Write your name here Surname	Other nan	nes
Pearson Edexcel GCE	Centre Number	Candidate Number
History Advanced Unit 3 Option D: The Challenge of Fascism		
Friday 9 June 2017 – Mor Time: 2 hours	rning	Paper Reference 6HI03/F (D1) 6HI03/D (D2)
You must have: Sources Insert (enclosed)		Total Marks

Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- There are two sections in this question paper. Answer one question from Section A and one question from Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
 - there may be more space than you need.

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 70.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets
 - use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.
- The quality of your written communication will be assessed in all your responses
 - you should take particular care on these questions with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression.
- This paper has two unit codes. Unit 3 6HI03/F Topic D1 From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45 is a prohibited combination with Unit 1 6HI01/F.

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.



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SECTION A

Answer ONE question in Section A on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section A on page 3.

Section B begins on page 11.

D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

1 To what extent was the Weimar Republic threatened by the actions of political extremists in the years 1919–23?

(Total for Question 1 = 30 marks)

OR

2 'In the years 1939–45, opposition from within Germany posed a serious threat to the Nazi regime.'

How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 2 = 30 marks)

D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

3 'British governments undertook a policy of appeasement towards Germany in the years 1933–37 because they felt Germany had legitimate grievances.'

How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 3 = 30 marks)

OR

4 How far do you agree with the view that, without victory in the Battle of the Atlantic, the ultimate victory in Western Europe would not have been possible?

(Total for Question 4 = 30 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS



Chosen question number:	Question 1	Question 2	\boxtimes
	Question 3	Question 4	



(Section A continued)	



(Section A continued)	





(Section A continued)	





ection A continued)	
	TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS



SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section B on page 13.

D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.

Answer EITHER Question 5 OR Question 6.

EITHER

5 Use Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that German aggression was not responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914?

Explain your answer, using Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 5 = 40 marks)

OR

6 Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree that Hitler's hold on the German people relied more upon terror than consent in the years 1933–39?

Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)



D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.

Answer EITHER Question 7 OR Question 8.

EITHER

7 Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

How far do you accept the view that, in appearing Hitler in the years 1937–39, Chamberlain's judgement was correct?

Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 7 = 40 marks)

OR

8 Use Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that there was an expectation of government provision of major social reform when the war ended in 1945?

Explain your answer, using Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 8 = 40 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS



osen question number:	Question 5	×	Question 6	\boxtimes
	Question 7	×	Question 8	\boxtimes



(Section B continued)	



(Section B continued)	



(Section B continued)	





(Section B continued)	



(Section B continued)	
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	TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS TOTAL FOR PAPER = 70 MARKS



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Pearson Edexcel GCE

History

Advanced Unit 3

Option D: The Challenge of Fascism

Friday 9 June 2017 – Morning

Sources Insert - Section B

Paper Reference 6HI03/F (D1) 6HI03/D (D2)

Do not return the insert with the question paper.

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Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

D1 - From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900-45

Sources for use with Ouestion 5

SOURCE 1

(From Steven Ozment, A Mighty Fortress: A New History of the German People, published 2004)

A deliberate German programme to occupy Central Europe came after, not before, the outbreak of the war in August 1914, which at its beginning was intended to be a defensive war, although the Schlieffen Plan was an offensive strategy to achieve that end. Many in states beyond Germany had been willing to risk war as a solution to the problems they faced. However, neither the Germans, nor anyone else at the time, had a special plan to dominate Europe.

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SOURCE 2

(From Gordon Corrigan, *Mud*, *Blood and Poppycock*, published 2003)

Fritz Fischer, the German historian, is adamant that Germany's foreign policy aims were focused on annexation and that she went to war in order to achieve these aims. What is undeniable is that Germany, by offering unconditional support to Austria-Hungary in her dispute with Serbia, precipitated the series of events that led to war. Long before that, at least as early as 1906, Germany had in place a plan for an aggressive war based on the premise that Germany would have to fight Russia and France simultaneously, with Britain as a possible ally of France.

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SOURCE 3

(From Mark Hewitson, Germany and the Causes of the First World War, published 2004)

The German army and the government pushed for war before 1914, even though significant sections of public opinion opposed the idea. This push was a 15 consequence of a belief in the ascendancy of the German nation-state. There was also an acceptance of the validity of war as an instrument of policy and a belief in the decisiveness of power politics in international relations. The main impediment to war was effectively removed when Russia became Germany's principal enemy during the winter of 1913, in place of France. Because tsarist autocracy and 'Slav' 20 barbarity were traditional bugbears of left-wing liberals, socialists and democratic Catholics, the Reich government was able to undercut public opposition to war by casting Russia as the aggressor in July 1914. This did not mean that German leaders planned war, but rather they continued a policy of brinkmanship which had been framed against a supposedly weaker French state during the 25 previous decade.

D1 - From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900-45

Sources for use with Question 6

SOURCE 4

(From Mary Fulbrook, *The Fontana History of Germany 1918–1990*, published 1991)

The Nazi regime was bolstered by an elaborate apparatus of terror. The first concentration camp for political opponents of the regime was opened at Dachau, near Munich, with considerable fanfare and publicity in March 1933. In subsequent years, well before the radicalisation of the wartime period, a network of concentration camps was set up across Germany. The SS of Heinrich Himmler was able to arrest, torture and murder, with little respect for any rule of law. Himmler, between 1934 and 1936, took over the police powers of the Reich and State Ministries of the Interior, effectively controlling the means of terror in the Third Reich. Fear of arrest, and fear of informers, led to public conformity and the leading of a double life for many Germans, who withheld their real views and feelings for expression only in complete privacy in the company of family and close friends.

SOURCE 5

(From Robert Gellately, *Backing Hitler*, published 2001)

There were at most only 3,000 prisoners in the camps by the end of 1934, and that was the lowest point they ever reached in the Third Reich. The decline was accelerated by a Hitler amnesty of 7 August 1934. Shortly thereafter there were fewer than 500 prisoners in all Prussian camps and by the end of 1934 there were only around 1,600 in Bavaria. It made perfect sense to close the camps, because by 1934–35 the country was positively inclined towards Hitler's dictatorship.

Organised opposition was silent or as good as dead. The surprise was that, for all Hitler's popularity and the social consensus that supported the new regime, the camps did not disappear.

SOURCE 6

(From Catherine Epstein, *Nazi Germany: Confronting the Myths*, published 2015)

What was the nature of German support for the Nazi regime? Many Germans found elements of Nazi economic, social and foreign policies, and thus the regime, attractive. But some did not – although only a tiny minority of Germans engaged in resistance to Hitler's dictatorship. German support for the regime must also be placed in the context of Nazi coercion and racism. While racism generally heightened the regime's appeal, coercion cut many ways. Many Germans appreciated the suppression of leftists yet disliked arbitrary Nazi terror. At the same time, the threat of coercion may have kept some from voicing discontent.

Even if most Germans were not enthusiastic Nazis, they nonetheless came to accept the Third Reich. They shared the fundamental values and goals of Nazism: racism, anti-Marxism, and German national revival.

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Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

D2 - Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925-60

Sources for use with Question 7

SOURCE 7

(From an article by Robert Pearce, *Appeasement*, published 1998)

Was Chamberlain right? He said that he 'was hoping for the best [by appeasing Hitler] whilst preparing for the worst [by rearming]'. Did this make sense?

Aware that declaring war on behalf of Czechoslovakia would have been an empty gesture, given Britain's inability to help the Czechs, he chose to appease Hitler while there still seemed to be a chance of avoiding a catastrophic war. By waiting until September 1939 he was able to enter the conflict with a united nation behind him, with the support of the Dominions, and with the moral support of neutral nations like the USA. A good case can be made out for Chamberlain.

And if he was motivated by a deep-seated personal hatred of war, it can still be argued that he did the right thing, even if for the wrong reason. Some would say that his policy went wrong only with the guarantee to Poland.

SOURCE 8

(From Anthony P. Adamthwaite, *The Making of the Second World War*, published 1977)

Although from late 1937, Hitler set Germany on a course of territorial expansion in central Europe, it was only after March 1939 that Britain and France began to consider stopping him by force. By encouraging Hitler to think that his territorial ambitions would not be opposed, Anglo-French appeasement contributed to the making of the Second World War. Although appeasement was not merely the personal policy of Neville Chamberlain, it is from late 1937 that the immediate causes of the Second World War can be discerned. The essential error of the policy lay in a readiness to make concessions without asking for concessions in return. The offer of a colonial settlement to Germany in March 1938 and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in September were the main instances of this misjudgement.

SOURCE 9

(From Richard Overy, *The Road to War*, published 1989)

The overwhelming bulk of the British population was still repelled by the prospect of war, particularly 'continental entanglements'; many were hostile even to increased levels of rearmament. The popular attitude to the Czech issue was fragmented. In the Empire as a whole the issue was much clearer.

All the Dominions except New Zealand were hostile to the idea of fighting for Czechoslovakia. The fear of Empire disunity was an important one for Chamberlain as it would have been for any British Prime Minister. Chamberlain was fully aware of public opinion and the consequent difficulty of taking a divided country and a divided empire into war.

D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Sources for use with Question 8

SOURCE 10

(From Alan Sked and Chris Cook, Post-War Britain, published 1979)

The nation had, in a sense, changed. The British people, in the words of one historian, had 'come of age' in resisting Hitler. People of widely differing social backgrounds had found it possible to live and work together when faced with common tasks and common dangers. They had accepted the need for controls and restrictions and had been impressed by the results of their common effort. They assumed, quite naturally, that after the war they would share in common rewards, that is, in better housing and better social services. And if these entailed continuing government planning and interference, they were more than ready to put up with it.

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SOURCE 11

(From David Kynaston, A World to Build, published 2007)

Was there perhaps widespread popular anticipation of a future national health service? Those who have scoured wartime diaries report remarkably few sightings, and indeed the 1944 Gallup poll revealed 55% approval and also showed a significant 32% in favour of the status quo. Polling evidence demonstrated that approval towards the end of the war for Labour's nationalisation plans was reasonably broad (usually 40–60%) but with few people seeing it as a high priority issue. As for education, a poll in 1945 found less than half those questioned had heard of the recent Education Act and a mere 13% were aware of its provision to remove fees from grammar schools. Understandably, the novelist George Orwell's earlier optimism about a newly radicalised people had by this time completely vanished. He told his readers in 1944 'Everyone expects not only that there will be a ghastly muddle over demobilisation, but that mass unemployment will promptly return.' And he added, 'Everyone wants, above all things, a rest.'

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SOURCE 12

(From Kenneth O. Morgan, *The Oxford Illustrated History of Great Britain*, published 1984)

By 1945, Britain may be said to have moved more rapidly to the left than at any period of its history. In government, Labour ministers of the Churchill administration wanted post-war reconstruction to be carried into effect, as did reformist Conservative ministers such as R. A. Butler, author of the Education Act. Their views coincided with the new planners, many of them Liberal thinkers such as Keynes or Beveridge. It was clear that the public was also becoming more radical – at least, it should have been clear, since this was documented in Gallup polls in the newspapers. Even in the armed forces, so it was murmured, left-wing or novel ideas were being discussed. Letters home from servicemen voiced the angry determination for a better deal in the post-war world.

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