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History
Paper 2Q (AS) Additional Specimen Question
Paper
Question 01 Student 1
Specimen Answer and Commentary

## Specimen Answer plus commentary

The following student response is intended to illustrate approaches to assessment. This response has not been completed under timed examination conditions. It is not intended to be viewed as a 'model' answer and the marking has not been subject to the usual standardisation process.

## Paper 2Q (AS): Additional Specimen question paper

**01** With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, which of these two sources is more valuable in explaining Truman's decision to introduce the Truman Doctrine?

[25 marks]

## Student response

Source A is a speech made by the US Secretary of Defence, and previously Secretary of State, George Marshall after he won the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1953. Marshall criticises the decisions made by the US government concerning foreign policy, and most significantly the reduction of the army, which occurred between 1945 and 1950. Marshall's speech has a cautious and wary tone, and is contemplative of previous events that threatened the defeat of the US, for example the Korean War. Marshall is receptive to the difficult place of the US and the 'hazardous world situation', yet he makes clear that the presence of a strong army will help to maintain world peace, along with the strength of 'Allied cohesion'. Marshall was in a very high position of trust and authority, therefore his source is valuable as he has first hand experience in the dealings of war and military strength. Marshall refers to his responsibility of rebuilding the national military strength, described as his 'duty', before the Second World War in 1939, and the Korean War in 1950, so consequently he understand the importance of a strong military presence, which forms the body of his argument for encouraging the US government and policy makers to continue the American military power. This acts as a pressing warning due to Marshall referencing previous historical events, which he believes that we should learn from and move forward.

Marshall was the organiser of the Marshall Plan, created in June 1947 as a means of preventing the fall of countries to Communism by providing financial aid. It allowed those who were devastated by World War Two to rebuild their country and stimulate the economy. The Plan was a success as it gave \$17 billion in aid, which led to significant improvements in the reconstruction of cities, therefore allowing industry to flow. Between 1948 and 1952 there was the fastest period of growth in European history as industrial production rose to 35%. However the plan deepened the divisions between Eastern and Western Europe due to the Soviets rejecting the plan. However Marshall believed that this aid should be back up by a military force as it displayed strength and power, and it could also be used if there was a need to intervene. However there is evidence to suggest that there was not a need for this 'vast power'. The Truman Doctrine promoted the use of force as a possibility not a definite as the assistance was given 'primarily through economic and financial aid'. Therefore this highlights that there isn't as larger need for an extensive American force due to the changes in warfare and the creation of the UN. Technology had become much more advanced since the beginning of the Second World War due to the creation and use of nuclear weapons. The threat alone posed by nuclear power, and the fact that the US had been proven to act with them, shifted the focus from vast armies to an effective and conventional number of troops. The creation of the UN was established to encourage peace through discussion and 'Allied cohesion', thus not requiring the necessity of a mass US military power. The UN formed a body of countries that discussed foreign affairs in order to decide the most effective outcome, hence emphasised the use of violence and force when it was only vitally necessary.

Source B is a section of George Kennan's 8000 word 'Long Telegram'. Kennan was the deputy chief to the US mission in Moscow, and was viewed as an expert on the matter of Communism. The classified telegram was sent from Kennan to Byrnes in February 1946 and outlined the Soviet position based on their thinking and intention. Kennan also explained the response that he believed the US should have in order to contain the threat of Communism; respond with 'strong resistance'. The tone of the source is highly alarmist and antagonistic as it states that the Soviets are 'impervious to the logic of reason', therefore will not cooperate with peaceful approaches, so action must take place. Kennan also suggests that there is strategy to how the USSR are thinking, with a long term goal to achieve the fall of Capitalism to be reached in an exploiting and opportunistic manner. The base of American policy towards the USSR (and Communism) is said to be founded upon the principles of Kennan's Long Telegram as the US policy of Containment was largely based on the USSR being 'highly sensitive to the logic of force' and inherently expansionist. This highlights a aggressive and strong presence against the Soviets, as Kennan believes that they will back down to any show of force. Furthermore, Kennan advocates the readers to agree with this use of force as the only way to successfully contain the Soviet Union and the threat of Communism. Kennan does this by portraying the USSR in a very menacing manner as they come across as being sneaky and a hidden threat, which needs to be stopped. Kennan's own anti-communist views and ideas can be seen in the Truman Doctrine as Truman shared the same approach, therefore Source B is valuable in explaining why Truman introduced the Truman Doctrine because Kennan and Truman agreed on policy and approach.

Concerning the context of this time, Stalin made a speech on the 9th February where he declared that the continuing existence of capitalism and imperialism was to be the reasoning behind future wars. Here Stalin publically condemned the approach of Capitalism, but also created the impression that he was war-mongering due to him describing future wars as 'inevitable', which suggests that the USSR was willing to fight. Kennan provides a response to this threat by imploring the use of force in order to ensure that the USSR will 'easily withdraw', hence the use of force is needed. Additionally, Kennan adds that this war-mongering attitude may be as a result of Stalin's reasonable suspicion of the US and their aims due to the dropping of the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki without any prior warning or discussion, proving that the US will take extensive action if it was felt to be needed. Moreover, Kennan explains another origin of Stalin's suspicion and insecurity to be the invasion from Germany showing that they are still 'by far the weaker force' and susceptible of attack from not only America, but smaller and closer countries within Europe. Kennan signifies this weakness of the USSR in order to stir patriotism about the advanced US, thus gaining more support for his cause one the telegram was published a year later. The US had the advantage of nuclear weapons and economic power making the USSR limited to how they could attack as the US had the upper hand, and the initial threat of the nuclear weapons could have acted as a large enough deterrent. Kennan believed that a pre-emptive strike was key to the downfall of Communism, which is where he later clashed with Acheson and Truman. Kennan had no boundaries in how to deal with Communism, as he strongly believed that military force and action was the only effective way of containing Communism with as much 'cohesion, firmness and vigour which the Western World can muster'. Kennan criticised the approach of Truman and Acheson as being too lenient and not employing as much force as needed, therefore the valuable nature of the source can only be applied to a certain extent due to the clashing beliefs of Kennan and his opinion of the execution of Containment and the Truman doctrine.

To conclude Source B is more valuable in explaining Truman's decision to introduce the Truman Doctrine and the policy of Containment as it summarises the attitude that Truman had towards the

USSR, which then was made apparent in his doctrine. Kennan and his Long Telegram are to be known as the foundations of the American policy for the following 25 years, and Kennan himself was accredited to be the originator of Containment. Contrasting Source B, Source A is less valuable in explaining Truman's decision to introduce the Truman Doctrine as it focuses more on the aspect of force, and not the policy as a whole, also the view presented in Source A (though valid), is contradictory to that of Truman and his doctrine which focused more on the significance of economic power, nuclear weapons, and strategic alliances, all of which Kennan encouraged and Truman followed.

## Commentary - Level 5

This is a very strong response with excellent understanding of the arguments of the two sources and carefully selected deployment of knowledge of context to challenge and corroborate these. There could have been slightly more development of the provenance of the sources and their tone, but this is a Level 5 response.