

**Published Mark Scheme for  
GCE A2 History**

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**NORTHERN IRELAND GENERAL CERTIFICATE OF SECONDARY EDUCATION (GCSE)  
AND NORTHERN IRELAND GENERAL CERTIFICATE OF EDUCATION (GCE)**

**MARK SCHEMES (2010)**

**Foreword**

***Introduction***

Mark Schemes are published to assist teachers and students in their preparation for examinations. Through the mark schemes teachers and students will be able to see what examiners are looking for in response to questions and exactly where the marks have been awarded. The publishing of the mark schemes may help to show that examiners are not concerned about finding out what a student does not know but rather with rewarding students for what they do know.

***The Purpose of Mark Schemes***

Examination papers are set and revised by teams of examiners and revisers appointed by the Council. The teams of examiners and revisers include experienced teachers who are familiar with the level and standards expected of 16- and 18-year-old students in schools and colleges. The job of the examiners is to set the questions and the mark schemes; and the job of the revisers is to review the questions and mark schemes commenting on a large range of issues about which they must be satisfied before the question papers and mark schemes are finalised.

The questions and the mark schemes are developed in association with each other so that the issues of differentiation and positive achievement can be addressed right from the start. Mark schemes therefore are regarded as a part of an integral process which begins with the setting of questions and ends with the marking of the examination.

The main purpose of the mark scheme is to provide a uniform basis for the marking process so that all the markers are following exactly the same instructions and making the same judgements in so far as this is possible. Before marking begins a standardising meeting is held where all the markers are briefed using the mark scheme and samples of the students' work in the form of scripts. Consideration is also given at this stage to any comments on the operational papers received from teachers and their organisations. During this meeting, and up to and including the end of the marking, there is provision for amendments to be made to the mark scheme. What is published represents this final form of the mark scheme.

It is important to recognise that in some cases there may well be other correct responses which are equally acceptable to those published: the mark scheme can only cover those responses which emerged in the examination. There may also be instances where certain judgements may have to be left to the experience of the examiner, for example, where there is no absolute correct response – all teachers will be familiar with making such judgements.

The Council hopes that the mark schemes will be viewed and used in a constructive way as a further support to the teaching and learning processes.



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## **History**

**Assessment Unit A2 1**

**[AH211]**

**WEDNESDAY 20 JANUARY, MORNING**

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**MARK  
SCHEME**

## Level of response mark grid

This level of response grid has been developed as a general basis for marking candidates' work, according to the following assessment objectives:

- AO1a** recall, select and deploy historical knowledge accurately, and communicate knowledge and understanding of history in a clear and effective manner;
- AO1b** present historical explanations, showing understanding of appropriate concepts, and arrive at substantiated judgements;
- AO2** In relation to historical context:
- interpret, evaluate and use a range of source material;
  - explain and evaluate interpretations of historical events and topics studied.

The grid should be used in conjunction with the information on indicative content outlined for each assessment unit.



<b>Level</b>	<b>Assessment Objective 1a</b>	<b>Assessment Objective 1b</b>	<b>Assessment Objective 2</b>
	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:
1	recall, select and deploy some accurate factual knowledge and communicate limited understanding in narrative form. There will be evidence of an attempt to structure and present answers in a coherent manner.	display a basic understanding of the topic; some comments may be relevant, but general and there may be assertions and judgements which require supporting evidence.	limited recognition of the possibility of debate surrounding an event or topic.
2	be quite accurate, contain some detail and show understanding through a mainly narrative approach. Communication may have occasional lapses of clarity and/or coherence.	display general understanding of the topic and its associated concepts and offer explanations which are mostly relevant, although there may be limited analysis and a tendency to digress. There will be some supporting evidence for assertions and judgements.	an attempt to explain different approaches to and interpretations of the event or topic. Evaluation may be limited.
3	contain appropriate examples with illustrative and supportive factual evidence and show understanding and ability to engage with the issues raised by the question in a clear and coherent manner.	display good breadth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Analysis is generally informed and suitably illustrated to support explanations and judgements.	there will be an ability to present and evaluate different arguments for and against particular interpretations of an event or topic.
4	be accurate and well-informed and show ability to engage fully with the demands of the question. Knowledge and understanding will be expressed with clarity and precision.	display breadth and depth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Explanations will be well-informed with arguments and judgements well-substantiated, illustrated and informed by factual evidence.	there will be appropriate explanation, insightful interpretation and well-argued evaluation of particular interpretations of an event or topic.

## Option 1 ANGLO–SPANISH RELATIONS 1509–1609

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

(Answer **one** question)

- 1 This question asks candidates to consider if religious policy had the greatest impact on the relations between England and Spain in the period 1509–1609. An explanation for the quality of the relationship is multi-causal and better answers will be able to demonstrate knowledge and understanding of religious, political and economic influences. Given the nature of the period, it is difficult to disentangle political and religious motivation. The rulers in this period believed that their political position was granted by God, and they were only accountable to God. The rulers felt that they had a role to fulfil for God and hence there is an overlap in religion and society in general. Candidates must be aware of an intensification of rivalry between the powers as the century progressed and their answers should make this apparent. The initial focus should be on religion and its influence should be considered.

(a) Religious influences on Anglo-Spanish relations:

- Henry VIII's divorce from Catherine of Aragon initiated the English Reformation. This was resisted by Charles V, for dynastic reasons, and this added religious differences to dynastic and political ones;
- Edward VI's move toward strong Protestantism deepened division;
- A return to Catholicism under Mary I was linked to dynastic union, Mary and Philip. Religious persecution under Mary became associated with a Spanish influence in politics and tainted future relations;
- Philip II saw himself as 'the sword' of the Catholic Reformation while England saw itself as an 'Elect nation'. Both countries believed that they had a divine mission to further God's will and work. After initially limiting Papal action against Elizabeth, Philip supported her excommunication.
- After the English Reformation, and especially in Elizabeth's reign, Englishmen were no longer prepared to accept the papal division of the non-European world. Their privateering was justified as a response to an injustice while Philip saw the privateers as heretics and their activities added insult to injury. Also he had a sense of mission to 'catholicise' the New World;
- England, a Protestant country, sympathised with the Protestant rebels of the northern Netherlands, while Spain, a Catholic country, saw the rebellions as religious revolts and therefore saw English interference as religiously motivated;
- Events in France also had religious dimensions. As the Dutch revolt matured, Calvinism became identified with resistance. Philip feared a France controlled by the Calvinist Huguenots would be anti-Spanish and would intervene in the Netherlands to support their co-religionists. Similarly, Elizabeth was concerned that France led by the Catholic Guise would support Spain and allow Philip to complete the re-conquest of the Netherlands;
- Spanish interference in English internal policies was linked to support for Catholicism and the Catholic champion for the English throne, Mary of Scots.

**(b)** Economic influences on relations:

- Spain's economic weaknesses; poor agriculture, parasitic nobility and church and investment directed towards government bond, was overwhelmed by Philip's foreign policy. The imbalance of payments from within Philip's empire left Castile carrying a heavy tax burden and being dependent on New World bullion. Clashes with English privateers damaged this lifeline and led to a strain in relations;
- England wanted to expand trade by establishing new markets and sources of raw materials and find new homes for a surplus population. It was not content to let Spain have the New World more or less to itself. England was also concerned for the security of its traditional markets in the Netherlands. It was a market for English exports. Antwerp was the European base for the Merchant Adventurers who controlled the vital woollen trade.

**(c)** Political influences on relations:

- The changing dynastic links between the two countries. Henry VIII divorced Catherine of Aragon, the aunt of Charles V, and Elizabeth refused to marry Philip II. Philip meddled in English politics in order to topple Elizabeth, supporting Mary Stuart, the Revolt of the Northern Earls, the Ridolfi and Babington Plots;
- During the course of the century the role of France in shaping Anglo-Spanish relations changed. In the first half of the century France was a common enemy that united the two countries but when France was consumed by the Wars of Religion each side interfered in France to further its own interests and this increased tension. For example, Elizabeth interfered in France with the intention of inducing France to intervene in the Netherlands against Spain. Money was given to the Duke of Anjou and troops were sent to the aid of Henry of Navarre for this purpose;
- Whoever controlled the Netherlands was of interest to England because it was the natural invasion route from the continent. The ports of the Netherlands were only a day's sailing away from England. For such interests of national security, England preferred the Netherlands to be largely self-governing. Spain's increasing military presence from the 1560s posed a threat to national security. Elizabeth's support for the Dutch rebels in the Treaty of Nonsuch (1585) was a trigger for the war between Spain and England. The treaty committed England to sending a force of 6,000 under the Earl of Leicester;
- English privateering raids from Hawkins and Drake in the New World were an attack on Philip's authority and prestige, revealing the vulnerability of his overseas empire and forcing him into costly projects for their defence.

Candidates should conclude that relations were influenced by this range of factors and reach their own conclusion. Religion was a vital element but it may be argued that it was or was not the 'greatest influence'. Arguments must reflect the period and may put different emphasis at different parts of the century and with different monarchs. [50]

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2 This question focuses primarily on the second half of the century. Spain's development of its colonies in the Americas went largely unchallenged until the reign of Elizabeth I and candidates should consider how and why this change occurred. A focus might be on what factors are symptoms rather than causes.

Candidates might consider why little rivalry occurred pre 1560.

- Marital and dynastic links were important in both binding and unravelling Anglo-Spanish relations. Henry VIII's marriage to Catherine of Aragon cemented the Treaty of Medina del Campo. Divorce damaged this link and the products of the marriage and the divorce, Mary and Elizabeth, would influence relations later. Philip's attempts to replace his dead wife Mary I with Elizabeth were rejected and this clash was mirrored in other clashes including the New World. The removal of Papal authority from England undermined the Spanish monopoly of the New World which had been granted by the Pope;
- Early Anglo-Spanish relations were cemented by a common enemy, France. France's descent into the War of Religion removed a threat to both England and Spain and allowed conflict to increase. One symptom of this conflict was a clash in the New World;
- Rebellion in the Netherlands threatened a vital trade for English wool and this worried England. Some English mercantile enterprise switched towards the Americas and hence conflict increased. Elizabeth was more worried about the presence of a large Spanish army in the Netherlands and this threat increased rivalry between England and Spain. English interference in internal Spanish policy undermined Philip and damaged Anglo-Spanish relations;
- The Reformation brought a major redefinition of Anglo-Spanish relations. Philip II saw himself as 'the sword' of the Catholic Reformation while England saw itself as an 'Elect nation'. Both countries believed that they had a divine mission to further God's will and work. Philip II supported the Papal excommunication of Elizabeth. This conflict led Elizabeth to encourage 'privateers' and their actions in the Americas. Religion was a major factor that damaged relations but personal dislike between Elizabeth and Philip heightened conflict;
- The actions of men like Drake and Hawkins enraged Philip especially as their actions damaged the Spanish economy which depended on New World bullion. Spanish domination of the New World antagonised English efforts to develop new markets, resources and homes for surplus population.

Analysis of this question should identify that expansion in the New World was a source of conflict between England and Spain. However, consideration of a range of other factors might suggest that New World rivalry was also a symptom of rivalry and was not the decisive factor. [50]

**Option 1**

**AVAILABLE  
MARKS**

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**50**

## Option 2 CROWN AND PARLIAMENT IN ENGLAND 1603–1702

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

(Answer **one** question)

- 1 The role and status of Parliament changed considerably throughout the course of the seventeenth century. Answers that reach the highest level should consider the ways in which the Constitutional Revolution might be considered the most important turning point in the role and status of Parliament. Having examined this proposition, the best answers will suggest alternative turning points, such as the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1689, the Civil Wars and execution of Charles I, the Restoration Settlement or the reign of William III (c1690–1702). It would be legitimate to argue that no single period might be called a turning point but that the change in the role and status was gradual. Alternatively it may be noted that the 'Whig myth' of an organic, gradual rise of Parliament has been discredited by revisionist and post revisionist historians who have interpreted the change in Parliament's status to be less inevitable than first thought. The seventeenth century should not be seen as a simple victory of Parliament over the king. Candidates might argue that, while the role and status changed throughout the period, it is debatable if the actual prerogative power of Parliament was substantially altered.

**(a) The 'Constitutional Revolution' of 1640–1641.**

It is legitimate to argue that the 'Constitutional Revolution' was the most critical turning point in the seventeenth century. During this period a number of successful attempts were made to impose limits on royal power and secure an increased and more permanent role for Parliament. The Triennial Act and the Act Against Own Dissolution ensured that Parliament was to be called on a more regular basis and should have prevented the monarchy employing personal rule in the future. This 'revolution' saw the abolition of the crown's prerogative financial devices increasing the need for monarchy to rely upon finance from Parliament. The abolition of the prerogative courts helped protect the nobility from the king's abuse of the judicial system.

However, there were limits to what was actually achieved by Parliament in this period. The demand that the appointment of royal ministers should be subject to parliamentary approval was never agreed by the Crown. The Root and Branch petition, that proposed the abolition of the episcopacy, was never implemented. Parliament did not insist on a General election if it was still in session. There was nothing to prevent a monarch from becoming financially independent if his revenues increased due to an expansion of trade. There was no widespread acceptance that the armed forces of the state should be subject to Parliament rather than the King.

**(b) The Execution of Charles I, 1649.**

It is legitimate to argue that England was never the same after the execution of the King in 1649 and that the status of Parliament reached its pinnacle at this point in the seventeenth century as it became the ruling political force in the country. Good candidates will note that the execution of the King was not supported by all of Parliament, noting the significance of Pride's Purge or even how the country had been divided during the Civil War. Furthermore the execution resulted in a period of interregnum rather than the death of monarchy, and the restoration of Charles II in 1660 suggests that the change in the role and status of Parliament was only temporary. Some historians have argued that, although the execution did not result in major long term changes to the status of monarchy, the concept of a parliament standing against an unjust, unpopular monarch re-emerges in the events of the Glorious Revolution.

**(c) The Restoration Settlement 1660–c.1665.**

Since King Charles I had been defeated in the Civil War and executed, and his son and heir had been invited back on terms dictated by Parliament, it might be expected that this settlement would mark a significant strengthening in the role and status of Parliament. The Restoration Settlement confirmed all the reforms passed by Parliament up to the end of the 1641 session. The prerogative taxation and courts of Charles I's reign remained illegal and the King could no longer collect taxes without Parliament's consent. The King's permanent revenue was set at a level, £1.2M, which was designed to ensure the need for Parliament to meet and vote additional supply. The Clarendon Code and the later Test Acts reasserted the supremacy of Parliament over the church. Despite this apparent improvement in the position of parliament, the monarchy retained most of its prerogative powers. Charles II's Cavalier Parliament further strengthened his position by making it treason to imprison or restrain the king, censoring the press and passing a weakened Triennial Act. Charles was also able to end his reign in personal rule as a trade explosion and his links with France enabled him to survive financially without having to call Parliament. The strong position of monarchy restored in the settlement of 1660–1665 and enhanced by Charles II during his period of personal rule, 1680–85, shatters the Whig myth of a gradual, inexorable rise in the role and status of Parliament during the seventeenth century.

**(d) The Glorious Revolution and The Revolution Settlement 1688–89.**

Candidates may argue that the most important turning point in the changing position of Parliament was the Glorious Revolution. The pro-catholic and absolutist policies of James II resulted in his loss of power and the creation of a joint monarchy. Good answers will examine the changing prerogative power of the monarchy as a result of the new coronation oath, the Bill of Rights, the Mutiny Act, the Toleration Act and the revised financial arrangements. For example in the Bill of Rights of 1689 Parliament insisted that the monarch had to be Protestant. Despite the fact that parliament had played a prominent role in the creation of new monarchs and a new style of monarchy in reality the Crown retained its power and resources. It is arguable that the period does not deserve the title 'revolution' and that little had changed in the role and status of either monarchy or Parliament.

**(e) Changes to the role and status of Parliament during the reign of William III.**

At the end of the century, Parliament asserted itself more decisively in the realm of finance, achieving royal dependence and accountability through the Commission of Accounts and Civil List. The Act of Settlement achieved the independence of the judiciary, determined the religion of the monarch and the succession to the throne and a new Triennial Act established the duration of a Parliament as three years. William's desire to defend his homeland from the expansionism of Louis XIV committed England to a costly war in Europe. He was willing to enter into a partnership with the gentry to ensure a regular supply in return for a regular parliament, with a direct involvement in how subsidies were to be spent. This new style of government gave parliament a permanency that allowed it to become more efficient and effective in its operation. Candidates may note the emergence of political parties rather than factions and the impact this had upon the changing the role and nature of Parliament. By 1700 the Crown was coming under pressure to appoint ministers that could command a majority in the House of Commons although even at this late stage there was no legal obligation to do so and Parliament still had no authority over the appointment of the monarch's ministers.

Parliament also clarified its role in foreign affairs. Parliament was upset when it was not shown the Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1699 and The Act of Settlement of 1701 dictated that the Crown could not go to war in defence of its foreign dominions without parliamentary support. In 1701 William thought it best to ask Parliament's approval for his treaty of Grand Alliance. [50]

- 2 The execution of Charles I, and period of interregnum that followed, suggest that his reign was pivotal in changing the powers and prerogatives of the monarchy. Candidates may argue that the proposition is correct and that the events of his reign were to ensure that monarchy and its relationship with parliament would never be the same again. Whig historians have tended to emphasise the long-term causes of the upheaval of the 1640s, suggesting that the roots of revolution are evident in the reign of James I. They interpret the civil wars and execution as stepping stones on the road to parliamentary democracy – a gradual erosion of the position and status of the monarchy that can be traced throughout the seventeenth century. Revisionists have challenged the simplicity of such an analysis citing the Restoration Settlement as evidence that monarchy remained strong. Candidates may argue that the events of the short reign of James II were more significant in shaping the monarchy. The final decade of the century, under the monarchy of William and Mary, will be analysed for the significant impact it had upon the prerogative powers of the monarchy and the emergence of a new form of government in England.

**(a) Charles I (1625–1649)**

There is little doubt that the reign of Charles I challenged the power and position of the monarchy in England. Two civil wars and the eventual execution of the monarch give evidence of the extent of the breakdown in the relationship between the king and his Parliament. In the early years of his reign Parliament was alienated by the catastrophic failure of his foreign policy, engineered by the Duke of Buckingham, and by his use of forced loans. The Petition of Right, 1628, demonstrates the extent to which the relationship was strained although the document itself did not seek to change the prerogative power of the king. Charles's refusal to call parliament for eleven years under Personal Rule was to have an important impact upon their relationship. His abuse of his prerogative financial devices, Laudian changes to the church and the closed nature of his court all contributed to gentry perceptions of Catholicism and absolutism.

The period 1640–1642 witnessed substantial losses for the monarchy. Parliament made inroads into the royal prerogative of appointing and retaining ministers when Laud and Strafford were impeached by Parliament and Strafford was executed by Act of Attainder. The Commons took more control over the Church when it declared that Convocation had no power to bind clergy or laity without the consent of Parliament, by the abolition of the Court of High Commission and when Bishops were excluded from the House of Lords. Royal powers to call, prorogue and dissolve parliament were weakened by the act which declared that the Long Parliament could not be dissolved without its own consent and by the Triennial Act which made arrangements for a General Election if a Parliament had not been in session for three years. Parliament's powers in public finance were displayed in legislation concerning Tunnage and Poundage and Ship Money that effectively prohibited the raising of revenue without Parliament's consent. Parliament also increased its power over the judiciary by the abolition of the Star Chamber and other prerogative courts.

However, there were limits to what was achieved in each of these areas and it is highly debatable that the period deserves its Whig title of a 'Constitutional Revolution'. Many of the reforms pushed through by John Pym in the Grand Remonstrance and Nineteen Propositions never made the statute books and the Crown retained many of its most important prerogative powers. Candidates may analyse the significance of the conflict between Crown and parliament in the two civil wars of the 1640s and the significance of the defeat of monarchy on the battlefield.

It could be argued that the execution of Charles I represented the ultimate victory of Parliament and a telling blow to the power and prerogatives of the Crown. However, Charles was not executed by the Long Parliament but by the Rump and the restoration of his son to the throne in 1660 suggests that it was an attack upon the person of Charles rather than the institution of monarchy or at least that parliament was unable to find a workable settlement without the involvement of monarchy.

**(b) James I (1603–1625)**

Although James I clashed with parliament during his reign, usually over his financial and foreign policies, the early decades of the seventeenth century are more marked for co-operation and conciliation than conflict. James certainly called parliament more readily than his predecessors although he was quite prepared to dissolve it when necessary, as is evident with the Addled Parliament of 1614. James did face a legal challenge by John Bate over his use of impositions to raise funds although the court found for the king and, if anything, the incident strengthened the monarch's prerogative power. By the end of his reign the outbreak of the Thirty Years War in Europe had strained relations with his gentry and he faced criticism from Puritan MPs for his failure to take leadership of the Protestant Alliance. He also clashed with his later parliaments over his financial policies, notably monopolies, and it is valid to argue that, while prerogative powers had not been weakened during his reign, the relationship with parliament had.

**(c) Charles II (1660–1685)**

The restoration of Charles II in 1660 is significant for the remarkable lack of restrictions that were placed upon the Crown. Charles inherited virtually the same powers as his father although the reforms of the 'Constitutional Revolution' remained in place. Despite losing the rights to prerogative taxation and prerogative courts, Charles retained most of the key monarchical powers. He was able to call, prorogue and dissolve Parliament, suspend or veto legislation and dispense individuals from the law. He still chose his own ministers, retained sole responsibility for foreign policy and remained Head of the Church. Given that his father had been executed and he had spent his formative years in exile, it was a remarkable comeback. Candidates should note that the Restoration Settlement did not just not weaken monarchy, it arguably strengthened it. His loyal Cavalier Parliament passed a series of censorial and protective Bills that lessened the likelihood of Charles facing opposition like his father. The Triennial Act of 1664 weakened the Act of 1641 stating that Charles only 'ought' to call parliament, a fact he was to exploit in the final years of his reign. The Militia Act reasserted the Crown's sole right to control the armed forces, further securing its position. The power and stability of the monarchy was further enhanced by the alliance of gentry, Crown and the church created by the Clarendon Code, even if it actually undermined Charles's own preference for religious toleration. Candidates may note that, while Whig historians generally dismissed Charles II as a monarch of little substance, more recent writings have acknowledged his skill in protecting the



divine right of monarchy during the Exclusion Crisis, and the steps he took to strengthen the Crown's position under his period of personal rule, 1680–85. By crushing the Whigs and creating an alliance with the Tories, he left his brother James a stronger and more stable throne than he himself inherited. Candidates may note the huge expansion in trade and the accompanying benefits for the Crown in customs duties. This, along with the subsidies from Louis XIV, resulted in Charles enjoying a position of financial strength superior to his predecessors and enabled him to rule without having to call parliament. Of course, the outbreak of war would necessitate a parliamentary recall and the Crown's financial independence was limited. The reign of Charles II, therefore, did not weaken the powers and prerogatives of the monarchy, indeed it could be argued that it strengthened them. He left a strong throne to his brother, James, although his Declarations of Indulgence and links with Louis XIV's France had aroused fears and suspicions of Catholicism and absolutism that were to come to a head in the Glorious Revolution.

**(d) James II (1685–88/9)**

James II's desire to secure religious and political toleration for Catholics was misinterpreted as an attempt to forcibly convert England and create an absolutist monarchy comparable to the one in France. His suspension of the Test and Corporation Acts was perceived by his loyal Tory supporters to be an attack on the Anglican Church. His subsequent wooing of the Dissenters, in a misguided attempt to secure toleration for Catholics, only succeeded in uniting his opponents against him. While the prerogatives of the monarchy were not directly changed by the events of James II's reign, it was his abuse of these powers that led to the Glorious Revolution and the creation of a new settlement between king and parliament. His establishment of the Court of Ecclesiastical Commission and Declarations of Indulgence ensured that parliament would take steps to ensure a protestant monarchy and strong Church of England. His dispensing of Catholics from the Test Act to allow their promotion to positions of influence, particularly in the Standing Army, alarmed his opponents and would be tackled by the Bill of Rights.

**(e) William and Mary (1689–1702)**

The Glorious Revolution represented a significant change to the power and position of monarchy. The invite to William and Mary to replace James II and become joint monarchs of England challenged the very concept of the divine right of kings. The new Coronation Oath and the agreed Bill of Rights signalled a new relationship between Crown and parliament. The Crown's dispensing power and abuse of legal proceedings was ended. Taxes were not to be levied nor a standing army called without parliamentary consent. Parliament gained the right of petition and free elections. Good candidates will note that while this might represent a revolution in the personnel of monarchy it was not a revolution in its powers and prerogatives. The Bill of Rights required William and Mary to recognise the existing rights of parliament rather than to give up any of their actual powers. It was designed to rectify the abuses of the reign of James II and, arguably, his brother Charles. William and Mary agreed to the terms of their coronation rather than having them imposed upon them. Indeed it was William who insisted on the creation of a joint monarchy.

The real changes to the powers and prerogatives came in the final decade of the seventeenth century and were a result of the 'King's War' that William III was to lead England into. A revised Triennial Act of 1694 limited the royal power of dissolution and ensured the regular calling of Parliament. William's

need for subsidies, to fund his war in Europe, enabled the establishment of a Commission of Accounts and a Civil List that allowed parliament a degree of control over how the king spent his income. By servicing the Crown's National Debt, with the newly founded Bank of England, Parliament became an essential and permanent institution of government. The Act of Settlement, 1701, determined the religion of the monarch and ensured a protestant succession.

There is no doubt that the reigns of William and Mary saw the creation of a new form of government in the partnership between king and parliament. Good candidates may note that James I had enjoyed a similar working relationship with his parliament at the outset of the century and that although the prerogative position of the monarchy had changed it was arguably not substantially different. The Crown retained the right to choose ministers and judges, to determine foreign policy and to call, dissolve and prorogue parliament. It could even be argued that the increased financial strength of the monarchy allowed by the Civil List and Bank of England actually meant the Crown was, in some respects, stronger than ever before. It was this financial foundation that was to enable English success in the War of the Spanish Succession that was to follow. Most historians, though, would recognise the reigns of William and Mary as being of crucial significance in changing the power and position of both monarchy and parliament. [50]

**Option 2**

**AVAILABLE  
MARKS**

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**50**

### Option 3 LIBERALISM AND NATIONALISM IN EUROPE 1815–1914

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

(Answer **one** question)

- 1 It is to be expected that some answers will deal with the difficulties faced by liberalism in the early part of the 19th century, including its defeat in 1848, but will point out that as the period continued liberal gains increased, with wider franchises and clear progress towards 20th century democracy. The best answers, however, will recognise that liberalism had different facets, including the economic one, will note the middle class nature of much classical liberalism, and will trace highs and lows across the period in question, probably arriving at a conclusion which agrees with the proposition.

In 1815 liberal hopes, raised during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, were largely disappointed. The modest gains which had been achieved were largely wiped out as vindictive and reactionary ancien regime rulers were restored and the middle classes found that the career open to talent was blocked. Each of the states in the German Confederation was supposed to have a constitution, but only in the south west, particularly in Baden, was this meaningfully realised. In ensuing years Metternich, especially once Alexander I had abandoned his flirtation with liberalism, managed an anti-revolutionary system which established harsh censorship within the Habsburg territories and sent Austrian armies to quell uprisings in Italy, allowed the French to overthrow a newly appointed liberal government in Spain, and leaned on the Diet to pass the Carlsbad Decrees and Six Acts, both of which limited academic freedom throughout Germany. In France Charles X ignored the spirit of the Charter to attempt a partial restoration of the ancien regime, while his successor, Louis Philippe, began with liberal intentions, but was happy to utilise censorship, and proved unwilling to acknowledge the growth of the bourgeoisie which was his main support by offering even a modest extension of the franchise.

Yet the picture was not entirely bleak for the liberals. For all their failings, the 1814 and 1830 Charters gave France the most liberal form of government in continental Europe, while French influence continued to permeate into the relatively liberal south west of the German Confederation. During the later 1820s and 1830s a series of political and social reforms moved Britain down a liberal path. The economic dimension of liberalism, in the shape of free trade, made gains in Britain under Huskisson and later Peel, while the Prussian *Zollverein* saw a reduction in tariffs and a resultant expansion of trade throughout the northern half of Germany.

But 1848 was to be a year of disillusion for liberals. Seeking extended personal and political freedoms, alongside representative government, their initial surge to power proved fleeting. Untried in government, with a corresponding lack of political guile, they were not only outwitted by the old rulers, but also revealed a caution born of a fear of democracy which divided them from their temporary radical allies and condemned them to eventual defeat. Hopes for the Prussian Constitution were high until the three tier voting system limited its effectiveness, and only the Piedmontese Statuto remained standing amid the wreckage of liberal hopes.

The years after 1850 will be seen as a more fruitful time for liberalism, although the best answers will recognise the “inconsistency” referred to in the question. In Italy Piedmont became a prosperous liberal state which was nonetheless a solitary beacon of hope in the peninsula, while the Bach era represented a return to authoritarian rule in the Habsburg dominions. Napoleon III imposed “order first” in France, and Manteuffel went out of his way to sideline the liberal middle classes in Prussia, before Bismarck rode roughshod over the tax protests of

parliament in order to fund army reform. Against that the survival instinct of a number of rulers led them to see the value of concessions. Napoleon III at last offered "liberty later" with his "Liberal Empire", while Piedmontese institutions were extended across Italy after unification. In Russia Alexander II reformed the penal code and introduced a new level of local government, but held back from the vital liberal demand for a national parliament. His emancipation of the serfs could also be read as an economic reform in line with a liberal belief in the free market, which elsewhere in Europe was continuing apace, with the reduction of tariffs and reciprocal trade treaties between different states.

Liberals were gaining more experience and displaying a more resilient approach. Cavour, a classical 19th century liberal, modernised Piedmont and spearheaded an Italian process of unification which extended Piedmontese hegemony and values across Italy. In France Thiers, a veteran liberal, successfully fought off serious attempts from both Left and Right to overthrow the newly established French Third Republic. In Germany the majority of liberals performed a volte face to ally in government with their former enemy Bismarck. When the Ausgleich made concessions to constitutional demands in the Habsburg Empire, it seemed that liberal values were steadily sweeping from west to east across Europe.

Yet despite the growth in personal freedoms and, apparently, responsible government, there were setbacks as well. The German National liberals put their principles to one side to back the anti-Catholic Falk laws, and only saved themselves from electoral annihilation in 1878 by belatedly agreeing to support anti-socialist legislation. They had scant thanks from Bismarck, who dropped his alliance with them to pursue a return to protectionism. This ran counter to the liberal belief in free markets, and matters were made worse as other countries were alarmed by the late century depression into abandoning free trade. Freedom of property also came under attack as governments began introducing embryonic welfare reforms which similarly could be seen as an assault on the principle of the individual's freedom to enjoy his property rights. In France, although the republic survived, the divisions revealed by the Boulanger and Dreyfus affairs suggested a considerable body of opinion which hankered after a more authoritarian form of government. In Austria the Emperor accrued increasing powers as the 20th century dawned, while in Russia the reign of Alexander III had been viciously repressive, and even after the 1905 revolution had led to the calling of a Duma, Nicholas II tinkered with the electoral system until he achieved a docile parliament he found acceptable.

The paradox that authoritarianism was not yet dead despite the adoption of many liberal demands is well illustrated in the German Empire, where a Reichstag, universally elected, had a Social Democratic majority by 1914 yet was largely ignored by the government. In addition, the original bourgeois and individualist complexion of liberalism was under threat with the rise of left wing, collectivist ideologies.

Candidates who recognise the complexities and inconsistencies of liberalism's progress should be well rewarded. Any material not mentioned here, so long as it is relevant and accurate, will receive appropriate credit. [50]

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- 2 It is acceptable to answer this question either by theme, that is by dealing first with “individuals”, then with other factors relevant to the success of nationalism, or in a chronological way.

The Emperor Napoleon, who confederated large areas of Italy and Germany and offered Poland unity again, may be seen as an important individual who helped cultivate the seeds of nationalism. His nephew Napoleon III, who sought to destroy the Vienna Settlement and who was an avowed supporter of Italian freedom, was similarly someone whose accession raised nationalist hopes and whose short-lived campaign against Austria in 1859 sparked off the most successful period of the Risorgimento. Although less successful in practical and immediate terms, the Italian writer and would-be revolutionary Mazzini was an individual whose influence far outweighed his practical achievements. Nationalists across the continent, and not only in his native land, were fired by his Utopian vision of a Europe of nations, living in freedom and harmony. Louis Kossuth was another who, despite short-lived success, through his charismatic personality boosted the cause of Magyar nationalism in Britain, the USA and further abroad during his long years of exile.

Candidates will probably deal at greater length with the spectacular achievements of those leaders who brought about the unifications of Italy and Germany in the 1860s. In Italy, Count Camillo Cavour paved the way for unification by making Piedmont a modern and a model state, then securing French help for a successful war against the colonial power, Austria. Tricking the Austrians into a declaration of war, he overcame the precipitate withdrawal of the French thanks to his clandestine links with the influential National Society, which maintained the impetus towards unification of Northern Italy. When Garibaldi seized the South and marched on Rome, Cavour wisely saved the Papacy and outflanked his radical rival by persuading him to hand over all his gains to the House of Savoy. Where Cavour had political nous, Garibaldi had daring and the ability to inspire others. Cavour’s original conception of “Italy” probably omitted the backward South, so Garibaldi’s campaign which began in Sicily was the catalyst for the unification of the whole country, and even after 1860 the inspirational guerrilla leader campaigned and plotted for the inclusion of Venetia and Rome in the Kingdom.

Bismarck, the prime architect of German unification, was similar to Cavour in that his primary interest was in advancing the cause of his own country. In his case he served Prussia and its king, and sought to continue that state’s long history of expansion. Defying a Liberal parliament in order to pay for crucial army reform, his diplomacy proved masterly as he isolated and then overwhelmingly defeated Austria, then tricked France into declaring what was, for them, a disastrous war. Although both Cavour and Bismarck were more devoted to Piedmont and Prussia than they were to the countries they helped to establish, they were ruthless enough to play the nationalist card when it suited, and achieved success partly because they were experienced, practical and determined to stay the course, in contrast to their predecessors von Gagern, Mazzini and Charles Albert. Candidates may point to the contributions of two other individuals who played vital roles in the creation of the German Empire – the Prussian War Minister von Roon, and the Chief of the General Staff von Moltke, without whose reorganisation and command of the army Prussian hegemony over Germany might not have been achieved.

The role played in nationalism’s success by individuals who helped to shape and popularise the ideology through their books, opera, paintings etc. should be referred to. Thus Gioberti sought to unite Italy under the papacy, and the brothers Grimm conjured up memories of Germany’s distant past in their fairy stories. Verdi’s operas were frequently coded cries for freedom from Austrian oppression, while Czech music was particularly rich in nationalist motifs, with Smetana,

Dvorak and Janacek all prominent in the use of folk tunes in their orchestral works. Specific examples should be given.

Aside from the part played by individuals, answers must also consider political, economic and social factors which contributed the success of nationalism. War was a vital catalyst – the failure of the Irish, the Czechs, the Poles, the South Slavs etc. to achieve independence during the period 1815 to 1914 is at least partly due to the comparatively war-free “long nineteenth century”, and it required the cataclysm of the First World War to create conditions in which these nation-states could emerge. Greece, in 1839, Bulgaria (1878) and Albania (1913) all gained their independence after wars against Turkey, while Italian and German unification, and Hungarian self-government all followed a spate of mid-century wars. In addition, the evidence also points to a need for the aspiring nation to obtain help, diplomatic or preferably military, to achieve independence. The Belgians received both sympathy and support from Britain and France, which also, with Russia, offered political and practical help to Greece. Candidates might also allude to the waning powers and consequent inability to retain their territories of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.

Economic factors played their part in the successes of nationalism. Increasing industrialisation meant, especially before 1850, a growing number of bourgeois, literate citizens who were open to nationalist persuasion, while as the century progressed the expanding urban proletariat was subjected to national propaganda which emanated more and more from governments rather than from revolutionary groups. Carried out partly to wean the working classes away from socialism and partly to increase loyalty to the state, such propaganda was, in the light of the rush to join up in 1914, a real, if grim, triumph for nationalism. Much earlier, the spread of the Zollverein across Germany seemed to suggest that economic unity could lead directly to political unity, although the record of non- Prussian Zollverein members in 1866 (overwhelmingly they fought on the Austrian side) does not point in that direction. In addition, trade rivalries which reappeared after 1875 with the resurgence of protectionism are frequently credited with being one of the causes of the First World War.

Any other material which is accurate and pertinent to the question will be given due credit. [50]

**Option 3**

**AVAILABLE MARKS**

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**50**

#### Option 4 UNIONISM AND NATIONALISM IN IRELAND 1800–1900

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

(Answer **one** question)

- 1 This question requires candidates to examine the fortunes of both constitutional and revolutionary nationalism in the period. The two key words in the question can be interpreted as widely as possible. “High expectations” may refer to the optimism of achieving constitutional goals during the eras of O’Connell and Parnell. “Disappointment” may describe some of the outcomes of constitutional and revolutionary activity, though candidates may debate where the balance lies. For example, they may argue that the former experienced a mixture of disappointment and achievement, while for the latter a lack of fulfilment was apparent. **Answers may reflect either a thematic or chronological approach, addressing the fortunes of the two strands of nationalism.**

- (a) **In the period 1800–1850, constitutional nationalists experienced a mixture of high expectations and disappointment.**

In the first twenty years of the 19th century, there was little expectation that Catholic emancipation would be forthcoming, but these expectations were transformed by O’Connell’s leadership in the 1820s. O’Connell’s campaign for emancipation was ground-breaking in its creation of modern day pressure group political activity, and brought its reward when a weak and divided government conceded emancipation in 1829.

The expectation that repeal of the Union would follow in the 1830s proved misplaced, dashed by the hostile vote against repeal in the Commons in 1834.

However, the Lichfield House Compact with the Whigs witnessed a mixture of disappointment and progress over such issues as the promotion of Catholics in the professions, tithe reform, municipal government and the poor law.

When O’Connell again turned to repeal in the 1840s, he raised expectations by resurrecting all the techniques of the emancipation campaign, only to find Peel unyielding. Clontarf, and the Famine, brought total disappointment for O’Connell.

- (b) **1850–1900 witnessed a mixture of expectation and varying degrees of disappointment.**

Between 1850 and 1870 there was little expectation of constitutional progress, especially in the aftermath of the Famine and the death of O’Connell. The formation of the Home Rule Party in 1870 under Isaac Butt created a new era in Irish politics, yet real expectations only materialised with the emergence of Parnell shortly afterwards.

Parnell’s liaison with the Land League in 1879 fulfilled the expectations that constitutional nationalists could make some progress in either political or social issues, and this was confirmed by the Land Act of 1881 and the Arrears Act in 1882.

Expectations for home rule looked favourable by 1885. Parnell had established a tightly disciplined and pledge-bound political machine through the machinery of the Irish National League. There were nearly 80 home rule MPs in the Commons. A rapprochement with the Conservatives under Salisbury resulted in the downfall of the Liberals in 1885, followed briefly by some benevolent reforms in Ireland, such as a land purchase scheme under Ashbourne’s Act. However, Conservative reluctance to endorse home rule

forced Parnell to switch his allegiance to Gladstone, whereupon all expectations were dashed by the defeat of the first Home Rule Bill in 1886 and Parnell's divorce scandal of 1890–1891.

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

- (c) **Revolutionary nationalists certainly experienced nothing but disappointment between 1800 and 1900. Candidates may link their failure to their own expectations for success.**

Revolutionary nationalism in the form of Emmett and Young Ireland failed in their attempts at revolt in 1803 and 1848 respectively. Emmett planned to seize Dublin Castle and other strategic sites in the capital, followed by a largely spontaneous rising throughout the country. His expectations of assistance from France proved unfounded. His subsequent execution, along with 21 others, marked the end of the United Irishmen as a serious revolutionary conspiracy. A government fully informed by a spy network, which responded by an increased military presence in Dublin and suspending habeas corpus easily dealt with the revolutionary expectations of Young Ireland. The military coup planned by the Fenians failed to measure up to the expectations of their leaders. No large city was held long enough for the wider participation of the populace to emerge, and no foreign power – such as USA – intervened to embarrass the British government. Ironically, Fenian failure brought success in another form: Gladstone's determination to take more interest in the Irish question and to "pacify Ireland".

*However, it can be argued that all the failed revolts left a legacy of success. Emmett's oratory inspired Pearse. The Young Irelanders' cultural links encouraged the literary tradition of 1916, while the manner of the failure of the Fenian revolt in 1867 was to influence the planning of the Rising of 1916. In these circumstances, answers may reflect that "disappointment" is too generalised a comment on the efforts of revolutionary nationalism in this period.* [50]

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- 2 **This question requires candidates to discuss the extent to which Ulster and Southern Unionists shared common aims and methods in their determination to defend the Union. Top band answers will embrace a wide range of headings in their analysis, and determine the balance between similarities and differences as they proceed. They may conclude that common features were apparent in some areas, subtle contrasts in others, while clear divergence was apparent elsewhere.**

- (a) **Economic motives provide a common theme in the attitudes of Ulster and Southern Unionists.** Northern Unionists made constant references to the link between their economic prosperity and the maintenance of the Union. Shipbuilding, linen and the ropeworks were testimony to an industrial base which set Ulster apart from the rest of the country. Southern Unionists emphasised the importance of the Union in the preservation of their landed property, especially in the light of land reforms which they perceived as a threat to the ownership of land. The activities of the Land League, the Land Acts of 1870 and 1881, as well as reform to the franchise and local government in 1884 and 1898 respectively, made the landholders of Southern Unionism apprehensive about their security under a home rule parliament.



(b) **Attitudes towards the empire suggest that Unionists had little in common, since Southern Unionists attached more significance to the Empire than their northern counterparts.** This imbalance of focus may be attributed to the *social composition of Southern Unionists*, many of whom – Dunraven, Dufferin and Midleton – served in the empire in both administrative and diplomatic roles.

(c) **Religious considerations occupied the speeches and literature for all Unionists.**

However, there were more religious fears for Ulster Unionists than in the South, explained in part by the geographical distribution of Unionists. Ulster Protestants comprised a population of 890,000 out of 1.25 million, while their southern counterparts made up only 25% of 2.25m population in the remaining three provinces. **Denis Henry** was a unique example of a Catholic Ulster Unionist, while **William Kenny**, who won the **St. Stephen's Green** seat in Dublin in 1892, represented a wider trend in the South and West of Ireland.

(d) **The social structure of Unionism invites comments about contrasts.** Landowners such as **Midleton, de Vesci** and **Lansdowne** dominated the leadership in the South and West. In the north, skilled and unskilled workers in both urban and rural areas supported Ulster Unionism. Leadership was provided by prominent businessmen such as Thomas Sinclair, prominent in the commercial life of Belfast.

(e) **A scrutiny of the methods of the supporters of the Union contributes to the debate over their comparisons or contrasts.**

Northern and Southern Unionists employed constitutional means to preserve the Union. Ulster Unionists used their political connections in the House of Commons, while their Southern colleagues exploited their significant social and political influence in the House of Lords where, by 1886, of **144 peers with Irish interest, 116 owned land in the south and west of Ireland.**

*However, material contrasts emerge in methods.* For Southern Unionists, the production of propaganda, the contesting of elections and the use of political connections at Westminster for lobbying were evident. Answers may comment on the work of such organisations as the **ILPU** and the **Property Defence Association**. While Ulster Unionists organised rallies such as the great **Belfast Convention** of June 1892, they also hinted at the use of force to maintain the Union. Answers may comment on the work of the **Unionist Clubs**, the **Protestant Colonisation Society** and **Young Ulster**.

These contrasts can be explained by the imbalance in the geographical distribution of Unionism in the south and west of Ireland which made a strident approach unwise. However, secure in their majority in Ulster, unionists there could present a more formidable threat to any government wishing to ignore their attachment to the Union. [50]

Option 4

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

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## Option 5 CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES IN EUROPE 1900–2000

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

(Answer **one** question)

- 1 Candidates should select appropriate evidence from Soviet foreign policy in Europe after 1917 to illustrate their responses. Different perspectives influencing it at different times such as ideological, economic, strategic and also pragmatic should be drawn upon.**

Most candidates will probably argue that, while the Soviet Union was in part determined to advance communism, other factors were also important at different times. In such a broad topic, candidates have to be selective with their historical evidence. The following evidence from each phase is therefore only a suggestion as to what could be included.

1917–1924. Lenin's belief that a Soviet Union would act as a catalyst to other nations and the fact that the Soviet Union was the only communist state could be used as the basis for the claim that the Soviet foreign policy was initially dedicated to expansionist aims. Lenin set up the Comintern in 1919 with the goal of trying to spread communism internationally. In this regard it could be argued that foreign policy was indeed motivated by a desire to expand communism. Equally it could be pointed out that Kennan was subsequently to claim that communism was an inherently aggressive and expansionist ideology and there is some evidence for that claim.

However, temporary capitalist intervention from western countries in the Civil War also demonstrated to the Bolsheviks that an isolated USSR was vulnerable and for a Communist regime to survive it would have to ensure its security in the future. Survival rather than any desire to expand communism was the main priority in this phase and in 1922 the Treaty of Rapallo with Weimar Germany showed that the USSR could be pragmatic and work with capitalist states if necessary for survival.

1924–1941. Stalin continued the more inward looking policies of Lenin and concentrated upon the economic reconstruction of the USSR. The policy of "Socialism in One Country" focused partly on industrialisation to develop its ability to increase its levels of rearmament to protect itself from potential attacks by capitalist states. By 1933 with the rise to power of Hitler the USSR recognised the potential threat of Nazism. In 1934 the USSR joined the League of Nations to try to co-operate with capitalist states such as the UK and France to achieve collective security. Self-preservation was the clear motive. The involvement with the Spanish Civil War was limited in character and may indeed be viewed as a piece of opportunism by Stalin rather than evidence of a desire to advance communism. After the Munich Conference in 1938 the USSR gradually realised that the West could not be relied upon and in 1939 it agreed the Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact with its ideological enemy Nazism.

Such pragmatism revealed that the USSR needed to gain time to rearm more but also partly in the interests of security it would be beneficial to acquire the Baltic states and Eastern Poland as a potential buffer zone against possible attack from the West. The USSR was also able to recover territory lost by the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

1941–1945. In this regard it could be argued that Soviet foreign policy was seeking to advance communism, but more as a defensive measure than any expansionist tendency. The Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941 forced it into a temporary alliance with capitalist states to defeat the forces of Fascism but at

some point during the Second World War Stalin decided that after victory had been achieved the USSR would never again have to depend on others for its own strategic security.

1945–1964. The traditional interpretation of the origins of the Cold War suggests that the USSR occupied the states of Eastern Europe it liberated from Nazi Germany for ideological motives to spread communism. Here is the prime case that the Soviet Union wanted to advance communism wherever possible. Revisionist interpretations suggest that Stalin broke the 1945 Yalta Agreement more for reasons of security and survival. The USSR only narrowly escaped defeat during the Second World War and by 1945 it was near economic ruin. Its security needs led it to seek governments in nearby states which were not anti-Soviet and to ensure that no military threat ever emanated from German soil again. Stalin not only wanted to maintain a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe amongst the People's Democracies through the Cominform in 1947 and Comecon in 1949 but he also wanted to prevent a united capitalist Germany rising up again to threaten the USSR. This represents the background to the disagreements with the West over Germany culminating in the 1948 Berlin crisis. After the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 the USSR was determined to maintain the Iron Curtain. The 1956 Hungarian revolution was crushed to prevent states in Eastern Europe from leaving the alliance.

1964–1982. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 the Brezhnev Doctrine revived the potential influence of ideology in Soviet foreign policy by stressing that the USSR would protect and maintain any states which had become communist. However, other motives also explain Soviet foreign policy in the Brezhnev era. Co-existence with the West through Détente, such as the SALT agreement of 1972, was partly pursued due to the stagnation of the Soviet economy which could not sustain high levels of rearmament, while the 1975 Helsinki Accords were signed by the Soviets to get recognition from the West of the Soviet Bloc for security reasons.

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to the end of Détente and was justified by the Soviets on the ideological grounds of the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine. Equally it could be argued that here was an example of a desire to spread communism or alternatively that it was a defensive move motivated more by insecurity and the threat of Islamic separatism.

1982–1991. Soviet foreign policy was transformed after Gorbachev became the new leader in 1985. He was not prepared to shore up a USSR-dominated structure in Eastern Europe which was failing economically and threatened to bankrupt the USSR itself if it continued to try to match the USA as a military force. In a speech to the United Nations in 1988, Gorbachev had committed himself to ending the Cold War, had renounced the emphasis in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution on trying to export communist doctrine abroad and the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine, and had committed the USSR to disarmament. From 1986 to 1989 he withdrew troops from Afghanistan; in 1987 he reached agreement with President Reagan to destroy all stocks of intermediate nuclear weapons and in 1989 did not intervene to prop up unpopular communist regimes in the former Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev was not interested in spreading communism or maintaining the balance of power in Europe. He wanted to reform communism within the USSR but his policies resulted in the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. [50]

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**2 Answers that reach the higher level should discuss the opponents of Communism over the whole period from 1917 to 1991. Balanced answers must discuss both the 1917–1945 and the 1945–1991 periods and the relative successes or failures in those given timeframes.**

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

1917–1945. Democratic hostility towards the USSR by intervention by western powers during the Civil War was not very successful as the Bolsheviks were victorious. Despite the initial isolation of the USSR at Versailles and the League of Nations, democratic regimes reluctantly accepted the existence of the USSR as the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo with Weimar Germany showed rather than actively attempt to bring down the regime in Moscow.

From 1933 the main threat to the USSR shifted from democratic regimes to Nazi Germany. Hitler made no secret of his loathing of Bolshevism and considered it to be an ideology that had to be destroyed. The invasion of the USSR would bring the territorial expansion needed to gain living space for the German people, and regions of eastern Europe would provide many of the raw materials needed for Germany to gain self-sufficiency. Fascist opposition developed with the Anti-Comintern pacts in 1936 between Germany and Japan and in 1937 when Italy under Mussolini joined. The 1939 Nazi–Soviet pact failed to prevent the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941 which was an attempt to try to destroy the communist state by force. This led to Stalin joining forces with the democratic regimes in a marriage of convenience to defeat the Axis powers, which ultimately failed to destroy the USSR. Towards the end of the Second World War the democratic regimes were unable to prevent Stalin from liberating countries in Eastern Europe from Hitler.

Thus on balance it could be argued that, even though the forces of opposition were able to contain communism, they did little to destroy it, despite the loss of life the Soviets experienced. Indeed, it could be argued that three decades after its creation the Soviet Union and communism was stronger than it had ever been.

1945–1991. Democratic governments soon distrusted Stalin as he broke the 1945 Yalta Agreement and did not allow free elections in the states of Eastern Europe.

The creation of a Soviet satellite empire behind an iron curtain led the capitalist democratic western powers to adopt a policy of containment of communism as the Cold War escalated. The Domino theory now appeared – if one state falls under Soviet influence its neighbour will not be far behind. The 1947 Truman Doctrine illustrated America's determination to contain the spread of communism in Western Europe and the Marshall Plan of 1947 gave vital economic aid to democratic states in Western Europe to produce stable economies and thus reduce the chances of internal communist revolutions. The Berlin Airlift in 1948 prevented Stalin taking the whole of Berlin and the formation of NATO in 1949 showed that the West was determined to contain communism to Eastern Europe.

The West was not prepared to intervene in the Soviet sphere of influence behind the iron curtain in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968 when the Soviets invaded. The acceptance of Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence was acknowledged in the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The era of Détente came to an end when Reagan and Thatcher denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1989 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 were primarily due to the policies of Gorbachev who was not prepared to engage in an expensive arms race with NATO led by Reagan. Despite the fears of many, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were essentially defensive alliances and neither was planning a surprise attack on the other, which would almost certainly have escalated into mutual nuclear destruction.

The West won the Cold War because the USSR withered away. In the long term the policy of containment was relatively successful. Had it not been for the arms race, the USSR might have survived. Gorbachev believed that it could not continue to devote so much of its economy to the military. As the USSR collapsed when opposed by democratic regimes rather than when opposed by Fascist regimes, most candidates will probably be in broad agreement with the statement but each answer should be judged on its own merits by the quality of the argument presented.

[50]

**Option 5**

**Total**

**AVAILABLE  
MARKS**

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