

CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATIONS Cambridge International Advanced Subsidiary and Advanced Level

MARK SCHEME for the May/June 2015 series

9389 HISTORY

9389/41

Paper 4 (Depth Study), maximum raw mark 60

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Generic Levels of Response

Level 5	25–30	Responses show very good understanding of the question and contain a relevant, focused and balanced argument, fully supported by appropriate factual material and based on a consistently analytical approach.
		Towards the top of the level, responses might be expected to be analytical, focused and balanced throughout. The candidate will be in full control of the argument and will reach a supported judgement in response to the question.
		Towards the lower end of the level, responses might typically be analytical, consistent and balanced, but the argument might not be fully convincing.
Level 4	19–24	Responses show a good understanding of the question and contain a relevant argument based on a largely analytical approach.
		Towards the top of the level, responses are likely to be analytical, balanced and effectively supported. There may be some attempt to reach a judgement but this may be partial or unsupported.
		Towards the lower end of the level, responses are likely to contain detailed and accurate factual material with some focused analysis, but the argument is inconsistent or unbalanced.
Level 3	13–18	Responses show understanding of the question and contain appropriate factual material. The material may lack depth. Some analytical points may be made but these may not be highly developed or consistently supported.
		Towards the top of the level, responses contain detailed and accurate factual material. However, attempts to argue relevantly are implicit or confined to introductions and conclusions. Alternatively, responses may offer an analytical framework which contains some supporting material.
		Towards the lower end of the level, responses might offer narrative or description relating to the topic, but are less likely to address the terms of the question.
Level 2	7–12	Responses show some understanding of the demands of the question. They may be descriptive with few links to the question or may be analytical with limited relevant factual support.
		Towards the top of the level, responses might contain relevant commentaries which lack adequate factual support. The responses may contain some unsupported assertions.
		Towards the lower end of the level, responses are likely to contain some information which is relevant to the topic but may only offer partial coverage.
Level 1	1–6	Responses show limited understanding of the question. They may contain some description which is linked to the topic or only address part of the question.
		Towards the top of the level, responses show some awareness of relevant material but this may be presented as a list.
		Towards the lower end of the level, answers may provide a little relevant material but are likely to be characterised by irrelevance.
Level 0	0	No relevant, creditworthy content.

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Depth Study 1: Europe of the Dictators, 1918–1941

Indicative content

1 Discuss the view that Trotsky was more important than Lenin to Bolshevik victory in the Civil War in Russia. [30]

An assessment of the role of Trotsky and then a comparison with the role of Lenin and other factors in the final Bolshevik victory is expected here. A discussion which just has a focus on the two men is acceptable, but credit should be given to those who argue that there were many other, often very important, factors to consider. Lenin provided overall leadership and also a degree of pragmatism which was to be vital. The shift from War Communism to the NEP is a good example of this, particularly when it was realised the harm that the grain requisition was doing to the Bolshevik cause. His development of the CHEKA and the overall ruthlessness was also a major factor, as well as policies like censorship. There was the inspirational leadership and speechmaking, but his focus was in providing solutions to the economic and political problems in Russia during the war.

The military strategy and leadership were left to Trotsky. The Red Army (and later the Labour Army) was his creation. His military leadership and its ruthlessness were vital. The use of railways, the developments of the all-important commissars and conscription were all down to him. It can be difficult to envisage success without the pair working together towards a common goal. It could be argued that both were equally important in their own ways. There were, of course, many other factors that could be brought in: the many failings of the Whites, the internal divisions there, and the competence of men like Wrangel and Denikin was not high. They had fewer resources in many cases, and geographical factors – fighting from the periphery – did not help. The tide of Russian nationalism was against them. The role of the Party could also be seen as important, and others ranging from Stalin to Kamenev had a claim to some of the successes.

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2 'The appeal of fascism was the main reason for Mussolini becoming Prime Minister in 1922.' How far do you agree? [30]

It could be argued that it was only one factor amongst many. The appeal of fascism certainly played a part. What elements that could be identified did raise hopes that it would end the political instability and provide solutions to the many social, economic and political problems that Italy faced. Mussolini was particularly skilful in trying to get this message over, while at the same time not being too specific in terms of policies. The long-term weakness of the Italian state was vital to the rise. There seemed to be endless short-term coalitions which seemed to collapse after regular infighting. The electoral system, while not causing instability, proved to be good at reflecting it and none of the war or post-war leaders offered much in the way of leadership. Democracy was a recent growth in Italy and there were still too many reluctant to accept its implications. There were also too many forces which did not respect the state as it stood, and worked happily to undermine it.

The war proved to be a major factor in Mussolini's rise, not only the humiliation of the early defeats but also the feeling that Italy had been betrayed by its leadership at Versailles and had failed to get its just deserts. There was also huge economic and social dislocation to add to the humiliation. Major conservative interests, ranging from the King to the Church, were hostile to the state and willing to support him for their own ends, while Liberals such as Giolitti were prepared to work with Mussolini in order to block the socialists.

He could be a useful vehicle for other men's plans. Mistakes by the liberals must be seen as a major factor. The Left saw the real danger too late, and could not, of course, ally with the centre to block him. Fascist supporters in the localities, often under little or no control from the centre, played their part, particularly in making Mussolini seen as a bastion of order against the left. His own abilities need stressing. He was an adroit politician, a fine mob orator, good at exploiting the violence of others, highly flexible in terms of ideology and policy; he kept his nerve in the final critical days.

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3 'Totalitarian rule was a means to an end for Stalin, and not an end in itself.' How far do you agree? [30]

The central issue under discussion here is Stalin's motivation for the creation of the totalitarian state that existed in Russia by 1941, possibly the most extreme example of totalitarian rule seen in the 20th century. Was his motivation primarily to enable him to attain the first genuinely communist state or was the motivation to ensure that he got into absolute power and just stayed there? There is a considerable historiographical debate on the issue, unsurprisingly, and awareness of the various theories from both writers like Tucker and the more recent Russian authors and their 'revisionist' and more Russian viewpoint should be welcomed. The ends of making Russia both a genuinely socialist state, a major industrial power capable of fending off her many enemies and also capable of spreading the gospel of socialism and world revolution and ending capitalism could not be attained by gentle methods and Marx had never expected anything otherwise.

Others such as Mao and Pol Pot have argued that unless a radical ideological 'cleansing' process is undertaken, there can be no way forward to a socialist paradise which benefits all. However, it is also equally easy to present Stalin as little more than a brilliant opportunist, always the suspicious ex-peasant, determined to grasp total power and keep it for himself. It is argued that he could have attained his 'socialist' objectives of collectivisation and industrialisation by gentler methods, that the purges were no more than his determination to eliminate all opponents and possible opponents, and just terrify all into total submission to his autocracy. Was it necessary to censor folksongs and nursery rhymes to get socialism?

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4 'Weimar politicians must bear the greatest responsibility for Hitler becoming Chancellor in 1933.' Discuss this view. [30]

The issue to be debated is the principal responsibility for Hitler's accession to power. A wide range of issues need to be discussed and a prioritisation, with reasons, needs to be established. There is ample scope here also for a historiographical debate. The depression in both industry and agriculture were vital in drawing support away from the parties of the Centre and making both Left and Right much more appealing.

The polarisation of politics was a direct result of mass unemployment and depression. The growth of the far Left raised real fears of many of the more conservative Germans. The way in which Hitler and the Nazis exploited the depression was an important factor as well. He and his ideas appealed to many of the élites in the world of business, the middle classes and the army. His management of the media and propaganda was outstanding and in Goebbels he had a master tactician.

With strong support in the regions and the valuable work of Roehm and the SA in not only dealing with the communists but in creating an atmosphere of fear and violence which he maintained he could 'solve', Hitler was in a strong position to take advantage of the crisis of the early 1930s. His care to be vague on policy issues meant he could give the impression of offering much to all. His outstanding oratorical skills and careful stage management of the rallies were also vital. Money flowed into his coffers and men like Hugenburg and the war hero Goering gave him respectability.

Certainly the inability of the Weimar leadership, ranging from the aging Hindenburg to von Schliecher and von Papen to Bruning and Groener, failed to offer clear solutions to the crisis. The means to ban Hitler and his movement were there, and the plan that Schacht was later to implement under Hitler was ready in 1932, but the will was not there and too many of the Weimar politicians like von Schliecher and von Papen felt that they could use Hitler to further their own ends.

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Depth Study 2: The History of the USA, 1945–1990

Indicative content

5 Assess the reasons why the 1950s were a period of economic growth.

[30]

The reasons why the 1950s were a period of economic growth include both international and domestic factors. The former included the comparative trade advantage that the USA had gained as a result of the Second World War. After 1945, the USA produced 60% of the world's manufactured goods. The needs of the economies of western Europe and Japan, rebuilding after the war, provided markets for US goods. The growth in trade was further encouraged by the reduction of national tariffs on foreign imports following the establishment of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] in 1947. By 1960, there had been four GATT agreements to reduce tariffs. In addition, the onset of the Cold War further stimulated American economic growth, especially following the Korean War of 1950–53.

By 1960, the US defence expenditure was almost three times what it had been in 1950 – and that is in real terms. The Cold War in space following the launch of the first sputnik in 1957 further stimulated federal expenditure; NASA was formed in 1958. These external developments were supplemented by domestic factors such as increased social expenditure, e.g. on education, especially via the extension of the 1944 G I Bill in 1952. Within the USA, full employment enabled families to spend more money on new consumer goods, the most obvious of which were televisions.

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6 'By the late 1970s the American people were less united than they had been in the late 1960s.' How far do you agree? [30]

By the late 1960s, the US people were deeply divided, split by the Vietnam war, race relations and the generation gap between baby boomers and their parents. These divisions are better known than those of the later 1970s. In more detail, the Tet Offensive by the Vietcong in early 1968 had caused a psychological defeat for the USA which was much greater than the military defeat it inflicted on US forces. The withdrawal of President Johnson from the context to elect the next US President in the spring of 1968 came as a further shock. The assassinations of Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy, two controversial figures murdered within months of each other, illustrated social and cultural divisions more than they brought people together in shared grief.

The Black Power movement was at its height, as was evident from the Black Power salute by three US athletes at the Mexico City Olympic Games later in the year. The election of a new President, Richard Nixon, in November 1968 did little to bring people together. He was a controversial politician who claimed to speak for 'the silent majority' against various minorities, including the young and African Americans. He first used the term in November 1969. By then, the cultural 'war' between young and not-so-young was at its height. The counter culture associated with the use of illegal drugs such as LSD was gaining more supporters, especially on college campuses. Though in 1970 and thus strictly outside the limits of the question, the shooting of four college students at Kent State University by the National Guard symbolised the deep divisions in US society.

By the late 1970s, new divisions had replaced the old. The Vietnam war was over, race relations was no longer a national issue and the baby boomers had grown older. The Vietnam war still cast its shadow, however. The humiliation of the US withdrawal from Saigon in 1975 was a great blow from which the USA did not recover until the 1980s, if then. The main division of the late 1970s was cultural. Existing laws about abortion, homosexuality and school prayers were all challenged, as were attempts to pass the Equal Rights Amendment to the constitution. The Roe vs. Wade decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 galvanised conservatives to oppose a woman's right to have an abortion. The religious right began to emerge as a powerful force, especially given the apparently weak and ineffective presidency of Jimmy Carter. The state of the economy, experiencing an era of stagflation – economic stagnation combined with inflation – following the oil price crises of the early 1970s caused concern about the state of America and the direction in which it was heading.

The divisions of the later 1970s were perhaps less visible as the street-based politics of the later 1960s gave way to more conventional forms of political expression. The later 1970s were less obviously turbulent than the later 1960s. Nevertheless, the period was still experiencing its own form of social upheaval.

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[30]

7 How successful was Reaganomics?

Reaganomics was the economic policy associated with President Reagan. It involved a mixture of supply side economics and monetarism. **Supply side economics** focused on the supply side of the economy rather than demand. It meant removing the obstacles to increasing the supply of goods and ensuring more competition between companies. These obstacles included high direct taxes, especially on the rich, restrictive practices, especially by labour unions, and excessive public expenditure on welfare. **Monetarism** meant control of money supply to curb inflation, which in 1979–80 was very high. In general, Reaganomics opposed Keynesian economics, which had been economic orthodoxy since the 1940s. Keynesian economics focused on the demand side of the economy, aiming to ensure economic growth by means of public expenditure and levels of taxation. It was an approach which by 1980 seemed to have failed, resulting only in stagflation.

The most dramatic illustration of Reaganomics was Reagan's decision in August 1981 to sack some 11 000 striking air traffic controllers, showing how far he was prepared to go in attacking the power of labour unions. His federal budget of the same year reduced higher-rate income taxes as well as welfare entitlements. However, it also increased defence expenditure at a time of the Second Cold War. Thus the Reagan Presidency ran an increasingly large budget deficit, which did not fit traditional fiscal orthodoxy. Inflation fell in the 1980s but not because the government limited the supply of money. Monetarism was soon abandoned – if it was ever practical. Instead, an initial recession of the early 1980s had resulted in falling prices, a trend accelerated by falling oil prices after the second oil price crisis of 1979–81. By the mid-1980s, the US economy was growing again. Reagan could claim a success for his economic policy, for breaking with Keynesianism. In reality, especially via his hugely expanded defence budget, Reagan had acted to increase demand for US goods and services.

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8 How far was President Truman personally responsible for the USA's hard-line policy towards the USSR in the period 1945–50?

The focus here is on American foreign policy and not the origins of the Cold War. Thus the well known three schools of history about the latter are not relevant here. The role of President Truman in deciding US foreign policy remains much studied and much debated. He became President in April 1945 on the death of Roosevelt, who had not involved him in foreign policy making. Truman was immediately faced with some huge decisions about both ending the war against Japan and the peace settlement in Europe and Asia thereafter.

[30]

Truman's hard-line policy, that of containment, as stated in the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, is usually contrasted with Roosevelt's policy of seeking cooperation with the USSR. At some time in the two years 1945–47, the USA's policy towards the USSR changed dramatically. Did Truman take a hard line from the start? The answer to that would appear to be 'no'. Truman wanted to continue the policies of Roosevelt. He wanted the USSR to join the war against Japan, which was far from won. Truman took a harder line because (a) from the summer of 1945 he had the great advantage of the atomic bomb, and (b) the USSR demands for dominance over eastern Europe broke some wartime agreements as well as being against US interests. By 1947 Truman saw the USSR as an expansionist ideological power which, if not contained, threatened the economic and political interests of the USA.

He did not come to this position on his own, however. His ministers and advisers had a major influence over his foreign policy: George Marshall, Dean Acheson and George Kennan. Kennan, especially, with his Long Telegram from Moscow in February 1946 and his anonymous article in *Foreign Affairs* in June 1947, helped provide the intellectual framework of the new policy to contain the USSR. This change led to the Berlin Blockade, the formation of NATO and NSC-68.

Constitutionally, formally, Truman was responsible for the anti-Soviet policy. In practice, however, the introduction of containment in the later 1940s was the result of a combination of factors, of which Truman was the most important. And it could be argued that the policy was more a reaction to Soviet aggressive policies rather than one initiated by the US President.

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Depth Study 3: International History, 1945–1991

Indicative content

9 To what extent did relations between the USA and the USSR improve in the period from 1953 to 1961? [30]

Following Stalin's death in 1953, the new Soviet leadership of Malenkov and, subsequently, Khrushchev wanted to improve relations with the USA. Khrushchev argued that '*peaceful coexistence*' was the only way of preventing a war (probably nuclear, since both superpowers now had the hydrogen bomb). In the USA, McCarthyism was discredited and Eisenhower argued for better relations with the USSR. Evidence of the thaw might include:

- the ending of the Korean War
- Soviet suggestions for the reunification of Germany (1954)
- Soviet agreement to give up its military bases in Finland (1955)
- lifting of the Soviet veto on the admission of 16 new members to the UN (1955)
- the abandonment of the Cominform (1955)
- the reunification of Austria (1955)
- the agreement regarding cultural exchanges following the Geneva Summit (1955), the first meeting of American and Soviet leadership since Potsdam in 1945
- Khrushchev's acceptance of an invitation to visit the USA in 1959
- the USSR's improved relations with Yugoslavia.

However, despite Khrushchev's conciliatory statements, he remained sceptical of the USA's intentions and determined to maintain control over the USSR's satellite states. Examples of remaining tensions between the superpowers might include:

- military coordination of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe being strengthened with the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. The USA interpreted this as a gesture against West Germany's membership of NATO
- the ruthless crushing by the USSR of the Hungarian rising in 1956
- denied access to Disneyland during his visit to the USA in 1959, which led to Khrushchev accusing the Americans of hiding rocket launching pads there
- a summit meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Paris (May 1960) collapsing when an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over the USSR
- nothing being achieved at the meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev at the Vienna summit (June 1961). Khrushchev, however, became convinced that he could dominate the young and inexperienced Kennedy
- both the USA and the USSR continuing to enhance their military capabilities
- the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961
- Khrushchev's brinkmanship over Cuba.

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10 'Détente did little to stabilise international relations during the 1970s.' How far do you agree? [30]

In support of the view, it could be argued that détente was merely a change in the tactics of superpower conflict, as a result of changed political and economic circumstances, rather than a move towards ending the Cold War. Little of any substance was achieved. Armaments increased during the period of détente despite the SALT Treaties, and SALT II was never ratified. Many of the signed agreements were ignored (for example, the USSR did not keep to the promises it made in the Helsinki Accords regarding human rights). Tensions between the USSR and China remained high, with both competing for American support and for leadership of the communist world while in dispute over Vietnam. Conflict in the Third World intensified; events in Iran, Angola and Afghanistan showed that the USSR had continued to extend its influence during the period of détente.

In challenging the view, it could be argued that, despite its limitations, SALT marked a spirit of cooperation between the USA and the USSR and a mutual desire to move away from confrontation. US-Soviet trade increased; for example, the USSR came to rely on American wheat imports. The Helsinki Accords of 1975 did lead to better links across the iron curtain, through trade and technology exchanges. Willy Brandt's policy of 'Ostpolitik' led to greater stability in Europe. Under the Basic Treaty of 1972, West Germany accepted the existence of East Germany as a separate state and agreed to increase trade links. As a result of the Helsinki Accords, the West accepted the existence of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, including East Germany.

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11 How successful was Mao Zedong in dealing with China's domestic problems?

When Mao came to power in 1949, China faced major problems. The long civil war and war against Japan had severely damaged China's infrastructure; industry was backward, agriculture could not feed the large population and inflation was high. Evidence of Mao's success might include:

[30]

- provision of a constitution (officially adopted in 1954), which provided China with a strong central government
- development of cooperative (collective) farms to improve agricultural output
- nationalisation of most industries. Five Year Plan adopted in 1953. This enabled China to recover from war, restore communications and bring inflation under control
- the Great Leap Forward was intended to adapt agricultural and industrial development to the Chinese situation, rather than relying on methods which had been used in the USSR. This led to the introduction of communes. After a slow start, agricultural and industrial output increased substantially. By the mid-1960s, China was no longer suffering from famines and unemployment was virtually non-existent
- education and welfare services were developed and the position of women in society was improved.

Evidence which could be used to argue that Mao was not successful might include:

- the notion of a one-party constitution was not universally popular in China
- the redistribution of land to the peasants did lead to some violence against rich landowners. Some estimates talk of up to 2 million deaths
- the initial Five Year Plan, based on the Soviet model, was inappropriate for China
- the Hundred Flowers Campaign (1957) was intended to allow for constructive criticism and improve relations between cadres and experts/intellectuals. Instead, it was divisive, leading to criticism of over-centralisation and the undemocratic nature of the one-party system. Mao was forced to call off the Campaign
- the Great Leap Forward initially led to criticism there was opposition to the communes, a series of bad harvests (1959–61), the removal of Soviet aid, and hardship until 1963. It is estimated that some 20 million died
- Mao faced opposition from the rightists, who argued that it was necessary to introduce capitalist ideas such as piecework, wage differentials and larger, private plots of land. The Cultural Revolution (1966–69) was designed to overcome this opposition and retain the Marxist-Leninist course of Chinese communism. This led to chaos; it led to many deaths and held up China's economic growth by ten years.

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12 'In the Gulf War (1990–91), the USA acted entirely out of self-interest.' How far do you agree? [30]

In support of the statement, it could be argued that the USA and its allies took action against Saddam Hussein because they felt he was threatening their vital oil supplies. After the Iraqis had been forced out of Kuwait, Saddam was allowed to withdraw with much of his army intact. No international action was initially taken when Saddam ruthlessly crushed uprisings of the Kurds in the north and Shia Muslims in the south – it was in the USA's best interests to ensure that Iraq remained strong enough to prevent an increase in the power of Iran. Only when world opinion became outraged at Saddam's bombing of his own people did the USA and its allies, with UN backing, declare no-fly zones. Moreover, they allowed Saddam to remain in power, seeing this as the best way to keep Iraq united and the region stable.

In challenging the statement, it could be argued that the USA and its allies acted in the interests of moral and international justice. Despite the fact that the USA had a vested interest in maintaining the unity of Iraq, they were prepared to confront Saddam over his invasion of Kuwait. They acted with the support of the UN and other Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt, and formed part of a mission to which over 30 nations supplied troops. Having removed Iraqi troops from Kuwait, they did not consider it their right or responsibility to remove Saddam from power in Iraq, since that was an internal matter over which the UN had no jurisdiction. Despite their vested interests in keeping Iraq united, they were prepared to confront Saddam again with the imposition of no-fly zones.