

Examiners' Report June 2015

GCE History 6HI03 D

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Introduction

It was pleasing to see a good standard of responses from candidates in the penultimate session of the 6HI03 D examination. Many candidates wrote insightful comments which placed them in the higher grade categories. The paper was divided into two sections: Section (A) was an In-Depth Study question, and Section (B) an Associated Historical Controversy question.

Centres should note that the amount of space provided in the booklet for answers is more than enough for full marks.

Although a few responses were quite brief, there was little evidence on this paper of candidates having insufficient time to answer both questions. The ability range of those entering was diverse but the design of the paper allowed all abilities to be catered for. There were also very few rubric errors. By a large majority, more entrants sat *D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany 1900-45* than for *D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925-60*

One positive was the impression that, in general, candidates were able to offer more specific knowledge, particularly in relation to the controversy questions. The discriminating factor in their relative success in applying the knowledge was how well this was integrated with the arguments in the given sources and the precise demands of the question.

One pleasing trend is that very few candidates produced essays which were devoid of analysis. The two main weaknesses in responses which scored less well tended to be: (1) a lack of sufficient knowledge, rather than lengthy descriptive writing without analysis, or (2), informed writing which, whilst analytical in some senses, tended more towards answer a generic version of the given question, e.g. responses that offered seemingly pre-prepared explanations for Hitler gaining power, rather than the specific question asked in Section A, Question 2. The latter issue was also found across the controversies in Section B, with some answers tending more towards the broader controversy than the question as specifically asked. As a result in such cases, engagement with the sources was also often less successful. Overall though, the paper provided candidates with the opportunity to develop their essay writing and to include source material as and when necessary.

At the higher levels, and related to the issue above, a discriminating factor was often the ability to really explore the key words and phrases in the question, be these specific to the particular topic, such as 'national interest' or 'misjudgements', as well as qualifiers such as 'as best he could', as well as the common stems such as 'to what extent'. Candidates who convincingly applied their knowledge to exploring these issues were very successful. However, candidates should be wary of forcing the use of these, as there were cases where arguments over the 'extent' or the application of key phrases was simply asserted or misapplied.

The previously noted tendency for candidates to analyse and produce judgements in the main body of the answer and have cursory conclusions was to some extent reduced. Candidates should still be minded that considered introductions and conclusions often provide a solid framework for sustained argument and evaluation.

The answers of a minority of less successful candidates in Section A suggested that they lacked the detailed knowledge base required to tackle these questions and produced a catch-all commentary on the stipulated topic, with obvious repercussions. The best answers to Section A questions showed some impressive study of 20th century German and British history, with students producing incisive, scholarly analysis.

Question 1

Question 1 was the less popular of the two Section A questions for A1, but produced a range of responses, including many excellent answers. Candidates produced responses covering a range of economic, social and political consequences in their discussion of 'wholly positive'. More successful responses were convincing effectively linking these issues to economic development, such as exploring the impact of the rise of the working class on Reich politics. For example, some were able to link economic power to the rise of Germany as a world power and the negative impact of this. A minority did stray from the required focus, such as seeking to use the question as a springboard for writing about issues of some relevance, but with unconvincing or connection to economic developments. As well as detailed examinations of industrial growth, issues such as urbanisation and the development of electrical goods featured in many responses.

SECTION A

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross . If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then indicate your new question with a cross .

Chosen question number:

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

Economic development was positive:

~~Increase in the standard of living pay
Introduction of railway services~~

~~more people were moving to main cities to work → causing urbanisation of Berlin~~

~~Wasn't positive:~~

~~Standard of living decreased~~

~~Homelessness rose by 12%~~

~~Many families on rations~~

~~People that benefited:~~

~~Business owners~~

~~Junkers~~

It is accurate to state that economic development was wholly positive in Germany from 1900-1914, with Germany producing the same coal and iron input as Britain in 1909, and also leading the world in mechanical and

(Section A continued) pharmaceutical developments, consequently raising Germany's GDP. However, these changes, although statistically positive, were detrimental on the standard of living of regular German workers, resulting in a rise in rationing and homelessness, indicating that urbanisation of main cities such as Berlin was in fact wholly negative.

An indication of a positive economic development was Germany's ^{extraction, and development} ~~production~~ of coal and steel, showing a steady, large increase from 1900 through the use of the Ruhr area. This increase in raw materials shows indications that Germany's metal production and also world trade were booming, with Germany having produced 12% more coal than Britain ~~middle~~ towards the end of 1912. Alongside this, with the increase of production, more people were being employed, thus proving that Germany's previous issues of people without jobs in the early Second Reich were being tackled, ^{showing} ~~proving~~ that Germany's economic

development in these years were ^{positive} ~~likely~~ to some ~~We can also infer that Germany's economic~~ extent.

An indication of a positive economic development was Germany's ^{extraction, and development} ~~production~~ of coal and steel, showing a steady, large increase from 1900 through the use of the Ruhr area. This increase in raw materials shows indications that Germany's metal production and also world trade were booming, with Germany having produced 12% more coal than Britain ~~in the~~ towards the end of 1912. Alongside this, with the increase of production, more people were being employed, thus proving that Germany's previous issues of people without jobs in the early Second Reich were being tackled, ^{showing} ~~proving~~ that Germany's economic development in these years were ^{positive} ~~likely~~ to some ~~We can also infer that Germany's economic~~ extent.

(Section A continued) Moreover, another indication that Germany's economic development was positive is the fact that Germany was leading the world in mechanical and pharmaceutical developments. Despite having traits of an autocratic monarchy, favouring outdated methods of rule, these developments indicated that Germany was in fact modernising, with the increase in the production of medicines and also new machinery that helped industrialise German industries.

These developments furthered Germany's GDP even more so, which lends itself to having a positive impact on economic development.

However, despite these economic developments that may superficially indicate a more prosperous Germany only divided the country even more so. With the ~~industrial~~ development of industry came many individuals moving to Berlin, causing the rapid urbanisation and overcrowding of the city, which only held more issues regarding the fall in standards of living despite a rise in employment. The ~~rise~~ ^{fall} of ~~Germany's~~ standard of living only caused a more polarised class difference within the main cities, with ~~most~~ business owners and workers often



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5

Turn over ►



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Examiner Comments

The following is part of a focused response which develops an analysis across different issues with some balance. It gained a level 4.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Tip

For a level 5 response, sustained argument and evaluation would be expected, with more depth of knowledge. On a question like this, it would mean exploring every issue and weighing up the extent to which it was 'wholly positive' throughout the essay.

Question 2

SECTION A

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box . If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then indicate your new question with a cross .

Chosen question number:

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

Plan:

1929 - 1933

→ Misjudgements Politicians

- Believe they can tame him - might cabinet
H + Paper but 1932 proves
he could not compromise left SA
bar. • failure of Brüning gov. in crisis.
- Left/Communist = signified crisis in
capitalist system

→ Hitler and his party:

- Strag would not compromise
- Broad base of support (especially
after 1929 crisis.
- Largest party 1932 [37.3% 230]
CA 4% loss Nov.

→ Political atmosphere of the time:

- Undermine democracy, dependent
on President 1932 Coup D'état
- Barrier to Communism
- Personal rivalries - deal + intrigues
Van Papen + Van Schleicher. (Brüning
gov)

(Section A continued) Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in 1933 was certainly made possible by the Weimar Politicians who misjudged him, ~~and~~ underestimating his character and believing they could tame him. However, it was by no means the only reason for his appointment. The ~~extreme~~ popular nature of the Nazi party and Hitler's ~~character~~ strong-willed character also contributed. Furthermore, the ~~corrupt~~ political and economic atmosphere at the time provided the opportunity where Hitler would be offered the role of Chancellor.

Primarily, the lack of opposition when Hitler was offered Chancellor came from Hindenburg, and indeed Von Papen's belief that they could 'tame' Hitler's mass movement and use it to create a dictatorship with populist backing. Despite the fact that Hitler had already proven himself to be strong-willed and independent in 1932, when he only took up Von Papen's offer to join the cabinet after he promised to lift the ban on the SA and remove Brüning from office, the

(Section A continued) establishment ~~and~~ ^{misjudged} him - believing they could control him by locking him into a cabinet of the right and through Hindenburg's dominance as President. Arguably, this choice actually came from Hindenburg's misjudgement of the communist threat, following the growth in KPD votes in 1932 from 14.8% to 16.9%. ~~Although~~ Hindenburg's fear of a communist revolution caused him to believe Hitler's mass movement could be used to create a sufficient barrier to ~~the~~ communism and therefore minimise the threat.

However, in reality the communist movement was ~~not~~ more of a threat in perception as the movement was often divided and unorganised. Furthermore, their misjudgement ~~of the situation~~, especially on left-wing politicians at the time, especially regarding Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, weakened their potential for opposition. Many socialist and communist politicians at the time believed Hitler's ~~an~~ appointment

(Section A continued) - It signified a crisis in the capitalist system and would therefore result in collapse and thus communist victory. So, many decided not to oppose the decision which later proved to be a fatal mistake.

Another factor ~~was~~ for Hitler's appointment as Chancellor was Hitler's own character and the nature of the Nazi party. Especially after the 1929 Wall Street Crash and the subsequent economic crisis in Germany, Hitler was incredibly efficient in utilising propaganda to appeal to the masses and gain a wide support base. Indeed, his inspirational speeches and initiative to seize the opportunity to undermine the Weimar Republic contributed massively to the growth of the Nazi party, which went from 12 seats in 1928 to 107 seats in 1930. On becoming the largest party in 1932 with 37.9% of the vote and 230 seats, Hitler and the Nazi party saw an increase in their influence within German politics. This meant that the Weimar

(Section A continued) Republic and Brüning's government which had been dependant on Presidential support 1930 onwards were in a much weaker position. When coupled with the fact that the nature of the parties, which mostly acted as interest groups making it hard to compromise and make valid coalitions, meant that the broad base of support made the Nazi party appealing to the establishment. Although, arguably this again marks a misjudgement in the actions of Weimar politicians - believing they could use Hitler and the Nazis to support their government - without Hitler's strong character and ^{the} popular nature of the Nazi party it is unlikely Hitler would have ever been considered for Chancellor in 1933.

However, it can be argued that the fact that Nazi votes ^{had} dropped by 4% in November, suggests the popularity of the Nazis wasn't the main reason for Hitler's appointment as Chancellor. In fact by 1933 votes and popularity

(Section A continued) were not the only way in which to gain power. This draws attention to the political atmosphere of the time which provided the opportunity for Hitler's appointment and rise to power. This is best exemplified through the Prussian Coup D'état in 1932, which saw Hindenburg use Article 48 to remove the socialist dominated Prussian government from power on the grounds of failing to keep the peace. This reveals the fact that by this time it was not support of the people that maintained power but the President's favour and arguably Hitler's awareness of this and ability to manipulate the situation saw his appointment resulted in his appointment.

However, it can also be argued that his appointment was more to do with the political rivalries at the time, most notably that of Van Schleicher and Van Papen. By this stage in time government was dictated by intrigue and behind the scenes deals, providing the perfect ~~idea~~ such as those that removed Brüning and Groener in

(Section A continued) 1932, providing the perfect atmosphere for settling personal rivalries. This was what Von Papen, who ~~resented~~ resented Von Schleicher's replacement of him, hoped to use ~~at~~ the Nazi party to do. He wished to further undermine Von Schleicher's government, which had already alienated the right wing support through an economic bill which was argued to be far too conciliatory to the left, by forming a new right government and so ^{again} regaining power. This arguably presents ^{again} the misjudgement of a Weimar politician, however in this case it was Hitler's talents as a politician and unwillingness to compromise which allowed him to make use of the opportunity provided by the political atmosphere and become Chancellor in 1933.

In conclusion, the misjudgements of Weimar politicians 1929-1933 were essential in ~~pro~~ allowing the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor, as they ~~believed~~ not only ~~under~~ underestimated him

(Section A continued) but ^{also} believed they could 'tame' him into guaranteeing their power. However, without the economic crisis and indeed the corrupt political atmosphere of the time ~~and~~ and more importantly Hitler's ability to utilise and manipulate the opportunity provided, it is unlikely that ~~the option of~~ Hitler being Chancellor would have been seen as an option, let alone become reality in 1933.



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Examiner Comments

This response to question 2 is structured, argued, with clear support and analysis, and attempts to relate issues back to the stated factor in the question - 'misjudgements'. The conclusion also weighs up issues. This gained a Level 5.



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Examiner Tip

Strong responses often give a thorough and reasoned judgement at the end of each point of issue they deal with. These individual points are usually explored, considering 'how far' within that point.

Question 3

This question elicited a range of responses, both in terms of the arguments offered and the ultimate quality of the work produced. Many candidates were confident on the reasons for appeasement and gave specific detail as to why Britain was unable to take action due to the pacifist mood of the nation and its weakened economic state. There were also interesting arguments brought in regarding the context of the rise of communism and a desire to use German strength as a buffer. Others were able to balance Britain's position with the lack of potential international allies against Germany with a good debate as to whether this was due to the weak leadership of MacDonald and Baldwin. What often discriminated candidates were an ability to firmly link such issues to decisions and events directly related to policy towards Germany in the years 1933 to 1937. However, some lapsed into description and irrelevant points about appeasement upto Munich and beyond, or drifted to other areas of foreign policy with limited focus on Germany. A common issue, which has been noted before and was found even amongst otherwise good responses, was referring to Chamberlain as being Prime minister throughout the period. The strongest responses were able to offer detail analysis, clearly defining 'sensible' in the context of the period.

SECTION A

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box . If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then indicate your new question with a cross .

Chosen question number: **Question 1** **Question 2**
 Question 3 **Question 4**

British foreign policy towards Germany between the years 1933-37 was sensible given the circumstances due to the fact a policy of appeasement should be followed to ensure that Britain was ready for combat by 1937.

The British foreign policy that was followed between 1933-37 was a policy of appeasement. This policy was used to try and keep peace rather than start conflict with Hitler. The policy's main aim was also to postpone the conflict the conflict for as long as possible so that Britain was able to rearm effectively. This part of the policy seemed to be successful. As Britain was much more ready for war in

(Section A continued) 1937) then it would of been by 1937. Appeasement was a policy brought up by Neville Chamberlain who was prime minister at the time. This seemed like the most sensible policy at the time as the majority of the British public had agreed that appeasement was the best policy to follow. Not only did it have the backing of the public, appeasement also enabled the British to be able to bide their time and prepare effectively for war. Another reason appeasement

(Section A continued) War to early might of
meat that the British economy might
of not been suitable for wartime ~~condition~~
situation. The policy could also
be seen as a sensible one to
follow due to the fact that
Hitler was seen as a warming



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

The response has an understanding of the question, but material is very thin and thus development is limited. Such a response merits Level 2.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Tip

To access the higher levels on the Depth Study question, you must have a sound subject knowledge and be able to apply this consistently to the demands of the question. Check the specification for the key topics.

Question 4

This was marginally the more popular of the two Section A questions for D2, and produced a range of responses. The majority were able to offer at least sound detail on the given issue of the bomber offensive, and start to shape this towards the question. A range of other factors were discussed, with the Battle of the Atlantic featuring heavily, the Eastern Front, and to a lesser extent, theatres such as sometimes Italy and other issues such as code breaking. Knowledge of D-Day itself and subsequent operations such as Market Garden or the Battle of the Bulge was less frequently developed. The strongest answers were those which were able to convincingly tie material concerning the bomber offensive and other factors offered to D-D and liberation. For example, some responses were carried away with examining the negatives of the bomber campaign, yet were less secure in linking this to the impact it had on the German war effort. A number did adroitly argue, often succinctly, that aerial superiority mattered much more than the actual bombing campaign. Stronger responses tended to connect factor in manner which allowed for authentic analysis of their relative contribution, such as a debate about the role of the USSR and the supply from America which was built upon the supplies across the Atlantic, linked in with detailed knowledge of the American contribution within the bomber offensive. At times these were coupled with impressive knowledge of the capabilities of the Mustang and Lancaster bombers.

SECTION A

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross . If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then indicate your new question with a cross .

Chosen question number: 2/3 Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4

British coastal command sunk Ger planes

Battle of Atlantic pre condition.

4. *British landings & bomber offensive*

PTD

British idea - m. berry harbours, PLUTO.

British idea to wait until 1944 not 1943 when suggested

Operation fortitude

Slowed Germans by resisting at Falaise

Allied air superiority over Europe.

Blutley Park knew Ger. positions

Americans secured U-Boat threat with industrial dominance

Market Garden disaster. Only 1/4 of 9000 troops liberated.

Bridge at Remagen.

Liberated France Paris 25th August

Normandy American idea.

Red Army advancing from elsewhere

No Americans needed

British idea - campaign drew away German platoons.

- 79% of ships
British at DDay.
10,000 more than
US.

- Caen allowed
Americans to slip
through.

- Much under RAF

- By March 1945
Americans had
twice as many troops
in mainland Europe.

- Battle of Bulge 1944-5
was mainly ~~the~~ Americans
v Germans.

- ~~The~~ US liberated S France.

4. The impact of the bomber offensive of 1942 - 1945 was highly important in the success of the DDay landings and the subsequent liberation of Europe definitely as it secured Allied air superiority over Northern Europe.

However there are many factors to consider as preconditions for the successful campaign such as the Battle of the Atlantic where the Americans played a crucial role, the British led Allied effort at Operation Fortitude but ~~also~~ not forgetting the vital help that came from British intelligence at Bletchley Park also.

There is an argument to say that the impact of the bomber offensive of 1942-1945 was paramount in the success of the Allied campaign to liberate Europe from Hitler. Hugh Dowding, who was in charge of the RAF's coordination in the Battle of Britain secured Allied air superiority after a long onslaught with the use of radar stations and carefully selected resources, even though the Luftwaffe's planes were far superior to the Spitfire and Hurricane. The RAF managed to also target and destroy many

(Section A continued) of the German's key industrial buildings to the war effort which ~~retarded~~ slowed the German's movements and set up points of attack for Allied troops on the mainland. However air superiority alone would not have secured a victory for the Allies, naval superiority was also vital. The Battle of the Atlantic successfully defeated the U-Boat threat and proved Roosevelt's view that Britain could not defeat Germany if their navy did not reign supreme. The Battle of the Atlantic was only made possible by the information that came so importantly from Bletchley Park from British Intelligence. The breaking of the German enigma code and consequent 'Ultra' intelligence allowed the British to secretly track the movements of the ~~U-Boats~~.

Germans. Also without the overpowering dominance and production of the US industry outproducing Germany's U-Boats, the British would not have succeeded. Two thirds of British fuel and supplies came from America. The Battle of the Atlantic was a precondition for the later success of the D Day Landings and subsequent defeat of Germany.

Another event to which the Allied effort owes its success is the British led Operation Fortitude ~~near the banks of Dover~~. It fooled the Germans ~~very well~~ fully and forced them to move tanks and troops to Calais in expectation of an attack at that crossing. The British also correctly made the US wait until 1944 to make an attack instead on 1943 where air superiority had not yet been secured. The British Army ~~have~~ credit also for the ideas of the Mulberry Harbours that ^{facilitated} ~~allowed~~ movements of troops across the Channel and also crucially PLUTO, which fuelled the Army as it travelled great distances across France. ~~The liberation of Europe~~ The British are mainly responsible for the preparation of the D Day landings in June 1944, landing 10,000 more troops than the US and 79% of the total effort was

~~RAF Coastal Command~~ RAF Coastal Command
sunk two thirds of German planes over the

(Section A continued) channel also securing a safe
~~crossing~~ ^{crossing}. Furthermore the British Italian
campaign drew away forty platoons
of Germans, instead thousands of troops,
from Northern Europe, weakening the German
defence at the Rhineland, ^{later also.} ~~when~~ Together
~~with~~ with the impact of the bomber
offensive there were crucial to the
success of D Day.

The subsequent liberation of Europe was not
much due to the impact of the bomber
offensive of 1942-1945 until the latter stages
when Allied forces approached Berlin.
~~The~~ Eisenhower now led a majority American
force through France. There were
double the number of Americans to
British by March 1945 in Europe. It
was primarily American troops who fought
the Germans at the Battle of the Bulge
in 1944-45 and subsequently liberated
Paris on the 25th August and later
the South of France. Whilst the British, led
by Montgomery, did well to slow down
the Germans by resisting them at Caen,
thousands of German troops escaped at

(Section A continued) Falaise as the British were too slow moving through the ~~the~~ bocage. The British Operation Market Garden at Arnhem was disastrous and from there the Americans were responsible for ~~the~~ much of the success ~~on~~ on land, securing the Bridge at Remagen. The British only managed to liberate one quarter of the nine thousand Allied troops whereas the ~~the~~ US plan to attack on a ~~the~~ broad front saw much more success. The Allies were furthermore aided by the Germans losing many troops to Eastern Germany where they were holding off the Soviet Red Army.

In conclusion, whilst the ~~the~~ success of the D-Day landings was much due to the impact of the bomber offensive of 1942-1945 and additionally it aided the subsequent liberation of Europe, the success was actually owed to many ~~the~~ other factors also. Operation Fortitude and Bletchley Park provided vital intelligence ~~of~~ on the movements of the Germans which

(Section A continued) in their absence would have almost inevitably led to an Allied defeat. Furthermore the British led ideas, ~~as~~ carried out by an Allied effort of the Mulberry Harbours and PLUTO secured resources for the Allied movements in mainland Europe. The British also diverted German troops in their Italian campaign which quickened the ~~process~~ of the liberation and also they waited until June 1944 to launch the campaign and timed the crossing perfectly, ignoring the impatience of the Americans. Lastly the liberation would not have taken place without the sheer resources and manpower provided by the Americans. Their military strategy secured France first and later the rest of Europe.



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Examiner Comments

The example response is a clearly argued piece, from the introduction onwards. It is focused, analytical, conceptually strong and with exemplification firmly tied to the demands of the question and is clearly evaluative. It achieved a level 5.



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Examiner Tip

Where a question has two aspects, such as the 'D-Day' and 'liberation of Europe' references in this, it is important to try to focus on and develop both of these. Some very good analysis and judgements may make distinctions between these two issues within the same point.

Question 5

This was the more popular of the two controversy questions for D1, and there were a wide range of responses seen. On the whole, candidates knowledge of issues and the historiographical debate surrounding this continue to impress, although in some cases, this can begin to be to the detriment of an analysis of the specific question and given sources. At times, it appeared that some candidates had learnt and revised a generic 'Was Germany to blame for the First World War?' essay, and were to a lesser or greater extent attempting to replicate these in the exam. Such an approach placed obvious limitations on these responses, both in terms of the engagement with the sources, as well as the degree of focus on the nuance of argument, particularly with regards the issue of a German 'desire for war'. At the higher end, many candidates were able to shine by offering a detailed analysis of what 'German desire for war' might mean. For example, some broke this down into desire for war relating to aggressive, defensive or for domestic motivations, or the drawing distinctions between actions and desire. A close reading of the sources was also a discriminating factor in the success of responses. Some candidates assumed that by quoting Fischer, Layton fully agreed with every aspect of his work, or misreading Source 3's reference to domestic issues. There also appeared to be some increase in referencing other historians and theories or 'reasons', e.g. calculated risk, offensively conducted defensive war, escape forwards, planned war aggression, how Europe stumbled/slithered/'sleepwalked' into war. At times, this amounted to little more than 'namedropping', although in the hands of candidates who were able to explore these with confidence, considering the given evidence and precise exemplification, it did produce excellent responses.

SECTION B

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross . If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then indicate your new question with a cross .

Chosen question number:

Question 5

Question 6

Question 7

Question 8

The view that a German desire for war cannot be seen as the main cause of World War One is disputed in both source 2 and 3. Source 1 is completely ~~against~~ ^{supports} the view, instead suggesting that the alliance system had a larger influence. Whereas source 3 is mixed; some aspects suggest that Germany did desire war, but then also supports the idea that other factors influenced the war such as Germany's innenpolitik. Source 2 ~~completely supports~~ ~~against~~ is against the view, supporting the idea that Germany did desire war and this was reflected in their aggressive foreign policy. It can be argued that WW1 was the result of many combined factors, such as their desire to have a war, ^{the role of other powers and trying to solve internal problems.} ~~their fear of encirclement and the role of other powers.~~ However it seems that Germany did desire a war to a certain extent.

Source 1 supports the view that ~~Germany~~ a German desire for war cannot be seen as the main cause of WWI. Source 1 suggests that Germany was being more defensive than aggressive and was only acting in support of their alliance country; Austria. Source 1 states that Germany was 'frequently embarrassed by the stupidities in which Austria indulged', this disputes the claim that Germany was aggressive, as they would be supporting them in all wars if Germany really ~~is~~ desired a war. It also suggests that Germany was acting ~~in~~ in a defensive manner as they wanted to

(Section B continued) 'preserve the solidarity of the group' and ensure that Austria is safe. However this ~~has~~ ^{has} been disputed by source 3 which suggests that in fact Germany wanted to gain and maintain world domination, as was 'Germany's international position demanded' war, and therefore they encouraged Austria to become involved in conflict with other countries. From my own knowledge I know that this is ~~slightly~~ ^{to a certain extent} true, especially when Germany sent the 'Blank Cheque' to Austria in 1912; saying they would support them if they became involved in a war. However there is little doubt that Germany was aggressive ~~thru~~ in the run up to the outbreak of WWI; therefore they are likely to have desired a war.

Germany's aggressive foreign policy in the lead up to World War One was bound to cause friction with other countries. In Source 2 it states that from 1911 there was 'clear continuity of German aims and policies which even culminated in the war'; suggesting that only from 1911 did Germany really become aggressive. However from my own knowledge, I know that Germany showed their aggression through foreign policies much earlier than 1911. Even as early as 1900, with the second Navy Law planning 38 battlecruisers in 20 years, showed that they were challenging Britain. Once again in 1906, Germany's foreign policies threatened Britain's naval supremacy even further; ensuring that Britain knew Germany was trying to become a bigger threat. These laws suggest that Germany did indeed desire a war. Source 3 goes against this view, by stating 'Bülow encouraged Weltpolitik... never allowed it to carry him away', this infers that even though he did not want world domination,

(Section B continued) it never really had a drastic impact on his foreign policies, and therefore Bülow Germany was not aggressive. ~~His~~ Historian, Fischer, completely disagrees with the idea that Germany was not aggressive. Fischer believes that Germany did desire war and therefore planned aggressive foreign policies. Fischer used documents from the 1912 War Council meeting, where Bethmann-Hollweg's private secretary refers to the Chancellor's plans for peace negotiations and annexations. This supports the idea that Germany was planning a war, but put it off so they could become militarily prepared to win.

Other powers clearly had a role in ~~the~~ influencing the start of WWI; Germany cannot be completely blamed. Their only and closest ally, ^{Austria} influenced WWI as they knew they had the support of Germany. Source 2 refers to Austria Hungary 'being threatened by an increasingly powerful...serbia'; this would result in Germany having to adapt to support Austria. However ~~after~~ the July Crisis of 1912 suggests that Austria was not as innocent as some historians suggest. ~~The~~ ~~assassination~~ From my own knowledge I know that the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand resulted in Austria sending Serbia an ultimatum; only because Germany supported them. When this ultimatum was rejected because of only (point), Austria be involved in the investigation of the assassination; Austria made sure Germany supported her before she went any further. The view of other powers influencing the war is also supported by source 1; ~~alliances~~ ~~were~~ it suggests that alliances played a larger role than source 2 suggests. Source 1 states '~~for~~

(Section B continued) 'thought it prudent to counter-balance... consenting to the desire of his two Entente friends' this ^{infers} ~~refers~~ that whoever was in the alliance always had to consult the other countries involved. However this can be disputed with my own knowledge, as I know that in the Balkans war, the majority of Austria's actions were not supported by Germany. Therefore Germany's desire for a war cannot be seen as the main cause of WWI; as the alliance system, the majority of time influenced different countries actions.

The final argument historians have suggested that caused WWI was Germany trying to solve their internal problems with war. Source 3 states that 'Under Bethmann Hollweg, Weltpolitik was of ~~completely~~ considerably less domestic we'; this suggests that he did not

use war as a solution to internal problems. However ~~the quote~~
~~However this quote also says~~ However from this quote I can
infer that maybe previous Chancellors used war as a solution
for innenpolitik; in the hope that it would decrease the divisions
between political parties and that it will bring the public to
support the second Reich. No other sources support the idea of
Innenpolitik influencing the war. Therefore it is likely that innenpolitik
was the least important factor in the outbreak of WWI.

In conclusion, after analysing all the sources and combining it
with my own knowledge; it seems that Germany did in fact
desire a war and this was clearly presented in ~~his~~ ~~for~~ their
foreign policy which was ultimately aggressive. However as source
1 ~~say~~ and 3 suggest, other factors did influence the WWI, such
as innenpolitik and other powers. Therefore ~~that~~ I agree

(Section B continued) completely that Germany did desire war. ~~It was~~
~~also other factors~~



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

The following response is relatively brief, yet in the main well-argued and making good use of sources. It lacks real depth of evaluation and some of the subtleties and issues within the sources were not quite picked up on, but it is sufficiently structured and analytical for a level 4 on both assessment objectives.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Tip

When planning your answer, read through the sources carefully and all of the arguments, issues and evidence you can. This will help you to cross-reference and analyse effectively in your answer.

Question 6

As with Question 5, there was evidence of pre-prepared answers here, with some candidates writing somewhat generic 'weak dictator' or 'strong dictator' essays. There was also a lot of reference to intentionalist and structuralist arguments, and some of these lapsed into description. However, once again, the question did allow for many strong responses to achieve the higher levels by focusing on the precise wording of the question and engage with the nuances and detail within the sources. Some, for example, were able to offer sustained analysis by considering whether aspects of the system did truly 'constrain' Hitler's power or whether, perversely, they may have enhanced it. The most able candidates gave really good links between the sources and actual practical examples as to how the Nazi state worked with most able to identify a good line of argument that the system suited Hitler's needs. The degree of own knowledge was variable, with most candidates using the economic chaos caused by the duplication of Schacht and Goering's positions. Better candidates went into detail about the nature of the Hitler's personal office and the ending of effective cabinet government and how this ultimately helped Hitler's control. Evidence used also tended to focus around Aktion T4, Darre, Hitler's Bohemian lifestyle, Economics conflicts. A distinction between candidates accessing the higher levels and those who did not was often the ability to use this knowledge to examine exactly how and to what extent it revealed Hitler to be constrained, rather than just assert that it supports the source or not.

SECTION B

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number:

Question 5 ☒

Question 6 ☒

Question 7 ☒

Question 8 ☒

'Hitler's power was constrained by the very system he had created'

PLAN

'weak dictator'

INTRO - usually seen as an omnipotent dictator; but 'chaos theory'

1) power constrained due to 'bureaucracy being' 'impossibly polyratic'

(S4)

↳ 'confusion of rival hierarchies' S4 'extensive duplication'

↳ 'pend with each other' (S5)

↳ 'channeled through conflicting + overlapping orgs' S6

→ ok. institutional proliferation & social Darwinism

2) certain Nazis were very powerful; 'free' SS

↳ 'channeled through Nazi elite' S6

→ ok. Goering 1941 and 'having access to' S6 → personal loyalties

3) not constrained but did this by choice 'not interested' S5

↳ could if he wanted to 'interventions whenever he chose' S5

↳ 'followed without discussion' S6 → ok. personality

4) alternative - H. had 'unlimited state power' S6

↳ 'unlimited power' over nation = terror

↳ Machtergreifung

CONC - far from being constrained; the fact he'd 'created' this system - could reshape it 'intervene whenever' S5
→ chose not to be more powerful

(Section B continued) ~~II~~ 'constrained'

ESSAY: 1933

Hitler is often seen as an omnipotent dictator. However, with the development of the 'chaos thesis', it has been suggested that he was not as powerful as once thought, due to the chaotic nature of Nazi rule. This has led to the suggestion that he is a 'weak dictator', as source 4 suggests. However, others suggest that Hitler's relaxed approach to rule 'suited Hitler very well' as source 5 suggests. Additionally, the very fact that in reality, as a result of the Enabling Act of 1933, Hitler had absolute legal power, throws doubt on source 4's suggestion that his power could be 'constrained'. This thus ~~needs~~ ^{requires} closer analysis.

Source 4 suggests that Hitler's power was 'constrained' due to the Nazi rule being 'impossibly polycratic'. Source 5 extends upon this by stating that the overlapping institutions would 'pend with each other'. This implies that despite ~~the~~ Nazi rule being directed to working towards Hitler's will, his will was, as source 6 states, 'channelled' through overlapping organisations. It is true that in some cases, Hitler's will was perhaps not enforced with ~~the~~ maximum efficiency possible. For example, Gauleiters held vast amounts of power in their districts. Although they worked to broadly ensure the people

(Section B continued) in their districts were following Nazi regulations, they inhibited several plans to centralise government, as this would have detracted from their local power. As a result, due to the fact that Gauleiters held power over occupied territories, ^{during WW2} these were not always used to their potential. Additionally, institutional proliferation was very costly. By the 1930s, the Nazi Party paid the wages of 25,000 Germans; a cost that may have been reduced had Hitler retained a tighter control on the budget. Despite the problems with efficiency, some suggest that rather than 'constraining' his power, the 'pends' between organisations meant that Hitler's own power was not detracted from. ~~For this was the principle of~~ For example, Minister-Presidents of each state were retained, alongside the newly created Reich State Governors - each of these parties complained to central government about their overlapping powers; but never to Hitler himself. He was free to rule as he

pleased - perhaps without the constraints of day to day business. It could thus be suggested that the 'impossibly polycratic' nature of Nazi rule served only to make Hitler's personal power ~~more~~ ^{even} stronger - by no means a 'constraint'.

Additionally, source 5 implies that certain Nazi leaders ~~were~~ ^{may} have detracted ^{from Hitler's power} due to the feudal nature of Nazi rule, as they were 'free' to do as they wished. This leads to the suggestion in source 6 that the will of the Führer

(Section B continued) had to be 'channelled through the Nazi elite'.

This implies that the will of the Führer may in some cases have been diluted as a result of the power of a select few, an 'uneven distribution' of power as source 4 suggests - suggesting that this caused Hitler to be 'constrained'. However, in reality Hitler was extremely suspicious even of his closest associates gaining too much power. Goering was ignored in policy discussions after 1941, and denied access to Hitler as a result of his increasing power. If this appeared unlikely Hitler would allow his power to be 'constrained' by a select few Nazi leaders. This leads to the idea, stated in source 6, that all power in the Nazi regime relied on having 'access to Hitler', thus implying that as the omnipotent Führer, he was placed in the fundamental position to be able to give, and take power as he pleased. Indeed, Hitler was favourable to 'personal loyalties', disliking traditional bureaucracy. This resulted in institutional proliferation - auxiliary agencies were created on top of existing ones. This meant that despite the 'impossibly

polycratic' nature of Nazi rule as source 4 states, Hitler still had overall power. Indeed, following the process of 'Gleichschaltung' in ^{the} 1930's (co-ordination), Hitler had managed to ^{centralise} incorporate traditional bureaucracy, as well as party organisations. The civil service was co-ordinated through the 'Law for the Re-establishment

(Section B continued) of the Professional Civil Service'. This gave the Nazis time to promote Nazi members while demoting or sacking any disloyal or Jewish elements. As such, it is clear that although Hitler did not define the most precise detail of the Nazi regime, he still maintained, despite not exercising, complete power over its workings. He was certainly not, as source 4 states, a 'weak dictator'.

Additionally, the statement suggests that Hitler was constrained by the 'system'. Others would agree with the idea that Hitler was 'constrained', but rather than by the 'system', he was limited by his own personality. As a result of his insomnia, he was unavailable to govern at most times - ~~he~~ was very ^{often} rarely ~~to be found~~ ~~at~~ at his retreat in the Berghof. This implies that he did not exercise much control over ^{policy} ~~decision~~ making. Indeed, source 5 suggests he was simply 'not interested' in the daily routine of the regime. This may have been the cause behind Hitler's reluctance to make decisions - for example, in the economic crisis of ^{winter} 1935-6, Hitler refused to make decisions on economic policy, despite pressure from the Reich Ministry of Economics, and the Wehrmacht.

This ~~can~~ approach to rule left the war economy inefficient until Speer's appointment as Minister of Economics, leading to the suggestion that Hitler could have been a lot more powerful had he chosen to be.

(Section B continued) Despite this, it was clear that he could ~~enact~~ enact 'interventions whenever he chose', as source 5 suggests. Indeed, there was no great need for Hitler to intervene anywhere else than where he was interested - the whole regime and its members were prescrib'd to Hitler's 'weltanschauung', his world view - as such his will would be materialised as working policies without ~~his~~ a need for his own work. For example, ~~the origin~~ of the euthanasia policy came about as a direct intervention by one of the Reich office's members, ~~as they~~ ^{who} felt ^{that} Hitler would approve of their suggestion. Indeed, where Hitler chose to intervene, his ideas would be 'followed without discussion', as source 6 suggests. This was seen in the implementation of the 1933 Sterilisation Law, which aimed to sterilise those with genetic deficiencies - Hitler pushed this through an autogenetic Cabinet. It was thus clear that far from being 'constrained' by the system, Hitler could utilise it 'wherever he chose'.

In conclusion, Hitler was far from being 'constrained'. The very statement, ~~say~~ in stating that he created the system, suggests that due to the fact he had created any potential constraints on his power through institutional proliferation, he would also

(Section B continued) be able to reshape the very system he had created, should he so wish. As source 5 states, Hitler could 'intervene wherever he chose to do so'. It is clear that although the regime may have resulted in ~~the~~ inefficiency in terms of the implementation of policy, this by no means equated to a 'constraint' of Hitler's power - indeed, to some extent it only emphasised the overriding influence he could have on policy if he wished. This, paired with the fact that any chaotic elements of the system worked towards the will of the Führer, meant that despite the inefficiency and troubles of the regime, Hitler was by no means a 'weak dictator', as source 4 suggests.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

The sample script highlights many of the features of a very strong response. It offers a clear focus, with an excellent grasp of concepts and issues, developed analysis, strong support and considerable evaluation throughout the essay, building to overall judgement considering Hitler's authority. The response was marked at level 5.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Tip

Whilst the sources are there to be used on to answer the question, they shouldn't be relied upon as your only source of information. Good responses are able to bring in own knowledge which is used to analyse the issues, integrating this with the sources, analysing and evaluating the validity of their views.

Question 7

This was the more popular of the two controversy questions in option D2, and produced a range of responses. Where candidates were less successful, one or more of the following was often at issue. Firstly, one-sided responses which were damning of Chamberlain, without considering opposing arguments sufficiently or even asserting Chamberlain was foolish with limited evidence to support this. Secondly, some candidates tended to offer a general assessment of appeasement, without real consideration of 'national interest'. Thirdly, some candidates offered sound analysis, but with little support from the period, relying on the sources or material from earlier in the 1930s, such as the East-Fulham by-election or Oxford Union debate, with less secure material directly relating to the period in the question. That said, many candidates made good use of earlier material, particularly with regard to national feeling in support of Chamberlain's policies. Higher level responses tended to overcome these issues, and the following issues were more evident. Many candidates engaged confidently with the idea of national interest, and explored points such as the buying time argument and the lack of support from other nations. In general, there was less evidence of pre-prepared responses, and many candidates were able to make valid historiographical comment without losing sight of the precise question.

Additionally, high scoring candidates were usually able to use the sources to drive arguments about the lack of alternatives and allies, exploring these with evidence from the sources and own knowledge. Particularly impressive arguments were also seen which carefully considered the question, such as examining Chamberlain's zeal for appeasement, linking this back to the decline of British power in order to reach judgements which addressed the issue of 'as best he could'.

SECTION B

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross . If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then indicate your new question with a cross .

Chosen question number:

Question 5

Question 6

Question 7

Question 8

Whilst the view that Chamberlain defended the national interests as best he could in the years 1937-39 has held considerable sway for some time, defence of Chamberlain's actions have since ^{been made} emerged. Cockett takes the view that 'Chamberlain's initiative was too little, far too late' and describes his demeanour as 'self delusion'. Taylor takes a different perspective in saying appeasement 'turned into capitulation' and that Munich 'became an emotive word'. Neville, agrees with the opinion in the question in claiming that despite earlier convictions that

'Chamberlain betrayed the National Interests', the view in contemporary hindsight 'the 1960's' has since become 'under challenge'. Therefore in any debate of this it is essential to evaluate how Chamberlain was viewed at the time, the extent to which his policies were justified, whilst also considering the implications of the revolving British public opinion at the time.

Neville argues that the policy of appeasement 'cannot (Section B continued) just be written off as cowardly', he further claims Chamberlain was 'confronted with the impending threat of war with Germany, Italy and Japan'. In order to examine this, two issues must be evaluated: the extent to which Chamberlain's policy of appeasement best met the defence of National Interests and the extent to which this was the best policy. On the latter Chamberlain was more than ~~self-delusion~~ a statesman of 'self-delusion', as Cockett argues; he secured a joint agreement that two countries would not go to war at Munich. Chamberlain's intention was not 'peace at all costs', although met by cheering crowds at Heston, and London not entirely motivated by altruism related Chamberlain was still weary of Hitler. Therefore in spite of working in defence of National Interests, the issue with Munich was not the negotiation itself, it was the delusion, however temporary, that peace could hold. As highlighted in Taylor's argument which 'is doubtful whether Hitler took Chamberlain's sincerity seriously

before Munich; it is certain that he did not so a few days after. Indeed, the Munich agreement set limitations but Hitler clearly violating these in making aggressions into areas of neither valid claim or agreement; the agreement essentially failed.

What is perhaps more interesting is,

^{that} (Section B continued) ^{opinion} The public in 1937 was still in favour of non-intervention, however once Hitler had not only annexed Austria under the Anschluss, but also made claim on the Sudetenland in 1938, the opinions began to change. Indeed, polls in February 1939 saw 28% of the public believing appeasement would hold a lasting peace and 80% favouring a Grand Alliance with the USSR. ~~as~~ Chamberlain did not envisage a Grand Alliance and distrusted Stalin following purges in 1938 which saw 80% of his military officers killed, indeed as Neville argues, his military advisers were adamant that Britain could not win; the meagre air defences of 1938 were much greater in 1939 seeing 8000 aircraft produced. Taylor highlights 'he expected to make them by playing on British and French fear', indeed the Nazi Suez pact in January 1939 came as a bombshell to London, as such an alliance was unimaginable.

E. Cockett's argument can be used to challenge ^{Neville's} Taylor's argument in saying 'his fixation' led to appeasement hampering National interests. That said, Neville is correct in claiming 'Chamberlain was absolutely in the tradition ~~of~~ of British foreign policy in 1919', thus highlighting that whilst his appeasing methods worked

with National Interests is hampered it also as he was
outmanoeuvred by Hitler and lost a potential ally
by in the USSR - which much criticism levelled on
using outdated methods



ResultsPlus

Examiner Comments

The response has a clear and confident focus on both the question and the views taken on this in the given extracts. It examines these drawing on evidence from the sources and own knowledge, offering reasoned evaluation of the strengths of their arguments. Such a response is typical of a level 5 for both assessment objectives.



ResultsPlus

Examiner Tip

When making individual points, look for links to other points. This helps keep answers focused, and at the higher levels like this, highlights opportunities to explore the nature of these connections and give an ongoing relative evaluation of the points you raise.

Question 8

This was the less popular option for the controversy questions in D2. The question managed to produce a wide range of responses. Most responses were able to focus on some benefits in the post-war system, with some real consideration of the extent to which there was a desire to 'build... a better society', although there was in general less development on the extent to which this stemmed from wartime shared suffering. In general, less successful responses tended to explain and to some extent analyse the changes that took place after the war, drawing on the sources and often good knowledge, but lacked clear argument and focus. As a whole, responses to this question offered detailed knowledge of a range of issues in the post-war period, particularly the various aspects of the establishment of the welfare state and post-war rebuilding, which appeared to give them greater confidence in exploring the issues raised by the sources, such as the reference to leaving 'intact an independent education sector' in Source 11. There was also good knowledge of the wartime experience, often related to the Beveridge Report, although in some cases candidates drifted to material of less relevance. The best responses were confident in relating material from the wartime and post-war period to develop arguments which genuinely examined 'how far'.

SECTION B

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross . If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then indicate your new question with a cross .

Chosen question number:

Question 5

Question 6

Question 7

Question 8

After its general election victory in July 1945, the Labour government wholeheartedly introduced a welfare programme based on the 1942 Beveridge Report into 'Social Insurance and Allied Services'. Whether or not this was a result of war sacrifices creating a "new resolve" for "a better society" is the subject of much controversy.

Source D forwards the view that "a new resolve was born to build, from the sacrifices of war, a better society".

The argument that the "common effort" during the war, together with shared "experience of evacuation" and "stringent rationing" created a new resolve for reform, is supported

by source 12 which "states that" "the acceptance of wartime rationing" and "spirit of the time" aided the welfare reforms "immensely". The popularity for reform is shown by the sale of

(Section B continued) 100,000 copies of the Report into Social Insurance and Allied Services which set out the desired reforms; even source 11 acknowledges that "in 1939" (before the war), such reforms "seemed impossible", suggesting the war did change public opinion somewhat.

However, source 10 disagrees that the aims of such reforms were ^{solely} to build a "better society". It argues that "reconstruction and planning" were "necessities"; the "capital investment in housing" discussed in source 12 was necessitated by the destruction or inhabitation of 460,000 homes by axis bombing and 2 million marriages following the war. This view is supported further by source 11 which notes that reforms could not be a result of the resolve for a better society as "labour's working-class supporters were definitely not favoured". ~~It argues~~ The source (11) argues that the "old ideological

apparatus of the state", such as the "independent" education sector" were left

(Section B continued) "largely intact" ~~creating~~ ^{conning} a system which allowed the rich to achieve a better education, reinforcing social stratification."

Despite a lack of social revolution creating a perfectly just and equal society, ~~this is~~ not to say that such reforms were ~~des~~ society was not made "better" by the reforms, or as the view presented suggests, that a resolve for such reforms was built.

Source 12 agrees with the view presented, stating that the "welfare programme was so widely accepted that... the Tory government had no choice but to continue" what it describes as a "social revolution. Source 10 also believes in the desire for "a better society" in which all deserved "the necessities of life", "the opportunity to work" and to "live in decent surroundings". As a result, the labour government constructed 1/4 million new homes by 1951 and created a ~~free~~ National Health Service free at the point of provision, to which 95% of

(Section B continued)

the population registered in its first year. According to source 12, this welfare programme was achieved by "a consensus over the need to protect" it.

~~It can also be argued that~~
Whilst the sources appear to agree to some extent that there was a consensus that a "better society" was necessary as pre-war social hardship was made to seem "grossly unjust" (source 10), it should be highlighted that this "resolve" for a "better society" was not universal. Source 12 notes the "acceptance" ~~of reforms~~ rather than a passion for the spirit involved in rationing; it also points out that the "Tory government had no choice^A but to continue" the welfare programme, showing a reluctant acceptance from some of a "better society". This is shown by the "institutions of civil society" being left^B alone^{*} and the failure of some hopes of "nationalised industries to be realised" (source 12). In reality, the Tory government privatised industries where it was viable (*source 11)

(Section B continued)

to do so (e.g. steel industries and parts of heavy road hauliers).

In conclusion, ~~it~~ it is clear that the shared experiences and sacrifices of war did build a new resolve for a better society.

Sources 10 and 12 support this point view overwhelmingly, pointing to the implementation of the 'Beveridge Report' which brought about the creation of the welfare state. Source 11 does not oppose the view that such reforms were desired, merely that they were not entirely successful as old institutions remained favourable to the middle and upper classes.

Despite this claim, it can only be viewed as successful in producing a better society as 1.5 million houses were built, healthcare costs no longer caused poverty for the working classes and full employment was achieved; even source 11 concedes that these reforms were seemingly "impossible in 1939", and were only realised as a result of a shared sacrifice and common experience during war.

(Section B continued) Source 11 describes this as
a "common effort".



ResultsPlus Examiner Comments

The response offers mainly good analysis, clearly identifying the arguments within the sources and relating these to each other and the view in the question. Issues of debate are extended using own knowledge. Such responses are typical of level 4 for both assessment objectives.



ResultsPlus Examiner Tip

To achieve these levels, make sure that your answer is firmly focused on the debate in the question and that your use of the sources cross-references them in considering this debate. Using own knowledge and other sources more to assess the given views would raise the mark even higher.

Paper Summary

Based on their performance on this paper, candidates are offered the following advice:

In Depth Study question

- Candidates must provide more factual details. Candidates need to ensure their subject knowledge conforms to the specification. Weaker responses usually lacked range and/or depth of analysis.
- Stay within the specific boundaries of the question – for example, some candidates explored issues outside of the relevant time periods.
- More candidates would benefit from planning their answers more effectively.
- In order to address the question more effectively, candidates need to offer an analysis not provide a descriptive or chronological account. Many candidates produced answers, which were focused and developed appropriately.
- Some candidates need to analyse key phrases and concepts more carefully.
- Some candidates could have explored links and the interaction between issues more effectively.
- Regarding conclusions they were sometimes basic summaries rather than offering an explicit judgment linked to the analytical demands of the question. The importance of conclusions that are explicit rather than implicit is emphasised. Indeed, it was fairly rare to find an answer for Section A especially that was not of Level 4 quality overall where there were effective, considered introductions and conclusions.
- Some candidates explored issues outside of the relevant time periods, especially for questions 1, 2 and 3.
- It is suggested that the students who perform best on Section B tended to be those who read the sources carefully, accurately and critically; recognised themes and issues arising from the sources, then used these to address the question. Some candidates potentially limited themselves by closing off potential areas of enquiry by seeking to make the evidence of the sources fit the contention in the question, without full thought to the issues within the sources, or by using the sources to illustrate arguments without relating evidence to other sources or own knowledge.
- Candidates need to treat the sources as a package to facilitate cross-referencing and advance a convincing line of argument. Many weaker candidates resorted to 'potted' summaries of each source which failed to develop a support/challenge approach.
- Candidates need to integrate the source material and their own knowledge more effectively to substantiate a particular view. Some candidates could have explored links and interaction more effectively between own knowledge and the sources. Weaker responses were frequently too reliant on the sources provided and little or no own knowledge was included.
- Some needed to develop their points with more specific factual details.
- Some candidates explored issues outside of the relevant time periods, especially for questions 6 and 7.
- More candidates would benefit from planning their answers more effectively.
- Some candidates could have explored links / interaction more effectively between own knowledge and the sources. Some needed to develop their points with more specific factual details.
- Candidates should avoid memorised 'perspectives' essays and base their responses on the issues raised by the sources instead. The Associated Historical Controversy

question is an exercise in interpretation not historiography. Whilst there was some excellent analysis which incorporated historiographical knowledge, reference to the likes of 'structuralist' historians often added little, or was even to the detriment of genuine analysis.

- That said, there were very few really weak responses. The impression was that the substance of the source at least enabled candidates offer some development and supporting evidence. In such cases though, candidates often struggled to extend issues with own knowledge, or really analyse the given views.
- There was also a correlation between those candidates who reviewed all sources in their opening paragraph and high performance. Whilst a telling introduction is not essential, the process of carefully studying the sources to ascertain how they relate to the statement in the question, prior to writing the main analysis, allows candidates to clarify and structure their arguments.

Grade Boundaries

Grade boundaries for this, and all other papers, can be found on the website on this link:

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