lenin immediately ~~showed~~ ^{showed} terror's importance in sustaining the regime ~~through~~ ^{when he formed} the Cheka under Felix Dzerzhinsky in 1917 to deal with political opponents. Shooting 200,000 political opponents from 1917-24, the Cheka grew from 70,000 staff to 250,000 by 1923, forming the OGPU. ~~Under~~ ^{It} ~~was~~ ^{was} significant and increased under Stalin when it became the NKVD in 1934 and was pivotal in identifying and punishing all class enemies during the great purges of 1936-38. Without this atmosphere of terror produced by the secret police, it is ~~not~~ unlikely that propaganda could have been so manipulative in shaping people's views. Although the secret police's influence declined under Khrushchev and Brezhnev from 1953-82 largely, again, due to the promise of ~~material~~ ^{material} benefits, it still existed in the form of the KGB which undertook surveillance of

winer, especially the dinosaurs from 1967-82. This continued atmosphere of fear was essential in maintaining the regime's sustainability and for these reasons, it is clear that the secret police was a more significant method of control than that of media throughout the period of 1917-82.

It is clear that the state control of mass media was a significant method of sustaining the regime from 1917-85, especially under Lenin and Stalin ^{from 1917-83} ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~significance~~ ~~declined~~ under Khrushchev and Brezhnev from 1953-85 but still remained necessary in maintaining control. However, ^{the secret police} ~~the~~ ~~secret~~ ~~police~~ was clearly far more significant in sustaining the regime throughout the period as without the atmosphere of terror it created, the views of the population were ~~likely~~ unlikely to have been so ~~easily~~ ^{easily} moulded by mass media and propaganda.



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Examiner Comments

This response provides a sustained analysis of the role of state control of mass media and propaganda in sustaining the Soviet regime in the years 1917-85. It is focused on the wording of the question and establishes the extent of impact. This is not a most significant question so there is no requirement to consider other factors to the same extent as the given factor. This response does argue that terror was a more significant factor but the emphasis throughout, and in the conclusion, is on the significance of the factor under discussion.



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Examiner Tip

For a 'how significant' question try to focus on the given factor/event/issue in depth so that you can come to a substantiated judgement about impact.

Question 4

This question required candidates to consider the extent to which government attitudes towards the family as a social unit changed in the years 1917-85. Most candidates chose a chronological approach while others looked more thematically at the various roles within the family. Many candidates focused on the role of women within the family; this was a valid approach as long as the response was not wholly focused on women. However, those candidates who drifted into a discussion of children's education were less successful in maintaining a good focus. There was also a tendency to look at the attitude of the leaders but it is difficult not to see the attitude of the individual leaders as the attitude of the government of a specific time period. There were some candidates, however, who were able to consider structural attitudes over time. In general, candidates had a very good knowledge of the government attitudes under Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev but less so from the 1960s onwards.

Stronger responses were focused on the wording of the question and really attempted to view government attitudes to the family as a social unit. Some responses were able to show how the radical opposition to bourgeois family values of the early Soviet regime resulted in attempts to redefine the concept of family but that after Stalin's accession to power conservative values once again emerged to be redefined as a 'patriotic duty'. Even at the higher levels, candidates were less secure in their knowledge of the post-1953 period but were able to discuss the emergence of a social contract that included attempts at family welfare. In general though, candidates concentrated on elements of family policy such as the role of women, divorce, care of children and population policies. Most candidates argued that after Stalin's Great Retreat there was little change in government attitudes.

Weaker responses tended to describe and explain, rather than explore, different elements of family policy with an emphasis on Lenin and Stalin and on women and divorce. These responses also tended to suggest that Khrushchev reverted to Leninist policies and that Brezhnev and subsequent leaders were Stalinist. These responses were often limited in development and lacking in coherence and structure, particularly losing coherence in the long chronological responses.

This is a level 4 response.

The attitudes towards the family in the years 1917 - 1945 fluctuated and throughout with a number of policies which changed reflected the ~~changing~~ ^{different} attitudes of the Soviet leaders ~~but~~ ultimately. The extent to which these attitudes changed will be judged by ~~how in a~~ ~~paper~~ the leaders's beliefs seemed ~~on a way~~ ^{to be similar} but in practice these ~~are~~ entrenched ~~exist~~ ~~the~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~very~~ ~~nature~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~social~~ ~~and~~ ~~traditional~~ ~~values~~ ~~that~~ ~~were~~ ~~so~~ ~~deeply~~ ~~entrenched~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~system~~ ~~the~~ ~~pol-~~ ~~icy~~ ~~measures~~ ~~were~~ ~~that~~ ~~were~~ ~~implemented,~~ ~~were~~ ~~whether~~ ~~they~~ ~~were~~ ~~profoundly~~ ~~similar~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~impact~~ ~~they~~ ~~had~~ ~~on~~ ~~the~~ ~~family.~~ It seems that they were progressive and changing under ~~each~~ ^{same} leaders but ~~many~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~then~~ ~~were~~ ~~reverted~~ ~~back~~ ~~to~~ ~~and~~ ~~reverted~~ ~~adhere~~ ~~to~~ ~~traditional~~ ~~values~~ ~~as~~ ~~under~~ ~~Stalin's~~ ~~and~~ ~~Bre~~ ~~great~~ ~~retreat~~ ~~of~~ ~~1936~~ ~~and~~ ~~Brezhnev's~~ ~~panatalkit~~ ~~policies~~ ~~their~~ ~~attitudes~~ ~~were~~ ~~very~~ ~~similar~~.

(Section B continued) and ~~Lenin's~~ under Lenin and Khrushchev both shared progressive ~~and~~ attitudes towards the emancipation of the family unit. However overall the attitudes of the family unit changed throughout ~~but~~ through the implementation of policy that ~~is~~ was influenced by the leader's ~~at~~ attitudes.

In 1918 Lenin implemented a decree called the Family code. This was headed by Kollontai, who in 1917 was appointed commissioner of People's Welfare. She was a believer of sexual freedom and advocated that the family ceases to be necessary under socialism and that this role should be monopolised by the state. This code, made divorce much easier, whereby either party could ~~so~~ merely request a separation with no reason needed, abortion and abortion was also legalised. These changes reflected Lenin's progressive attitudes towards the family unit being less important thus lowering its status. Also under ~~to~~ Lenin ~~to~~ during the civil war 1918-21 ~~to~~ the number of women in the ~~work~~ conscripted in the workplace increased thus causing a change in the of family unit, however

(Section B continued) It could be argued that this didn't reflect Lenin's belief in female liberation by but ~~as~~ was out of necessity, as he needed women to help the Bolsheviks win the war, however on the surface it appears his attitudes towards the family were somewhat liberal. His family code resulted in the an increased divorce rate. However, this changed when ~~the~~ during Stalin's great retreat in 1936, where he implemented policies which intended to greatly raise the status of the family. He made marriage much harder, and costly, increasing it from 4 to 50 rubles, abortion was criminalised and he implemented pro-natalist policies increasing maternity leave to 16 weeks, also prison sentences were given to fathers who failed to pay for the upkeep of their child. ~~Stalin~~ Stalin also advocated for 'wife activists' who were wives of elite party officials that were encouraged to set a good example of obedient wives and mothers. ~~The~~ The implementation of these policies shows the profound change and difference of attitudes between Lenin and Stalin as Stalin reversed many of the ~~conservative~~ liberating and progressive policies for the family which Lenin established. This indicates how the sexist assumptions

(Section B continued) and patriarchal nature of the Soviet system were too deeply entrenched into society, which influenced Stalin's policies as he wanted to promote the family keeping women in the home to instill communist ideology and socialists into the ~~young~~ next generation establishing a strong ~~them~~ ^{the family} used it as a political weapon and apparatus to maintain communism.

However ~~was~~ in 1956 when Khrushchev came to power & he ~~was~~ under his policies of de-Stalinisation he held similar progressive attitudes that Lenin did regarding the family unit. He valued the importance of a high standard of living, making life prosperous ~~and~~ for the Soviet people and under the Social contract by which he ensured loyalty of the regime through guaranteed high ~~standard~~ ~~of~~ ~~living~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~people~~ ~~and~~ ~~under~~ ~~the~~ ~~social~~ ~~contract~~ ~~by~~ ~~which~~ ~~he~~ ~~ensured~~ ~~loyalty~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~regime~~ ~~through~~ ~~guaranteed~~ ~~high~~ ~~standard~~ ~~of~~ ~~living~~ he reversed many of Stalin's restrictive family policies. In 1955 he ~~has~~ legalized abortion and made divorce easier. # Under his seven five year plan 1959-65 he introduced mass production of clothing and food ~~however~~ ~~store~~ convenience stores to alleviate the burden of the double women

(Section B continued) many women faced and there was a growth in ~~o~~ creches and day care facilities. However these attitudes changed under Brezhnev who introduced a new family code in 1968 where he made divorce much harder and advocated the importance of family. He was very concerned with the ~~to~~ decline in the birth rate (0.8%) as he wanted Russia to remain dominant over the other republics. Finally under ~~an~~ Andropov had similar attitudes as in 1982 he implemented the Anti-alcohol campaign to ~~do~~ try and reduce the divorce rate as ~~divorce~~ was. alcoholism was the main cause of divorce.

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Overall, throughout 1947 - ~~to~~ 85 the attitudes towards the family did fluctuate and change throughout the different leaders as ~~they all~~ they all reversed each others policies regarding the family, reflective of their differing attitudes. ~~to~~ Brezhnev's continued Stalin's legacy regarding the family, ultimately leading to the family being thought of as ~~a~~ very important.



This response explores government/leadership attitudes to the family as a social unit using a chronological approach. The candidate uses the introduction to provide some analysis of change and then goes on to survey attitudes across the time period. The chronology means that the whole period is covered but less developed towards the end so it does not meet the demands of bullet point 2 fully. The conclusion is substantiated in the main body of the essay and does show some attempt to establish criteria.



When using a chronological approach plan the response so that sufficient coverage is given across the time period of the question.

Question 5

Stronger responses developed a clear extract-based analysis of the extent to which the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of a nationalist resurgence in the Soviet bloc. Such responses explored most of the arguments raised within the extracts (that events in the Baltic republics and Yeltsin's activities undermined the cohesiveness of the Soviet Union; that Gorbachev's actions unleashed 'people power' in the Eastern bloc; that the heavy-handed suppression of demonstrations in Lithuania discredited the Soviet government; that the USSR would have continued to exist if Gorbachev had not attempted a variety of reforms; that Gorbachev's political and economic reforms undermined his position). Contextual knowledge was also used effectively to examine the merits/validity of the interpretations provided in the extracts, such as the situation in the Baltic republics, Gorbachev's response to events in Georgia, the undermining effect of Gorbachev's reforms and the role of Yeltsin. The best responses were able to note that nationalist resurgence and the role of Gorbachev were key elements of both extracts but that, whereas extract 1 put nationalist resurgence at the centre of its argument, extract 2 saw Gorbachev's reforms as being the catalyst for the nationalist resurgence. These responses also came to a reasoned judgement on the given view, referencing the views in the extracts; this is essential to meet the requirement for bullet point 3 in the mark scheme.

Weaker candidates showed some understanding of the extracts but tended to select quotations or describe what was in the extracts. Quite often these candidates only read the first few sentences of each interpretation commenting mainly on the role of Yeltsin from extract 1 and the weakness of Gorbachev as a leader from extract 2. This meant that many responses failed to comprehend or analyse the material in the extracts relating to the nationalist resurgence in the late 1980s. In addition, some candidates claimed that the extracts failed to mention Yeltsin or Gorbachev's economic reforms. It is vital that candidates read and use all the material available to them in the extracts. In the weaker responses, contextual knowledge was mainly used to expand on the information already in the extract rather than to analyse the views being put forward by the historians. Examiners also noted that candidates were often unable to distinguish between the satellite states of the USSR and the Soviet republics. Weaker responses were also often limited in development, lacked coherence and structure, and made unsubstantiated or weakly supported judgements. Some candidates described and commented on both extracts with some discrimination but then suggested a completely different reason for the collapse of the USSR from their own knowledge in two or three lines at the end of the answer leading to a conclusion based on this evidence only.

This is a level 3 response.

There has been much debate around why the USSR collapsed by 1991. Ultimately, ~~Extracts~~ ~~Source~~ 1 and 2 agree that the resurgence of nationalism in the Soviet Bloc caused the collapse of the Union.

However, they disagree on why nationalism resurfaced. So Extract 1 explains how Yeltsin appeal to 'ethnic Russian patriotism' and the events at Lithuania led to nationalism resurfacing. On the other hand, Extract 2 argues that it was Gorbachev's political policies that led to nationalism resurfacing.

Extract 1 argues that Yeltsin's popular appeal in Russia caused an ~~pro~~ anti soviet sentiment in the Russia, 'building an independent power-base by appealing to ethnic Russian patriotism'. This shows how Yeltsin became the leader of Russia and people supported him over Gorbachev. This was partly due to Gorbachev

lacking popular legitimacy and Yeltsin winning 89% of the votes in the Moscow elections.

This is further emphasised by how Meridale says, 'Gorbachev's creation of a new post, President of the USSR'. This further shows that Gorbachev's lack of ~~popu~~ popular legitimacy sparked anti-soviet sentiments. This further shown by how the Communist Party had an 18.8% approval rating.

Furthermore, Meridale emphasises the role of different nationalities seeking independence, specially Lithuania, who's campaign was 'particularly vocal'. Lithuania was famous because 90% of Lithuanians wanted independence, and the government declared it. When the tanks were sent and the 'violence was televised', where 14 people were killed shows how the USSR had lost its grip over the soviet bloc. Hence, Lithuania's persistence in the search for independence shows the importance of Nationalism in the collapse of the USSR.

Gorbachev's refusal to use violence and his political liberalisation for the good of the people.

was also important in the collapse of the USSR. Brown emphasise the importance of Gorbachev being a 'weak' leader in bringing about the rise of Nationalisation. His refusal to use violence meant different Nationalities started to grow powerful and confident that they would achieve their independence. Specially after Gorbachev's 'Sinatra Doctrine' allowing greater independence to the Eastern Bloc, this is shown by how Brown says how the most 'dissatisfied Soviet nationalities' ~~was~~ saw 'the people of Eastern Europe' gain theirs. This shows the importance of Gorbachev's liberalisation in encouraging the rise of nationalism in the Soviet bloc.

Moreover, Brown explains how the USSR could have ~~exist~~ persisted, but Gorbachev's 'strong dislike of bloodshed' and his policies of 'liberalisation and democratisation' meant the USSR could not be 'held together for many ~~for more~~ years'. This shows that if

Gorbachev would not have allowed greater freedom, the Nationalist movement would not have sparked.

However, both extracts completely ignore the role of the inherent weaknesses in the Soviet economy. By 1985 the USSR had failed industrially, shown by how 20% of the 400,000 tractors were not used and how 12% of machinery was not used either. Also the lack of incentives prevented the economy from becoming productive and innovative. This was a huge problem in the USSR that got worse year on year.

Both extracts also fail to comment on the failure of Gorbachev's economic policy. The policy of acceleration to modernise the economy led to an increase in the deficit from 2.4% to 6.2%. Also, normalisation and the 50% cut to alcohol production led to a fall in 9% of GDP that the alcohol revenue accounted for. Finally, the policy of Transformation

failed to create an effective market economy and as a result GDP shrank by 4%. Both these factors led to resentment from the people, who would inevitably claim for independence from an inefficient Communist government.

In conclusion, the ~~national~~ resurgence of nationalism in the Soviet bloc was definitely an important factor in the collapse of the USSR. Yeltsin's creation of the CIS, accepted by 11 out of 15 of the Soviet Republics, it is what ~~quite~~ put the nail ~~of~~ on the government's coffin. However, to say that nationalism on its own caused the collapse of the USSR is a flawed argument, as it would not have happened without Gorbachev's political liberalisation. ~~the~~



ResultsPlus
Examiner Comments

This response uses the extracts as the main focus of the answer; demonstrating understanding and showing some analysis by selection and explaining some of the key points of the interpretations. It does show knowledge of some aspects of key issues related to the debate but also includes knowledge by commenting on what is not mentioned (level 2). In the conclusion a judgement is given on the view under consideration.



Use the extracts as the basis for a discussion of the view in the question rather than just selecting and explaining some of the key points in the extracts.

This is a level 4 response.

The view that the USSR collapsed because of nationalist resurgence in the Soviet bloc is not convincing from these interpretations. Extract 1 ^{implies} ~~discusses~~ the reason ^{to be} ~~of~~ nationalism but mentions Gorbachev's responsibility, agreeing with Extract 2 ~~which~~ which emphasises this further, suggesting Gorbachev's action are more important.

There is some evidence that the fall was due to the spread of nationalism. Extract 1 suggests that ~~the~~ many countries were "spurred by the success of their neighbour neighbours," to seek independence from the USSR. This can be seen by the break out of nationalist campaigns in countries such as Hungary following the independence gained by the Baltic states. Calling Lithuania's campaign "particularly vocal," refers to this nationalist propaganda that was spreading from country to country. In addition, "protestors in Moscow," were seeking nationalism for Russia under the influence of Yeltsin's "ethnic Russian patriotism," which further emphasises the extent

to which the campaign for independence had spread. Even the people of Russia had lost faith in the USSR and were led by a person in power who had lost faith in the USSR. Actions such as Yeltsin leaving the Communist Party will have amplified the unrest and been seen by other countries as reason for independence. This emphasises the interpretation that the fall was down to nationalism spreading because it shows the extent to which it spread; from those with no political power to those at the top of the Party with the power. Extract 2 supports this referring to the "aspirations" that were given to the people of the USSR once the propaganda had taken on speed and the USSR had lost their main bases of argument, referred to in Extract 1. The use of "Soviet tanks," went against Gorbachev's policy of no involvement, specified when he removed the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1986. Going against their own policies showed how even the Party weren't confident in the USSR and what it had become, emphasising the ~~speed~~ spread of the need for nationalism. However, the ~~over~~ interpretation implies the spread

started with the unrest and riots in other countries. Prior to this 1985 there had been riots for example in Gorki over food in 1965 and in Prague over Communist control so the need for independence was already a clear ambition for many countries. Therefore to say it was ~~over~~ down to the desire for nationalism isn't ~~exactly~~ true to why it fell when it did but could be put down to the policies that allowed nationalism to take place. So the ~~E~~ interpretations aren't convincing of the statement.

There is ~~not~~ a reasonable amount of evidence to suggest that the USSR fell due to Gorbachev's economic and political policy. Extract 2 ~~refer~~ refers to this "failure," to ~~try~~ and achieve "Liberalisation of the Soviet economy," suggesting the changes made to the system moved the USSR away from what it stood for. For example, Perestroika moved power away from ~~the~~ central planning and gave it to factory owners. This was followed by the 500 Day Programme which intended to ~~was~~ completely shift to a market-led economy. The policies went against the fundamental pillars that

held Communism up which meant loss of faith within the Party. This included members like Yeltsin who were encouraged by these changes that ~~the Party weren't~~ that Communism wasn't working. This loss of support then spread from here. In addition, Gorbachev's political aims of complete transparency through Glasnost resulted in easier spread of criticism and loss of faith.

Extract 1 implies "Gorbachev's earlier reforms," were responsible for negative propaganda which again knocked a pillar of what Communism previously stood on and ~~spread~~ further spread the negative views on the USSR. Furthermore, Gorbachev's move for "democratisation," ~~but~~ weakened ~~the~~ the USSR's position with the removal of Article 6. This ~~had~~ held up the fundamental idea of a 'one party state' and ~~encouraging~~ merely gave nationalism an opportunity to be politically heard. Therefore, ~~the~~ nationalism wasn't the cause of the fall but a consequence of ~~the~~ ~~the~~ Gorbachev's policies put in place earlier on.

In conclusion, the interpretations are more convincing in showing Gorbachev's ~~contrib~~ massive contribution to the fall

and being the main reason that nationalism spread. His policies were the root of the ~~sp~~ what gave nationalists the power for the change they wanted.



Clear attention is given as to whether the view under consideration is convincing. Contextual knowledge is integrated with the issues raised by the extracts. A judgement is made on the view and these are supported in the main body of the responses but there is only a limited sense of the extracts being matters of interpretation.



Use the conclusion effectively to bring together the main issues raised by the extracts and to reach a judgement based on the different interpretations.

This is a level 5 response.

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union on Christmas day 1991, historians have argued what the over-arching factor was that led to the union's relatively sudden demise. Both Merridale and Brown argue the extent to which the over-arching factor was a resurgence of nationalism within the Soviet Union. Merridale places much more emphasis on the impact of growing nationalism whereas Brown identifies Gorbachev's preceding programme of reform as the underlying factor for the growth of nationalism. Overall, Extract two is more convincing as the argument that Gorbachev's reform programme laid the basis upon which nationalist tensions, as well as economic and political tensions could rise to such a destructive extent that they culminated in the disintegration of the USSR, holds more weight.

In Extracts one and two, both Merridale and Brown provide relatively persuasive arguments for the growth of nationalism being the core factor in the USSR's collapse. In extract one, Merridale argues that "spurred on by the success of their neighbors, Soviet citizens increased their demands (for independence)". This view is convincing - here ~~what~~^{we} consider the

fact that nationalism did, to a large extent, ~~lead~~ contribute to the ~~dis~~ dissolution of the USSR. For example, by ¹⁹⁸⁹ ~~1988~~, the communist party almost entirely lost control of the republic of Azerbaijan as a result of growing nationalist sentiment regarding the region of Karabagh, and which Republic it should belong to. Highlighting how the growth of nationalist sentiment heavily weakened the Party's grip on the peripheral regions of the USSR, as early as 1989. However, ~~this~~ the accuracy ^{of} ~~of~~ this view can be questioned ~~when~~ when we consider that it was in fact Gorbachev's decision to place Karabagh under the control of Moscow in 1988 that largely inflamed tensions in Azerbaijan and led the ~~republic~~ republic into chaos. Therefore, it is more accurate to say it was Gorbachev's misjudgement of the nationalist question, rather than an isolated explosion of nationalism that led to the USSR's collapse in 1991. The argument put forward by Meridale "to an extent, supported by Brown who correctly points out that those in the Baltic states saw the situation in Eastern Europe, and it 'raised their aspirations from seeking greater freedom within the Soviet state to demanding full independence". This view is made more convincing when we consider the fact that in 1990, ^{in Lithuania} after the popular front gained a majority in the election and therefore were placed in charge of the Lithuanian parliament, they declared formal independence from the USSR, in March 1990. Once more highlighting how ~~the~~ surging nationalism had largely engulfed large majorities of the Soviet population, which in turn largely established the

The power and authority of the Communist Party. However, the accuracy of this argument can once more be questioned when we consider the underpinning role Gorbachev played. It was his repealing of the Brezhnev doctrine in 1989 that effectively allowed the satellite states to campaign and eventually gain independence from Communism. Therefore, it is unlikely that nationalist tensions would have exploded as they did without Gorbachev's intervention.

* Both Brown, and to a lesser extent Merridale, provide persuasive arguments in favour of the fundamental role played by Gorbachev's political (glasnost) and economic (perestroika) reforms. In ~~the~~ extract two, Brown argues that the USSR could've been held together longer if it wasn't for Gorbachev's 'democratisation of the Soviet political system'. This argument is made even more convincing when we consider that without the initial media liberalisation granted under glasnost by Yavlutsev, which made information regarding Stalin's terror toward nationals within the USSR public knowledge for the first time, nationalist sentiment most likely wouldn't have become so rampant as there would have been far less evidence available to build it upon. Furthermore, without the introduction of multi-candidate elections in 1989 and the repeal of article 6 in 1990, nationalists would not have been granted the ability to legally campaign against the

Communist Party and would therefore have continued to be restricted at a political voice with which they could spread nationalist sentiment and influence Soviet politics. This argument is somewhat supported by Merridale who argues "Thanks to Gorbachev's earlier reforms" ~~the~~ ~~USSR~~ ~~was~~. Although this is rather tenuous considering the context of the quote we can infer from it the failure of Gorbachev's previous reform. For example, with the implementation of the anti-alcohol campaign in 1986, government taxation revenue declined by 67 billion rubles which in turn contributed to national debt increasing to 64% by 1987, highlighting the overwhelming failure of Gorbachev's economic reform as it heavily stripped the government of much needed funds and therefore prevented the improvement in living standards which ultimately ended social conformity. Therefore highlighting the fundamental role played by Gorbachev's reform programme.

Overall, it is the view expressed in extract two that is most convincing. Without the failure of Gorbachev's political and economic reform programme, the foundation upon which nationalist sentiment could grow would not have existed, therefore discrediting Merridale's view that nationalism was the ever-arching cause of the USSR's collapse in 1991. Furthermore, nationalism was nothing new in the Soviet Union, what made the difference was

Khrushchev's abandonment of the traditional Soviet system
as well as his inability to recognise the essential aspect
of his reforms.



The extracts are interpreted with confidence and the issues raised by the authors discussed in relation to the view to be considered in the question. Contextual knowledge is integrated with the issues raised by the extracts. There is an evaluative argument presented in the main body of the response with a judgement reached on the views given in the extracts.



Use the wording of the question as a basis for the discussion of the extracts. You are being asked how convincing you find the view under consideration. Evaluate the interpretations in terms of how convincing you find the issues raised within them and come to a judgement based on that evaluation.

Paper Summary

Based on their performance on this paper, candidates are offered the following advice.

Features commonly found in section A/B responses which were successful within the higher levels were:

- Candidates paying close attention to the date ranges in the question.
- Sufficient consideration being given to the issue focused upon in the question.
- Candidates explaining their judgement fully.
- Focusing carefully on the second-order concept(s) targeted in the question.
- An appropriate level of knowledge, in terms of depth of detail and supported analysis, e.g. a realistic amount to enable a balanced and rounded answer on breadth questions.
- Evidence of planning.

Common issues which hindered performance in section A/B were:

- Paying little heed to the precise demands of the question, e.g. writing about the topic without focusing on the question or attempting to give an answer to a different question than the one that has been asked.
- Answering a question without giving sufficient consideration to the given issue in the question, e.g. looking at other causes, consequences, with only limited reference to the issue/factor/key feature given in the question.
- Failure to consider the date range as specified in the question.
- Assertion of change, causation etc while using the formulaic repetition of the words of the question.
- A judgement not being reached or explained.
- A lack of sufficient supporting detail.

Features commonly found in section C responses which were successful within the higher levels are:

- Candidates paying close attention to the precise demands of the question.
- Thorough use of the extracts (though this need not mean using every point they raise).
- A confident attempt to use the two extracts together, such as consideration of their differences, comparison of their arguments, or evaluating their relative merits.
- Careful use of own knowledge; clearly selected to relate to the issues raised within the sources and confidently used to examine the arguments made.
- Careful reading of the extracts.
- Attempts to see beyond the obvious differences between sources, such as, consideration of the extent to which they disagreed, or where appropriate, an attempt to reconcile their arguments.
- Confident handling of the extracts allied to a sharp focus on the arguments given, recognising the distinct skills demanded by A03.

- Evidence of planning using the extracts as the basis of the answer.

Common issues which hindered performance in section C were:

- Limited or uneven use of the extracts e.g. extensive use of one extract, with limited consideration of the other.
- Limited comparison or consideration of the differences between the given interpretations.
- Using the extracts merely as sources of support.
- The use of pre-prepared material covering the more general controversy as outlined in the specification.
- Arguing one extract is superior to the other on the basis that it offers more factual evidence to back up the claims made or without genuinely analysing the arguments offered.
- Evaluating the extracts using AO2 skills of source analysis.

Grade Boundaries

Grade boundaries for this, and all other papers, can be found on the website on this link:

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