

History

Answers and commentaries

A-level (7042)

2K International Relations and Global Conflict, c1890 — 1941

Marked answers from students for questions from the June 2022 exams. Supporting commentary is provided to help you understand how marks are awarded and how students can improve performance.

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Answers and commentaries

Please note that these responses have been reproduced exactly as they were written by the student.

This resource is to be used alongside the A-level History Component 2K International Relations and Global Conflict, c1890-1941 June 2022 Question paper and inserts.

Question 1

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying Italy's entry into the First World War in 1915.

[30 marks]

Mark scheme

- L5:** Shows a very good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with a strong awareness of the historical context to present a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. The answer will convey a substantiated judgement. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context. **25-30**
- L4:** Shows a good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with an awareness of the historical context to provide a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. Judgements may, however, be partial or limited in substantiation. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context. **19-24**
- L3:** Shows some understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance together with some awareness of the historical context. There may, however, be some imbalance in the degree of breadth and depth of comment offered on all three sources and the analysis may not be fully convincing. The answer will make some attempt to consider the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates an understanding of context. **13-18**
- L2:** The answer will be partial. It may, for example, provide some comment on the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question but only address one or two of the sources, or focus exclusively on content (or provenance), or it may consider all three sources but fail to address the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates some understanding of context. **7-12**

A-LEVEL HISTORY – 7042/2K – ANSWERS AND COMMENTARIES

L1: The answer will offer some comment on the value of at least one source in relation to the purpose given in the question but the response will be limited and may be partially inaccurate. Comments are likely to be unsupported, vague or generalist. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context. **1-6**

Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Student responses

Response A

Source A is a factual retelling of the events of the ~~great~~ ^{Great} war, written by American historians during the ~~great~~ Great war. This proves the source's utility and value, as the tone of the source is not led to be subjective, but rather factual, as America had little involvement in Italy's relations with Austria-Hungary ~~or~~ the allies. The fact that this was written a year following the described event speaks well for value as it is not an emotional or blinded account due to the influence of recent events, but it ~~is~~ is also a limitation, as this is far too recent for a historical account - the historians are still writing within war time and have yet to see Italy's actions play out to give hindsight into the motivations for their entry into the war following their past neutrality. The source is further useful however, when considering its factual tone, ~~written~~ ^{when written} by Americans about the allies in 1916 as, despite America still being neutral, they were more opposed to Germany and Austria-Hungary due to its stronger aid given to the allies when supporting both sides and, namely, due ~~to~~ to the sinking of the civilian ship the Lusitania by a German submarine a year prior, which contributed to America joining the war in 1917. The historians here show an admirable lack of bias, which better their utility for modern-day historians.

Within Source A, we can see that the intent of the historians is to inform the public - likely the American public - of the reasoning for Italy's late entry into the war, perhaps even, to aid justifying America joining the war, which they do soon after, although this is merely speculative. The source describes Italy's 'unfortunate position', feeling morally obliged to aid its allies, but split between its alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, the Triple Alliance, versus that of a covert alliance made with Britain in the early 1900s. The source implies that Italy poised its positioning in the war, based on the threat that the Triple Entente posed if they were to be opposed - 'avoid offending the French-English-Russian combination'. This is questionable when considering the utility of the source as, of course, these three major powers were formidable, but at this point during the war, they were yet to have the upper hand ~~in the war effort~~ ~~in the war effort~~ in the war effort, though it is acceptable to say that Italy viewed them as a very clear threat should they be opposed, perhaps more so than Germany and Austria-Hungary, who had less support overall. The source also references the 1915 Treaty of London, in which Italy was promised territory. To counteract the information of the source however, its utility is limited when it implies that Italy prioritised status over economic success in the war, as they did expect these territories

to be delivered, as shown with Italian Discontent in the Treaty of Versailles when they are not. This source is overall valuable as the authors are detached from bias and very factual, but holds minor limitations due to a lack of foresight when speculating on Italian motivations.

Source B is ~~perhaps~~ an official order given out by the Leader of Austria-Hungary, ^{both} Italy's ally and opposition, immediately following their ~~leaders~~ ^{allies} with the allies. Franz Joseph is undeniably subjective on the matter, which both limits and adds utility to his account. On the one hand, the source is limited as it is strongly opposed to the actions taken and to Italy, as seen with the angered and righteous tone taken. On the other, this source is incredibly valuable as it is Austria-Hungary's official stance towards Italy, and it gives context into why Italy sided with the allies, due to its strained relationship with Austria-Hungary. As an immediate account, it is blinded by emotion and impulse, but this ~~is~~ adds to its utility, not as a factual account like source A, but to show Franz Joseph's emotional response in response to this perceived betrayal, and to see how he ~~really~~ delivered this narrative and this ~~was~~ negatively enforced image of Italy as the betrayer and the enemy, to the Austrian people.

Franz Joseph here, ~~is~~ takes a very dramatic and outraged tone, making it clear to his people that, from his perspective, Austria-Hungary had been a good ally and 'fatherly' to Italy, and Italy was clouded by 'ambition' and 'jealous glances' at Austria-Hungary's success. With this being an official order, the message was clearly designed more as propaganda than Franz ~~Joseph's~~ Joseph's outright opinion, which partially limits the source as an individual account. It holds much value however, in seeing how the Emperor utilised this perceived betrayal into further patriotism and vilified the Italians in turn, showing that even through an official order, Franz's own impulses and anger at Italy's actions come through. Joseph implies that Italy's only motivation was only to better its own prestige after viewing Austria-Hungary's own power and wanting to better it. This, of course, was not the case as Germany and the members of the triple entente ~~is~~ had stronger forces and empires than Austria-Hungary, but this does hold value in showing the ego of the Emperor and the Austrian-centred ~~is~~ idealism of the country and how it was governed - being far less helpful in perceiving the real reasons for Italy joining the war, opposed to Austria, apart from the clear spite the Emperor holds for the country. Franz Joseph even implies in the source that Austria-Hungary is doing God's work,

with the foreboding line that 'fate must take its course'. With this imperative, his clear opposition to Italy in response to their involvement in the war is made clear, and we can see him justifying conflict-ridden actions by ^{illusively} taking away Austria-Hungary's choice, as seen prior with the unreasonable ultimatum sent to Serbia in 1914, to justify going to war. Source B is overall very useful in seeing the ~~reasons~~ basic reasons for Italy joining the allies, due to its relationship with Austria-Hungary, but ~~it is~~ it is extremely subjective and is far more useful in interpreting Austrian attitudes to Italy, which is relevant but does not give real information about Italy's entry into the war.

Source C is incredibly valuable as it is a public statement - likely to Italy's public - by the actual Italian Prime Minister, immediately following the declaration. There are considerable limitations of course, as Italy, much like Austria-Hungary, would defer from taking actual blame or admitting to any ^{or unreasonable} negative ~~reasons~~ decisions making when joining the war. Also, with the Triple Entente now as ~~is~~ their allies, Salandra is notably in their favour and opposed very closely to Austria, and thus, the statement would not include some considerations taken, such as the allies being

a threat should Italy oppose them. Considering this, the source is still undeniably valuable, as it very bluntly states that its key motivation for joining the allies, was to oppose Austria-Hungary and its past actions. When Salandra states that 'mediocre statesmen... set fire... to the whole of Europe', he is, of course, referring to the July Crisis which started the First World War, and laying the blame of the crisis with Austria-Hungary. This is useful as it shows that Italy's chosen neutrality on the 2nd of August 1914 wasn't only due to not being ready for conflict, but also because they opposed their allies actions, seeing them as fuelled by 'hatred and blood', much like Franz Joseph does to Italy. Salandra's message and tone vilifies Austria-Hungary, stating that they had been opposed to them since 'the aggression... against Serbia'. This is referencing Austria's attitudes towards the more nationalistic state and the actions taken to try and squash ^{the} Serbian influence of Pan-Slavism in Austrian states, notably seen with the Pig War in 1906-08, where Austria cut off tariffs to Serbia in an attempt to choke their economy. Italian interests ~~had~~ also opposed Austrian action in 1908 with the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, increasing their own power and thus, increasing on Italy's own influence. Source C is overall

valuable therefore, as it shows the resentment built over time which led to Italy's main motivation to join the war effort with the 1915 Treaty of London, to oppose and thwart Austria - Hungary. Salandra purposefully doesn't mention the territories promised to Italy in this treaty, so as to better the wronged narrative of a 'modest citizen' who opposes the 'criminal madness' of Austria in the name of benevolence rather than self-interest, this narrative making the source more valuable to show Italy's righteous perspective and reasoning.

This is a Level 5 response

This is a well-balanced response which shows good understanding of the content and provenance of the sources, and of the wider context, ranging from the events in the Balkans in 1908 to the July crisis and the sinking of the Lusitania. There is a recognition of the limitations of each of the sources, but the value of the source is judged independently of those limitations, showing an awareness of the purpose of the sources and their value for this enquiry. The partisan nature of Sources B and C is well understood, with appropriate reference to the provenance, and the knowledge of context leads to a developed explanation of Italian motives for joining the war in 1915. There are sensible points made about the provenance of A, with good contextual knowledge. The answer demonstrates a good grasp of tone and purpose overall.

Response B

Source A is taken from a six volume set published in 1916, describing the situation in Europe during the start of the war and Italy's position in this.

The source is valuable to a historian studying reasons for Italian entry as it informs us about how 'public opinion was too strong against Austria-Hungary', consequently encouraging Italy to enter the war against the Central Powers. The context of the time is valuable in explaining this as Italy and Austria-Hungary had conflicting expansionist aims in the Balkans. Consequently this therefore proved to be a source of tension and opposition between the two powers, enhancing the source's value. The content of the source is also valuable as it infers that 'support for war, however, gained rapidly in strength' leading to their declaring of war on Austria May 1915 ^{on the side of the} ~~this can be supported~~ Triple Alliance. This can be supported by the fact that the Allies offered Italy its desired territories including Istria and Tyrol encouraging and explaining Italian entry on the side of the Triple Alliance. The central powers did not offer these territories to Italy. The pro

The provenance of the source is very valuable as it provides an overview of Italian reasons for entry from an American perspective. This is valuable as

the US had not joined the war at this time meaning they provide a more objective overview of the reasons for Italian entry. It is also very valuable in delivering the American Opinion on matters. However, the source's value is limited by the fact it does not offer ~~Germany~~ Italy's own personal reasons for entry. The tone of the source is very factual, enhancing its value, as it provides a detailed account of Italian reasons for entry from a neutral and objective perspective, making it more reliable.

Overall, the source is very valuable to a historian studying Italy's entry into WWI as it explores the role of Austria-Hungary in encouraging this. However, the fact it is not presented from Italy themselves, limits its value.

Source B is an official order by Franz Joseph to his army following Italian entry into the war. The source presents the Emperor describing how Italy had ~~abandoned~~ abandoned the Triple Alliance (Germany and Austria) to join the Triple Entente and how now Austria 'yate must take its course'.

The provenance of the source proves very valuable in providing the Austro-Hungarian ^{own} view on Italian entry. The fact that the source was written ~~the~~ immediately after Italian entry perhaps reduces the value of the source. This is because it was written at a time of high emotions, presenting Austria's immediate reaction which could disguise

their true reaction of great anger. The tone of the source is presented through a strong sense of betrayal as their ~~Italy~~ Italy's entry on the ~~Allies~~ Allies side is viewed as 'a breach of faith'. This enhances the source's value as further informs us of the Emperor's disapproval of Italy's actions.

The content of the source is very valuable as it informs us about how Italy joined the war by declaring war against Austria - 'King of Italy has declared war on me'. This can be explained by the Italian and Austrian conflicting territorial aims. The Italian nationalist movement had played a prominent role in encouraging Italian entry against Austria. The movement had dreams of Risorgimento - the resurgence of Italy as a world power. This encouraged territorial expansion which clashed with Austria Hungary. Therefore, the source

Overall, source B is very valuable in highlighting Austria - Hungary's reaction to Italian entry into the war - 'a breach of faith', despite the provenance of the source slightly reducing this.

Source C is ~~written~~ a public statement from the Italian Prime Minister, explaining why Italy joined WWI and providing a response to Austria's view of Italian entry. This is highlighted in the ~~quotation~~ phrase we 'seriously condemned ... the aggression of Austria against Serbia'.

The content of the source is very valuable in explaining how Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia, led to Italian entry into the war. ~~The~~ Italy ~~was~~ believed this action 'set fire last July to the whole of Europe'. The content of the terms agreed under the Triple Alliance is very valuable in explaining this idea. Under the agreement, Italy agreed to only join a defensive war. Therefore, since Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia first, Italy was ~~obligated~~ ~~to~~ not obligated to join the war. This helps explain why they remained neutral initially. However, the source goes on to explain that this is later view as an act of aggression and justifies Italy's later entry on the allies side.

The provenance of the source is very valuable as it is presented for the Italian Prime Minister, who would have played a great role in Italy's entry into war and is well-placed to comment on the matter. The tone of the source is shown through a sense of blame being placed on Austria referring to their 'act of criminal madness' proving valuable in explaining Italian entry. However, the source is limited by the fact it does not offer other ~~overall~~ reasons for Italian entry, such as their expansionist aims.

Overall, source C is very valuable in explaining Italian entry into WWI from their own perspective, despite failing to address how expansionism also motivated their entry.

This is a Level 3 response

All three sources have been understood to a degree and there is an awareness of the relevance of the provenance. The contextual knowledge offered in support is not consistent, but there is an understanding shown, for example the references to Istria, Tyrol, and the Risorgimento. The answer is dependent on extracts from the source content, with the use of over-long quotations. The evaluation of value is not convincing. For example, source A is seen as valuable for giving us an 'American opinion', whilst being criticised for not giving 'Italy's own...reasons for entry'. Even so, it is seen as a 'factual' source. Source B is rightly recognised as showing anger and a sense of betrayal, but this emotion is seen as reducing the value of the source. There is a tendency for the sources to be judged on what they do not say, rather than on an assessment of provenance and content in relation to the issue.

Question 4

To what extent was the self-interest of Britain and France responsible for the failure to resolve the crises over Manchuria and Abyssinia in the years 1931 to 1936?

[25 marks]

Mark scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a very good understanding of the full demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively delivered. The supporting information will be well-selected, specific and precise. It will show a very good understanding of key features, issues and concepts. The answer will be fully analytical with a balanced argument and well-substantiated judgement. **21-25**
- L4:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. It will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment relating to the question. The answer will be well-balanced with some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated. **16-20**
- L3:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information, which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features, but may, however, be unspecific or lack precision of detail. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be a good deal of comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance, but a number of statements may be inadequately supported and generalist. **11-15**
- L2:** The answer is descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way, although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist. **6-10**
- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1-5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Student responses

Response A

The League of Nations' (LON) response to the crises threatening collective security between 1931-36 can be blamed on several factors. The slow response to the 1931 Manchuria crisis and the lack of effective sanctions on Italy following the invasion of Abyssinia all contribute to failed collective responses to ~~these~~ events threatening the stability of international relations. The self interest of both Britain and France during these crises can be put down as a key reason for these failings, but the Great Depression in 1929 and the LON's weakness due to the ~~absence~~^{absence} of key nations such as the USA can also be blamed for the inability to resolve these crises. By analysing these ~~therefore~~ factors, this essay will conclude that self-interest played a larger part in the failure to resolve the Manchuria and Abyssinia crises.

The first area to analyse is the role of self-interest in the failed response to the crises. Japan's invasion of Manchuria was met with slow and ineffective responses from the LON mostly due to the reluctance from Britain to respond. Britain had important trade and commercial interests in China during the 1930s in goods such as tea, and the former Anglo-Japanese alliance discouraged Britain from getting involved. Although France lacked such a pessimistic approach, inaction from Britain limited the LON's response. Self-interest was also seen to prevail in Abyssinia, where the collective fears of Britain and France over Italy

leaving the Stresa Front to join Germany discouraged calls to harshly sanction Italy. Whilst it can be argued that the swift response of the League following the full invasion of Abyssinia in 1936 showed some desire to hold Italy accountable, the League still failed to intervene during the first attempt to invade by Italy due to concerns over German rearmament under Hitler. Ineffective sanctions over coal due to the harm it would have on Britain's coal mining industry also resulted in an inadequate response to Italy's aggression. By the end of 1936 the Stresa Pact had fallen through anyways due to the scandal of the Hoare-Laval pact between British and French ministers, undermining the League completely. Here we can see that self interest undoubtedly played a significant role in the failed response to the crises in 1931-36.

However, there are other factors contributing to the ineffective responses, one of the vital ones being the ^{absence} ~~absence~~ of the USA in the League. The USA's fear of 'entangling alliances' returned them to a policy of isolationism after WWI, despite its role in establishing the League which they never joined. As an economic superpower, even through the effects of the Depression, the USA was a key figure in trade. Their lack of ability to engage in collective security with the League therefore made any embargoes placed on aggressor nations by them ineffective, as they could simply turn to ~~Japan~~ the USA instead. Although the USA did condemn Japan's

invasion of Manchuria in 1932 with the Streissman report, no sanctions against them to force a withdrawal were implemented by the ~~League~~ ~~and~~ the USA nor the League. The USA's export of oil also became a reason for ^{the League's} failure over the sanctions imposed on Italy in 1936, in which oil was not sanctioned due to the USA. This allowed Italian troops to fuel tanks and aircraft, failing to obstruct their military campaign in the East African nation. This evidence therefore allows us to suggest that the USA's absence from the League severely affected its ability to effectively respond to crises affecting international relations in 1931-36.

Thirdly, the impact of the Great Depression largely impacted the LON's ability to respond to the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises. The Depression in 1929 had long lasting effects on the economic position of European nations which forced them to focus on recovery more than international relations. During the Manchurian crisis, Britain lacked the ~~to~~ money to send out peacekeeping troops to ~~at~~ the region contributing to its apathy to respond against Japan. Policies including the Import Duties Act in 1932 ~~and~~ which ended free trade in Britain's market ~~to~~ and the abandonment of the ~~floating~~ gold standard in 1931 to encourage the public to buy locally sourced goods highlighted the focus of Britain as a key player in the LON on recovering from the Depression ~~then~~ rather than international cooperation. Here we

can see the impact of the Depression on the interests of the members of the League - however, it can be argued that the effects contributed to the ~~self~~ prioritisation of self-interest by France and Britain, as opposed to being a stand alone issue. Thus, we can suggest that the Depression's impact on nations contributed to the importance of self-interest with regards to the response to the crisis in Manchuria and Abyssinia.

In conclusion, I would argue that self-interest of France and Britain played a much larger role than other factors ~~for~~ in the failure to resolve the crises between 1931-36. The Depression promoted self-interest between nations, as well as concerns over Germany's rearmament which increased in 1936. Whilst the absence of the USA limited the effectiveness of ~~the~~ proposals and sanctions from the League, their failure to even do so in Manchuria due to self-interest ~~is~~ supersedes this. Therefore it can be argued that France and Britain's self interest played an extensive role in the failure of the League's response to Japanese and Italian aggression in 1931-36.

This is a Level 5 response

The script is focused from the beginning and points towards a balanced argument. The question has been fully understood and there are specific references to the self-interest of Britain and France, both in economic terms and in international diplomacy. The supporting information is well-selected. The essay is balanced with reference to other factors: the weaknesses of the League, and the international economic situation, and so there is good range. The answer shows understanding of the impact of the self-interests of Britain and France within a wider context of a flawed League and a challenging international situation. There is a supported judgement.

Response B

The Manchurian and Abyssinian Crises were signs of a collapse of collective security. These major events saw a rise in fascism in Italy and a rise of the belief of Social Darwinism in Japan, providing a threat to the Allies and other democratic nations.

Firstly, the Manchuria Crisis of 1931 saw Japan invade an area called Manchuria, soon to be called Manchukuo, in Chinese territory. This was a result of Emperor Hirohito (accession in 1929) applying a militaristic foreign policy. Hirohito was a believer in Social Darwinism, meaning that he believes that Japan were the superior race in Asia. Britain and France were reluctant leaders of the League of Nations (proposed in Wilson's 14 Points speech 1918). Britain and France wanted to focus on internal reconstruction as, especially France, they were still recovering from WWI. Their self-interest allowed Japan to invade Manchuria with no consequences, an evident failure of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. The League of Nations eventually sent the Lytton Committee. America wanted to avoid conflict, so tried influencing the Lytton Report to be as less harsh as possible. The Lytton Report was 10 months late and Japan had already taken over Manchuria, evidence that it was the League of Nations' fault to respond quicker to this crisis. The lack of sanctions put on by the League allowed Japan to increase her sphere of influence, arguably showing the League to be weak. This was an evident sign that it wasn't the self-interest of Britain and France that allowed the Manchurian Crisis to occur, but more the failure of the League and the influence of America to prevent conflict with Japan. Consequences of this was that Japan left the League of Nations in 1933, again showing the failure of the League.

Overall, I believe that the failure of the League of Nations was to blame for not resolving the Manchurian Crisis. The void of power in the League was a case of America not being involved, indicating the League to be weak and unable to act. Previous treaties in the 1920's failed to define an act of aggression showing the League to

be ineffective.

Secondly, the Abyssinia Crisis of 1935-36 showed ~~the~~ Mussolini's approach of 'Italia Irredenta' (unredeemed Italy) to be successful. Italy's increase in nationalism post-WWI saw Ben, especially Mussolini, wanting to rebuild aspects of the Roman Empire and to expand into Northern Africa.*

The self-interest of Britain and France is ~~to~~ a factor in the failure of solving the Abyssinian Crisis. Both countries refused to close the Suez Canal, allowing Italy to just go by with no punishments imposed. Britain and France wanted to maintain an alliance with Italy so allowed them to do basically what they like, showing the approach of appeasement. Britain and France also acted away from the League in the Hoare-Laval Pact 1935. This proposed that Britain and France will allow Italy to take $\frac{2}{3}$ of Abyssinia if they retreat immediately. Italy refused and went on to annex Abyssinia as a result of the Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-36). This shows Britain ~~to~~ and France to be independent and shows the failure of them doing so.

On the other hand, the weakness of the League of Nations was also ~~to~~ to blame. After Roosevelt's Bombshell Message of 1933, it emphasised the weakness of the League. ~~Abyssinia~~ The Abyssinian Crisis saw the death of the League. The League's failure into dealing significant sanctions on Italy further emphasised the freedom countries had as there was no power powerful enough to stop them. The Abyssinia Crisis is a consequence of the failures of the League in Manchuria, showing a domino effect of crises in the 1930's. Abyssinia sent a plea to the League of Nations, but they never responded.

However, another factor is the long-term failures of post-war treaties.

Though before 1931, their failures to define acts of aggression and their weakness saw them to be more of a concept rather than put into place. For example, the Geneva Protocol of ~~1924-25~~ 1924-25 banned use of chemical and biological weapons. In Abyssinia Italy used chemical weapons on civilians emphasising the weakness of

post-war treaties and their consequences

Overall, I believe that for Abyssinia Britain and France's reluctance to respond to Italy was the biggest factor in the failure to resolve this crisis as it happened right in front of them.

To summarise, I disagree with the statement. I strongly believe that the lack of American presence was the biggest factor in the crises occurring. Without the financial and global power of America countries like Japan and Italy with extreme views can take over and annex whenever they want as they knew no country was powerful enough to stop them. Failures of the crises led to both Italy and Japan leaving the League of Nations and resulting in an alliance between Italy and Germany, shortly joining the Axis Powers. If America had put itself on the global stage maybe the likelihood of the Axis Powers formation would've decreased. The failure of the League allowed this to occur.

* Mussolini was prepared for a sphere of influence in Northern Africa as he already had bases of troops, for example in Eritrea.

This is a Level 3 response

The script shows that the question has been understood to a degree, and is addressed, although this tends to be through description followed by comment rather than analytically. For example, the opening paragraph is purely descriptive. As a consequence of this the knowledge that the candidate has, which is quite good, is not always deployed effectively. The self-interests of Britain and France are addressed a little more successfully with respect to the Abyssinian crisis, though the awareness of the key issue is not precise, as it lacks comment, for example, on the role of Germany. A judgement is offered, that the absence of the USA was the main factor, but the development of this judgement is limited and there is no examination of the interplay between the factors.

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