



Rewarding Learning

**ADVANCED
General Certificate of Education
2016**

History

Assessment Unit A2 1

[AH211]

WEDNESDAY 18 MAY, AFTERNOON

**MARK
SCHEME**

Level of response mark grid

This level of response grid has been developed as a general basis for marking candidates' work, according to the following assessment objectives:

- AO1a** recall, select and deploy historical knowledge accurately and communicate knowledge and understanding of history in a clear and effective manner;
- AO1b** present historical explanations, showing understanding of appropriate concepts and arrive at substantiated judgements;
- AO2** In relation to historical context:
- interpret, evaluate and use a range of source material;
 - explain and evaluate interpretations of historical events and topics studied.

The grid should be used in conjunction with the information on indicative content outlined for each assessment unit.

Level	Assessment Objective 1a	Assessment Objective 1b	Assessment Objective 2
	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:
1	recall, select and deploy some accurate factual knowledge and communicate limited understanding in narrative form. There will be evidence of an attempt to structure and present answers in a coherent manner.	display a basic understanding of the topic; some comments may be relevant, but general and there may be assertions and judgements which require supporting evidence.	limited recognition of the possibility of debate surrounding an event or topic.
2	be quite accurate, contain some detail and show understanding through a mainly narrative approach. Communication may have occasional lapses of clarity and/or coherence.	display general understanding of the topic and its associated concepts and offer explanations which are mostly relevant, although there may be limited analysis and a tendency to digress. There will be some supporting evidence for assertions and judgements.	an attempt to explain different approaches to and interpretations of the event or topic. Evaluation may be limited.
3	contain appropriate examples with illustrative and supportive factual evidence and show understanding and ability to engage with the issues raised by the question in a clear and coherent manner.	display good breadth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Analysis is generally informed and suitably illustrated to support explanations and judgements.	there will be an ability to present and evaluate different arguments for and against particular interpretations of an event or topic.
4	be accurate and well-informed and show ability to engage fully with the demands of the question. Knowledge and understanding will be expressed with clarity and precision.	display breadth and depth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Explanations will be well-informed with arguments and judgements well-substantiated, illustrated and informed by factual evidence.	there will be appropriate explanation, insightful interpretation and well-argued evaluation of particular interpretations of an event or topic.

Synoptic Assessment

Examiners should assess the candidate's ability to draw together knowledge and skills in order to demonstrate overall historical understanding. Candidates' answers should demonstrate breadth of historical knowledge and understanding by ranging comprehensively across the period of study as a whole. They should make links and comparisons which are properly developed and analysed and thus indicate understanding of the process of historical change. The knowledge and understanding of the subject should come from more than one perspective – political or cultural or economic – and there should be understanding demonstrated of the connections or inter-relationship between these perspectives.

Generic Levels of Response for Synoptic Assessment

The generic levels of response should be used in conjunction with the information on the indicative content outlined for each answer.

Level 1 ([0]–[5]) AO2(b), ([0]–[7]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level may recall some accurate knowledge and display understanding of mainly one part of the period and one perspective. The answer will be characterised throughout by limited accuracy and a lack of clarity. Answers may provide a descriptive narrative of events. There will be few links and comparisons made between different parts of the period. Answers will be mainly a series of unsubstantiated assertions with little analysis **AO1(b)**. There may be perhaps an awareness of contemporary **or** later interpretations but the answer may focus only on one interpretation **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be characterised throughout by unclear meaning due to illegibility, inaccurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; there will be an inappropriate style of writing; and defects in organisation and lack of a specialist vocabulary.

Level 2 ([6]–[10]) AO2(b), ([8]–[15]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level may recall and deploy knowledge which draws from examples across the period. The answer will have frequent lapses in accuracy and at times lack clarity. The answer will provide some explanation though at times will lapse into narrative. Links and comparisons will be made but these will not be fully developed or analysed. Answers will contain some unsubstantiated assertions but also arguments which are appropriately developed and substantiated **AO1(b)**. There will be an awareness of contemporary **or** later interpretations about the subject but this will be limited and in need of further development **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will have frequent lapses in meaning, inaccurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; at times the style of writing will be inappropriate; there will be occasional defects in organisation and little specialist vocabulary.

Level 3 ([11]–[15]) AO2(b), ([16]–[22]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level will recall and deploy knowledge accurately, drawing from all parts of the period with clarity and focus. Answers provide focused explanations and make links and comparisons which are developed and analysed, indicating an understanding of the process of historical change. Arguments are developed, substantiated, illustrated and reach a judgement **AO1(b)**. There is a satisfactory evaluation of either contemporary **or** later interpretations of the subject **or** a partial evaluation of both **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be characterised by clarity of meaning due to legibility, accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; the style of writing is appropriate; there is good organisation and with some specialist vocabulary.

Level 4 ([16]–[20]) AO2(b), ([23]–[30]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level will demonstrate accurate recall of knowledge from across the period studied with clarity and precision. Answers will provide detailed and focused insightful explanations drawing on actions, events, issues or perspectives across the period, and there is an excellent understanding of the connections or interrelationships between these. A judgement is reached using arguments that are fully developed, illustrated and substantiated **AO1(b)**. There is a well informed and insightful evaluation of contemporary **and** later interpretations **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be consistently characterised throughout by clarity of meaning due to legibility, accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; the style of writing is most appropriate; there is very good organisation and appropriate use of specialist vocabulary.

Option 1: Anglo-Spanish Relations 1509–1609

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “Anglo-Spanish relations were very good until Elizabeth I’s accession to the throne in 1558 but remained tense throughout her reign.” How far would you accept this statement?

This question requires an assessment of how strong Anglo-Spanish relations were before 1558 and how far Elizabeth’s accession to the throne led to relations becoming tense. Answers should consider a range of factors which influenced Anglo-Spanish relations and see how these influences may have changed throughout the period.

Top level responses will reflect on the nature of the words “very good” and “tense” and explore how far these terms reflected Anglo-Spanish relations in the period 1509–1609. Responses may consider whether Elizabeth was the defining feature in changed relationships or whether other factors were more important. Answers must debate whether the statement is true or is too general in its description of the period.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) 1509–1547

Answers may conclude that relations in this period were generally good. The period opened with good relations having been developed by Henry VII and Ferdinand I. The Treaty of Medina del Campo created strong trading links and used marriage as a means to bind the new Tudor dynasty with a newly united Spain. Henry VIII’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon suggested a good but possibly not a very good relationship. The strength of Henry and Catherine’s marriage did lead to stronger Anglo-Spanish relations as Catherine used her influence to support links with Spain. Henry’s desire for war with England’s traditional enemy, France, again created strong links, although Ferdinand’s manipulation of the inexperienced Henry did weaken Anglo-Spanish relations. Candidates might use the contemporary correspondence between Catherine of Aragon and Ferdinand to support this argument. Charles V’s (I) reign further intensified Franco-Spanish conflict and it was this which provided the bedrock for strong Anglo-Spanish relations.

The divorce issue and the eventual split with Rome could be used to show that Anglo-Spanish relations declined rapidly in the late 1520s and early 1530s. Contemporary discussions between Cromwell and the Imperial Ambassador, Chapuys, could be used to support this assertion. Candidates might use historians such as Doran or Scarisbrick to illustrate the debate on how good Anglo-Spanish relations were in this period. Answers might suggest that the international needs of each nation became secondary to the social standing of each of the Royal families. Henry VIII’s opposition to Luther had earned him the title “Defender of the Faith” and this highlights

the religious unity in Anglo-Spanish relations. The split with Rome could be used to highlight how religious difference began to undermine Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers should consider how good relations were restored in the 1540s as England and Spain united against France. Responses should be able to show that strong relations were supported by the threat of France and by strong economic ties in the Netherlands.

(b) 1547–1558

Responses should consider how good Anglo-Spanish relations were maintained despite the accession of Edward VI. Answers should consider how Anglo-Spanish relations were strengthened by conflict with France and its Scottish allies. Responses should consider the influence of the Protestant faith of Edward and his two protectors, Edward Seymour and John Dudley. Religious change in England did put pressure on Anglo-Spanish relations and so answers might suggest that relations remained good but not strong. Candidates might use the debate between historians such as Haigh and Pollard to highlight Anglo-Spanish relations in this period.

The accession of Mary Tudor could be said to have strengthened Anglo-Spanish relations. Mary's closeness to her Spanish mother made her look to Spain as an ally. She was determined to marry Philip of Spain and this led to very good Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers might suggest that opposition and limitations placed on this marriage by Parliament show that Anglo-Spanish relations were not as good as they may have seemed. Wyatt's rebellion in 1554 showed how xenophobic opinion in England opposed the marriage and links to Spain. Candidates might use Wyatt's speech to raise support for rebellion to give contemporary support for this point.

(c) 1558–1603

Responses should consider how far relations changed in this period. The accession of Elizabeth I came only two years after her former brother-in-law, Philip II, had become King of Spain. Philip's time in England meant that he had a personal knowledge of Elizabeth and her religious faith. Despite this, Philip proposed marriage but was rejected by Elizabeth and answers may suggest that this was the basis of declining relations. Philip's comments to his Ambassador in England that "all depends on who this woman marries" could be used to give contemporary support for this discussion. With doubts over Elizabeth's legitimacy, it seems surprising that Philip supported her over the alternative claimant to the English throne, Mary Stuart. Philip stated, "better a heretic on the throne than a French woman". Answers should conclude that Anglo-Spanish relations remained good as Philip continued his struggle with France. The ending of the Habsburg/Valois dynastic wars marked the beginning of a change in Anglo-Spanish relations. The outbreak of the French Wars of Religion in 1562 was to weaken France and remove the threat which encouraged good Anglo-Spanish relations. Responses should show that Anglo-Spanish relations remained good until the late 1560s and then decline set in. Answers will consider a number of other factors which damaged Anglo-Spanish relations, including some of the following: Spanish support for rebellion in England and Ireland, such as the Ridolfi Plot; England's growing interference in the Netherlands; economic clashes over the New World and English privateers like Drake and Hawkins; events such as Elizabeth's acquiring of Genoese silver ships or Philip's reaction to the Dutch 'sea beggars' attack on Flushing. Responses should show that relations became tense largely through events rather than design. The

Treaties of Joinville and Nonsuch saw Anglo-Spanish relations decline to their lowest state with the declaration of war in 1585 and answers might suggest that this far exceeds tense relations. The war continued for a further eighteen years and was only concluded after the death of both Elizabeth I and Philip II, despite the adverse economic effects and an inability of either nation to win. Roper's description of Philip's foreign policy as being similar to Germany's *Weltpolitik* could be compared to Wilson's view of Elizabeth's foreign policy. Responses might conclude that such a conflict far exceeds the word "tense" and the religious divisions between each nation highlights the depth of decline in Anglo-Spanish relations.

(d) 1603–1609

Answers should show that relations returned to a more positive position after the Treaty of London in 1604. Both nations sought to normalise relations and allow their economies to recover after such a long war. Candidates might use Lerma and Robert Cecil to give a contemporary insight into the needs of each nation. Responses might show the extent to which personal disagreements had damaged Anglo-Spanish relations in the period 1558–1603. After Elizabeth's death this was replaced by mutual acceptance so that relations were no longer tense but not good either.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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- 2** "Queens had a greater impact than Kings on Anglo-Spanish relations in the period 1509–1609." To what extent would you agree with this verdict?

This question requires an assessment of the role played by monarchs in Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers should consider the impact of Queens such as Mary I and Elizabeth I who ruled in their own right and the impact of others such as Anne Boleyn or Catherine of Aragon. Candidates must compare the influence of these Queens with the impact of Kings such as Charles V or Philip II.

Top level responses will reflect on the varying influences of Queens in the two different nations. Answers should consider the impact of females in a man's world and the differences between individuals which were not dependent on gender.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) Queens

Answers might divide these into two groups: Queens who ruled in their own right and those who were married to a ruler. Responses may refer to Isabella of Castile who had a major impact on Anglo-Spanish relations despite dying in 1504. The excellence of Isabella's rule encouraged Catherine of Aragon's resistance to her divorce from Henry VIII. Catherine saw no need for a male heir since she believed that her daughter could rule as well as any man. Answers should identify the impact that Catherine's actions had on Anglo-Spanish relations. Responses might compare her influence on Anglo-Spanish relations in the 1530s with that in the 1510s. Catherine's support for

an Anglo-Spanish alliance improved relations yet her later actions damaged them.

Answers could show how Anne Boleyn had a major impact on Anglo-Spanish relations. The opposition of Spain to the divorce led Anne to push Henry VIII towards a pro-French position. Candidates might use contemporary quotes from Anne Boleyn or Thomas Cromwell to support this position.

The marriage of Anne of Cleves had an impact on Anglo-Spanish relations as Henry VIII, under Cromwell's influence, leaned towards Protestant Northern Europe. Charles V's annoyance with this was short-lived as Henry VIII's disregard for his new wife led to the end of both a possible Protestant alliance and Thomas Cromwell's career. The Anglo-Spanish alliance against France in 1542 shows the impact that Queens could have on Anglo-Spanish relations.

Catherine Parr is often regarded as one of the least important of Henry VIII's Queens, yet candidates might argue that she had a lasting impact on Anglo-Spanish relations since the strength of her Protestant beliefs allowed her to have a major impact on both Edward VI and Elizabeth I. Catherine appointed reforming tutors for both of these royal children and their resultant Protestant faith greatly influenced Anglo-Spanish relations.

Mary Tudor's reign could be said to have had a major impact on relations. Her marriage to Philip II brought Anglo-Spanish relations to their closest point of the period. Answers may argue that Mary's reliance on Philip created difficulties inside England since it encouraged anti-Spanish sentiment, which continued throughout the century. Mary's reign could be used to show how a dominant Spanish King was able to control England due to the weakness of the Queen. Candidates might use the historical debate between Scarisbrick and Pollard to consider if Mary was a weak monarch.

The growth of English power during the reign of Elizabeth I shows the strength of a female monarch. Candidates might suggest that Elizabeth's strength was directly responsible for war with Spain in 1585. Her stubbornness could be said to be responsible for continued conflict with Spain, which did not end until after her death.

Elizabeth's speech of 1588, referring to herself as "a having the body of a weak and feeble woman," could be used by candidates to give a contemporary perspective on this issue. Candidates might consider the historical debate between Camden and Neale to examine the nature of Elizabeth's foreign policy and show how this influenced Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers might consider whether it was the growth of English power in conjunction with the decline of both Spain and France which had a key impact on Anglo-Spanish relations rather than the influence of Elizabeth.

Candidates could argue that Catherine de Medici had a huge impact on Anglo-Spanish relations. As regent for two of her sons, she dictated French policy at a time of internal division. Her possible involvement in the massacre of French Protestants caused Elizabeth to worry about a Catholic crusade against England, which seemed likely after the Treaty of Joinville in 1584.

Mary Stuart's claim to the English throne initially improved Anglo-Spanish

relations. French support for the Dauphin's wife forced Elizabeth to seek Spanish assistance and for Philip II to offer it. Mary's escape from Scotland in 1568 and her long residence in England further changed relations. She became the focus for a Spanish-backed Catholic revolt in England. While Mary lived, Philip II saw an opportunity to restore England to the true faith and to remove the troublesome Elizabeth from the throne.

(b) Kings

The long period of Henry VIII's reign could be used to demonstrate his dominance of English affairs. During his reign major events such as the break with Rome and Dissolution of the Monasteries revolutionised English society and had a huge impact on Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers might suggest that in the early part of his reign Henry was out-manoeuvred by his much more experienced Spanish counterpart, Ferdinand I. Candidates might use the correspondence between Ferdinand and his daughter Catherine of Aragon as contemporary opinion to support this view. The historian Elliott's view of Henry being motivated by war with France could be used to show how Ferdinand manipulated Henry VIII.

Charles V's wealth and power suggests that he dominated Anglo-Spanish relations, yet the complex international position he faced limited his power. War with France forced reconciliation with England even after disagreements over Henry VIII's divorce of Catherine of Aragon. Charles V's acceptance of the English parliament's marriage terms in 1554 further highlights the difficult position in which he found himself. Answers could show that, although more powerful, Spain was unable to dominate Anglo-Spanish relations.

Philip II's reign has often been described as the "Golden Age of Spain", yet this did not equate to a dominance of Anglo-Spanish relations. Philip's proposal of marriage was rejected by Elizabeth in 1559 despite the weak position in which her questionable legitimacy placed her. Growing conflict between the two nations demonstrates the negative impact Philip II's actions had on Anglo-Spanish relations, such as in the Treaty of Joinville and the Armada. The viewpoint of Dutch historians, such as Geyl, could be used to demonstrate the negative impact Philip had on Anglo-Spanish relations and these might be compared to the views of Kamen, who suggests that the King of Spain was not aggressive, but rather reactive, towards England.

Philip III and James I restored Anglo-Spanish relations through necessity in the Treaty of London of 1604. Philip III faced further problems in the Netherlands and James was a foreigner trying to establish his rule in England. Davies concludes that Philip III achieved more even in this short period than his father did through years of war. Both monarchs clearly had a positive impact on Anglo-Spanish relations.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately. [50]

Option 1

**AVAILABLE
MARKS**

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Option 2: Crown and Parliament in England 1603–1702

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “The Constitutional Revolution of 1640–1642 changed the power and position of Parliament more than any other event in the period 1603–1702.” How far would you agree with this verdict?

This question requires an assessment of the changing power and position of Parliament throughout the course of the seventeenth century. A comparative analysis should be made with the other key events of this period, such as the Glorious Revolution, the Restoration of Charles II, the Civil Wars and execution of Charles I and the impact of the European war during the reign of William III.

Top level responses will reflect on the extent to which the power and position of Parliament was transformed by the events of the Constitutional Revolution. Responses may choose to outline the role and status of Parliament at the beginning of the century in order to address the changes which occurred later in the period. The Whig interpretation of a gradual, almost inevitable, rise in the position of Parliament may be explored.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) The power and influence of Parliament in 1603

In 1603 Parliament’s main role was to provide the King with advice and finance. It was essential for passing new laws and provided a point of contact between the monarch and his subjects. As the Crown was able to summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament and James I appointed his own ministers, the power and status of Parliament was limited. Irregular sittings and the factional nature of early seventeenth century politics meant that Parliament lacked efficiency and effectiveness. Its main strength lay in the fact that it was the Crown’s major source of income. Contemporary opinion from Salisbury may be used to explain the relative positions of Parliament and the Crown in 1603.

(b) The ‘Constitutional Revolution’ of 1640–1642

During the ‘Constitutional Revolution’, Parliament succeeded in imposing limits on royal power and securing an increased role in the government of England. Charles I’s ability to govern by Personal Rule was restricted by the passing of the Triennial Act and the abolition of the Crown’s prerogative financial devices and courts. The King’s willingness to surrender prerogative powers reflects the growing power and influence of Parliament in this period; however, there were limits to what it actually achieved. The King retained the right to choose his ministers and Parliament failed to gain influence over the Church. The monarch also remained in control of the armed forces and the collection of customs duties. Parliament’s attempt to increase its power and position further, through the Nineteen Propositions, resulted in a complete breakdown in its relationship with the monarchy and the outbreak of the English Civil War.

(c) The Execution of Charles I, 1649

The execution of Charles I could be interpreted as Parliament's ultimate victory over the monarchy. However, it did not even have the full support of Parliament or indeed the people of England. During the interregnum Parliament failed to find a workable political settlement without a monarch and the restoration of Charles II suggests that the long-term power and position of Parliament had not been radically altered by the regicide. The views of leading historians such as Sharp may be employed.

(d) The Restoration Settlement, 1660–c.1665

Having defeated the King in two Civil Wars and removed the monarchy entirely in 1649, Parliament might be expected to have been in a position of strength when it invited Charles II to be restored to the English throne. However, the resulting settlement saw the monarchy regain a status unimaginable during the interregnum. Although the restrictions to the prerogative power of the King introduced by the Constitutional Revolution remained in place, the Restoration Settlement put the monarchy back in the dominant position in the government of England. Charles regained the right to call, prorogue and dissolve Parliament, choose his own ministers and determine foreign policy. However, Parliament had succeeded in restricting his financial position and, through the Clarendon Code and later Test Acts, it was able to protect the supremacy of the Church of England. Parliament restrained the monarch's financial independence by setting the King's permanent revenue at a fixed level of £1.2million, although the later trade boom helped Charles II achieve a more secure financial position. The political and economic strength of the restored monarchy is evident in the King's ability to employ personal rule in the final years of his reign. This impressive comeback by the monarchy challenges the Whig interpretation of an inexorable rise in the power and position of Parliament during the seventeenth century. The contemporary opinion of Charles II and the views of leading historians such as Tomlinson may be employed.

(e) The Glorious Revolution and the Revolution Settlement, 1688/1689

It could be argued that the most significant changes to the power and position of Parliament came during, and as a result of, the Glorious Revolution. James II's pro-Catholic and seemingly absolutist policies had resulted in his personal loss of power. Parliament played a central role in replacing James with William and Mary, even if the creation of a joint monarchy was at the insistence of William. Good responses will explain how the position of Parliament was improved by the settlement which followed, including the Coronation Oath, the Bill of Rights, the Mutiny Act, the Toleration Act and the revised financial arrangements. Alternatively, it may be argued that the power and position of Parliament had not been revolutionised and that these actions only fixed the perceived abuses of James II's reign. The monarch may have been changed but the Crown's position of authority arguably had not. The views of historians such as Fellows and George may be employed to explain the impact of this period upon the role and status of Parliament.

(f) Changes to the power and position of Parliament during the reign of William III.

Arguably the most significant advances in the power and position of Parliament came in the final decade of the century and were a direct result of the King's foreign policy. Parliament secured a more permanent position

of influence through a revised Triennial Act and the establishment of a Commission of Accounts and a Civil List which allowed Parliament control over the King's spending. As a result of meeting more regularly, Parliament was able to increase its efficiency and political parties became more organised and influential. It became in the interest of the monarch to appoint ministers and pursue policies which Parliament supported.

The reign of William III had witnessed the development of a partnership between King and Parliament. Candidates may observe that James I had also enjoyed an effective working relationship with his Parliament and that cooperation between the two was not a new phenomenon. What had certainly changed was the power and position of Parliament, which now possessed the means to influence the monarch more than ever before. The contemporary opinion of leading parliamentarians such as Talbot may be included. It may be acknowledged that the monarchy still remained strong and that the Crown retained the right to choose ministers and judges, determine foreign policy and call, dissolve and prorogue Parliament. The improved financial position of the monarchy, allowed by the Civil List and Bank of England, could suggest that the Crown was actually in a stronger position than ever before.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately. [50]

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- 2 "In 1702, the monarchy still remained in total control of the government of England." To what extent would you accept this assessment of the relations between Crown and Parliament in the period 1603–1702?

This question requires an assessment of the nature and extent of the changes to the relationship between Crown and Parliament throughout the course of the seventeenth century.

Top level responses will reflect on the extent to which the Crown was in total control of the government of England in 1702 and analyse the key events during this period which had affected its relationship with Parliament. For example, the Constitutional Revolution, the execution of Charles I, the Restoration Settlement, the Glorious Revolution and the reign of William and Mary saw the power and position of the Crown fluctuate. Candidates should address the extent to which the Crown was in 'total control' of the government of England at the end of this period.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) The reign of James I

At the beginning of James I's reign Parliament was responsible for passing bills and providing the monarch with advice and supply. However, its power and influence were restricted by the fact that it was summoned, prorogued and dissolved according to the will of the King. Parliament was further weakened by the lack of political parties with shared policies and aims.

Although the reign of James I saw some significant clashes between King and Parliament, notably over monopolies and foreign policy, there was little significant change to their relationship. The monarchy retained the most important prerogative powers and Parliament was dependent on James for its very existence. James I's contemporary opinion may be employed to illustrate his belief in the divine right of kings and his position of authority above Parliament. Candidates may use an observation from an historian such as Gardiner to support their arguments.

(b) Charles I and the Constitutional Revolution of 1640–1642

This period saw a number of attempts to limit the extent of royal power and prevent Charles I from re-employing the absolutist approach he had followed during his Personal Rule. The Triennial Act and the Act Against Own Dissolution compelled the monarch to call regular Parliaments and weakened the Crown's control of the government of England.

Although the Long Parliament was able to remove many of the Crown's financial devices and prerogative courts, there were limits to what it actually achieved. The King retained the right to collect customs duties, choose his ministers and control the armed forces. Although the changes to the power and position of the Crown were certainly significant and in some cases proved to be permanent, the term 'revolution' is misleading. Contemporary comment from leading figures such as Pym and the views of historians such as Hill could be used to illustrate the position of the Crown in this period.

(c) The Civil Wars and the execution of Charles I

As a result of its victory in the Civil Wars and the execution of the King, Parliament became the ultimate authority in the government of England. The interregnum was to be the only period in the century where England was not ruled by the monarchy. While the execution of Charles I had certainly created a radical change in the government of England, the restoration of his son, Charles II, in 1660 suggests that this change was only temporary. Contemporary opinion from Ireton may be employed, while historians such as Morrill and Anderson could be used to explain the importance of these events.

(d) The Restoration Settlement and the reign of Charles II

In 1660 Charles II was restored to the position and power his father held after the 1641 session of the Long Parliament. This represented a remarkable comeback for the monarchy, which had been in exile for the previous decade. Although prerogative taxation and courts remained illegal and Charles required the consent of Parliament to collect taxes, the Restoration Settlement placed the monarchy in a position of power. The loyal Cavalier Parliament strengthened the Crown's position by passing a revised Triennial Act and making opposition to the monarchy treasonable. Charles II benefited financially from the trade boom and was even able to re-introduce a brief period of personal rule at the end of his reign. However, the monarchy certainly did not assume total control of the government of England. For example, in his religious policy, Charles II was compelled to withdraw the Declaration of Indulgence and introduce a Test Act. The emergence of political parties during the Exclusion Crisis revealed a more organised, policy-driven attitude in parliamentary politics. Contemporary opinion from leading figures such as Hyde may be employed, while the views of historians like Smith could be utilised.

(e) The reign of James II and the Glorious Revolution

Although James II had initially enjoyed a good relationship with his Tory-dominated Parliament, his retention and Catholicising of a standing army quickly alienated this support. His systematic attempt to improve the social and political position of his fellow Catholics resulted in the total breakdown of his relationship with the gentry. His opponents interpreted his actions as an attempt to mirror the Catholic, absolutist French King. James never enjoyed the political power and independence of his ally Louis XIV and he was ultimately removed from power in the Glorious Revolution. The views of historians like Coward could be used to explain the impact of the reign of James II.

(f) The Revolution Settlement, 1688–1689

Candidates may examine the changing prerogative power of the monarchy as a result of the new Coronation Oath, the Bill of Rights, the Mutiny Act, the Toleration Act and the revised financial arrangements. Although the Crown remained in control of many of the main prerogative powers, the Revolution Settlement increased significantly the influence of Parliament. The contemporary opinion of William of Orange could be employed to illustrate the changing power and position of the Crown.

(g) Changes to the power and position of the monarchy in the reign of William III

William III's determination to wage war in Europe meant that he was keen to develop an effective working relationship with Parliament. Through the creation of the Commission of Accounts and a Civil List, Parliament gained direct influence over the monarch's use of finance. William's reliance upon regular supply and the revised Triennial Act allowed Parliament a permanency that enabled it to become more efficient and effective in its operation. By the end of the century Parliament now met almost annually and it had become a permanent and integral part of central government. The Act of Settlement of 1701 further strengthened the inter-dependence of Crown and Parliament. The views of historians such as Kishlansky may be employed to explain the changing power and position of the Crown in this period. Although Parliament did not dominate government, the balance of power had shifted to ensure that the monarchy was not in 'total control'. Candidates may argue that the relationship had always been co-dependent and that, under the Stuart monarchs, the Crown had never been in 'total control' of government.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately. [50]

Option 2

**AVAILABLE
MARKS**

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Option 3: Liberalism and Nationalism in Europe 1815–1914

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “Liberalism by itself was too weak to bring about permanent political or economic change in Europe between 1815 and 1914. Any successes it did achieve were due to Europe’s rulers choosing to introduce reforms.” How far would you agree with this assessment of liberalism in Europe between 1815 and 1914?

This question requires an account of the main liberal successes between 1815 and 1914, and an assessment of why they happened. Most answers will probably agree with the proposition, noting that liberal revolutions tended to fail in everything other than the short term during this period, and that liberal political strength was limited. Constitutions were usually granted by the rulers rather than forced through by liberals. Top level responses, however, will reflect on the fact that, although liberals often appeared to fail, the pressure they mounted on rulers frequently played a role in concessions eventually granted.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) 1815–1848

The period between 1815 and 1848 saw relatively few successes for liberalism, but answers ought to consider them. On the surface such successes were, overwhelmingly, the work of leaders. In France the Charter under which the restored Bourbons ruled was a concession to liberalism, ostensibly “granted” by Louis XVIII, but in practice largely forced on him by the Allies as a condition of restoration. Haddock’s comment on the essential precariousness of the Charter could be referred to as an example of historical interpretation. The great economic success of these years, the *Zollverein*, was introduced by a Prussian government anxious to achieve superiority over the Habsburg Empire. The constitutions which all the states of the German Confederation were obliged to introduce, a stipulation only properly observed in the South West of Germany, came as a result of the rulers’ remaking of Europe at the Congress of Vienna. The best answers may note, however, that the *Zollverein* was also the product of lobbying from Prussian industrialists. The economist List, their chief spokesman, might usefully be referred to as an example of contemporary interpretation. The Allied insistence on a French Charter was a direct consequence of their fears of a further outbreak of liberal or republican revolution, and in Württemberg, pressure from the people played a considerable part in the granting, and maintenance, of the comparatively liberal constitution of 1819. The more liberal Charter under which Louis Philippe ruled France after 1830 was the result of the liberal hijacking of Parisian street protests, and should be read as a development which refutes the proposition. Some answers may choose to mention the abortive liberal risings and demonstrations of the 1820s and 1830s, especially in Italy and Germany, to illustrate the essential weakness of the liberal movement, and Metternich’s ability to preserve the status quo throughout this period.

(b) 1848–1850

The revolutions of 1848 may be cited to illustrate the weakness of the liberal movement. In that year liberalism appeared strong enough to secure major constitutional concessions from various rulers, but opportunities for consolidation were frittered away, and the old, reactionary regimes were restored. Liberal weaknesses manifested themselves in various ways: in Germany, indecision and timidity lost liberals their best chance of advancing the cause throughout Europe, while in Paris and in Vienna the essentially bourgeois liberals, faced with the twin threats of radicalism and reaction, reluctantly accepted the inevitability of a return to the latter. Historians such as Collins, who refers to the middle class fear of “turmoil”, may be quoted. A clear illustration of the proposition comes from Prussia, where, late in 1848, Frederick William IV dissolved the liberal Assembly in what amounted to a counter-revolution, but went on to introduce his own constitution. The best answers may point out that, although the King had regained control over the constitutional process, the concessions he now made must have been, at least in part, due to fear of further uprisings, and were thus a tacit acknowledgement of the continuing presence of liberalism. The Prussian constitution was rapidly watered down, in line with the general European pattern throughout the 1850s. Austrian control was reasserted in Italy and in the German Confederation; despotism returned to the Habsburg Empire itself, while in France the Second Empire was characterised by repression of political opponents and curbs on freedom of expression. Napoleon III’s views on the need to establish “order” as his first priority might be quoted as contemporary interpretation. It seemed that the liberal movement was indeed too weak to bring about lasting change in Europe.

(c) 1850–1870

The sole success for liberalism in the 1850s was the survival of the *Statuto*, the Piedmontese constitution granted in 1848. Under it Count Camillo Cavour, Prime Minister after 1852, maintained a secular state, politically and economically liberal, an object of admiration to liberals elsewhere in Italy. This was a great success for liberals, as was the eventual unification of Italy, with the Piedmontese constitution extended to cover the whole Kingdom. This was an undeniable success for liberalism, but better answers may refer to the assistance of Napoleon III and Garibaldi in the military campaign, the former still in his despotic phase in 1859, the latter a radical republican, and suggest that later liberal governments in Italy left much to be desired, thus clouding any assessment of the episode as a liberal “success.” After 1860 liberal success was marked. In France Napoleon III steadily liberalised his regime: the historical debate as to whether he always intended to change course or was forced to do so as a result of liberal electoral gains is relevant interpretative material. German liberals began to flex their muscles after the setbacks of 1848–1849. In Prussia, they sought to block von Roon’s army reforms, but their essential weakness was once again displayed as Bismarck defied them and the constitution to force the necessary taxation through. However, the North German Confederation of 1867 and the subsequent constitution of the Second *Reich* both contained concessions to the twin liberal political demands of individual rights and representative government. Even though Bismarck did not want parliamentary government on the British model (his views on the need for a strong executive are useful for contemporary interpretation), he showed sufficient awareness of the growth of liberal sentiment to feel the necessity of conceding some ground in order to preserve the regime. He reciprocated the National Liberal retreat over

the army reforms by making a decade-long political alliance with them at a time when they held a majority in the *Reichstag*, during which period the liberals won successes such as the right to secret voting. Economically, the liberals saw free trade continue to grow. Following the lead of Britain and those German states which joined the *Zollverein*, governments continued to lower tariffs and sign reciprocal free trade treaties. Notably, Napoleon III was persuaded to adopt free trade by liberal free market theorists, and went against the protectionist instincts of French industrialists and agriculturalists, a rare example of liberal strength and a ruler's personal wishes coinciding.

(d) 1870–1914

After 1870 liberalism had limited success: individual freedoms continued their growth, suggesting that liberal pressure was stronger than the proposition suggests. Better answers may note, however, that progress towards complete universal suffrage was not necessarily the aim of middle class liberals, and that more radical parties were now making the running. But in terms of achieving responsible government there was less success, with rulers defying liberal demands in Austria, where, by the turn of the century, Franz Josef was returning to autocracy, and in the German Empire, where Wilhelm II showed a regular disregard for the universally-elected *Reichstag*. Bismarck's bitter comments on the dangers of the Kaiser accruing serious power after 1890 are useful in terms of contemporary interpretation. In economic matters, liberals were losing ground to socialists and to collectivist policies, and their great goal of free trade was rejected by European rulers after 1879. The best answers will once again recognise contradictions and exceptions, such as France, where the liberals themselves became the rulers, achieving many of their goals, from the preservation of the Republic against its enemies on left and right, to the secularisation of France in the early 1900s. Cobban could be utilised as a historian who perceived the underlying strength of the liberal values of the Third Republic.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately

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- 2** “Between 1850 and 1914 nationalism in Europe enjoyed greater success than in the period 1815–1849.” To what extent would you agree with this statement?

This question requires an overview of nationalism's success in creating nation-states during both periods referred to, perhaps noting the close links between nationalism and liberalism between 1815 and 1849, years of comparative failure, followed by a more pragmatic, successful and right-wing version of the ideology in the years to 1914. Top level responses will reflect on the amount of genuine nationalism, as opposed to aggrandisement, involved in Italian and German unification, and recognise nationalism's failures to consolidate these successes after 1870. There may be reference to the way in which nationalism, once a disruptive force, was harnessed by some states as a means of keeping the population quiet.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

AVAILABLE
MARKS

(a) 1815–1848

Nationalism's growth began after 1815 with a return to a dynastic Europe from which Napoleon's embryonic Italian, Polish and German states were eradicated, with nationalism perceived by the ruling elites as revolutionary and dangerous. Between 1815 and 1848 it struggled to make progress, meeting its match in Metternich, to whose cosmopolitan Habsburg Empire nationalism spelt disintegration. There were some successes before 1848. Greece achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1832 after Russian, British and French military action subdued the Turks, who had been engaged in war against the Greeks since 1821. In 1830 Belgium, largely through its own efforts, but after approval from the Great Powers, broke free from Dutch rule. Against this there was no progress for nationalists in Germany, Italy or the Habsburg Empire. The Wartburg and Hambach Festivals, both demonstrations of support for nationalism (and liberalism), were followed by a clamp down on freedom of speech. In 1820 and 1831 Italian risings were crushed by Austrian military incursions, while the Polish rising of 1830 was defeated by Tsarist forces. In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars the European empires were determined not to yield any ground, but nationalists were handicapped in other ways. They usually came from the educated classes, or, in Hungary, the unrepresentative gentry, and were consequently limited in numbers. Catterall and Vinen provide useful interpretation on this point. The essential impotence of nationalist efforts was displayed in the 1830s by Guiseppe Mazzini, who nevertheless demonstrated the idealism of early period nationalism. Mazzini believed that, by satisfying national needs, the causes of tension would disappear and a new era of international peace would follow. He was influential in intellectual terms (and might be used for contemporary interpretation), but his efforts to foment rebellion in Italy proved laughably inept.

(b) 1848–1850

1848 cruelly exposed nationalism's weakness, with no alteration in the map of Europe, despite the efforts of so many Germans, Italians, Magyars and other inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire. In Germany the indecisive Frankfurt Parliament showed little inclination to offer the Poles the same national independence it sought for itself. Italians proved reluctant to co-operate; with localism dominant, the peasantry were unreceptive to nationalist appeals, and Piedmont was unable, without outside help, to dislodge the Austrians from Northern Italy. The revolutions gave nationalists a brief opportunity, but a lack of military muscle meant the inevitable return of the former ruling power. The Austrians played a particularly canny game, having generals like Radetsky in Italy, allies like Russia to crush the Magyars, and the patience to pursue strategic retreat until divisions opened up among the revolutionaries. William Fortescue offers the alternative view that, despite the defeats, 1848 gave nationalism the oxygen of publicity.

(c) 1850–1870

Nationalism had little success in the 1850s but during the years 1860–1870 enjoyed not merely greater success, but arguably its most productive period. The Kingdom of Italy was declared in 1861 after a process markedly different from the failures of earlier years. Nationalism at last produced a pragmatic leader of the highest quality, the Piedmontese Cavour, who

built his country up as a prosperous and liberal state which attracted the admiration of nationalists across the peninsula. He wished Piedmont to absorb other Italian states, but played the nationalist card to disguise this, while recognising the need for outside help to oust Austria. Thus he gained French arms and British sympathy, and overcame French withdrawal halfway through the war thanks to the influential National Society, with which he had clandestine links. He only wished for a unified northern state, but, after a successful insurgency by the Italian patriot Garibaldi, Cavour intervened to force him to hand over his conquests to avoid further conflict with the Pope and ensure a Piedmontese-led liberal monarchy rather than a radical republic, the latter leading many to see this triumph for “nationalism” as nothing of the sort. Dennis Mack Smith’s views on this are useful for historical interpretation. Germany may be seen as a mirror image of the Italian process, with true German nationalism bowing to Prussian aggrandisement. Bismarck, the Prussian Chancellor, ruthless in pursuing Prussian aims while cultivating the support of German nationalists, presented a strong contrast to earlier liberal-nationalist indecision. Bismarck lured Austria into a Danish war, which also stimulated German nationalism, before winning the Seven Weeks War, eliminating Austria as a Germanic state. In this war Prussia also defeated most of the other German states, despite their *Zollverein* ties. Bismarck’s diplomatic powers were at their height as he outwitted Napoleon III and tricked France into a suicidal declaration of war which resulted in the absorption of the South German states. The declaration of the German Empire was a breathtaking achievement, but there was little doubt about the Prussified nature of the new Reich, while to improve the Prussian army Bismarck had had to ride roughshod over the Prussian Liberals. Bismarck’s own views on the Prussian core of the newly-created state are useful for contemporary interpretation. One by-product of the 1866 war was its exposure of Habsburg weakness. Relevant historical interpretation on the “centrifugal forces” tearing the Empire apart comes from Jasz. The Magyars had failed in 1848, but had continued to put pressure on the government in Vienna, and now the *Ausgleich* inaugurated the partnership known as Austria-Hungary.

(d) 1870–1914

The Habsburg Monarchy was not the only one to show signs of strain in the late nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire had been in slow retreat from the Balkans since the Greek War of Independence. The Rumanians, with significant help from the French, achieved full independence in 1878; the Bulgarians, again with foreign help, this time from Russia, gained their nationhood in stages which culminated in 1908. The Balkan Wars resulted in Albanian independence. These small victories for nationalism were countered by Austrian annexation of the former Turkish territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. The subsequent history of Balkan quarrels seems to undermine the Mazzinian theory of completed nation-states living in friendship. (The historical debate on the causes of World War I might be useful here.) A further illustration of nationalist lack of progress is the failure of the Poles, Czechs, Irish and the various European nationalities living under Russian rule to achieve statehood until after the Great War.

- (e)** The best answers may point to another “success” for nationalism, at least in the eyes of some governments, although Mazzinian nationalists would not have agreed. From being a subversive force to be vigorously countered, nationalism became in many cases an arm of the state.

Panslavism, ostensibly a nationalist movement, was useful to a Russian government anxious to take advantage of Turkish decline, while efforts to build a German consciousness, rather than, say, a Bavarian one, after 1871 became increasingly belligerent. Nationalism, particularly in terms of its development into imperialism abroad, was seen by the ruling classes as a means of diverting the working class away from socialism. All too readily patriotism could become jingoism or even racism (Waller describes these developments as “sombre and sinister”). Mayor Lueger of Vienna rose to power on an anti-semitic platform, Wagnerian operas were read by some as racialist tracts, and Social Darwinism led writers such as H. S. Chamberlain to teach that society should be organised into a hierarchy of races based on their inherent characteristics, an example of contemporary historical interpretation. Mazzinian nationalists would have been horrified.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately

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Option 3

**AVAILABLE
MARKS**

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Option 4: Unionism and Nationalism in Ireland 1800–1900

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “Irish nationalism only achieved success when it attracted mass popular support.” How far would you accept this assessment of constitutional and revolutionary nationalism in Ireland in the period 1800–1900?

This question requires an assessment of the importance of the mobilisation of mass popular support in the success of constitutional and revolutionary nationalism. The phrase ‘mass popular support’ can be interpreted at the candidates’ own discretion, but should be debated for both strands of nationalism.

Top level responses will reflect on the extent to which mass popular support led to nationalism experiencing either success or failure and link the question of success or failure to other factors as well, such as the relative strength of successive British Governments, the role of key leadership figures or the support of the Catholic Church. Top marks will be awarded to those candidates who debate all the relevant factors including the proposition, before arriving at a valid and substantiated conclusion.

The structure of the answer is immaterial; whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

- (a) The role of mass popular support did play a significant role in both the success and failure of constitutional nationalism in this period. Daniel O’Connell successfully attracted mass popular support for his campaign for Catholic Emancipation in 1829. Through the creation and utilisation of the Catholic Association, he combined the power of the Catholic masses with the Catholic middle class, as well as the clergy. Oliver MacDonagh described the Catholic Association as “a pioneer of mass constitutional politics and pacific popular democracy.” O’Connell also appealed to the goodwill of Irish Presbyterians towards his cause. The tactics of the Association, including the collection of the penny rent and mass rallies, when coupled with O’Connell’s electoral strategy, played a tangible role in the struggle for emancipation. These tactics and strategy maintained and increased this support, as results were clearly recognisable.

There were, however, other factors which contributed to the success of the Emancipation campaign. O’Connell’s own personal charisma and keen political intelligence were vital. His recognition of the crisis at Westminster and within the Tory party was another factor. The splits in the Tory party between Wellington and Peel also played their part, and Peel even conceded that he was relenting to protect the rule of law and restore harmony in the United Kingdom. Wellington’s government was weak in 1829 and this helped O’Connell immensely in his campaign for emancipation. The way in which he exerted pressure on the government after his election in Co. Clare could also be discussed. The precedent set by Wellington having to pass the Test and Corporations Act and the overall support and mobilisation of the Catholic Church in support of both O’Connell and emancipation could also be

included as valid factors that led to success. O'Connell's successes with his reforms, such as the Education Reform of 1832 and the Irish Church Act of 1833, could also be discussed, leading to the years of his alliance with the Whigs in the Lichfield House Compact, when more reforms were passed. This was success but not due directly to mass popular support. MacDonagh's argument that O'Connell was always more committed to reform rather than repeal could be referred to in this context.

- (b) The campaign for the repeal of the Union was very different. Although candidates could argue that O'Connell still managed to attract mass popular support to his cause, it was not as effective this time. The support of Presbyterians was lukewarm and the masses arguably did not buy into the idea of repeal with the same conviction as Catholic Emancipation. O'Connell's decision to ally with Young Ireland backfired since he could not control the movement as he had hoped, leading to a split. The failure of repeal, however, was not only caused by a lack of mass popular support but also by factors such as the relative strength of Peel's government at this time in contrast to the situation in 1829. In addition, O'Connell was arguably not the political force or leader he had once been. This is evident from the gradual reduction in the O'Connell tribute during his later years. Peel's campaign of reforms for Ireland also damaged the repeal campaign.
- (c) Isaac Butt was another leader who enjoyed some limited success in the formative years of the Home Rule campaign, but arguably never enjoyed mass popular support. Butt's Home Rule movement was characterised by loyalty to the British establishment in the hope that concessions would be given. This brought some success in that Home Rule became an issue at Westminster. However, Butt's subservience eventually cost him his support and his leadership. Nonetheless, it can be claimed that Butt prepared the way for what Parnell would later do.
- (d) Parnell's ability to mobilise mass popular support was a key factor in his success. Parnell's association with the Land League and ex-Fenians, such as Davitt, led to the creation of the New Departure which brought together mass popular support, endorsement from the Catholic Church and co-operation for a time with some of the more radical elements of Irish nationalism. According to Emmett Larkin: "The Church had taken this step and allied with Parnell out of necessity and a need to remain relevant." Tangible successes were soon apparent such as the Land Act of 1881 and the Arrears Act of 1882. Parnell's transformation of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) into a unified, focused and pledge-bound party at Westminster also made the Irish presence so dominant in the House of Commons that it helped to prompt the Home Rule debate. The success of Parnell and the IPP at the 1885 general election, when it won 86 seats, could also be discussed to show how widespread mass support contributed to success. The oratorical skills of Parnell could also be analysed, such as when he claimed that "No man has the right to fix the boundary to the march of a nation. No man has the right to say to his country, this far shalt thou go and no farther." The failure of both the 1886 and 1893 Home Rule Bills did not change the fact that Parnell's real legacy had been that he had made Home Rule a dominant and recurring political issue at Westminster for the next thirty years.

Parnell's downfall can be explained by a combination of factors. The O'Shea scandal alienated the Church, which denounced Parnell. This had a huge impact on his support. The scandal also caused divisions in his own party. Gladstone was also forced to distance himself from Parnell due to the backlash. In some ways, then, Parnell could be described as the architect of his own downfall. Candidates could also debate the extent to which Tory and unionist hostility to Home Rule led to Parnell's failure. This shows that even with mass popular support, Irish nationalism could still suffer devastating defeats and losses.

- (e) The failure of revolutionary nationalists to build up mass popular support without doubt contributed to their failure in this period. There was little public support for either Emmet's rebellion of 1803 or the Young Ireland rebellion of 1848 and both were relatively easily suppressed. The Fenian rebellion of 1867 faced the additional problem of almost total condemnation from the Catholic Church and establishment, largely because of the views and overwhelming presence of Cardinal Cullen. As Bishop Moriarty claimed at the time: "Hell is not hot enough nor eternity long enough to roast the Fenians." This depleted any support the Fenians had. In each case, revolutionary nationalists suffered from a lack of mass popular support and so an argument for the proposition can certainly be put forward. In none of the three rebellions of the nineteenth century did there appear any significant spontaneous support for the rebels. The point could also be made, however, that revolutionary nationalists, by their very nature, did not ever seek or set out to achieve mass popular support.
- (f) Answers should, however, reflect on the other factors which contributed to the failure of revolutionary nationalists in this period. Inadequate planning and preparation were a common feature in all three rebellions. The Fenians were also hamstrung by the divisions in their leadership, both in Ireland and the USA. The role of government was also a key determinant as each prospective rebellion was easily crushed by a combination of firm leadership, strong military response and infiltration. In the case of the Fenians, the fear they inspired in Gladstone led to a frenetic campaign of Irish reforms which denied them support. The unrealistic aspirations of some of the revolutionaries could also be discussed, as well as the importance of external factors such as the hardships being endured during the Young Ireland rebellion of 1848 due to the famine, making any chance of success disappear.
- (g) It is valid for answers to comment on the legacy of physical force movements. Each movement contributed to the legacy of Irish revolutionary nationalism and provided inspiration for future Irish generations. Emmet's views and rhetoric can be linked clearly to Pearse in 1916, as can the cultural ideas of Young Ireland. Some members of Young Ireland later joined the Fenians, continuing their struggle. As stated above, the activities of the Fenians convinced Gladstone of the need to legislate for Ireland leading to a programme of social, economic and political reforms. The reform of the tithe question could then be attributed indirectly to the Fenians. The romanticised idea and legacy of the 'triumph of failure' and the ever-growing list of Irish martyrs did contribute to the wider nationalist struggle, maybe not in their own eras but certainly providing inspiration for successive revolutionary sentiment, most notably in 1916.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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- 2 “While the supporters of the Union in the north of Ireland were primarily motivated by religious fears, the main concern of southern Unionists was that their ties with the Empire would be weakened.” To what extent would you agree with this verdict on the motives and methods of the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland in the period 1800–1900?

This question requires an assessment of the motives of those who supported the Union in the north and the south of Ireland, making sustained and substantiated comparisons and contrasts.

The question requires candidates to examine the attitudes towards the Union held by its supporters in the north and south of Ireland. Religious fears were more influential in shaping unionist opinion towards the Union in the north than the south. Economic considerations were important for both groups but not equally so, whilst imperial concerns were arguably more keenly felt by unionists in the south. Top level responses will reflect on the wide range of motives which prompted the wish of northern and southern unionists to uphold the status quo. Answers should also explore the contrasting methods used by the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

- (a) While religious fears were prominent in the minds of northern unionists, they were not the sole motivation. Religious fears were undoubtedly at the forefront of Ulster unionist fears as the north of Ireland had a very different religious demography to the rest of Ireland and experienced more sectarian tension. This tension was heightened during the debates over the first and second Home Rule Bills. The link with geographical distribution explains the focus on religion, especially during the Home Rule debates as those in the north arguably felt they had more to lose from Home Rule. Responses could include public statements or speeches by leading Ulster unionists, such as Thomas Saunderson or Thomas Sinclair. There was also a belief that all Protestants had to work together to combat what was seen as a growing danger from Catholicism and the views of men like Rev. Henry Cooke could also be discussed: “Protestants have to overcome their denominational differences and learn to work together to combat the growing Catholic threat.” The variety of organisations formed to uphold and defend the Union, such as the Protestant Defence Association and the Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union, also show how northern unionists perceived themselves at this time and how prominent a role religion played in both their motivation and identity. Adelman argued that Ulster unionism was born primarily due to four factors, including the swift capture of the Catholic vote by Home Rulers, making religion a defining characteristic of Irish politics thereafter.
- (b) Economic motives were also clearly evident in the north of Ireland. A strong argument could be made that economic motives were the primary concern of northern unionists. There was a real fear that Ulster’s economic prosperity would be threatened if the Union was broken. It was a well and frequently articulated argument at the time that the welfare of Ulster’s industries, namely shipbuilding, linen and ropeworks, hinged on Britain’s relationship

with Ireland in general and on the success and continuance of the Union in particular. Ulster was also viewed as economically different from the rest of Ireland due to its global reputation and cutting edge industries, all of which depended on the continuance of the Union. Ulster unionists attributed all of the economic progress of the north directly to the Union. As Henry Cooke said: "Look at Belfast and be a repealer if you can." Repeal and later Home Rule, regardless of the supposed safeguards built in for the unionist minority, were believed by the vast majority to symbolise the destruction of Ulster's prosperity. This belief caused many Liberals to transfer their allegiance to unionism. Thomas Sinclair took this view, firmly believing that Home Rule would spell economic disaster for Ulster. This was despite his support for Gladstone's other Irish reforms such as the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland. Historians such as Kee and Rees have commented on the economic theme which underpinned many northern unionists' concerns about Home Rule.

- (c) Fears over Empire were also prevalent in the north, although arguably less so. Fears that Home Rule would threaten Ireland's position within the Union were very real, as were the concerns of northern unionists for the Empire as a whole should Home Rule be passed. The possibility of a 'domino effect' across the rest of the Empire was also articulated and exploited by unionists. Imperial concerns undoubtedly prompted many prominent English supporters to back Ulster unionism as Lord Randolph Churchill proved when he famously said: "The orange card was the one to play."

Responses will debate the relative balance of motivating factors in assessing the fears and overall motivation of northern unionists. As an Orange Order Manifesto published in the Irish Times in 1885 stated: 'While maintaining with unwavering determination the principles of our Order ... , we welcome with cordiality all those who will assist us in keeping intact the bond which unites us to that great Empire of which we are proud to form a not unimportant part.'

- (d) Fears for the well-being of the Empire were more prominent amongst southern unionists than their northern counterparts. The belief was widespread that the introduction of Home Rule would weaken the Empire worldwide. Southern views on the Empire can also be linked again to the social structure of southern unionism as many of their members travelled throughout and served the Empire. Southern unionists were also keen to highlight Ireland's part within the world's greatest Empire and draw contrasts to the lesser position an independent Ireland would hold on the world stage. There was also the wider fear, used to good effect, that any change in Ireland's constitutional status would have dire and far-reaching consequences for the unity of the Empire itself. It could also be argued that, because of their position as a minority within the rest of Ireland, southern unionists had to use fear for the Empire to appeal to others in order to build up support for their cause in the south. A case could also be made that southern unionists were more able to see the Irish situation in an imperial context, as a great many had experience of global or at least European travel. They had experienced first-hand all the benefits the Empire had to offer and were aware of all they stood to lose if the Union was changed. Candidates could refer to evidence from historians such as McDowell on the importance southern unionists attached to the imperial ideal.

- (e) Economic motives were also important for southern unionists. Many southern unionists had already expressed unease over their prosperity and position due to the passing of various land acts in the second half of the nineteenth century. The social structure of southern unionism also helps to account for these economic fears as so many prominent families had their wealth bound up in landed estates and preferred their fortunes to be controlled by an English parliament than an Irish Home Rule parliament. The social structure of southern unionists also meant that they feared for their agricultural prosperity with any change to the Union. Historians such as McDowell have written about the importance of agricultural concerns in resisting Home Rule. The reforms of the latter nineteenth century such as the Reform Act of 1867 and The Secret Ballot Acts led to increasing unease amongst southern unionists as their position became threatened.
- (f) Religious fears were also present in the south but, again due to demographics, to a much lesser extent. Religious fears can be linked to the geographical distribution of southern unionists. As a small and fragmented minority, they depended on the goodwill of their Catholic neighbours. They put forward arguments about the benefits of the Union for all religions in an attempt to spread their unionist beliefs. Catholics were made welcome in southern unionist organisations such as the Cork Defence Union which maintained in 1885 that: “The Union is non-sectarian and non-political.” The social make-up of southern unionism also directly affected its methods in opposing Home Rule as its members were able to use their family and political ties with the House of Lords to lobby for their position and for the defeat of Home Rule. Southern unionists were also always keen to stress their importance to the wider unionist movement. As William Kenny, a Catholic MP for Dublin, stated in 1892: “We are determined to show that Unionist Ireland is not represented by Ulster alone.”

Top responses should debate where the balance in motivation lay with southern unionists as well.

- (g) A discussion of the methods used by both Ulster and southern unionists should also be included. Geographical considerations impacted greatly on the methods of unionists. In the north, where unionism enjoyed a permanent majority, unionists could be confident, outspoken and even radical in their defence of the Union, sometimes hinting at the use of force. The Ulster Defence Union collected funds for the organisation of resistance to Home Rule. The threat of militancy in Ulster unionism was also in marked contrast to the south. Southern unionists could never use the same methods due to their different status as a permanent minority in the remaining three provinces. However, southern unionists were able to exert influence in the House of Lords by the force of their arguments, as well as by using their considerable financial power to back their defence of the Union, advantages not possessed by their northern counterparts. The veto possessed by the Lords in this period was a constant reminder of just how powerful the political contacts of southern unionists were to the cause. Even the titles of the organisations set up to defend the Union could be discussed. In the south, the word “Irish” was prominent, whilst in the north it was usually the word “Ulster.” This suggests differences in the self-perception of unionists in terms of their identities.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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Option 4

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Option 5: Clash of Ideologies in Europe 1900–2000

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “Soviet foreign policy had no clear aims but simply reacted to events as they occurred.” To what extent would you agree with this assessment of Soviet foreign policy in Europe between 1917 and 1991?

This question requires candidates to consider whether Soviet foreign policy operated under a coherent set of ideas or whether it was the result of improvisation in response to events as they occurred.

Top level responses will explore whether Soviet foreign policy was primarily the result of coherent foreign policy aims or the need to respond to events as they occurred. Top level responses will attempt to address periods where consistent aims are observable, as well as periods where noticeable shifts in foreign policy emerge as a result of events. Equally, candidates will analyse the reasons why changes occurred and assess how these changes had an impact on the clarity of the aims of Soviet foreign policy.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) 1917–1924

The period 1917–1924 offers candidates an ideal opportunity to test both aspects of the proposition at the heart of the question. Candidates may argue that on seizing power the Bolsheviks had a clear aim of global revolution. To this end the establishment of the Comintern would seem to provide evidence of the ideological spirit of the revolution. Equally, the Russo-Polish War is further evidence of clear aggressive ideological aims as Lenin tried to establish “a red bridge into Europe.” Alternatively, it is entirely reasonable for candidates to argue that, while the Bolsheviks had clear aims, events were to frustrate them. The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Civil War, defeat in the Russo-Polish War and the subsequent Treaty of Riga all indicate that the nascent communist state was at the mercy of events rather than the master of them. Candidates could continue with this line of argument and highlight that Soviet foreign policy was to undergo the first of several *volte faces* as the Bolshevik regime was forced to seek trading relations with imperialist Britain and Germany in the early 1920s. Finally, candidates could reject the aforementioned line of argument and suggest that the one clear aim the nascent state possessed was to avoid the fate Winston Churchill so ardently wished for it, namely “to be strangled in the crib” of its existence. In the pursuit of survival any means would be used, even if this meant compromising ideological principles in the short term. As Condren argued, the “Soviet leadership pursued its aims with whatever means were at its disposal.”

(b) 1924–1941

Candidates can adopt different approaches to the post-Lenin period. It could be argued that once Stalin had solidified his grip on power in the

late 1920s a clear set of aims was established and subsequently pursued. Stalin rejected the internationalism of Trotsky and adopted a transparent foreign policy that was rooted in the needs of the Soviet Union. This policy is captured perfectly in the oft-quoted comment: “One Soviet tractor was worth ten foreign communists.” The Comintern became largely inactive and Stalin decreed that overseas communists should adopt “the Moscow line”, most notably with his injunction that communist parties should not support Social Democratic parties as they were, in Moscow’s words, “social fascists.”

Although the Soviet Union would appear to be reacting to events when the rise of Hitler and the foreign policies of the Nazis prompted the Soviet Union to join the League of Nations and pursue collective security arrangements, candidates could argue that Stalin was still pursuing one clear aim, “a desperate search for security.” (Uldricks) This perhaps also explains Stalin’s actions in Spain in 1936. Military support was limited and opportunistic and there was a conscious attempt to maintain relations with France and Britain.

However, it is perfectly viable for candidates to take a different line of argument by inverting the logic of the previous approach and suggesting that a combination of personality, economic weakness and events shaped the decision making process. Candidates could argue that this was evident throughout the 1930s but particularly in 1939, when Stalin replaced Litvinov with Molotov and the Nazi-Soviet Non Aggression Pact was signed. Here, once again, we see Stalin reacting to events rather than pursuing clear aims.

In this context candidates could fruitfully explore the historiographical debate surrounding Soviet aims. Whether candidates adopt the position that the Soviet Union was largely reactive, as AJP Taylor and others have argued, or that there was a lucid and malign design, as Tucker has argued, is a matter of choice, but certainly there is ample opportunity to demonstrate awareness of debate in this area.

(c) 1941–1945

Clearly, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union occasioned a major shift in policy. It could be suggested that, in view of Stalin’s actions prior to the invasion and his belief that he had more time, it must be the case that the Soviet Union was reacting to events with the formation of the Grand Alliance. Candidates could argue that this was true but that the Soviet Union quickly reverted to type with the Percentages Agreement in Moscow 1944 and the subsequent creation of a buffer zone in the years immediately following the end of World War Two.

(d) 1945–1953

Arguably, Stalin had very clear aims after the end of the Second World War. The Soviet Union sought security and pursued this through the determined, yet cautious, creation of a buffer zone. Candidates would be expected to acknowledge how this process occurred in Eastern Europe but point out that there were limits to Soviet expansionism in Southern and Western Europe. Equally, the clarity of Soviet foreign policy can be seen with regard to Germany. Germany was unsurprisingly a major concern for the Soviet Union but the means the USSR employed were limited by the need to avoid outright conflict with the West as was evident in the blockade of Berlin in 1948–1949.

By contrast, it would be more than plausible to continue a line of argument that once again the Soviet Union was responding to events, be it the American use of the atomic bomb in Japan, the creation of Bi-zonia in Germany, the American announcement of the Marshall Plan or, as Stalin termed it, “dollar imperialism.” Candidates could of course argue this position from a revisionist perspective or indeed perceptively suggest that post-revisionism is helpful in highlighting that it is events and the reading, and indeed misreading, of events that shapes foreign policy rather than clear aims, as orthodox historians would contend.

(e) 1953–1964

The death of Stalin and the emergence of the Khrushchev era allows candidates to consider afresh how events can lead to the abandonment of apparently clear and coherent aims. It can be argued that Khrushchev set out to break with Stalin, as reflected in the “Secret Speech” of March 1956 and the desire to see East and West confront either the reality of “peaceful co-existence or the most destructive war in history.” However, events in Hungary forced a return to a security-conscious foreign policy that would witness the brutal suppression of Hungarian revolutionaries and the re-assertion of the Iron Curtain in its most visible and concrete form with the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

However, the very top level responses will do more than pay lip service to these events but rather analyse how the security concerns associated with Hungary, or the economic issues that helped shape Soviet foreign policy in Berlin, explain how events can override aims.

It is also reasonable for candidates to suggest that Khrushchev’s ambitions for peaceful co-existence may have floundered somewhat but such failures revealed the clearest of aims, namely survival and the security of the Soviet Union. As a result, as Evans and Jenkins have suggested: “in many ways the foreign policy aims of Khrushchev differed little from those of Stalin.”

(f) 1964–1982

Arguably, Brezhnev’s rise to power gives candidates the opportunity to suggest that Soviet foreign policy had a clear approach that was not defined by events. On the one hand, détente emerged, as Mason has argued, as a means of reducing tensions and limiting the cost of the Cold War; on the other hand, a repressive policy was adopted in response to events within satellite states. If détente was reflected in SALT I and the Helsinki Final Act as well as the out-workings of *Ostpolitik*, the more repressive aspects of Soviet foreign policy manifested themselves in both Czechoslovakia and the subsequent Brezhnev Doctrine. Candidates could plausibly argue that this was perhaps the one period of time in the Cold War when there were clear aims that were largely realised, at least within the context of Europe. However, candidates could suggest that such calm belied the undercurrents that were developing and were to manifest themselves in the late 1980s in terms of the dissident movements throughout Eastern Europe.

The most perceptive candidates may draw parallels in how Brezhnev mirrored Khrushchev with regard to the maintenance of Soviet control throughout the buffer zone, thus showing a coherent and consistent set of aims. However, the support for human rights that was built in to the Helsinki Final Act was to unleash a series of events that the Soviet Union was to react to in the most dramatic of fashions.

(g) 1982–1991

The years of rule by Andropov and Chernenko were characterised by attempts to maintain the status quo, even if Andropov attempted internal reform. Candidates would not be expected to offer any extended commentary on their leadership.

However, the arrival of Gorbachev into office offers candidates the opportunity to conclude by examining the proposition at the heart of the question. Gorbachev possessed clearly defined aims, both domestically and internationally. While his foreign policy was characterised by his decisions to reduce arms expenditure, withdraw from Afghanistan and renounce the Brezhnev doctrine, or as he put it in 1988 at the United Nations, “force, or the threat of force, neither can, nor should be instruments of foreign policy”. However, these aims led to a spiralling series of events to which he could merely respond, as both the eastern bloc and the Soviet Union itself crumbled.

Candidates could thus argue that Gorbachev’s categorical shift in aims was to leave him at the mercy of events. It would be reasonable to develop the argument that it was the structural weaknesses of the Soviet economy or the aggressive militarism of the Reagan regime that brought into play the events that proved Gorbachev’s undoing or alternatively, it was, as McCauley has suggested, that Gorbachev himself was to be “the gravedigger” of the Soviet Union.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately. [50]

AVAILABLE
MARKS

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- 2** “The opponents of communism in Europe were primarily motivated by ideology.” To what extent would you accept this verdict on the period 1917–1991?

This question requires an assessment of the motivations of the opponents of communism in Europe between 1917 and 1991. At the heart of this discussion should be the question of how important ideology was as a motivation for the various opponents of communism throughout the whole period.

Top level responses will reflect on how important ideology was and in part this will require an assessment of the different opponents of communism and their motivations at different times and how ideology may have waxed and waned depending on the opponent and the particular epoch being considered.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) 1917–1941

In the immediate aftermath of the October Revolution the deep hostility of capitalist states to the Soviet Union was clearly ideological and was reflected in their intervention in the Civil War on behalf of the Whites. Despite the limited nature of the intervention, the intent was clear. Churchill’s venomous contempt for the Soviet Union and his desire to see it “strangled in the

crib” reflected the ideological hatred of the statesmen of Europe’s capitalist powers towards the Soviet Union.

However, many European powers replaced their ideological outrage with *Realpolitik* and this led to a series of treaties between former foes. It would appear that treaties such as the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement and the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany in 1922 demonstrated that ideology was not particularly significant. Certainly, relations with Germany reflected the fact that both states were effectively “pariah nations” and, as such, mutual benefit trumped ideological suspicion.

In this regard different strategies were adopted by different opponents of the Soviet Union as needs dictated and candidates may make this point.

The rise of fascism across Europe from the 1920s onwards brought about a change in the aims of the opponents of communism. The Soviet Union had withdrawn into its own ideological shell and it was only the rise of Hitler which saw the complicated forces of ideology and pragmatism lead to a series of conflicting diplomatic treaties and military actions in what was to be the most tumultuous period in Europe’s long history.

The democratic states appeared keen to cultivate diplomatic ties to provide a bulwark against fascism and as such the Soviet Union was re-integrated into the world, or at least the European community, most notably with regard to the League of Nations in 1934, an organisation Lenin had previously described as “a den of robbers.” This would suggest that the ideological hostility had lessened and was replaced by a wary pragmatism.

On the other hand, fascist countries – particularly Nazi Germany – made explicit their outright hostility to the Soviet Union, most notably through diplomatic pacts such as the Anti-Comintern Pact. In the case of fascism, there was undoubtedly a deep ideological hatred of the Soviet Union. Hitler’s comment that “all I do, I do against the Soviet Union” bears this out, as do his writings in *Mein Kampf*. Candidates could note the various and varied motivations of fascist powers, for example Hitler seemed permeated with an anti-semitism connected to Marx, whereas with Mussolini such anti-semitism was not so evident. This would allow for a more sophisticated differentiation of motivation amongst the opponents of the Soviet Union.

Equally, the willingness of the democratic powers to entertain the possibility of some form of alliance with the Soviet Union suggests that ideology was not as significant as it had been in the early days of the Soviet Union. However, France and Britain were not prepared to stand up for democracy at any price, most notably with regard to the coalition of fascist forces that overthrew the republican government in Spain, while Britain and France sat silently on the sidelines. Equally, fascist opposition to the Soviet Union can be witnessed with the struggle in Spain in 1936, and, as Collier has argued, “Italy became heavily involved in the Spanish Civil War because it could not permit a communist government in the Mediterranean.”

The dealings of democratic countries with the Nazis in Munich in September 1938 led to a collapse in their relations with the Soviet Union, which then turned to the Nazis, which in turn gave them the opportunity to launch their assault on Western Europe. Hitler’s “ideological somersault” (Ward) speaks

for itself but candidates could consider the way in which the motivations of foreign policy are rarely straightforward to comprehend and this is reflected in the historiographical debate focused on the period.

(b) 1941–1945

The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union is a clear illustration of the culmination of Hitler’s ideological position towards it. The Grand Alliance that was to be formed in an attempt to defeat the forces of fascism reflected a willingness to set aside old ideological animosities to find common cause. However, candidates would do well to be aware of the limitations and tension that existed in what has been termed “a marriage of convenience.” The Soviet suspicion that the capitalist powers were withholding the opening of a “second front” to deliberately weaken the communist state reflects the mistrust that was to dominate the post-war years and the war-time conferences.

(c) 1945–1953

The emergence of the Cold War provides an excellent opportunity for candidates to consider the importance of ideology in considerable depth. At the heart of the matter is whether the clash was based on the ideological commitment of the United States to democracy and freedom and the Soviet Union’s ideological communist totalitarianism. For Churchill it clearly was and his famous “Iron Curtain” speech in Missouri perfectly encapsulates that sense of division. Such was the ideological commitment of the United States to the cause of democracy and freedom across Western, and parts of Southern, Europe that they created the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. As Truman himself noted: “It must be the policy of the United States to support free people.” However, more sophisticated answers would be expected to challenge this one-dimensional account of the origins of the Cold War and allow for the possibility that the United States was empire building and engaging in “dollar imperialism,” as the Soviets characterised it. Equally, candidates could point out the inconsistencies in the US actions by contrasting events such as the Berlin Airlift with their support for Greek monarchists and their laissez-faire approach to the fascist Franco in Spain.

(d) 1953–1964

Candidates could argue that the post-Stalin years were characterised by intermittent efforts at improved diplomatic relations, punctuated by breakdowns in relations usually due to aggressive Soviet actions. The United States and its allies were strongly committed to promoting and protecting democracy in the non-communist states of Western Europe. This was further reflected in the creation of NATO in 1949 and the integration of West Germany into that organisation in 1955. Efforts were made at better relations that reflected Khrushchev’s attempts to promote “peaceful co-existence”, such as the Geneva Summit of 1955, Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in 1959 and subsequent summits in Paris (1960) and Vienna (1961).

However, the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 illustrate the inherent instability and tension in relations. Candidates may wish to draw out the fact that at no point were the opponents of the Soviet Union prepared to engage in military action to roll back communism if it would lead to the possibility of a direct confrontation between the superpowers. Kennedy may have displayed his ideological commitment to democracy when he declared in June 1963: “Today, in the

world of freedom, the proudest boast is ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’”, but this was clearly limited to the rhetorical rather than the physical.

Indeed, the legacy of the Cuban missile crisis was to highlight this point with the establishment of the “hotline” between the White House and the Kremlin in August 1963 and the subsequent Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in October of the same year.

(e) 1964–1979

The years in which Brezhnev was to find himself watching over the Soviet Union coincided with the period known as détente. On the face of it a thawing in relations would reflect the willingness of both superpowers to reduce geopolitical tension through summits and diplomatic overtures such as SALT I and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It could be argued that détente was primarily motivated not by ideology but by finance. The crippling costs of the arms race and the dangers of imperial overstretch as the US embarked on costly wars in south and east Asia led to a willingness to see improved relations. In this context Todd has suggested: “Détente appealed to the USA as they felt it might help to resolve problems elsewhere – such as Vietnam.” However, candidates would be right to argue that statesmen like Nixon and Kissinger remained implacably opposed to communism and were also practitioners of the art of *Realpolitik*.

(f) 1979–1991

Ideological hostility came to the fore with the election of Ronald Reagan, who described the Soviet Union as the “evil Empire”. This ideological motivation was reflected in increased military adventurism beyond European shores but also in the form of the stationing of new ranges of missiles (Pershing and Cruise) across Western Europe. Equally, there was a strong ideological drive to assert the supremacy of free market economics and its symbiotic relationship with both democracy and individual liberty. Ultimately, it is debatable about the degree to which the Soviet Union and the communist regimes in eastern and central Europe collapsed because of this or in effect because of the ideological weakening of the central communist leadership within the Soviet Union.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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Option 5

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**AVAILABLE
MARKS**