

CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATIONS
GCE Advanced Subsidiary Level and GCE Advanced Level

MARK SCHEME for the October/November 2012 series

9697 HISTORY

9697/33

Paper 3, maximum raw mark 100

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

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GENERIC MARK BANDS FOR ESSAY QUESTIONS

Examiners will assess which Level of Response best reflects most of the answer. An answer will not be required to demonstrate all of the descriptions in a particular level to qualify for a Mark Band.

| Band | Marks | Levels of Response |
|-------------|--------------|--|
| 1 | 21–25 | The approach will be consistently analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. Essays will be fully relevant. The argument will be structured coherently and supported by very appropriate factual material and ideas. The writing will be accurate. At the lower end of the band, there may be some weaker sections but the overall quality will show that the candidate is in control of the argument. The best answers must be awarded 25 marks. |
| 2 | 18–20 | Essays will be focused clearly on the demands of the question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. The answer will be mostly relevant. Most of the argument will be structured coherently and supported by largely accurate factual material. The impression will be that a good solid answer has been provided. |
| 3 | 16–17 | Essays will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation but there may be some heavily descriptive or narrative passages. The answer will be largely relevant. Essays will achieve a genuine argument but may lack balance and depth in factual knowledge. Most of the answer will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence. |
| 4 | 14–15 | Essays will indicate attempts to argue relevantly although often implicitly. The approach will depend more on some heavily descriptive or narrative passages than on analysis or explanation, which may be limited to introductions and conclusions. Factual material, sometimes very full, will be used to impart information or describe events rather than to address directly the requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively. |
| 5 | 11–13 | Essays will offer some appropriate elements but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will lack analysis and the quality of the description or narrative, although sufficiently accurate and relevant to the topic if not the particular question, will not be linked effectively to the argument. The structure will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the answer will be unbalanced. |
| 6 | 8–10 | Essays will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. There may be many unsupported assertions and commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the implications of the question. |
| 7 | 0–7 | Essays will be characterised by significant irrelevance or arguments that do not begin to make significant points. The answers may be largely fragmentary and incoherent. |

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Section A

1 *'The 1950 re-election of Trygve Lie for a second term as Secretary-General was not in the best interests of the United Nations.'* How far do Sources A-E support this view?

L1 WRITES ABOUT THE HYPOTHESIS, NO VALID USE OF SOURCES [1–5]

These answers will write about Trygve Lie and might use the sources. However, candidates will not use the sources as information/evidence to test the given hypothesis. If sources are used, it will be to support an essay-style answer to the question.

L2 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM THE SOURCES TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [6–8]

These answers use the sources as information rather than as evidence, i.e. sources are used at face value only with no evaluation/interpretation in context.

L3 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM SOURCES TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [9–13]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves both attempting to confirm and to disapprove it. However, sources are still used only at face value.

L4 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [14–16]

These answers are capable of using sources as evidence, i.e. demonstrating their utility in testing the hypothesis, by interpreting them in their historical context, i.e. not simply accepting them at their face value.

L5 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [17–21]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves attempting both to confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis, and are capable of using sources as evidence to do this (i.e. both confirmation and disconfirmation are done at this level).

L6 AS L5, PLUS EITHER (a) EXPLAINS WHY EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE/SUPPORT IS BETTER/PREFERRED, OR (b) RECONCILES/EXPLAINS PROBLEMS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT NEITHER CHALLENGE NOR SUPPORT IS TO BE PREFERRED [22–25]

For (a) the argument must be that the evidence for agreeing/disagreeing is better/preferred. This must involve a comparative judgement, i.e. not just why some evidence is better, but also why other evidence is worse.

For (b) include all L5 answers which use the evidence to **modify** the hypothesis (rather than simply seeking to support/contradict) in order to improve it.

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CONTEXT

Trygve Lie was elected as the first Secretary-General of the UN, with the task of establishing the UN Secretariat. The onset of the Cold War quickly destroyed the initial optimism associated with the founding of the UN, and split the Security Council. Feeling increasingly isolated at the UN, the USSR regularly used its right of veto and boycotted Security Council meetings. Such tactics threatened the existence of the UN and caused frustration to Trygve Lie. His initial attempts at discrete, behind-the-scenes diplomacy to facilitate East-West cooperation were unsuccessful. His decision to recommend UN action against North Korea greatly upset the USSR; the fact that the Security Council accepted his recommendation in the absence of the USSR delegation was to cause lasting resentment, with the USSR refusing to recognise Lie as Secretary-General. Such a response was predictable in 1950, when the General Assembly voted to re-elect Lie for a second term. It was not in the long-term interests of the UN. However, at the height of the Korean War, American prestige could not have allowed the UN to withdraw its support for the American mission in Korea. The USA had a vested interest in keeping Lie in post and used somewhat devious practices to ensure his re-election; a pragmatic, short-term victory for the USA, but a decision with profound longer-term consequences for the UN and the post of Secretary-General.

SOURCE A

Context:

A Soviet source from October 1950. Trygve Lie had completed his first five year term as Secretary-General. The USA wanted to keep Lie in post for another term, but the USSR opposed this. In the early months of 1950, the USSR delegation had boycotted many sessions of the UN Security Council (because the UN refused to allow entry to 'Red' China). During such an absence in June 1950, the Security Council had voted to support UN action against the North Korean attack on South Korea. Lie had been outspoken in support of this action, and this had angered the USSR.

Content (Face Value):

The source claims that Lie is unworthy of the post of Secretary-General because he has not shown the required qualities. In particular, Lie has not shown objectivity or impartiality. As a result, Lie has lost the trust of many UN member states. **(Y – Lie had not strengthened peace and international cooperation and had not been impartial; he had lost the trust of many UN member states. He was not worthy of holding the post of UN Secretary-General and certainly not of re-election for a second term).**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

While no specific examples are given to support its claims, the source accuses Lie of

- failing to observe the UN Charter (*X-Ref with Source C Vishinsky*)
- failing to strengthen international cooperation
- failing to remain objective and impartial (*X-Ref with Sources C and E*)
- becoming 'an exponent of the will and desires' of a particular 'power or group of powers' - the title makes it clear that the author is referring to the USA
- losing the trust of many member states (*X-Ref with Source E*)
- going beyond the remit of his post as the 'chief administrative official' of the UN

(Y – the source accuses Lie of abusing his position in a partisan manner, not conducive to ensuring peace and international harmony. He was unsuited to the post and to re-elect him would not be in the UN's best interests). However, this source was written for a Soviet audience and published in a Soviet newspaper for propaganda purposes. Context is also significant. The USSR felt isolated in the UN, which was essentially dominated by Western nations. The UN's refusal to allow membership to China angered the USSR and led them to boycott many meetings of the UN Security Council. It was during one such boycott, in June 1950, that the Security Council voted to provide military assistance to South Korea; this meant that the UN was taking action against one of the USSR's satellites. The USSR argued that it was illegal (in terms of the Charter) for the Security

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Council to make such a decision in the absence of the Soviet delegation (*X-Ref with Source E, which implies that the UN's decision to support South Korea was based on inadequate and partisan information*). That Trygve Lie was an outspoken supporter of UN action against the North Korean invasion of South Korea angered the USSR and led to accusations that he was 'the yes man' of the USA (*X-Ref with Source E*). While the source claims that the post of Secretary-General is merely administrative, Article 99 of the Charter gives the Secretary-General the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any issue which he perceives as threatening world peace and security; this is what Lie did in June 1950 with reference to the Korean problem. **(N – the source is merely Soviet propaganda, full of unsupported assertions and unsubstantiated allegations. No evidence is given to support the view that re-electing Lie would be a mistake).**

SOURCE B

Context:

Article from an American magazine in November 1950, following the appointment of Trygve Lie for a further term as UN Secretary-General.

Content (Face Value):

The source shows Lie as impartial (while he was quick to organise action against North Korea, he had earlier supported arguments for the admission of China to the UN). Lie's support for UN action against North Korea is seen as courageous. The vote in favour of extending Lie's term of office (46:5) shows that the majority of UN member states believed that he was doing a good job. **(N – Lie was supported by the majority of UN member states and had carried out his tasks in a fair and impartial manner).**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

The source claims that Lie carried out his duties in a fair and courageous manner, and remained popular with the majority of UN member states (*X-Ref with Source C: Lodge. However, Source E suggests that this majority was a reflection of the USA's dominance of the UN in 1950*) **(N)**. However, this source was written for an American audience and published in an American magazine at the height of the Korean War. After initial success, US/UN troops were being forced back in North Korea. UN support was a crucial factor in US action in Korea and had been strongly supported by Lie. A change of Secretary-General at this time could have had major implications. The source is attempting to show that the UN is threatened by communism (militarily by the Chinese in Korea and politically by the USSR in the General Assembly). The USSR is depicted as trying to 'punish' Lie for his courage in speaking out against communist aggression in Korea. The American strategy of moving the vote regarding the extension of Lie's term of office from the Security Council to the General Assembly (where the will of the USA was bound to hold sway) is depicted as a clever way of preventing the Soviets from boycotting a popular decision and causing further damage to the UN. The source does not mention that this was illegal under the UN Charter (*X-Ref with Source C: Vishinsky*). The USSR's anger at this move is seen as a victory for the USA. However, the source ignores the longer-term implications of this decision for the effectiveness of both the UN and Lie. Already split by the Cold War, the Security Council would become even more ineffective given that the USSR refused to recognise Lie as the Secretary-General. Vishinsky's statement that the Russians would 'have nothing to do with him' was no idle threat. Trygve Lie's position was virtually untenable after 1950 (*X-Ref with Sources C and D*). **(Y – Trygve Lie could not operate effectively in a situation in which a major member of the Security Council refused to recognise him in the post of Secretary-General. Moreover, the American manoeuvring to ensure Lie's re-election merely fuelled the Soviet view that he was 'the yes man of the USA' - X-Ref with Sources A and C).**

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SOURCE C

Context:

Minutes from the General Assembly meeting in April 1953, at which Dag Hammarskjold was confirmed as the new Secretary-General following Lie's resignation. At this meeting, delegates also said their 'thanks and final farewells' to Trygve Lie.

Content (Face Value):

US representative Lodge praises Lie for his work as Secretary-General, claiming that he worked with courage, energy and commitment to the Charter. He claims that Lie, as the first Secretary-General, had the difficult job of establishing the UN and had done this very effectively (**N – Lie had worked effectively throughout his time as Secretary-General; the extension of his term of office was logical and justified**). Soviet representative Vishinsky disagrees with the American view, claiming that Lie had been unfit to hold the post before 1950 and events since had confirmed this. He also claims that the extension of Lie's post into a second term had been illegal and that, in agreeing to carry on, Lie had been guilty of breaking the terms of the UN Charter (**Y – Lie's term of office should not have been extended because he had already shown himself to be unfit for the position. The manner in which the extension was arranged constituted a breach of the Charter**).

Content (Beyond Face Value):

The source reveals a difference of opinion between the American and Soviet representatives at the UN. The USA claims that Lie had been effective as Secretary-General (**N**), while the USSR claims that Lie was unfit to hold the office and, since 1950, had done so illegally (**Y**). The source reveals the problem facing the UN and the Secretary-General at the height of the Cold War. The UN had been founded on the assumption that the Great Powers would continue to work together with common aims; by gridlocking the Security Council, the Cold War made this impossible. Lie referred to the role of Secretary-General as 'the most impossible job in the world'. The fact that the USSR felt increasingly isolated at the UN is reflected in its frequent use of the veto and boycott of meetings of the Security Council. It is not surprising that the USSR had come to see the UN as pro-USA. Vishinsky states that Lie had shown himself to be unfit for the post even before 1950 (*X-Ref with Sources A and E*), but gives no evidence to support this. The USSR believed that Lie was the 'puppet' of the USA, a belief that was enhanced by the tactics the USA used to ensure his re-election for a second term (*X-Ref with Source B*). Conversely, Lodge claims that Lie has been an effective Secretary-General, but gives no evidence to support this (*X-Ref with Source B which shows that the vast majority of UN member states supported Lie in 1950*). This source is a product of the different perceptions of the superpowers at the height of the Cold War (**balanced**).

SOURCE D

Context:

Secondary source by an American academic in 1989.

Content (Face Value):

The source explains how the initial optimism at the founding of the UN was soon destroyed by the onset of the Cold War, as a result of which the UN was 'inundated' with a series of international crises. This implies that anyone would have found the post of Secretary-General difficult at that time; no matter how impartial he tried to be, any decision was likely to offend one of the superpowers. The West saw Lie as being 'sympathetic to the Soviet position' prior to the Korean War, while his decision to support action against North Korea earned him 'the lasting hostility of the East'. (**N – Lie had been impartial, but his actions were criticised by both superpowers. Anyone holding the post of Secretary-General at that time would have faced the same problem**). However, the last two sentences of the source suggest that Lie was unsuited to the post because he was 'too political and incautious' (**Y – Lie was unsuitable and should not have been re-elected for a second term**).

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Content (Beyond Face Value):

This is a secondary source, whose author would have had access to a wide variety of material. The source highlights the difficulties faced by the UN during the period when Lie was in post. The Cold War had begun and the Security Council was gridlocked. The USSR felt isolated within the UN and this was enhanced by the UN's decision to refuse admission to China and the USA's arranging the re-election of Lie for a second term (*X-Ref with Source C: Vishinsky*). This led the USSR to use the veto on numerous occasions and to boycott meetings of the Security Council, both of which served to further undermine the effectiveness of the UN. The source implies that Lie had tried to remain impartial (even showing sympathy for the Soviet position), but this would only have been possible if he avoided making public comments on major international issues for fear of offending one of the superpowers. This could have undermined the post of Secretary-General, making it a ceremonial position with no real power or influence (**N – the Secretary-General was 'caught between two camps'. Lie had tried to be impartial and there is no reason to believe that anyone else could have achieved more at that particular time. His successor, Dag Hammarskjold faced similar problems and hostility from the USSR**). However, the final sentences undermine this argument. That Lie resigned 'in bitterness' might suggest that he was emotionally unsuited to the post of Secretary-General. The difficult situation demanded a subtle approach from the Secretary-General, working discretely behind the scenes to foster cooperation between the superpowers. Being 'too political and incautious', Lie was unsuited to this strategy, as shown by his outspoken public support for UN action against North Korea (*X-Ref with Sources A and E*) (**Y – Lie clearly lacked the ability to foster cooperation between the superpowers (X-Ref with Source A), and the manner of his re-election to a second term in office (X-Ref with Sources B and C) guaranteed that he would lack both the respect and support of the USSR**).

SOURCE E

Context:

Secondary source by an American academic in 2003.

Content (Face Value):

The source claims that, in 1950, the UN was dominated by the USA because most member states were in some way dependent. Lie is depicted as pro-American and anti-communist, as shown by his support for UN action against North Korea and his secret agreement with the US State Department to get communist sympathisers removed from UN employment. (**Y – Lie was not impartial and was unsuited to the role of the UN Secretary-General**).

Content (Beyond Face Value):

The author would have had access to a wide range of materials, including the increasing number of Soviet sources which became available during the 1990s. The source claims that the Security Council's decision to defend South Korea was based on limited information, with the implication that the decision was only possible because of the USA, which dominated the UN at the time. Contextual knowledge shows that President Truman had already ordered American troops to Korea. Lie's outspoken support for UN action (*X-Ref with Source B*) is criticised by association, with the implication being that Lie was pro-American and not impartial (*X-Ref with Sources A and C*). Further evidence is that Lie made secret agreements with the US State Department in 1949 (before his re-election) to remove UN employees who had dubious political leanings (part of McCarthyism). Although written by an American, the source contains a marked lack of pro-American bias; it is critical of the US dominance of the UN prevalent in 1950. This might add to the credibility of the source, but there is no way of knowing if the author had any political leanings which might have influenced his views. (**Y – Lie was pro-American and, therefore, lacked the impartiality which is essential for a Secretary-General. UN action against North Korea, of which Lie was an active supporter, was based on inadequate information, and reflected the US dominance of the UN at the time. Lie's re-election**

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would, re-enforce Soviet antagonism towards the UN, further split the Security Council and make the Secretary-General's position untenable).

CONCLUSION

Given that the UN was dominated by the USA in 1950, and given that it was in American interests for Lie to remain in post, his re-election for a second term was inevitable. The majority in favour is a reflection of American dominance of the UN and member states' frustration at the tactics used by the USSR. However, the strategy used to ensure his re-election was of dubious legality, and fuelled Soviet claims that the UN was 'a puppet of the USA'. While Lie tried to remain impartial, he became frustrated and was unable to remain objective and discrete in his attempts at diplomacy. His outspoken recommendation of UN action against North Korea (while 'legal' under Article 99) was, 'incautious and too political'; it was also unnecessary, since the USA would have secured support for its action in Korea without Lie's intervention. His actions guaranteed that the USSR would not recognise him as Secretary-General in the future. In re-electing Lie to a second term, the UN accepted that the Secretary-General would be ignored by a senior member of the Security Council. Therefore, on balance, the hypothesis is supported.

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SECTION B

2 How far was the development of the Cold War between 1945 and 1949 due to the superpowers' misinterpretation of each other's motives?

Candidates may refer to the historical debate regarding the causes of the Cold War, the hypothesis representing the 'post-revisionist' viewpoint. Arguments in support of the hypothesis might claim that the USA misinterpreted Soviet actions in Eastern Europe as expansionist, whereas Stalin was merely trying to ensure security for a country which had been attacked from the west on three previous occasions by developing a 'buffer zone' and wanting to keep Germany weak. Concerned by this perceived Soviet expansionism, the USA used containment tactics (e.g. Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan). Similarly, it could be argued that the USSR misinterpreted Truman's actions as 'dollar imperialism' and as having motives which went beyond the containment of communism.

In challenging the hypothesis, candidates might refer to the 'traditional' view that Stalin's motives were expansionist (e.g. his breaking of the Potsdam promises, his actions in Eastern Europe, the Berlin Blockade etc.) which needed to be checked by actions such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Candidates might also refer to the 'revisionist' view, which argues that American actions (e.g. Truman's deployment of the atomic bomb in Japan without prior consultation with the USSR, the ending of Lend-Lease, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the desire for a strong Germany) had motives which went beyond the containment of communism. It could be argued that the Cold War was not caused by misinterpretations, but because the superpowers understood each other's motives only too well.

3 To what extent was the globalisation of the Cold War after 1950 caused by expansionist ambitions?

Arguments in support of the hypothesis might include Stalin's statements regarding world communist revolution, Soviet support for the communist take-over in China and Soviet involvement in Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Africa and the Middle East. Similarly, it could be argued that the USA became involved in what were essentially regional conflicts for its own strategic, economic, diplomatic or prestige reasons.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the Cold War was globalised because of the USA's over-reaction to what it incorrectly saw as a Soviet attempt to expand its influence through the encouragement of world-wide communist revolution, leading to containment, roll back and the domino theory. The USA's actions in Korea, Vietnam, South East Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East could be cited as evidence to substantiate this point. It could also be argued that those involved in various regional conflicts around the world exploited Cold War rivalries for their own ends.

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4 ‘Khrushchev’s priority was to protect a weak Communist country.’ How adequate is this as an explanation of Soviet policy towards Cuba from 1960 to 1963?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that Castro’s newly established regime was under intense pressure from the USA. American interests in Cuba had been adversely affected by Castro’s revolution and the removal of Batista, and various attempts had been made to remove Castro (most notably the Bay of Pigs fiasco). American fighter planes regularly flew over Cuba. Denied economic ties with the USA, Castro sought assistance from the USSR; under the Monroe Doctrine the USA interpreted this as European interference and it therefore necessitated US involvement. The USA became convinced that Castro was a communist. It could, be argued that, in placing nuclear weapons in Cuba, Khrushchev was trying to protect Cuba from an impending American invasion. Indeed, one of the key elements of the settlement of the Cuban missile crisis was that the USA agreed not to invade Cuba in exchange for the removal of the Soviet nuclear weapons. While Kennedy was seen initially as the victor in the Cuban missile crisis (and Khrushchev was soon replaced in the USSR), more recent historians give greater credit to Khrushchev.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that Khrushchev’s motives were not as simplistic or one-dimensional as seeking to protect Cuba from an American invasion. As the self-styled leader of the Communist world, the USSR was seeking prestige at the height of the Cold War by supporting another communist state, especially one as vulnerable as Cuba. Arguably, Khrushchev saw this as an opportunity to ‘score points’ against the USA in their Cold War rivalry. US President Kennedy being new and untested seemed to offer the perfect opportunity for this. The USSR was seeking to gain some form of parity in the nuclear arms race – placing Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba was seen as the equivalent of American weapons in Turkey. The resulting stand-off created a situation in which both superpowers were effectively forced to back down – the USSR removed missiles from Cuba and the USA from Turkey (although this had already been planned).

5 ‘External factors were more important than internal factors in explaining the collapse of the USSR in 1991.’ How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that the US built up enormous financial pressure on the Soviet Union throughout the arms race. The Soviet economy simply could not continue to cope with the ever-increasing commitment, especially when Reagan instituted his ‘star wars’ programme. US aid to Soviet enemies in Afghanistan added to the USSR’s economic burdens. Improving relations with China also impacted on the USSR, while Eastern European states became increasingly aware of the very different economic circumstances prevalent in the West. Changes occurred rapidly in Eastern Europe following the success of Solidarity in Poland in 1988. Communist governments were quickly removed in Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. Nationalist uprisings soon followed within the Soviet Union itself (e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). Such uprisings caused enormous and unsustainable strain on limited Soviet resources.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that internal factors were equally significant. Political stagnation occurred under a number of Soviet leaders and, by the time Gorbachev came to power, the USSR was in a poor state. Gorbachev’s reforms of glasnost and perestroika were unable to redress the problems and, arguably, made them worse. His decision to rescind the Brezhnev Doctrine added to the impact of nationalism. It could be argued that nationalist uprisings in Eastern Europe were a symptom rather than a cause of the collapse of the USSR.

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6 ‘Attempts to control the development and spread of nuclear weapons from 1949 to 1989 were ineffective.’ How fair is this assessment?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that, despite meetings and treaties, there was a constant build-up of nuclear arms by the USA and USSR, while other countries (e.g. UK, France and China) gained nuclear capability. The USSR’s development of the atomic bomb in 1949 led the USA to increase its own expenditure on arms (massive retaliation). By 1953, both superpowers had developed hydrogen bombs. Even the move to Mutually Assured Destruction after 1962 failed to impose an effective restriction on the development of nuclear arms. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was limited in its scope and almost impossible to monitor effectively, while the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 was never endorsed by India, Pakistan and Israel. The SALT Treaties were limited in scope and SALT II was never ratified due to Soviet activity in Afghanistan. Real progress was not made until the START Treaties after 1989.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that attempts to control nuclear weapons did have some success. The Test Ban Treaties made it harder for non-nuclear states to develop nuclear capability, while the NNPT limited the proliferation of nuclear weapons, with only a relatively small number of countries failing to honour it. The SALT Treaties imposed limits on certain types of nuclear weapons and could be seen as a vital precursor to subsequent, more effective Treaties (e.g. START). The effectiveness of attempts to control nuclear weapons was enhanced during periods of detente (e.g. 1970s).

7 How far was Japan’s economic miracle dependent on the USA?

Arguments which support the hypothesis are likely to include support from the USA, which saw Japan as a bulwark against communism in Southeast Asia; favourable trading arrangements with USA; Japanese concentration on industrial investment as the US provided security; the Korean War provided enhanced markets for Japanese products; the fact that much of Japan’s industry had been destroyed in WWII meant that it could rebuild with modern, high-tech equipment.

Arguments which challenge the hypothesis might include the fact that the Liberal Democratic Party provided stable government throughout the period from 1952 to 1993. Conservative in nature, it encouraged business practice, reformed land ownership and encouraged investment in industry. Government initiatives included a scheme in 1960 aimed at doubling incomes within ten years.

8 ‘Disunited and ineffective.’ How far do you agree with this assessment of OPEC between 1960 and 1991?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that OPEC rarely achieved its stated aims and that disunity was a key factor in this. Founded at the Baghdad Conference in 1960, OPEC was a cartel aiming to limit oil supplies in the hope of keeping prices high. In the 1960s, OPEC was not able to achieve this because it had only 28% of the world’s oil output, oil reserves belonged to multi-national companies, there was an oil glut and there were political divisions within the Arab world. After a brief period of success in the 1970s, OPEC again failed from the 1980s. Production by non-OPEC countries (e.g. Mexico, Britain and Norway) continued to increase and OPEC’s share of world output fell by 27%. OPEC’s largest producer, Saudi Arabia, saw its oil revenues drop from \$113.2 billion in 1981 to \$20 billion in 1986. OPEC had a stark choice – cut prices to regain markets or cut production to maintain prices. OPEC did not want to cut prices for fear that this would undermine their whole pricing structure and destroy the economic and political gains they had made. However, OPEC members did not show a united front – e.g. Saudi Arabia chose to reduce prices to regain market share.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that OPEC was successful at certain times when conditions were appropriate. Its success in the 1970s was due to the fact that rising

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demand for oil began to outstrip supply. OPEC members reached new agreements with multinational companies, which led to rises in oil prices. Arab states used oil as a political weapon during the 1970s war between Egypt and Israel; this increased the price of oil still further. Prices rose from \$3 a barrel to \$11.65 which led to a deep recession in the world economy. The Second Oil Shock followed the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war and by the 1980s prices had risen to \$36 a barrel.